diff options
author | Donald Sharp <sharpd@nvidia.com> | 2020-09-09 05:59:18 +0200 |
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committer | Donald Sharp <sharpd@nvidia.com> | 2020-09-21 16:02:20 +0200 |
commit | cae8bc967cf7c93b7924ae4aaa05a99dfe345c78 (patch) | |
tree | c7de335da42ae46a645cecee414b85c8f991f79e /lib/privs.c | |
parent | Merge pull request #7036 from ton31337/fix/do_not_allow_setting_maximum-prefi... (diff) | |
download | frr-cae8bc967cf7c93b7924ae4aaa05a99dfe345c78.tar.xz frr-cae8bc967cf7c93b7924ae4aaa05a99dfe345c78.zip |
*: Remove solaris from FRR
The Solaris code has gone through a deprecation cycle. No-one
has said anything to us and worse of all we don't have any test
systems running Solaris to know if we are making changes that
are breaking on Solaris. Remove it from the system so
we can clean up a bit.
Signed-off-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@nvidia.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/privs.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/privs.c | 297 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 289 deletions
diff --git a/lib/privs.c b/lib/privs.c index dc43b7279..1bb5d059c 100644 --- a/lib/privs.c +++ b/lib/privs.c @@ -37,12 +37,12 @@ DEFINE_MTYPE_STATIC(LIB, PRIVS, "Privilege information") #ifdef HAVE_CAPABILITIES #ifdef HAVE_LCAPS static const bool privs_per_process; /* = false */ -#elif defined(HAVE_SOLARIS_CAPABILITIES) -static const bool privs_per_process = true; -#endif #else static const bool privs_per_process = true; -#endif /* HAVE_CAPABILITIES */ +#endif /* HAVE_LCAPS */ +#else /* HAVE_CAPABILITIES */ +static const bool privs_per_process = true; +#endif #ifdef HAVE_CAPABILITIES @@ -67,11 +67,7 @@ typedef cap_value_t pvalue_t; typedef struct _pset pset_t; typedef cap_t pstorage_t; -#elif defined(HAVE_SOLARIS_CAPABILITIES) -typedef priv_t pvalue_t; -typedef priv_set_t pset_t; -typedef priv_set_t *pstorage_t; -#else /* neither LCAPS nor SOLARIS_CAPABILITIES */ +#else /* no LCAPS */ #error "HAVE_CAPABILITIES defined, but neither LCAPS nor Solaris Capabilties!" #endif /* HAVE_LCAPS */ #endif /* HAVE_CAPABILITIES */ @@ -163,67 +159,7 @@ static struct { { 1, (pvalue_t[]){CAP_FOWNER}, }, -#elif defined(HAVE_SOLARIS_CAPABILITIES) /* HAVE_LCAPS */ - /* Quagga -> Solaris privilege mappings */ - [ZCAP_SETID] = - { - 1, (pvalue_t[]){PRIV_PROC_SETID}, - }, - [ZCAP_BIND] = - { - 1, (pvalue_t[]){PRIV_NET_PRIVADDR}, - }, -/* IP_CONFIG is a subset of NET_CONFIG and is allowed in zones */ -#ifdef PRIV_SYS_IP_CONFIG - [ZCAP_NET_ADMIN] = - { - 1, (pvalue_t[]){PRIV_SYS_IP_CONFIG}, - }, -#else - [ZCAP_NET_ADMIN] = - { - 1, (pvalue_t[]){PRIV_SYS_NET_CONFIG}, - }, -#endif - [ZCAP_NET_RAW] = - { - 2, (pvalue_t[]){PRIV_NET_RAWACCESS, - PRIV_NET_ICMPACCESS}, - }, - [ZCAP_CHROOT] = - { - 1, (pvalue_t[]){PRIV_PROC_CHROOT}, - }, - [ZCAP_NICE] = - { - 1, (pvalue_t[]){PRIV_PROC_PRIOCNTL}, - }, - [ZCAP_PTRACE] = - { - 1, (pvalue_t[]){PRIV_PROC_SESSION}, - }, - [ZCAP_DAC_OVERRIDE] = - { - 5, (pvalue_t[]){PRIV_FILE_DAC_EXECUTE, - PRIV_FILE_DAC_READ, - PRIV_FILE_DAC_SEARCH, - PRIV_FILE_DAC_WRITE, - PRIV_FILE_DAC_SEARCH}, - }, - [ZCAP_READ_SEARCH] = - { - 2, (pvalue_t[]){PRIV_FILE_DAC_SEARCH, - PRIV_FILE_DAC_READ}, - }, - [ZCAP_SYS_ADMIN] = - { - 1, (pvalue_t[]){PRIV_SYS_ADMIN}, - }, - [ZCAP_FOWNER] = - { - 1, (pvalue_t[]){PRIV_FILE_OWNER}, - }, -#endif /* HAVE_SOLARIS_CAPABILITIES */ +#endif /* HAVE_LCAPS */ }; #ifdef HAVE_LCAPS @@ -432,225 +368,8 @@ static void zprivs_caps_terminate(void) cap_free(zprivs_state.caps); } -#elif defined(HAVE_SOLARIS_CAPABILITIES) /* !HAVE_LCAPS */ - -/* Solaris specific capability/privilege methods - * - * Resources: - * - the 'privileges' man page - * - http://cvs.opensolaris.org - * - - * http://blogs.sun.com/roller/page/gbrunett?entry=privilege_enabling_set_id_programs1 - */ - -static pset_t *zprivs_caps_minimal() -{ - pset_t *minimal; - - if ((minimal = priv_str_to_set("basic", ",", NULL)) == NULL) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: couldn't get basic set!\n", __func__); - exit(1); - } - - /* create a minimal privilege set from the basic set */ - (void)priv_delset(minimal, PRIV_PROC_EXEC); - (void)priv_delset(minimal, PRIV_PROC_INFO); - (void)priv_delset(minimal, PRIV_PROC_SESSION); - (void)priv_delset(minimal, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY); - - return minimal; -} - -/* convert zebras privileges to system capabilities */ -static pset_t *zcaps2sys(zebra_capabilities_t *zcaps, int num) -{ - pset_t *syscaps; - int i, j = 0; - - if ((syscaps = priv_allocset()) == NULL) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: could not allocate syscaps!\n", __func__); - exit(1); - } - - priv_emptyset(syscaps); - - for (i = 0; i < num; i++) - for (j = 0; j < cap_map[zcaps[i]].num; j++) - priv_addset(syscaps, cap_map[zcaps[i]].system_caps[j]); - - return syscaps; -} - -/* callback exported to users to RAISE and LOWER effective privileges - * from nothing to the given permitted set and back down - */ -int zprivs_change_caps(zebra_privs_ops_t op) -{ - pset_t *privset; - - /* should be no possibility of being called without valid caps */ - assert(zprivs_state.syscaps_p); - if (!zprivs_state.syscaps_p) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: Eek, missing privileged caps!", __func__); - exit(1); - } - - assert(zprivs_state.caps); - if (!zprivs_state.caps) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: Eek, missing caps!", __func__); - exit(1); - } - - /* to raise: copy original permitted as our working effective set - * to lower: copy regular effective set stored in zprivs_state.caps - */ - if (op == ZPRIVS_RAISE) - privset = zprivs_state.syscaps_p; - else if (op == ZPRIVS_LOWER) - privset = zprivs_state.caps; - else - return -1; - - if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, privset) != 0) - return -1; - - return 0; -} - -/* Retrieve current privilege state, is it RAISED or LOWERED? */ -zebra_privs_current_t zprivs_state_caps(void) -{ - zebra_privs_current_t result; - pset_t *effective; - - if ((effective = priv_allocset()) == NULL) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to get priv_allocset! %s\n", - __func__, safe_strerror(errno)); - return ZPRIVS_UNKNOWN; - } - - if (getppriv(PRIV_EFFECTIVE, effective)) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to get state! %s\n", __func__, - safe_strerror(errno)); - result = ZPRIVS_UNKNOWN; - } else { - if (priv_isequalset(effective, zprivs_state.syscaps_p)) - result = ZPRIVS_RAISED; - else if (priv_isequalset(effective, zprivs_state.caps)) - result = ZPRIVS_LOWERED; - else - result = ZPRIVS_UNKNOWN; - } - - priv_freeset(effective); - return result; -} - -static void zprivs_caps_init(struct zebra_privs_t *zprivs) -{ - pset_t *basic; - pset_t *minimal; - - /* the specified sets */ - zprivs_state.syscaps_p = zcaps2sys(zprivs->caps_p, zprivs->cap_num_p); - zprivs_state.syscaps_i = zcaps2sys(zprivs->caps_i, zprivs->cap_num_i); - - /* nonsensical to have gotten here but not have capabilities */ - if (!zprivs_state.syscaps_p) { - fprintf(stderr, - "%s: capabilities enabled, but no valid capabilities supplied\n", - __func__); - } - - /* We retain the basic set in our permitted set, as Linux has no - * equivalent. The basic set on Linux hence is implicit, always - * there. - */ - if ((basic = priv_str_to_set("basic", ",", NULL)) == NULL) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: couldn't get basic set!\n", __func__); - exit(1); - } - - /* Add the basic set to the permitted set */ - priv_union(basic, zprivs_state.syscaps_p); - priv_freeset(basic); - - /* Hey kernel, we know about privileges! - * this isn't strictly required, use of setppriv should have same effect - */ - if (setpflags(PRIV_AWARE, 1)) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: error setting PRIV_AWARE!, %s\n", __func__, - safe_strerror(errno)); - exit(1); - } - - /* need either valid or empty sets for both p and i.. */ - assert(zprivs_state.syscaps_i && zprivs_state.syscaps_p); - - /* we have caps, we have no need to ever change back the original user - * change real, effective and saved to the specified user. - */ - /* only change uid if we don't have the correct one */ - if ((zprivs_state.zuid) && (zprivs_state.zsuid != zprivs_state.zuid)) { - if (setreuid(zprivs_state.zuid, zprivs_state.zuid)) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: could not setreuid, %s\n", - __func__, safe_strerror(errno)); - exit(1); - } - } - - /* set the permitted set */ - if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, zprivs_state.syscaps_p)) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: error setting permitted set!, %s\n", - __func__, safe_strerror(errno)); - exit(1); - } - - /* set the inheritable set */ - if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, zprivs_state.syscaps_i)) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: error setting inheritable set!, %s\n", - __func__, safe_strerror(errno)); - exit(1); - } - - /* we need a minimal basic set for 'effective', potentially for - * inheritable too */ - minimal = zprivs_caps_minimal(); - - /* now set the effective set with a subset of basic privileges */ - if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, minimal)) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: error setting effective set!, %s\n", - __func__, safe_strerror(errno)); - exit(1); - } - - /* we'll use the minimal set as our working-storage privset */ - zprivs_state.caps = minimal; - - /* set methods for the caller to use */ - zprivs->change = zprivs_change_caps; - zprivs->current_state = zprivs_state_caps; -} - -static void zprivs_caps_terminate(void) -{ - assert(zprivs_state.caps); - - /* clear all capabilities by using working-storage privset */ - setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, zprivs_state.caps); - setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, zprivs_state.caps); - setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, zprivs_state.caps); - - /* free up private state */ - if (zprivs_state.syscaps_p) - priv_freeset(zprivs_state.syscaps_p); - if (zprivs_state.syscaps_i) - priv_freeset(zprivs_state.syscaps_i); - - priv_freeset(zprivs_state.caps); -} -#else /* !HAVE_LCAPS && ! HAVE_SOLARIS_CAPABILITIES */ -#error "Neither Solaris nor Linux capabilities, dazed and confused..." +#else /* !HAVE_LCAPS */ +#error "no Linux capabilities, dazed and confused..." #endif /* HAVE_LCAPS */ #endif /* HAVE_CAPABILITIES */ |