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authorDonald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>2020-04-15 14:56:03 +0200
committerDonald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>2020-04-15 15:01:56 +0200
commitfd3f8e52b673bbf695ded218d3f566826fa1ce3f (patch)
treee02df9aca270a1726f51b05e2a9e59992fd52b49 /zebra/rule_netlink.c
parentMerge pull request #6154 from donaldsharp/check_interface_working (diff)
downloadfrr-fd3f8e52b673bbf695ded218d3f566826fa1ce3f.tar.xz
frr-fd3f8e52b673bbf695ded218d3f566826fa1ce3f.zip
zebra: Modify netlink_request to statisfy coverity
The netlink_request function takes a `struct nlmsghdr *` pointer from a common pattern that we use: struct { struct nlmsghdr n; struct fib_rule_hdr frh; char buf[NL_PKT_BUF_SIZE]; } req; We were calling it `netlink_request(Socket, &req.n)` The problem here is that coverity, rightly so, sees that we access the data after the nlmsghdr in netlink_request and tells us we have an read beyond end of the structure. While we know we haven't mangled anything up here because of manual inspection coverity doesn't have this knowledge implicitly. So let's modify the code call to netlink_request to pass in the void pointer of the req structure itself, cast to the appropriate data structure in the function and do the right thing. Hopefully the coverity SA will be happy and we can move on with our life. Signed-off-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'zebra/rule_netlink.c')
-rw-r--r--zebra/rule_netlink.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/zebra/rule_netlink.c b/zebra/rule_netlink.c
index 07e1902f6..a5a605f27 100644
--- a/zebra/rule_netlink.c
+++ b/zebra/rule_netlink.c
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ static int netlink_request_rules(struct zebra_ns *zns, int family, int type)
req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(struct fib_rule_hdr));
req.frh.family = family;
- return netlink_request(&zns->netlink_cmd, &req.n);
+ return netlink_request(&zns->netlink_cmd, &req);
}
/*