path: root/doc/user/rpki.rst

.. _prefix-origin-validation-using-rpki:

Prefix Origin Validation Using RPKI
===================================

Prefix Origin Validation allows BGP routers to verify if the origin AS of an IP
prefix is legitimate to announce this IP prefix. The required attestation
objects are stored in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (:abbr:`RPKI`).
However, RPKI-enabled routers do not store cryptographic data itself but only
validation information. The validation of the cryptographic data (so called
Route Origin Authorization, or short :abbr:`ROA`, objects) will be performed by
trusted cache servers. The RPKI/RTR protocol defines a standard mechanism to
maintain the exchange of the prefix/origin AS mapping between the cache server
and routers. In combination with a  BGP Prefix Origin Validation scheme a
router is able to verify received BGP updates without suffering from
cryptographic complexity.

The RPKI/RTR protocol is defined in :rfc:`6810` and the validation scheme in
:rfc:`6811`. The current version of Prefix Origin Validation in FRR implements
both RFCs.

For a more detailed but still easy-to-read background, we suggest:

- [Securing-BGP]_
- [Resource-Certification]_

.. _features-of-the-current-implementation:

Features of the Current Implementation
--------------------------------------

In a nutshell, the current implementation provides the following features

- The BGP router can connect to one or more RPKI cache servers to receive
  validated prefix to origin AS mappings. Advanced failover can be implemented
  by server sockets with different preference values.
- If no connection to an RPKI cache server can be established after a
  pre-defined timeout, the router will process routes without prefix origin
  validation. It still will try to establish a connection to an RPKI cache
  server in the background.
- By default, enabling RPKI does not change best path selection. In particular,
  invalid prefixes will still be considered during best path selection.
  However, the router can be configured to ignore all invalid prefixes.
- Route maps can be configured to match a specific RPKI validation state. This
  allows the creation of local policies, which handle BGP routes based on the
  outcome of the Prefix Origin Validation.
- Updates from the RPKI cache servers are directly applied and path selection
  is updated accordingly. (Soft reconfiguration **must** be enabled for this
  to work).


.. _enabling-rpki:

Enabling RPKI
-------------

.. index:: rpki
.. clicmd:: rpki

   This command enables the RPKI configuration mode. Most commands that start
   with *rpki* can only be used in this mode.

   When it is used in a telnet session, leaving of this mode cause rpki to be
   initialized.

   Executing this command alone does not activate prefix validation. You need
   to configure at least one reachable cache server. See section
   :ref:`configuring-rpki-rtr-cache-servers` for configuring a cache server.

.. index:: RPKI and daemons

When first installing FRR with RPKI support from the pre-packaged binaries.
Remember to add ``-M rpki`` to the variable ``bgpd_options`` in
:file:`/etc/frr/daemons` , like so::

   bgpd_options="   -A 127.0.0.1 -M rpki"

instead of the default setting::

   bgpd_options="   -A 127.0.0.1"

Otherwise you will encounter an error when trying to enter RPKI
configuration mode due to the ``rpki`` module not being loaded when the BGP
daemon is initialized.

Examples of the error::

   router(config)# debug rpki
   % [BGP] Unknown command: debug rpki

   router(config)# rpki
   % [BGP] Unknown command: rpki

Note that the RPKI commands will be available in vtysh when running
``find rpki`` regardless of whether the module is loaded.

.. _configuring-rpki-rtr-cache-servers:

Configuring RPKI/RTR Cache Servers
----------------------------------

The following commands are independent of a specific cache server.

.. index:: rpki polling_period (1-3600)
.. clicmd:: rpki polling_period (1-3600)

.. index:: no rpki polling_period
.. clicmd:: no rpki polling_period

   Set the number of seconds the router waits until the router asks the cache
   again for updated data.

   The default value is 300 seconds.

   The following commands configure one or multiple cache servers.

.. index:: rpki cache (A.B.C.D|WORD) PORT [SSH_USERNAME] [SSH_PRIVKEY_PATH] [SSH_PUBKEY_PATH] [KNOWN_HOSTS_PATH] PREFERENCE
.. clicmd:: rpki cache (A.B.C.D|WORD) PORT [SSH_USERNAME] [SSH_PRIVKEY_PATH] [SSH_PUBKEY_PATH] [KNOWN_HOSTS_PATH] PREFERENCE

.. index:: no rpki cache (A.B.C.D|WORD) [PORT] PREFERENCE
.. clicmd:: no rpki cache (A.B.C.D|WORD) [PORT] PREFERENCE

   Add a cache server to the socket. By default, the connection between router
   and cache server is based on plain TCP. Protecting the connection between
   router and cache server by SSH is optional. Deleting a socket removes the
   associated cache server and terminates the existing connection.

   A.B.C.D|WORD
      Address of the cache server.

   PORT
      Port number to connect to the cache server

   SSH_USERNAME
      SSH username to establish an SSH connection to the cache server.


   SSH_PRIVKEY_PATH
      Local path that includes the private key file of the router.


   SSH_PUBKEY_PATH
      Local path that includes the public key file of the router.


   KNOWN_HOSTS_PATH
      Local path that includes the known hosts file. The default value depends
      on the configuration of the operating system environment, usually
      :file:`~/.ssh/known_hosts`.


.. _validating-bgp-updates:

Validating BGP Updates
----------------------

.. index:: match rpki notfound|invalid|valid
.. clicmd:: match rpki notfound|invalid|valid

.. index:: no match rpki notfound|invalid|valid
.. clicmd:: no match rpki notfound|invalid|valid

    Create a clause for a route map to match prefixes with the specified RPKI
    state.

    In the following example, the router prefers valid routes over invalid
    prefixes because invalid routes have a lower local preference.

    .. code-block:: frr

       ! Allow for invalid routes in route selection process
       route bgp 60001
       !
       ! Set local preference of invalid prefixes to 10
       route-map rpki permit 10
        match rpki invalid
        set local-preference 10
       !
       ! Set local preference of valid prefixes to 500
       route-map rpki permit 500
        match rpki valid
        set local-preference 500


.. _debugging:

Debugging
---------

.. index:: debug rpki
.. clicmd:: debug rpki

.. index:: no debug rpki
.. clicmd:: no debug rpki

   Enable or disable debugging output for RPKI.

.. _displaying-rpki:

Displaying RPKI
---------------

.. index:: show rpki prefix-table
.. clicmd:: show rpki prefix-table

   Display all validated prefix to origin AS mappings/records which have been
   received from the cache servers and stored in the router. Based on this data,
   the router validates BGP Updates.

.. index:: show rpki cache-connection
.. clicmd:: show rpki cache-connection

   Display all configured cache servers, whether active or not.

RPKI Configuration Example
--------------------------

.. code-block:: frr

   hostname bgpd1
   password zebra
   ! log stdout
   debug bgp updates
   debug bgp keepalives
   debug rpki
   !
   rpki
    rpki polling_period 1000
    rpki timeout 10
     ! SSH Example:
     rpki cache example.com 22 rtr-ssh ./ssh_key/id_rsa ./ssh_key/id_rsa.pub preference 1
     ! TCP Example:
     rpki cache rpki-validator.realmv6.org 8282 preference 2
     exit
   !
   router bgp 60001
    bgp router-id 141.22.28.223
    network 192.168.0.0/16
    neighbor 123.123.123.0 remote-as 60002
    neighbor 123.123.123.0 route-map rpki in
   !
    address-family ipv6
     neighbor 123.123.123.0 activate
      neighbor 123.123.123.0 route-map rpki in
    exit-address-family
   !
   route-map rpki permit 10
    match rpki invalid
    set local-preference 10
   !
   route-map rpki permit 20
    match rpki notfound
    set local-preference 20
   !
   route-map rpki permit 30
    match rpki valid
    set local-preference 30
   !
   route-map rpki permit 40
   !

.. [Securing-BGP] Geoff Huston, Randy Bush: Securing BGP, In: The Internet Protocol Journal, Volume 14, No. 2, 2011. <http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/ipj_14-2/142_bgp.html>
.. [Resource-Certification] Geoff Huston: Resource Certification, In: The Internet Protocol Journal, Volume 12, No.1, 2009. <http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/ipj_12-1/121_resource.html>