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authorWerner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>1998-04-08 21:49:02 +0200
committerWerner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>1998-04-08 21:49:02 +0200
commit8b10a87908f4d382735a046e7d043ebc250d8d67 (patch)
tree9c4255d5cd84df663f9a7001b7b6277e53cf6e6e
parentNew tests (diff)
downloadgnupg2-8b10a87908f4d382735a046e7d043ebc250d8d67.tar.xz
gnupg2-8b10a87908f4d382735a046e7d043ebc250d8d67.zip
test release
-rw-r--r--NEWS3
-rw-r--r--THANKS1
-rw-r--r--TODO7
-rw-r--r--VERSION2
-rw-r--r--cipher/ChangeLog4
-rw-r--r--cipher/blowfish.c76
-rw-r--r--cipher/cipher.c6
-rw-r--r--cipher/misc.c21
-rw-r--r--g10/ChangeLog20
-rw-r--r--g10/build-packet.c16
-rw-r--r--g10/dsa.c10
-rw-r--r--g10/elg.c14
-rw-r--r--g10/encode.c2
-rw-r--r--g10/free-packet.c40
-rw-r--r--g10/getkey.c102
-rw-r--r--g10/kbnode.c3
-rw-r--r--g10/keydb.h8
-rw-r--r--g10/keyid.c16
-rw-r--r--g10/mainproc.c1
-rw-r--r--g10/packet.h48
-rw-r--r--g10/parse-packet.c28
-rw-r--r--g10/pkclist.c6
-rw-r--r--g10/pubkey-enc.c24
-rw-r--r--g10/ringedit.c96
-rw-r--r--g10/rsa.c16
-rw-r--r--g10/seckey-cert.c29
-rw-r--r--g10/sig-check.c31
-rw-r--r--g10/sign.c26
-rw-r--r--g10/skclist.c15
-rw-r--r--g10/trustdb.c18
-rw-r--r--include/cipher.h1
-rw-r--r--include/errors.h1
-rw-r--r--mpi/ChangeLog4
-rw-r--r--mpi/config.links2
-rw-r--r--util/errors.c1
35 files changed, 297 insertions, 401 deletions
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 2e110e64c..e2861de38 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.15
* CAST5 works (using the PGP's special CFB mode).
+ * Now more PGP 5 compatible.
+
+ * Some new test cases
Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.14
------------------------------------
diff --git a/THANKS b/THANKS
index 6a7845279..cbbf7a3e6 100644
--- a/THANKS
+++ b/THANKS
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ Peter Gutmann pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz
Ralph Gillen gillen@theochem.uni-duesseldorf.de
Thomas Roessler roessler@guug.de
Tomas Fasth tomas.fasth@twinspot.net
+Ulf Möller 3umoelle@informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Walter Koch walterk@ddorf.rhein-ruhr.de
Werner Koch werner.koch@guug.de
Wim Vandeputte bunbun@reptile.rug.ac.be
diff --git a/TODO b/TODO
index 897bb6093..a6d5b59ef 100644
--- a/TODO
+++ b/TODO
@@ -49,12 +49,7 @@
* fix the problems with "\v" in gettext
- * calculation of cechksums for secret keys is wrong. We used a
- the complete chunk length instead of the real number of bits.
- The problme ist that it is how to stay compatible to old
- keys? - Do wee need a kludge to calculate both versions of
- checksums???? (keygen.c, seckey-cert.c)
-
+ * replace getkey.c#enum_secret_keys
diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 160dadac6..ebe5042ff 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -1 +1 @@
-0.2.14a
+0.2.14b
diff --git a/cipher/ChangeLog b/cipher/ChangeLog
index e1bc0b8ec..bc9261b75 100644
--- a/cipher/ChangeLog
+++ b/cipher/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+Wed Apr 8 14:57:11 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+ * misc.c (check_pubkey_algo2): New.
+
Tue Apr 7 18:46:49 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* cipher.c: New
diff --git a/cipher/blowfish.c b/cipher/blowfish.c
index 9e3c2bdcc..466e8da67 100644
--- a/cipher/blowfish.c
+++ b/cipher/blowfish.c
@@ -396,35 +396,17 @@ blowfish_encrypt_block( BLOWFISH_context *bc, byte *outbuf, byte *inbuf )
{
u32 d1, d2;
- #ifdef BIG_ENDIAN_HOST
- d1 = ((u32*)inbuf)[0]; /* fixme: this may not be aligned */
- d2 = ((u32*)inbuf)[1];
- #else
- ((byte*)&d1)[3] = inbuf[0];
- ((byte*)&d1)[2] = inbuf[1];
- ((byte*)&d1)[1] = inbuf[2];
- ((byte*)&d1)[0] = inbuf[3];
- ((byte*)&d2)[3] = inbuf[4];
- ((byte*)&d2)[2] = inbuf[5];
- ((byte*)&d2)[1] = inbuf[6];
- ((byte*)&d2)[0] = inbuf[7];
- #endif
-
+ d1 = inbuf[0] << 24 | inbuf[1] << 16 | inbuf[2] << 8 | inbuf[3];
+ d2 = inbuf[4] << 24 | inbuf[5] << 16 | inbuf[6] << 8 | inbuf[7];
encrypt( bc, &d1, &d2 );
-
- #ifdef BIG_ENDIAN_HOST
- ((u32*)outbuf)[0] = d1;
- ((u32*)outbuf)[1] = d2;
- #else
- outbuf[0] = ((byte*)&d1)[3];
- outbuf[1] = ((byte*)&d1)[2];
- outbuf[2] = ((byte*)&d1)[1];
- outbuf[3] = ((byte*)&d1)[0];
- outbuf[4] = ((byte*)&d2)[3];
- outbuf[5] = ((byte*)&d2)[2];
- outbuf[6] = ((byte*)&d2)[1];
- outbuf[7] = ((byte*)&d2)[0];
- #endif
+ outbuf[0] = (d1 >> 24) & 0xff;
+ outbuf[1] = (d1 >> 16) & 0xff;
+ outbuf[2] = (d1 >> 8) & 0xff;
+ outbuf[3] = d1 & 0xff;
+ outbuf[4] = (d2 >> 24) & 0xff;
+ outbuf[5] = (d2 >> 16) & 0xff;
+ outbuf[6] = (d2 >> 8) & 0xff;
+ outbuf[7] = d2 & 0xff;
}
@@ -433,35 +415,17 @@ blowfish_decrypt_block( BLOWFISH_context *bc, byte *outbuf, byte *inbuf )
{
u32 d1, d2;
- #ifdef BIG_ENDIAN_HOST
- d1 = ((u32*)inbuf)[0]; /* fixme: this may not be aligned */
- d2 = ((u32*)inbuf)[1];
- #else
- ((byte*)&d1)[3] = inbuf[0];
- ((byte*)&d1)[2] = inbuf[1];
- ((byte*)&d1)[1] = inbuf[2];
- ((byte*)&d1)[0] = inbuf[3];
- ((byte*)&d2)[3] = inbuf[4];
- ((byte*)&d2)[2] = inbuf[5];
- ((byte*)&d2)[1] = inbuf[6];
- ((byte*)&d2)[0] = inbuf[7];
- #endif
-
+ d1 = inbuf[0] << 24 | inbuf[1] << 16 | inbuf[2] << 8 | inbuf[3];
+ d2 = inbuf[4] << 24 | inbuf[5] << 16 | inbuf[6] << 8 | inbuf[7];
decrypt( bc, &d1, &d2 );
-
- #ifdef BIG_ENDIAN_HOST
- ((u32*)outbuf)[0] = d1;
- ((u32*)outbuf)[1] = d2;
- #else
- outbuf[0] = ((byte*)&d1)[3];
- outbuf[1] = ((byte*)&d1)[2];
- outbuf[2] = ((byte*)&d1)[1];
- outbuf[3] = ((byte*)&d1)[0];
- outbuf[4] = ((byte*)&d2)[3];
- outbuf[5] = ((byte*)&d2)[2];
- outbuf[6] = ((byte*)&d2)[1];
- outbuf[7] = ((byte*)&d2)[0];
- #endif
+ outbuf[0] = (d1 >> 24) & 0xff;
+ outbuf[1] = (d1 >> 16) & 0xff;
+ outbuf[2] = (d1 >> 8) & 0xff;
+ outbuf[3] = d1 & 0xff;
+ outbuf[4] = (d2 >> 24) & 0xff;
+ outbuf[5] = (d2 >> 16) & 0xff;
+ outbuf[6] = (d2 >> 8) & 0xff;
+ outbuf[7] = d2 & 0xff;
}
diff --git a/cipher/cipher.c b/cipher/cipher.c
index 6e2bcce08..1f24c6b0e 100644
--- a/cipher/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher/cipher.c
@@ -225,8 +225,7 @@ do_cfb_encrypt( CIPHER_HANDLE c, byte *outbuf, byte *inbuf, unsigned nbytes )
if( nbytes <= c->unused ) {
/* short enough to be encoded by the remaining XOR mask */
/* XOR the input with the IV and store input into IV */
- c->unused -= nbytes;
- for(ivp=c->iv+STD_BLOCKSIZE - c->unused; nbytes; nbytes-- )
+ for(ivp=c->iv+STD_BLOCKSIZE - c->unused; nbytes; nbytes--, c->unused-- )
*outbuf++ = (*ivp++ ^= *inbuf++);
return;
}
@@ -271,8 +270,7 @@ do_cfb_decrypt( CIPHER_HANDLE c, byte *outbuf, byte *inbuf, unsigned nbytes )
if( nbytes <= c->unused ) {
/* short enough to be encoded by the remaining XOR mask */
/* XOR the input with the IV and store input into IV */
- c->unused -= nbytes;
- for(ivp=c->iv+STD_BLOCKSIZE - c->unused; nbytes; nbytes-- ) {
+ for(ivp=c->iv+STD_BLOCKSIZE - c->unused; nbytes; nbytes--,c->unused--){
temp = *inbuf++;
*outbuf++ = *ivp ^ temp;
*ivp++ = temp;
diff --git a/cipher/misc.c b/cipher/misc.c
index 35761e4f5..3016b8e56 100644
--- a/cipher/misc.c
+++ b/cipher/misc.c
@@ -114,18 +114,31 @@ digest_algo_to_string( int algo )
-
-
int
check_pubkey_algo( int algo )
{
+ return check_pubkey_algo2( algo, 0 );
+}
+
+/****************
+ * a usage of 0 means: don't care
+ */
+int
+check_pubkey_algo2( int algo, unsigned usage )
+{
switch( algo ) {
- case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:
+ if( usage & 2 )
+ return G10ERR_WR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+ return 0;
+
+ case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
+ return 0;
+
#ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:
- #endif
return 0;
+ #endif
default:
return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
}
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
index d3e06d2b7..94617fcc6 100644
--- a/g10/ChangeLog
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,23 @@
+Wed Apr 8 16:19:39 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+ * packet.h: packet structs now uses structs from the pubkey,
+ removed all copy operations from packet to pubkey structs.
+
+Wed Apr 8 13:40:33 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+ * trustdb.c (verify_own_certs): Fixed "public key not found".
+
+ * getkey.c (key_byname): New, combines public and secret key search.
+
+ * pkclist.c (build_pkc_list): Add new arg usage, changed all callers.
+ * skclist.c (build_skc_list): Likewise.
+
+ * ringedit.c (find_keyblock, keyring_search2): Removed.
+
+Wed Apr 8 09:47:21 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+ * sig-check.c (do_check): Applied small fix from Ulf Möller.
+
Tue Apr 7 19:28:07 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* cipher.c, encr-data.c, seckey-cert.c: Now uses cipher_xxxx
diff --git a/g10/build-packet.c b/g10/build-packet.c
index 4d0a7d69f..d1934e8c4 100644
--- a/g10/build-packet.c
+++ b/g10/build-packet.c
@@ -190,8 +190,8 @@ do_public_cert( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_public_cert *pkc )
mpi_write(a, pkc->d.dsa.y );
}
else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- mpi_write(a, pkc->d.rsa.rsa_n );
- mpi_write(a, pkc->d.rsa.rsa_e );
+ mpi_write(a, pkc->d.rsa.n );
+ mpi_write(a, pkc->d.rsa.e );
}
else {
rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
@@ -286,8 +286,8 @@ do_secret_cert( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_cert *skc )
write_16(a, skc->csum );
}
else if( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.rsa_n );
- mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.rsa_e );
+ mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.n );
+ mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.e );
if( skc->is_protected ) {
assert( skc->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH
|| skc->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_CAST );
@@ -296,10 +296,10 @@ do_secret_cert( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_cert *skc )
}
else
iobuf_put(a, 0 );
- mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.rsa_d );
- mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.rsa_p );
- mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.rsa_q );
- mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.rsa_u );
+ mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.d );
+ mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.p );
+ mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.q );
+ mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.u );
write_16(a, skc->csum );
}
else {
diff --git a/g10/dsa.c b/g10/dsa.c
index fa0cb271b..e8620ab25 100644
--- a/g10/dsa.c
+++ b/g10/dsa.c
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ void
g10_dsa_sign( PKT_secret_cert *skc, PKT_signature *sig,
MD_HANDLE md, int digest_algo )
{
- DSA_secret_key skey;
MPI frame;
byte *dp;
@@ -58,12 +57,9 @@ g10_dsa_sign( PKT_secret_cert *skc, PKT_signature *sig,
/ BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB );
mpi_set_buffer( frame, md_read(md, digest_algo),
md_digest_length(digest_algo), 0 );
- skey.p = skc->d.elg.p;
- skey.g = skc->d.elg.g;
- skey.y = skc->d.elg.y;
- skey.x = skc->d.elg.x;
- dsa_sign( sig->d.dsa.r, sig->d.dsa.s, frame, &skey);
- memset( &skey, 0, sizeof skey );
+ if( DBG_CIPHER )
+ log_mpidump("used sig frame: ", frame);
+ dsa_sign( sig->d.dsa.r, sig->d.dsa.s, frame, &skc->d.dsa );
mpi_free(frame);
if( opt.verbose ) {
char *ustr = get_user_id_string( sig->keyid );
diff --git a/g10/elg.c b/g10/elg.c
index 329b762fe..bf6bf4361 100644
--- a/g10/elg.c
+++ b/g10/elg.c
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@
void
g10_elg_encrypt( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek )
{
- ELG_public_key pkey;
MPI frame;
assert( enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL );
@@ -46,12 +45,9 @@ g10_elg_encrypt( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek )
enc->d.elg.b = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(pkc->d.elg.p) );
keyid_from_pkc( pkc, enc->keyid );
frame = encode_session_key( dek, mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.elg.p) );
- pkey.p = pkc->d.elg.p;
- pkey.g = pkc->d.elg.g;
- pkey.y = pkc->d.elg.y;
if( DBG_CIPHER )
log_mpidump("Plain DEK frame: ", frame);
- elg_encrypt( enc->d.elg.a, enc->d.elg.b, frame, &pkey);
+ elg_encrypt( enc->d.elg.a, enc->d.elg.b, frame, &pkc->d.elg );
mpi_free( frame );
if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
log_mpidump("Encry DEK a: ", enc->d.elg.a );
@@ -69,7 +65,6 @@ void
g10_elg_sign( PKT_secret_cert *skc, PKT_signature *sig,
MD_HANDLE md, int digest_algo )
{
- ELG_secret_key skey;
MPI frame;
byte *dp;
@@ -85,12 +80,7 @@ g10_elg_sign( PKT_secret_cert *skc, PKT_signature *sig,
sig->d.elg.a = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(skc->d.elg.p) );
sig->d.elg.b = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(skc->d.elg.p) );
frame = encode_md_value( md, mpi_get_nbits(skc->d.elg.p));
- skey.p = skc->d.elg.p;
- skey.g = skc->d.elg.g;
- skey.y = skc->d.elg.y;
- skey.x = skc->d.elg.x;
- elg_sign( sig->d.elg.a, sig->d.elg.b, frame, &skey);
- memset( &skey, 0, sizeof skey );
+ elg_sign( sig->d.elg.a, sig->d.elg.b, frame, &skc->d.elg );
mpi_free(frame);
if( opt.verbose ) {
char *ustr = get_user_id_string( sig->keyid );
diff --git a/g10/encode.c b/g10/encode.c
index a7fa409c2..b73938070 100644
--- a/g10/encode.c
+++ b/g10/encode.c
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ encode_crypt( const char *filename, STRLIST remusr )
memset( &afx, 0, sizeof afx);
memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
- if( (rc=build_pkc_list( remusr, &pkc_list)) )
+ if( (rc=build_pkc_list( remusr, &pkc_list, 2)) )
return rc;
/* prepare iobufs */
diff --git a/g10/free-packet.c b/g10/free-packet.c
index eb90f51ef..8a484eb25 100644
--- a/g10/free-packet.c
+++ b/g10/free-packet.c
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ release_public_cert_parts( PKT_public_cert *cert )
mpi_free( cert->d.dsa.y ); cert->d.dsa.y = NULL;
}
else if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.rsa_n ); cert->d.rsa.rsa_n = NULL;
- mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.rsa_e ); cert->d.rsa.rsa_e = NULL;
+ mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.n ); cert->d.rsa.n = NULL;
+ mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.e ); cert->d.rsa.e = NULL;
}
}
@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ copy_public_cert( PKT_public_cert *d, PKT_public_cert *s )
d->d.dsa.y = mpi_copy( s->d.dsa.y );
}
else if( s->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- d->d.rsa.rsa_n = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.rsa_n );
- d->d.rsa.rsa_e = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.rsa_e );
+ d->d.rsa.n = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.n );
+ d->d.rsa.e = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.e );
}
return d;
}
@@ -153,12 +153,12 @@ release_secret_cert_parts( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
mpi_free( cert->d.dsa.x ); cert->d.dsa.x = NULL;
}
else if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.rsa_n ); cert->d.rsa.rsa_n = NULL;
- mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.rsa_e ); cert->d.rsa.rsa_e = NULL;
- mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.rsa_d ); cert->d.rsa.rsa_d = NULL;
- mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.rsa_p ); cert->d.rsa.rsa_p = NULL;
- mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.rsa_q ); cert->d.rsa.rsa_q = NULL;
- mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.rsa_u ); cert->d.rsa.rsa_u = NULL;
+ mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.n ); cert->d.rsa.n = NULL;
+ mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.e ); cert->d.rsa.e = NULL;
+ mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.d ); cert->d.rsa.d = NULL;
+ mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.p ); cert->d.rsa.p = NULL;
+ mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.q ); cert->d.rsa.q = NULL;
+ mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.u ); cert->d.rsa.u = NULL;
}
}
@@ -189,12 +189,12 @@ copy_secret_cert( PKT_secret_cert *d, PKT_secret_cert *s )
d->d.dsa.x = mpi_copy( s->d.dsa.x );
}
else if( s->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- d->d.rsa.rsa_n = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.rsa_n );
- d->d.rsa.rsa_e = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.rsa_e );
- d->d.rsa.rsa_d = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.rsa_d );
- d->d.rsa.rsa_p = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.rsa_p );
- d->d.rsa.rsa_q = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.rsa_q );
- d->d.rsa.rsa_u = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.rsa_u );
+ d->d.rsa.n = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.n );
+ d->d.rsa.e = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.e );
+ d->d.rsa.d = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.d );
+ d->d.rsa.p = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.p );
+ d->d.rsa.q = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.q );
+ d->d.rsa.u = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.u );
}
return d;
}
@@ -337,9 +337,9 @@ cmp_public_certs( PKT_public_cert *a, PKT_public_cert *b )
return -1;
}
else if( a->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- if( mpi_cmp( a->d.rsa.rsa_n , b->d.rsa.rsa_n ) )
+ if( mpi_cmp( a->d.rsa.n , b->d.rsa.n ) )
return -1;
- if( mpi_cmp( a->d.rsa.rsa_e , b->d.rsa.rsa_e ) )
+ if( mpi_cmp( a->d.rsa.e , b->d.rsa.e ) )
return -1;
}
@@ -378,9 +378,9 @@ cmp_public_secret_cert( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_secret_cert *skc )
return -1;
}
else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- if( mpi_cmp( pkc->d.rsa.rsa_n , skc->d.rsa.rsa_n ) )
+ if( mpi_cmp( pkc->d.rsa.n , skc->d.rsa.n ) )
return -1;
- if( mpi_cmp( pkc->d.rsa.rsa_e , skc->d.rsa.rsa_e ) )
+ if( mpi_cmp( pkc->d.rsa.e , skc->d.rsa.e ) )
return -1;
}
diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c
index 7868df951..966bc5d69 100644
--- a/g10/getkey.c
+++ b/g10/getkey.c
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ static int pkc_cache_entries; /* number of entries in pkc cache */
static int lookup( PKT_public_cert *pkc,
- int mode, u32 *keyid, const char *name );
+ int mode, u32 *keyid, const char *name,
+ KBNODE *ret_keyblock );
static int lookup_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc,
int mode, u32 *keyid, const char *name );
@@ -238,7 +239,6 @@ get_pubkey( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid )
int rc = 0;
pkc_cache_entry_t ce;
-
/* lets see wether we checked the keyid already */
for( kl = unknown_keyids; kl; kl = kl->next )
if( kl->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && kl->keyid[1] == keyid[1] )
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ get_pubkey( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid )
/* do a lookup */
- rc = lookup( pkc, 11, keyid, NULL );
+ rc = lookup( pkc, 11, keyid, NULL, NULL );
if( !rc )
goto leave;
@@ -329,8 +329,11 @@ hextobyte( const byte *s )
* - If the userid starts with a '*' a case insensitive substring search is
* done (This is also the default).
*/
-int
-get_pubkey_byname( PKT_public_cert *pkc, const char *name )
+
+
+static int
+key_byname( int secret,
+ PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_secret_cert *skc, const char *name )
{
int internal = 0;
int rc = 0;
@@ -424,23 +427,60 @@ get_pubkey_byname( PKT_public_cert *pkc, const char *name )
if( rc )
goto leave;
- if( !pkc ) {
- pkc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkc );
- internal++;
+ if( secret ) {
+ if( !skc ) {
+ skc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *skc );
+ internal++;
+ }
+ rc = mode < 16? lookup_skc( skc, mode, keyid, name )
+ : lookup_skc( skc, mode, keyid, fprint );
+ }
+ else {
+ if( !pkc ) {
+ pkc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkc );
+ internal++;
+ }
+ rc = mode < 16? lookup( pkc, mode, keyid, name, NULL )
+ : lookup( pkc, mode, keyid, fprint, NULL );
}
- rc = mode < 16? lookup( pkc, mode, keyid, name )
- : lookup( pkc, mode, keyid, fprint );
leave:
- if( internal )
- m_free(pkc);
+ if( internal && secret )
+ m_free( skc );
+ else if( internal )
+ m_free( pkc );
return rc;
}
+int
+get_pubkey_byname( PKT_public_cert *pkc, const char *name )
+{
+ return key_byname( 0, pkc, NULL, name );
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Search for a key with the given fingerprint and return the
+ * complete keyblock which may have more than only this key.
+ * The fingerprint should always be 20 bytes, fill with zeroes
+ * for 16 byte fprints.
+ */
+int
+get_keyblock_byfprint( KBNODE *ret_keyblock, const byte *fprint )
+{
+ int rc;
+ PKT_public_cert *pkc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkc );
+
+ rc = lookup( pkc, 20, NULL, fprint, ret_keyblock );
+
+ free_public_cert( pkc );
+ return rc;
+}
/****************
- * Get a secret key and store it into skey
+ * Get a secret key and store it into skc
*/
int
get_seckey( PKT_secret_cert *skc, u32 *keyid )
@@ -486,8 +526,8 @@ get_seckey_byname( PKT_secret_cert *skc, const char *name, int unprotect )
{
int rc;
- /* fixme: add support for compare_name */
- rc = lookup_skc( skc, name? 2:15, NULL, name );
+ rc = name ? key_byname( 1, NULL, skc, name )
+ : lookup_skc( skc, 15, NULL, NULL );
if( !rc && unprotect )
rc = check_secret_key( skc );
@@ -547,9 +587,12 @@ compare_name( const char *uid, size_t uidlen, const char *name, int mode )
* 20 = lookup by 20 byte fingerprint which is stored in NAME
* Caller must provide an empty PKC, if the pubkey_algo is filled in, only
* a key of this algo will be returned.
+ * If ret_keyblock is not NULL, the complete keyblock is returned also
+ * and the caller must release it.
*/
static int
-lookup( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int mode, u32 *keyid, const char *name )
+lookup( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int mode, u32 *keyid,
+ const char *name, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
{
int rc;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
@@ -593,12 +636,22 @@ lookup( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int mode, u32 *keyid, const char *name )
}
}
else { /* keyid or fingerprint lookup */
+ if( DBG_CACHE && (mode== 10 || mode==11) ) {
+ log_debug("lookup keyid=%08lx%08lx req_algo=%d mode=%d\n",
+ (ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1],
+ pkc->pubkey_algo, mode );
+ }
for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
if( mode == 10 || mode == 11 ) {
u32 aki[2];
keyid_from_pkc( k->pkt->pkt.public_cert, aki );
+ if( DBG_CACHE ) {
+ log_debug(" aki=%08lx%08lx algo=%d\n",
+ (ulong)aki[0], (ulong)aki[1],
+ k->pkt->pkt.public_cert->pubkey_algo );
+ }
if( aki[1] == keyid[1]
&& ( mode == 10 || aki[0] == keyid[0] )
&& ( !pkc->pubkey_algo
@@ -643,6 +696,10 @@ lookup( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int mode, u32 *keyid, const char *name )
assert( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT );
copy_public_cert( pkc, k->pkt->pkt.public_cert );
+ if( ret_keyblock ) {
+ *ret_keyblock = keyblock;
+ keyblock = NULL;
+ }
break; /* enumeration */
}
release_kbnode( keyblock );
@@ -708,12 +765,22 @@ lookup_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc, int mode, u32 *keyid, const char *name )
}
}
else { /* keyid or fingerprint lookup */
+ if( DBG_CACHE && (mode== 10 || mode==11) ) {
+ log_debug("lookup_skc keyid=%08lx%08lx req_algo=%d mode=%d\n",
+ (ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1],
+ skc->pubkey_algo, mode );
+ }
for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT ) {
if( mode == 10 || mode == 11 ) {
u32 aki[2];
keyid_from_skc( k->pkt->pkt.secret_cert, aki );
+ if( DBG_CACHE ) {
+ log_debug(" aki=%08lx%08lx algo=%d\n",
+ (ulong)aki[0], (ulong)aki[1],
+ k->pkt->pkt.secret_cert->pubkey_algo );
+ }
if( aki[1] == keyid[1]
&& ( mode == 10 || aki[0] == keyid[0] )
&& ( !skc->pubkey_algo
@@ -825,7 +892,8 @@ enum_secret_keys( void **context, PKT_secret_cert *skc )
while( (rc=parse_packet(c->iobuf, &pkt)) != -1 ) {
if( rc )
; /* e.g. unknown packet */
- else if( pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT ) {
+ else if( pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT
+ || pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT ) {
copy_secret_cert( skc, pkt.pkt.secret_cert );
set_packet_list_mode(save_mode);
return 0; /* found */
diff --git a/g10/kbnode.c b/g10/kbnode.c
index 11b0e46be..3780eb24a 100644
--- a/g10/kbnode.c
+++ b/g10/kbnode.c
@@ -275,7 +275,8 @@ dump_kbnode( KBNODE node )
fprintf(stderr, " keyid=%08lX\n",
(ulong)node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] );
}
- else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ) {
+ else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT
+ || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
fprintf(stderr, " keyid=%08lX\n", (ulong)
keyid_from_pkc( node->pkt->pkt.public_cert, NULL ));
}
diff --git a/g10/keydb.h b/g10/keydb.h
index 6a2425272..6618894a1 100644
--- a/g10/keydb.h
+++ b/g10/keydb.h
@@ -87,11 +87,12 @@ struct pubkey_find_info {
/*-- pkclist.c --*/
void release_pkc_list( PKC_LIST pkc_list );
-int build_pkc_list( STRLIST remusr, PKC_LIST *ret_pkc_list );
+int build_pkc_list( STRLIST remusr, PKC_LIST *ret_pkc_list, unsigned usage );
/*-- skclist.c --*/
void release_skc_list( SKC_LIST skc_list );
-int build_skc_list( STRLIST locusr, SKC_LIST *ret_skc_list, int unlock );
+int build_skc_list( STRLIST locusr, SKC_LIST *ret_skc_list,
+ int unlock, unsigned usage );
/*-- passphrase.h --*/
void set_passphrase_fd( int fd );
@@ -103,11 +104,10 @@ int make_dek_from_passphrase( DEK *dek, int mode, byte *salt );
void add_keyring( const char *name );
const char *get_keyring( int sequence );
void add_secret_keyring( const char *name );
-/*void cache_public_cert( PKT_public_cert *pkc );
-void cache_user_id( PKT_user_id *uid, u32 *keyid );*/
int get_pubkey( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid );
int get_pubkey_byname( PKT_public_cert *pkc, const char *name );
int get_seckey( PKT_secret_cert *skc, u32 *keyid );
+int get_keyblock_byfprint( KBNODE *ret_keyblock, const byte *fprint );
int seckey_available( u32 *keyid );
int get_seckey_byname( PKT_secret_cert *skc, const char *name, int unlock );
int enum_secret_keys( void **context, PKT_secret_cert *skc );
diff --git a/g10/keyid.c b/g10/keyid.c
index 02e706fc2..5bbf6477a 100644
--- a/g10/keyid.c
+++ b/g10/keyid.c
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ keyid_from_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc, u32 *keyid )
md_close(md);
}
else if( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- lowbits = mpi_get_keyid( skc->d.rsa.rsa_n, keyid );
+ lowbits = mpi_get_keyid( skc->d.rsa.n, keyid );
}
else {
keyid[0] = keyid[1] = lowbits = 0;
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ keyid_from_pkc( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid )
md_close(md);
}
else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- lowbits = mpi_get_keyid( pkc->d.rsa.rsa_n, keyid );
+ lowbits = mpi_get_keyid( pkc->d.rsa.n, keyid );
}
else {
keyid[0] = keyid[1] = lowbits = 0;
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ nbits_from_pkc( PKT_public_cert *pkc )
return mpi_get_nbits( pkc->d.dsa.p );
}
else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- return mpi_get_nbits( pkc->d.rsa.rsa_n );
+ return mpi_get_nbits( pkc->d.rsa.n );
}
else
return 0;
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ nbits_from_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc )
return mpi_get_nbits( skc->d.dsa.p );
}
else if( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- return mpi_get_nbits( skc->d.rsa.rsa_n );
+ return mpi_get_nbits( skc->d.rsa.n );
}
else
return 0;
@@ -442,8 +442,8 @@ fingerprint_from_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc, size_t *ret_len )
pkc.d.dsa.y = skc->d.dsa.y;
}
else if( pkc.pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- pkc.d.rsa.rsa_n = skc->d.rsa.rsa_n;
- pkc.d.rsa.rsa_e = skc->d.rsa.rsa_e;
+ pkc.d.rsa.n = skc->d.rsa.n;
+ pkc.d.rsa.e = skc->d.rsa.e;
}
p = fingerprint_from_pkc( &pkc, ret_len );
memset(&pkc, 0, sizeof pkc); /* not really needed */
@@ -489,10 +489,10 @@ fingerprint_from_pkc( PKT_public_cert *pkc, size_t *ret_len )
MD_HANDLE md;
md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0);
- p = buf = mpi_get_buffer( pkc->d.rsa.rsa_n, &n, NULL );
+ p = buf = mpi_get_buffer( pkc->d.rsa.n, &n, NULL );
md_write( md, p, n );
m_free(buf);
- p = buf = mpi_get_buffer( pkc->d.rsa.rsa_e, &n, NULL );
+ p = buf = mpi_get_buffer( pkc->d.rsa.e, &n, NULL );
md_write( md, p, n );
m_free(buf);
md_final(md);
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
index 86a1716db..d8b4310a1 100644
--- a/g10/mainproc.c
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
* textmode filter (sigclass 0x01)
*/
c->mfx.md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160, 0);
+ md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 );
rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx );
if( rc )
diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h
index 0e6a188c9..8b1e3c4c0 100644
--- a/g10/packet.h
+++ b/g10/packet.h
@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@
#include "cipher.h"
#include "filter.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
+/* although we don't have RSA we need these structures to handle keyrings */
+typedef struct { MPI e, n; } RSA_public_key;
+typedef struct { MPI e, n, p, q, d, u; } RSA_secret_key;
+#endif
+
typedef enum {
PKT_NONE =0,
PKT_PUBKEY_ENC =1, /* public key encrypted packet */
@@ -106,21 +112,9 @@ typedef struct {
byte pubkey_algo; /* algorithm used for public key scheme */
ulong local_id; /* internal use, valid if > 0 */
union {
- struct {
- MPI p; /* prime */
- MPI g; /* group generator */
- MPI y; /* g^x mod p */
- } elg;
- struct {
- MPI p; /* prime */
- MPI q; /* group order */
- MPI g; /* group generator */
- MPI y; /* g^x mod p */
- } dsa;
- struct {
- MPI rsa_n; /* public modulus */
- MPI rsa_e; /* public exponent */
- } rsa;
+ ELG_public_key elg;
+ DSA_public_key dsa;
+ RSA_public_key rsa;
} d;
} PKT_public_cert;
@@ -143,27 +137,9 @@ typedef struct {
byte iv[8]; /* initialization vector for CFB mode */
} protect;
union {
- struct {
- MPI p; /* prime */
- MPI g; /* group generator */
- MPI y; /* g^x mod p */
- MPI x; /* secret exponent */
- } elg;
- struct {
- MPI p; /* prime */
- MPI q; /* group order */
- MPI g; /* group generator */
- MPI y; /* g^x mod p */
- MPI x; /* secret exponent */
- } dsa;
- struct {
- MPI rsa_n; /* public modulus */
- MPI rsa_e; /* public exponent */
- MPI rsa_d; /* secret descryption exponent */
- MPI rsa_p; /* secret first prime number */
- MPI rsa_q; /* secret second prime number */
- MPI rsa_u; /* secret multiplicative inverse */
- } rsa;
+ ELG_secret_key elg;
+ DSA_secret_key dsa;
+ RSA_secret_key rsa;
} d;
u16 csum; /* checksum */
} PKT_secret_cert;
diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
index 26c112244..b199ef21d 100644
--- a/g10/parse-packet.c
+++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
@@ -1084,15 +1084,15 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
putchar('\n');
}
if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT || pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
- pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.rsa.rsa_n = rsa_pub_mod;
- pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.rsa.rsa_e = rsa_pub_exp;
+ pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.rsa.n = rsa_pub_mod;
+ pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.rsa.e = rsa_pub_exp;
}
else {
PKT_secret_cert *cert = pkt->pkt.secret_cert;
byte temp[8];
- pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.rsa.rsa_n = rsa_pub_mod;
- pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.rsa.rsa_e = rsa_pub_exp;
+ pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.rsa.n = rsa_pub_mod;
+ pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.rsa.e = rsa_pub_exp;
cert->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( list_mode )
printf( "\tprotect algo: %d\n", cert->protect.algo);
@@ -1112,22 +1112,22 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
else
cert->is_protected = 0;
/* (See comments at the code for elg keys) */
- n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.rsa_d = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
- n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.rsa_p = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
- n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.rsa_q = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
- n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.rsa_u = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
+ n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.d = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
+ n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.p = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
+ n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.q = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
+ n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.u = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
cert->csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
if( list_mode ) {
printf("\t[secret values d,p,q,u are not shown]\n"
"\tchecksum: %04hx\n", cert->csum);
}
- /* log_mpidump("rsa n=", cert->d.rsa.rsa_n );
- log_mpidump("rsa e=", cert->d.rsa.rsa_e );
- log_mpidump("rsa d=", cert->d.rsa.rsa_d );
- log_mpidump("rsa p=", cert->d.rsa.rsa_p );
- log_mpidump("rsa q=", cert->d.rsa.rsa_q );
- log_mpidump("rsa u=", cert->d.rsa.rsa_u ); */
+ /* log_mpidump("rsa n=", cert->d.rsa.n );
+ log_mpidump("rsa e=", cert->d.rsa.e );
+ log_mpidump("rsa d=", cert->d.rsa.d );
+ log_mpidump("rsa p=", cert->d.rsa.p );
+ log_mpidump("rsa q=", cert->d.rsa.q );
+ log_mpidump("rsa u=", cert->d.rsa.u ); */
}
}
else if( list_mode )
diff --git a/g10/pkclist.c b/g10/pkclist.c
index d4e8133ae..8de95c3ab 100644
--- a/g10/pkclist.c
+++ b/g10/pkclist.c
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ release_pkc_list( PKC_LIST pkc_list )
}
int
-build_pkc_list( STRLIST remusr, PKC_LIST *ret_pkc_list )
+build_pkc_list( STRLIST remusr, PKC_LIST *ret_pkc_list, unsigned usage )
{
PKC_LIST pkc_list = NULL;
PKT_public_cert *pkc=NULL;
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ build_pkc_list( STRLIST remusr, PKC_LIST *ret_pkc_list )
rc = get_pubkey_byname( pkc, answer );
if( rc )
tty_printf("No such user ID.\n");
- else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo(pkc->pubkey_algo)) ) {
+ else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pkc->pubkey_algo, usage)) ) {
int trustlevel;
rc = check_trust( pkc, &trustlevel );
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ build_pkc_list( STRLIST remusr, PKC_LIST *ret_pkc_list )
free_public_cert( pkc ); pkc = NULL;
log_error("skipped '%s': %s\n", remusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
}
- else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo(pkc->pubkey_algo)) ) {
+ else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pkc->pubkey_algo, usage )) ) {
int trustlevel;
rc = check_trust( pkc, &trustlevel );
diff --git a/g10/pubkey-enc.c b/g10/pubkey-enc.c
index 7fd3101bd..0525f336f 100644
--- a/g10/pubkey-enc.c
+++ b/g10/pubkey-enc.c
@@ -50,36 +50,20 @@ get_session_key( PKT_pubkey_enc *k, DEK *dek )
goto leave;
if( k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
- ELG_secret_key skey;
-
if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
log_mpidump("Encr DEK a:", k->d.elg.a );
log_mpidump(" DEK b:", k->d.elg.b );
}
- skey.p = skc->d.elg.p;
- skey.g = skc->d.elg.g;
- skey.y = skc->d.elg.y;
- skey.x = skc->d.elg.x;
- plain_dek = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey.p) );
- elg_decrypt( plain_dek, k->d.elg.a, k->d.elg.b, &skey );
- memset( &skey, 0, sizeof skey );
+ plain_dek = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skc->d.elg.p) );
+ elg_decrypt( plain_dek, k->d.elg.a, k->d.elg.b, &skc->d.elg );
}
#ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
else if( k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- RSA_secret_key skey;
-
if( DBG_CIPHER )
log_mpidump("Encr DEK frame:", k->d.rsa.rsa_integer );
- skey.e = skc->d.rsa.rsa_e;
- skey.n = skc->d.rsa.rsa_n;
- skey.p = skc->d.rsa.rsa_p;
- skey.q = skc->d.rsa.rsa_q;
- skey.d = skc->d.rsa.rsa_d;
- skey.u = skc->d.rsa.rsa_u;
- plain_dek = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey.n) );
- rsa_secret( plain_dek, k->d.rsa.rsa_integer, &skey );
- memset( &skey, 0, sizeof skey );
+ plain_dek = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skc->d.rsa.n) );
+ rsa_secret( plain_dek, k->d.rsa.rsa_integer, &skc->d.rsa );
}
#endif/*HAVE_RSA_CIPHER*/
else {
diff --git a/g10/ringedit.c b/g10/ringedit.c
index 8eade961a..3193b0012 100644
--- a/g10/ringedit.c
+++ b/g10/ringedit.c
@@ -75,8 +75,6 @@ static int search( PACKET *pkt, KBPOS *kbpos, int secret );
static int keyring_search( PACKET *pkt, KBPOS *kbpos, IOBUF iobuf,
const char *fname );
-static int keyring_search2( PUBKEY_FIND_INFO info, KBPOS *kbpos,
- const char *fname);
static int keyring_read( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root );
static int keyring_enum( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root, int skipsigs );
static int keyring_copy( KBPOS *kbpos, int mode, KBNODE root );
@@ -165,36 +163,6 @@ get_keyblock_handle( const char *filename, int secret, KBPOS *kbpos )
}
-/****************
- * Find a keyblock from the informations provided in INFO
- * This can only be used fro public keys
- */
-int
-find_keyblock( PUBKEY_FIND_INFO info, KBPOS *kbpos )
-{
- int i, rc, last_rc=-1;
-
- for(i=0; i < MAX_RESOURCES; i++ ) {
- if( resource_table[i].used && !resource_table[i].secret ) {
- /* note: here we have to add different search functions,
- * depending on the type of the resource */
- rc = keyring_search2( info, kbpos, resource_table[i].fname );
- if( !rc ) {
- kbpos->resno = i;
- kbpos->fp = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
- if( rc != -1 ) {
- log_error("error searching resource %d: %s\n",
- i, g10_errstr(rc));
- last_rc = rc;
- }
- }
- }
- return last_rc;
-}
-
-
/****************
* Search a keyblock which starts with the given packet and put all
@@ -535,9 +503,9 @@ keyring_search( PACKET *req, KBPOS *kbpos, IOBUF iobuf, const char *fname )
&& !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.dsa.x, skc->d.dsa.x )
)
|| ( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
- && !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.rsa.rsa_n, skc->d.rsa.rsa_n )
- && !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.rsa.rsa_e, skc->d.rsa.rsa_e )
- && !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.rsa.rsa_d, skc->d.rsa.rsa_d )
+ && !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.rsa.n, skc->d.rsa.n )
+ && !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.rsa.e, skc->d.rsa.e )
+ && !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.rsa.d, skc->d.rsa.d )
)
)
)
@@ -561,8 +529,8 @@ keyring_search( PACKET *req, KBPOS *kbpos, IOBUF iobuf, const char *fname )
&& !mpi_cmp( req_pkc->d.dsa.y, pkc->d.dsa.y )
)
|| ( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
- && !mpi_cmp( req_pkc->d.rsa.rsa_n, pkc->d.rsa.rsa_n )
- && !mpi_cmp( req_pkc->d.rsa.rsa_e, pkc->d.rsa.rsa_e )
+ && !mpi_cmp( req_pkc->d.rsa.n, pkc->d.rsa.n )
+ && !mpi_cmp( req_pkc->d.rsa.e, pkc->d.rsa.e )
)
)
)
@@ -584,60 +552,6 @@ keyring_search( PACKET *req, KBPOS *kbpos, IOBUF iobuf, const char *fname )
return rc;
}
-/****************
- * search one keyring, return 0 if found, -1 if not found or an errorcode.
- * this version uses the finger print and other informations
- */
-static int
-keyring_search2( PUBKEY_FIND_INFO info, KBPOS *kbpos, const char *fname )
-{
- int rc;
- PACKET pkt;
- int save_mode;
- ulong offset;
- IOBUF iobuf;
-
- init_packet(&pkt);
- save_mode = set_packet_list_mode(0);
-
- iobuf = iobuf_open( fname );
- if( !iobuf ) {
- log_error("can't open '%s'\n", fname );
- rc = G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
- goto leave;
- }
-
- while( !(rc=search_packet(iobuf, &pkt, PKT_PUBLIC_CERT, &offset)) ) {
- PKT_public_cert *pkc = pkt.pkt.public_cert;
- u32 keyid[2];
-
- assert( pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT );
- keyid_from_pkc( pkc, keyid );
- if( keyid[0] == info->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == info->keyid[1]
- && pkc->pubkey_algo == info->pubkey_algo ) {
- /* fixme: shall we check nbits too? (good for rsa keys) */
- /* fixme: check userid???? */
- size_t len;
- byte *fp = fingerprint_from_pkc( pkc, &len );
-
- if( !memcmp( fp, info->fingerprint, len ) ) {
- m_free(fp);
- break; /* found */
- }
- m_free(fp);
- }
- free_packet(&pkt);
- }
- if( !rc )
- kbpos->offset = offset;
-
- leave:
- iobuf_close(iobuf);
- free_packet(&pkt);
- set_packet_list_mode(save_mode);
- return rc;
-}
-
static int
keyring_read( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root )
diff --git a/g10/rsa.c b/g10/rsa.c
index f1872b53a..ceba3fd1f 100644
--- a/g10/rsa.c
+++ b/g10/rsa.c
@@ -38,18 +38,14 @@ void
g10_rsa_encrypt( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek )
{
#ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
- RSA_public_key pkey;
-
assert( enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA );
keyid_from_pkc( pkc, enc->keyid );
enc->d.rsa.rsa_integer = encode_session_key( dek,
mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.rsa.rsa_n) );
- pkey.n = pkc->d.rsa.rsa_n;
- pkey.e = pkc->d.rsa.rsa_e;
if( DBG_CIPHER )
log_mpidump("Plain DEK frame: ", enc->d.rsa.rsa_integer);
- rsa_public( enc->d.rsa.rsa_integer, enc->d.rsa.rsa_integer, &pkey);
+ rsa_public( enc->d.rsa.rsa_integer, enc->d.rsa.rsa_integer, &pkc->d.rsa);
if( DBG_CIPHER )
log_mpidump("Encry DEK frame: ", enc->d.rsa.rsa_integer);
if( opt.verbose ) {
@@ -68,7 +64,6 @@ g10_rsa_sign( PKT_secret_cert *skc, PKT_signature *sig,
MD_HANDLE md, int digest_algo )
{
#ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
- RSA_secret_key skey;
byte *dp;
assert( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA );
@@ -82,14 +77,7 @@ g10_rsa_sign( PKT_secret_cert *skc, PKT_signature *sig,
sig->digest_start[1] = dp[1];
sig->d.rsa.rsa_integer =
encode_md_value( md, mpi_get_nbits(skc->d.rsa.rsa_n));
- skey.e = skc->d.rsa.rsa_e;
- skey.n = skc->d.rsa.rsa_n;
- skey.p = skc->d.rsa.rsa_p;
- skey.q = skc->d.rsa.rsa_q;
- skey.d = skc->d.rsa.rsa_d;
- skey.u = skc->d.rsa.rsa_u;
- rsa_secret( sig->d.rsa.rsa_integer, sig->d.rsa.rsa_integer, &skey);
- memset( &skey, 0, sizeof skey );
+ rsa_secret( sig->d.rsa.rsa_integer, sig->d.rsa.rsa_integer, &skc->d.rsa );
if( opt.verbose ) {
char *ustr = get_user_id_string( sig->keyid );
log_info("RSA signature from: %s\n", ustr );
diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c
index a4ce96206..d0e10b528 100644
--- a/g10/seckey-cert.c
+++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ check_elg( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
int res;
unsigned nbytes;
u32 keyid[2];
- ELG_secret_key skey;
char save_iv[8];
if( cert->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
@@ -93,12 +92,9 @@ check_elg( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
"\"--change-passphrase\" to convert.\n");
}
- skey.p = cert->d.elg.p;
- skey.g = cert->d.elg.g;
- skey.y = cert->d.elg.y;
- skey.x = test_x;
- res = elg_check_secret_key( &skey );
- memset( &skey, 0, sizeof skey );
+ mpi_swap( cert->d.elg.x, test_x );
+ res = elg_check_secret_key( &cert->d.elg );
+ mpi_swap( cert->d.elg.x, test_x );
if( !res ) {
mpi_free(test_x);
memcpy( cert->protect.iv, save_iv, 8 );
@@ -140,7 +136,6 @@ check_dsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
int res;
unsigned nbytes;
u32 keyid[2];
- DSA_secret_key skey;
char save_iv[8];
if( cert->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
@@ -183,13 +178,9 @@ check_dsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
}
- skey.p = cert->d.dsa.p;
- skey.q = cert->d.dsa.q;
- skey.g = cert->d.dsa.g;
- skey.y = cert->d.dsa.y;
- skey.x = test_x;
- res = dsa_check_secret_key( &skey );
- memset( &skey, 0, sizeof skey );
+ mpi_swap( cert->d.dsa.x, test_x );
+ res = dsa_check_secret_key( &cert->d.dsa );
+ mpi_swap( cert->d.dsa.x, test_x );
if( !res ) {
mpi_free(test_x);
memcpy( cert->protect.iv, save_iv, 8 );
@@ -227,7 +218,6 @@ check_rsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
int res;
unsigned nbytes;
u32 keyid[2];
- RSA_secret_key skey;
if( cert->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
DEK *dek = NULL;
@@ -266,12 +256,7 @@ check_rsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
if( csum != cert->csum )
return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
- skey.d = cert->d.rsa.rsa_d;
- skey.p = cert->d.rsa.rsa_p;
- skey.q = cert->d.rsa.rsa_q;
- skey.u = cert->d.rsa.rsa_u;
- res = rsa_check_secret_key( &skey );
- memset( &skey, 0, sizeof skey );
+ res = rsa_check_secret_key( &cert->d.rsa );
if( !res )
return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
break;
diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c
index 2e0159348..d366267e7 100644
--- a/g10/sig-check.c
+++ b/g10/sig-check.c
@@ -63,13 +63,14 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
MPI result = NULL;
int rc=0;
+ if( pkc->version == 4 && pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
+ log_info("WARNING: This is probably a PGP generated "
+ "ElGamal key which is NOT secure for signatures!\n");
if( pkc->timestamp > sig->timestamp )
return G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT; /* pubkey newer that signature */
if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
- ELG_public_key pkey;
-
if( (rc=check_digest_algo(sig->digest_algo)) )
goto leave;
/* make sure the digest algo is enabled (in case of a detached
@@ -85,15 +86,10 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
}
md_final( digest );
result = encode_md_value( digest, mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.elg.p));
- pkey.p = pkc->d.elg.p;
- pkey.g = pkc->d.elg.g;
- pkey.y = pkc->d.elg.y;
- if( !elg_verify( sig->d.elg.a, sig->d.elg.b, result, &pkey ) )
+ if( !elg_verify( sig->d.elg.a, sig->d.elg.b, result, &pkc->d.elg ) )
rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
}
else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA ) {
- DSA_public_key pkey;
-
if( (rc=check_digest_algo(sig->digest_algo)) )
goto leave;
/* make sure the digest algo is enabled (in case of a detached
@@ -135,27 +131,22 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
md_final( digest );
result = mpi_alloc( (md_digest_length(sig->digest_algo)
+BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1) / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB );
- mpi_set_buffer( result, md_read(digest, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1),
+ mpi_set_buffer( result, md_read(digest, sig->digest_algo),
md_digest_length(sig->digest_algo), 0 );
- pkey.p = pkc->d.dsa.p;
- pkey.q = pkc->d.dsa.q;
- pkey.g = pkc->d.dsa.g;
- pkey.y = pkc->d.dsa.y;
- if( !dsa_verify( sig->d.dsa.r, sig->d.dsa.s, result, &pkey ) )
+ if( DBG_CIPHER )
+ log_mpidump("calc sig frame: ", result);
+ if( !dsa_verify( sig->d.dsa.r, sig->d.dsa.s, result, &pkc->d.dsa ) )
rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
}
#ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
int i, j, c, old_enc;
byte *dp;
- RSA_public_key pkey;
const byte *asn;
size_t mdlen, asnlen;
result = mpi_alloc(40);
- pkey.n = pkc->d.rsa.rsa_n;
- pkey.e = pkc->d.rsa.rsa_e;
- rsa_public( result, sig->d.rsa.rsa_integer, &pkey );
+ rsa_public( result, sig->d.rsa.rsa_integer, &pkc->d.rsa );
old_enc = 0;
for(i=j=0; (c=mpi_getbyte(result, i)) != -1; i++ ) {
@@ -204,8 +195,8 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
rc = G10ERR_BAD_PUBKEY;
goto leave;
}
- if( mpi_getbyte(result, mdlen-1) != sig->d.rsa.digest_start[0]
- || mpi_getbyte(result, mdlen-2) != sig->d.rsa.digest_start[1] ) {
+ if( mpi_getbyte(result, mdlen-1) != sig->digest_start[0]
+ || mpi_getbyte(result, mdlen-2) != sig->digest_start[1] ) {
/* Wrong key used to check the signature */
rc = G10ERR_BAD_PUBKEY;
goto leave;
diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c
index 9f06680db..7e7921034 100644
--- a/g10/sign.c
+++ b/g10/sign.c
@@ -116,10 +116,10 @@ sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
if( fname && filenames->next && (!detached || encrypt) )
log_bug("multiple files can only be detached signed");
- if( (rc=build_skc_list( locusr, &skc_list, 1 )) )
+ if( (rc=build_skc_list( locusr, &skc_list, 1, 1 )) )
goto leave;
if( encrypt ) {
- if( (rc=build_pkc_list( remusr, &pkc_list )) )
+ if( (rc=build_pkc_list( remusr, &pkc_list, 2 )) )
goto leave;
}
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
/* prepare to calculate the MD over the input */
if( opt.textmode && !outfile )
iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx );
- mfx.md = md_open(DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160, 0);
+ mfx.md = md_open(opt.def_digest_algo, 0);
if( !multifile )
iobuf_push_filter( inp, md_filter, &mfx );
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
skc = skc_rover->skc;
ops = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *ops );
ops->sig_class = opt.textmode && !outfile ? 0x01 : 0x00;
- ops->digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160;
+ ops->digest_algo = opt.def_digest_algo;
ops->pubkey_algo = skc->pubkey_algo;
keyid_from_skc( skc, ops->keyid );
ops->last = !skc_rover->next;
@@ -276,11 +276,11 @@ sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
md_final( md );
if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
- g10_elg_sign( skc, sig, md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+ g10_elg_sign( skc, sig, md, opt.def_digest_algo );
else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
- g10_dsa_sign( skc, sig, md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
+ g10_dsa_sign( skc, sig, md, opt.def_digest_algo );
else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
- g10_rsa_sign( skc, sig, md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+ g10_rsa_sign( skc, sig, md, opt.def_digest_algo );
else
BUG();
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ clearsign_file( const char *fname, STRLIST locusr, const char *outfile )
memset( &tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
init_packet( &pkt );
- if( (rc=build_skc_list( locusr, &skc_list, 1 )) )
+ if( (rc=build_skc_list( locusr, &skc_list, 1, 1 )) )
goto leave;
/* prepare iobufs */
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ clearsign_file( const char *fname, STRLIST locusr, const char *outfile )
iobuf_writestr(out, "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\n"
"Hash: RIPEMD160\n\n" );
- textmd = md_open(DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160, 0);
+ textmd = md_open(opt.def_digest_algo, 0);
iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx );
rc = write_dash_escaped( inp, out, textmd );
if( rc )
@@ -432,11 +432,11 @@ clearsign_file( const char *fname, STRLIST locusr, const char *outfile )
md_final( md );
if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
- g10_elg_sign( skc, sig, md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+ g10_elg_sign( skc, sig, md, opt.def_digest_algo );
else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
- g10_dsa_sign( skc, sig, md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
+ g10_dsa_sign( skc, sig, md, opt.def_digest_algo );
else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
- g10_rsa_sign( skc, sig, md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+ g10_rsa_sign( skc, sig, md, opt.def_digest_algo );
else
BUG();
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ sign_key( const char *username, STRLIST locusr )
}
/* build a list of all signators */
- rc=build_skc_list( locusr, &skc_list, 0 );
+ rc=build_skc_list( locusr, &skc_list, 0, 1 );
if( rc )
goto leave;
diff --git a/g10/skclist.c b/g10/skclist.c
index 53941cbfe..6d34b05bf 100644
--- a/g10/skclist.c
+++ b/g10/skclist.c
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ release_skc_list( SKC_LIST skc_list )
}
int
-build_skc_list( STRLIST locusr, SKC_LIST *ret_skc_list, int unlock )
+build_skc_list( STRLIST locusr, SKC_LIST *ret_skc_list, int unlock,
+ unsigned usage )
{
SKC_LIST skc_list = NULL;
int rc;
@@ -59,8 +60,12 @@ build_skc_list( STRLIST locusr, SKC_LIST *ret_skc_list, int unlock )
free_secret_cert( skc ); skc = NULL;
log_error("no default secret key: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
}
- else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo(skc->pubkey_algo)) ) {
+ else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(skc->pubkey_algo, usage)) ) {
SKC_LIST r;
+ if( skc->version == 4 && (usage & 1)
+ && skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
+ log_info("WARNING: This is probably a PGP generated "
+ "ElGamal key which is NOT secure for signatures!\n");
r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
r->skc = skc; skc = NULL;
r->next = skc_list;
@@ -81,8 +86,12 @@ build_skc_list( STRLIST locusr, SKC_LIST *ret_skc_list, int unlock )
free_secret_cert( skc ); skc = NULL;
log_error("skipped '%s': %s\n", locusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
}
- else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo(skc->pubkey_algo)) ) {
+ else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(skc->pubkey_algo, usage)) ) {
SKC_LIST r;
+ if( skc->version == 4 && (usage & 1)
+ && skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
+ log_info("WARNING: This is probably a PGP generated "
+ "ElGamal key which is NOT secure for signatures!\n");
r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
r->skc = skc; skc = NULL;
r->next = skc_list;
diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c
index 8a9c959ed..321f7baa6 100644
--- a/g10/trustdb.c
+++ b/g10/trustdb.c
@@ -849,6 +849,7 @@ verify_own_certs()
log_debug("checking secret key %08lX\n", (ulong)keyid[1] );
/* look wether we can access the public key of this secret key */
+ memset( pkc, 0, sizeof *pkc );
rc = get_pubkey( pkc, keyid );
if( rc ) {
log_error("keyid %08lX: secret key without public key\n",
@@ -1146,8 +1147,6 @@ static int
build_sigrecs( ulong pubkeyid )
{
TRUSTREC rec, krec, rec2;
- PUBKEY_FIND_INFO finfo=NULL;
- KBPOS kbpos;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
KBNODE node;
int rc=0;
@@ -1163,23 +1162,13 @@ build_sigrecs( ulong pubkeyid )
log_error("%lu: build_sigrecs: can't read dir record\n", pubkeyid );
goto leave;
}
- finfo = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *finfo );
- finfo->keyid[0] = rec.r.dir.keyid[0];
- finfo->keyid[1] = rec.r.dir.keyid[1];
if( (rc=read_record( rec.r.dir.keyrec, &krec, RECTYPE_KEY )) ) {
log_error("%lu: build_sigrecs: can't read key record\n", pubkeyid);
goto leave;
}
- finfo->pubkey_algo = krec.r.key.pubkey_algo;
- memcpy( finfo->fingerprint, krec.r.key.fingerprint, 20);
- rc = find_keyblock( finfo, &kbpos );
+ rc = get_keyblock_byfprint( &keyblock, krec.r.key.fingerprint );
if( rc ) {
- log_error("build_sigrecs: find_keyblock failed\n" );
- goto leave;
- }
- rc = read_keyblock( &kbpos, &keyblock );
- if( rc ) {
- log_error("build_sigrecs: read_keyblock failed\n" );
+ log_error("build_sigrecs: get_keyblock_byfprint failed\n" );
goto leave;
}
/* check all key signatures */
@@ -1290,7 +1279,6 @@ build_sigrecs( ulong pubkeyid )
update_no_sigs( pubkeyid, revoked? 3:1 ); /* no signatures */
leave:
- m_free( finfo );
release_kbnode( keyblock );
if( DBG_TRUST )
log_debug("trustdb: build_sigrecs: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
diff --git a/include/cipher.h b/include/cipher.h
index 0dfcf3e17..87440ef8d 100644
--- a/include/cipher.h
+++ b/include/cipher.h
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ int string_to_digest_algo( const char *string );
const char * pubkey_algo_to_string( int algo );
const char * digest_algo_to_string( int algo );
int check_pubkey_algo( int algo );
+int check_pubkey_algo2( int algo, unsigned usage );
int check_digest_algo( int algo );
/*-- smallprime.c --*/
diff --git a/include/errors.h b/include/errors.h
index 4821a6bab..7f60b8715 100644
--- a/include/errors.h
+++ b/include/errors.h
@@ -60,5 +60,6 @@
#define G10ERR_DELETE_FILE 38
#define G10ERR_UNEXPECTED 39
#define G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT 40
+#define G10ERR_WR_PUBKEY_ALGO 41 /* unusabe pubkey algo */
#endif /*G10_ERRORS_H*/
diff --git a/mpi/ChangeLog b/mpi/ChangeLog
index ca01cb4d8..0a967df48 100644
--- a/mpi/ChangeLog
+++ b/mpi/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+Wed Apr 8 09:44:33 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+ * config.links: Applied small fix from Ulf Möller.
+
Mon Apr 6 12:38:52 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* mpicoder.c (mpi_get_buffer): Removed returned leading zeroes
diff --git a/mpi/config.links b/mpi/config.links
index 65331777a..fe9bda1c2 100644
--- a/mpi/config.links
+++ b/mpi/config.links
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ esac
case "${target}" in
- *-*-linuxaout* | *-*-linuxoldld*)
+ *-*-linuxaout* | *-*-linuxoldld* | *-*-linux-gnuoldld*)
needs_underscore="y"
;;
*-*-linux* | *-sysv* | *-solaris* | *-gnu*)
diff --git a/util/errors.c b/util/errors.c
index 59426e6e2..4436e78c0 100644
--- a/util/errors.c
+++ b/util/errors.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ g10_errstr( int err )
X(DELETE_FILE ,"File delete error")
X(UNEXPECTED ,"Unexpected data")
X(TIME_CONFLICT ,"Timestamp conflict")
+ X(WR_PUBKEY_ALGO ,"Unusable pubkey algorithm")
default: p = buf; sprintf(buf, "g10err=%d", err); break;
}