summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/cipher
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorWerner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>2000-09-18 16:35:34 +0200
committerWerner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>2000-09-18 16:35:34 +0200
commit986d928ce2a561b04fda7730de6a94f9b1e703d6 (patch)
tree9d815bcf427ee76f678153f4b000d8843816a2bd /cipher
parentSee ChangeLog: Tue Aug 22 14:31:15 CEST 2000 Werner Koch (diff)
downloadgnupg2-986d928ce2a561b04fda7730de6a94f9b1e703d6.tar.xz
gnupg2-986d928ce2a561b04fda7730de6a94f9b1e703d6.zip
See ChangeLog: Mon Sep 18 16:35:45 CEST 2000 Werner Koch
Diffstat (limited to 'cipher')
-rw-r--r--cipher/ChangeLog18
-rw-r--r--cipher/Makefile.am1
-rw-r--r--cipher/pubkey.c26
-rw-r--r--cipher/random.c4
-rw-r--r--cipher/rndlinux.c7
-rw-r--r--cipher/rndunix.c5
-rw-r--r--cipher/rsa.c136
7 files changed, 161 insertions, 36 deletions
diff --git a/cipher/ChangeLog b/cipher/ChangeLog
index e37e3c351..2e4ebe53e 100644
--- a/cipher/ChangeLog
+++ b/cipher/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,21 @@
+Mon Sep 18 16:35:45 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
+
+ * rndlinux.c (open_device): Loose random device checking.
+ By Nils Ellmenreich.
+
+ * random.c (fast_random_poll): Check ENOSYS for getrusage.
+ * rndunix.c: Add 2 sources for QNX. By Sam Roberts.
+
+ * pubkey.c (gcry_pk_algo_info): Add GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_USAGE.
+
+ * rsa.c: Changed the comment about the patent.
+ (secret): Speed up by using the CRT. For a 2k keys this
+ is about 3 times faster.
+ (stronger_key_check): New but unused code to check the secret key.
+ * Makefile.am: Included rsa.[ch].
+ * pubkey.c: Enabled RSA support.
+ (pubkey_get_npkey): Removed RSA workaround.
+
Mon Jul 31 10:04:47 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* pubkey.c: Replaced all gcry_sexp_{car,cdr}_{data,mpi} by the new
diff --git a/cipher/Makefile.am b/cipher/Makefile.am
index 2ed370f05..26de92520 100644
--- a/cipher/Makefile.am
+++ b/cipher/Makefile.am
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ libcipher_la_SOURCES = cipher.c \
rmd.h \
dsa.h \
dsa.c \
+ rsa.c rsa.h \
smallprime.c \
construct.c
diff --git a/cipher/pubkey.c b/cipher/pubkey.c
index bbf592bb4..3dab336d7 100644
--- a/cipher/pubkey.c
+++ b/cipher/pubkey.c
@@ -30,9 +30,7 @@
#include "cipher.h"
#include "elgamal.h"
#include "dsa.h"
-#if 0
#include "rsa.h"
-#endif
#include "dynload.h"
/* FIXME: use set_lasterr() */
@@ -196,7 +194,6 @@ setup_pubkey_table(void)
BUG();
i++;
- #if 0
pubkey_table[i].algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA;
pubkey_table[i].name = rsa_get_info( pubkey_table[i].algo,
&pubkey_table[i].npkey,
@@ -248,7 +245,6 @@ setup_pubkey_table(void)
if( !pubkey_table[i].name )
BUG();
i++;
- #endif
for( ; i < TABLE_SIZE; i++ )
pubkey_table[i].name = NULL;
@@ -433,8 +429,6 @@ pubkey_get_npkey( int algo )
if( pubkey_table[i].algo == algo )
return pubkey_table[i].npkey;
} while( load_pubkey_modules() );
- if( is_RSA(algo) ) /* special hack, so that we are able to */
- return 2; /* see the RSA keyids */
return 0;
}
@@ -450,8 +444,6 @@ pubkey_get_nskey( int algo )
if( pubkey_table[i].algo == algo )
return pubkey_table[i].nskey;
} while( load_pubkey_modules() );
- if( is_RSA(algo) ) /* special hack, so that we are able to */
- return 6; /* see the RSA keyids */
return 0;
}
@@ -467,8 +459,6 @@ pubkey_get_nsig( int algo )
if( pubkey_table[i].algo == algo )
return pubkey_table[i].nsig;
} while( load_pubkey_modules() );
- if( is_RSA(algo) ) /* special hack, so that we are able to */
- return 1; /* see the RSA keyids */
return 0;
}
@@ -484,8 +474,6 @@ pubkey_get_nenc( int algo )
if( pubkey_table[i].algo == algo )
return pubkey_table[i].nenc;
} while( load_pubkey_modules() );
- if( is_RSA(algo) ) /* special hack, so that we are able to */
- return 1; /* see the RSA keyids */
return 0;
}
@@ -1509,6 +1497,11 @@ gcry_pk_ctl( int cmd, void *buffer, size_t buflen)
* Buffer must be NULL, nbytes may have the address of a variable
* with the required usage of the algorithm. It may be 0 for don't
* care or a combination of the GCRY_PK_USAGE_xxx flags;
+ * GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_USAGE:
+ * Return the usage glafs for the give algo. An invalid alog
+ * does return 0. Disabled algos are ignored here becuase we
+ * only want to know whether the algo is at all capable of
+ * the usage.
*
* On error the value -1 is returned and the error reason may be
* retrieved by gcry_errno().
@@ -1535,6 +1528,15 @@ gcry_pk_algo_info( int algo, int what, void *buffer, size_t *nbytes)
}
break;
+ case GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_USAGE:
+ do {
+ int i;
+ for(i=0; pubkey_table[i].name; i++ )
+ if( pubkey_table[i].algo == algo )
+ return pubkey_table[i].use;
+ } while( load_pubkey_modules() );
+ return 0;
+
case GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_NPKEY: return pubkey_get_npkey( algo );
case GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_NSKEY: return pubkey_get_nskey( algo );
case GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_NSIGN: return pubkey_get_nsig( algo );
diff --git a/cipher/random.c b/cipher/random.c
index 0258f5dd0..6f31b5625 100644
--- a/cipher/random.c
+++ b/cipher/random.c
@@ -604,7 +604,9 @@ fast_random_poll()
#endif
#else
{ struct rusage buf;
- if( getrusage( RUSAGE_SELF, &buf ) )
+ /* QNX/Neutrino does return ENOSYS - so we just ignore it and
+ * add whatever is in buf */
+ if( getrusage( RUSAGE_SELF, &buf ) && errno != ENOSYS )
BUG();
add_randomness( &buf, sizeof buf, 1 );
memset( &buf, 0, sizeof buf );
diff --git a/cipher/rndlinux.c b/cipher/rndlinux.c
index bca596fd1..c23269644 100644
--- a/cipher/rndlinux.c
+++ b/cipher/rndlinux.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ get_entropy_count( int fd )
#endif
/****************
- * Used to open the Linux and xBSD /dev/random devices
+ * Used to open the /dev/random devices (Linux, xBSD, Solaris (if it exists), ...)
*/
static int
open_device( const char *name, int minor )
@@ -76,8 +76,9 @@ open_device( const char *name, int minor )
g10_log_fatal("can't open %s: %s\n", name, strerror(errno) );
if( fstat( fd, &sb ) )
g10_log_fatal("stat() off %s failed: %s\n", name, strerror(errno) );
- if( !S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode) )
- g10_log_fatal("invalid random device!\n" );
+ /* Don't check device type for better portability */
+ /* if( (!S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) && (!S_ISFIFO(sb.st_mode)) )
+ g10_log_fatal("invalid random device!\n" ); */
return fd;
}
diff --git a/cipher/rndunix.c b/cipher/rndunix.c
index 99a416ea7..6c8e680b2 100644
--- a/cipher/rndunix.c
+++ b/cipher/rndunix.c
@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ static struct RI {
{ "/usr/ucb/ps", "aux", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "/usr/bin/ps", "aux", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "/bin/ps", "aux", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ { "/bin/ps", "-A", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, /*QNX*/
{ "/usr/bin/ipcs", "-a", SC(0.5), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "/bin/ipcs", "-a", SC(0.5), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
/* Unreliable source, depends on system usage */
@@ -292,6 +293,10 @@ static struct RI {
/* This is a complex and screwball program. Some systems have things
* like rX_dmn, x = integer, for RAID systems, but the statistics are
* pretty dodgy */
+#ifdef __QNXNTO__
+ { "/bin/pidin", "-F%A%B%c%d%E%I%J%K%m%M%n%N%p%P%S%s%T", SC(0.3),
+ NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+#endif
#if 0
/* The following aren't enabled since they're somewhat slow and not very
* unpredictable, however they give an indication of the sort of sources
diff --git a/cipher/rsa.c b/cipher/rsa.c
index 5d852cd88..2bb451002 100644
--- a/cipher/rsa.c
+++ b/cipher/rsa.c
@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
/* rsa.c - RSA function
* Copyright (C) 1997, 1998, 1999 by Werner Koch (dd9jn)
* Copyright (C) 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
- ***********************************************************************
- * ATTENTION: This code should not be used in the United States
- * before the U.S. Patent #4,405,829 expires on September 20, 2000!
- ***********************************************************************
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@@ -23,11 +19,16 @@
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
+/* This code uses an algorithm protected by U.S. Patent #4,405,829
+ which expires on September 20, 2000. The patent holder placed that
+ patent into the public domain on Sep 6th, 2000.
+*/
+
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
-#include "util.h"
+#include "g10lib.h"
#include "mpi.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "rsa.h"
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ test_keys( RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits )
pk.e = sk->e;
{ char *p = get_random_bits( nbits, 0, 0 );
mpi_set_buffer( test, p, (nbits+7)/8, 0 );
- m_free(p);
+ g10_free(p);
}
public( out1, test, &pk );
@@ -200,22 +201,111 @@ public(MPI output, MPI input, RSA_public_key *pkey )
mpi_powm( output, input, pkey->e, pkey->n );
}
+#if 0
+static void
+stronger_key_check ( RSA_secret_key *skey )
+{
+ MPI t = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
+ MPI t1 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
+ MPI t2 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
+ MPI phi = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
+
+ /* check that n == p * q */
+ mpi_mul( t, skey->p, skey->q);
+ if (mpi_cmp( t, skey->n) )
+ log_info ( "RSA Oops: n != p * q\n" );
+
+ /* check that p is less than q */
+ if( mpi_cmp( skey->p, skey->q ) > 0 )
+ log_info ("RSA Oops: p >= q\n");
+
+
+ /* check that e divides neither p-1 nor q-1 */
+ mpi_sub_ui(t, skey->p, 1 );
+ mpi_fdiv_r(t, t, skey->e );
+ if ( !mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) )
+ log_info ( "RSA Oops: e divides p-1\n" );
+ mpi_sub_ui(t, skey->q, 1 );
+ mpi_fdiv_r(t, t, skey->e );
+ if ( !mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) )
+ log_info ( "RSA Oops: e divides q-1\n" );
+
+ /* check that d is correct */
+ mpi_sub_ui( t1, skey->p, 1 );
+ mpi_sub_ui( t2, skey->q, 1 );
+ mpi_mul( phi, t1, t2 );
+ mpi_gcd(t, t1, t2);
+ mpi_fdiv_q(t, phi, t);
+ mpi_invm(t, skey->e, t );
+ if ( mpi_cmp(t, skey->d ) )
+ log_info ( "RSA Oops: d is wrong\n");
+
+ /* check for crrectness of u */
+ mpi_invm(t, skey->p, skey->q );
+ if ( mpi_cmp(t, skey->u ) )
+ log_info ( "RSA Oops: u is wrong\n");
+
+ log_info ( "RSA secret key check finished\n");
+
+ mpi_free (t);
+ mpi_free (t1);
+ mpi_free (t2);
+ mpi_free (phi);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+
/****************
* Secret key operation. Encrypt INPUT with SKEY and put result into OUTPUT.
*
* m = c^d mod n
*
- * Where m is OUTPUT, c is INPUT and d,n are elements of PKEY.
+ * Or faster:
*
- * FIXME: We should better use the Chinese Remainder Theorem
+ * m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p
+ * m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q
+ * h = u * (m2 - m1) mod q
+ * m = m1 + h * p
+ *
+ * Where m is OUTPUT, c is INPUT and d,n,p,q,u are elements of SKEY.
*/
static void
secret(MPI output, MPI input, RSA_secret_key *skey )
{
+ #if 0
mpi_powm( output, input, skey->d, skey->n );
+ #else
+ MPI m1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
+ MPI m2 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
+ MPI h = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
+
+ /* m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p */
+ mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->p, 1 );
+ mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h );
+ mpi_powm( m1, input, h, skey->p );
+ /* m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q */
+ mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->q, 1 );
+ mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h );
+ mpi_powm( m2, input, h, skey->q );
+ /* h = u * ( m2 - m1 ) mod q */
+ mpi_sub( h, m2, m1 );
+ if ( mpi_is_neg( h ) )
+ mpi_add ( h, h, skey->q );
+ mpi_mulm( h, skey->u, h, skey->q );
+ /* m = m2 + h * p */
+ mpi_mul ( h, h, skey->p );
+ mpi_add ( output, m1, h );
+ /* ready */
+
+ mpi_free ( h );
+ mpi_free ( m1 );
+ mpi_free ( m2 );
+ #endif
}
+
/*********************************************
************** interface ******************
*********************************************/
@@ -226,7 +316,7 @@ rsa_generate( int algo, unsigned nbits, MPI *skey, MPI **retfactors )
RSA_secret_key sk;
if( !is_RSA(algo) )
- return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+ return GCRYERR_INV_PK_ALGO;
generate( &sk, nbits );
skey[0] = sk.n;
@@ -236,7 +326,7 @@ rsa_generate( int algo, unsigned nbits, MPI *skey, MPI **retfactors )
skey[4] = sk.q;
skey[5] = sk.u;
/* make an empty list of factors */
- *retfactors = m_alloc_clear( 1 * sizeof **retfactors );
+ *retfactors = g10_xcalloc( 1, sizeof **retfactors );
return 0;
}
@@ -247,7 +337,7 @@ rsa_check_secret_key( int algo, MPI *skey )
RSA_secret_key sk;
if( !is_RSA(algo) )
- return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+ return GCRYERR_INV_PK_ALGO;
sk.n = skey[0];
sk.e = skey[1];
@@ -256,7 +346,7 @@ rsa_check_secret_key( int algo, MPI *skey )
sk.q = skey[4];
sk.u = skey[5];
if( !check_secret_key( &sk ) )
- return G10ERR_BAD_SECKEY;
+ return GCRYERR_INV_PK_ALGO;
return 0;
}
@@ -269,7 +359,7 @@ rsa_encrypt( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *pkey )
RSA_public_key pk;
if( algo != 1 && algo != 2 )
- return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+ return GCRYERR_INV_PK_ALGO;
pk.n = pkey[0];
pk.e = pkey[1];
@@ -284,7 +374,7 @@ rsa_decrypt( int algo, MPI *result, MPI *data, MPI *skey )
RSA_secret_key sk;
if( algo != 1 && algo != 2 )
- return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+ return GCRYERR_INV_PK_ALGO;
sk.n = skey[0];
sk.e = skey[1];
@@ -303,7 +393,7 @@ rsa_sign( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *skey )
RSA_secret_key sk;
if( algo != 1 && algo != 3 )
- return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+ return GCRYERR_INV_PK_ALGO;
sk.n = skey[0];
sk.e = skey[1];
@@ -326,13 +416,13 @@ rsa_verify( int algo, MPI hash, MPI *data, MPI *pkey,
int rc;
if( algo != 1 && algo != 3 )
- return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+ return GCRYERR_INV_PK_ALGO;
pk.n = pkey[0];
pk.e = pkey[1];
result = mpi_alloc( (160+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB);
public( result, data[0], &pk );
/*rc = (*cmp)( opaquev, result );*/
- rc = mpi_cmp( result, hash )? G10ERR_BAD_SIGN:0;
+ rc = mpi_cmp( result, hash )? GCRYERR_BAD_SIGNATURE:0;
mpi_free(result);
return rc;
@@ -366,10 +456,16 @@ rsa_get_info( int algo,
*nsig = 1;
switch( algo ) {
- case 1: *usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG | PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; return "RSA";
- case 2: *usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC; return "RSA-E";
- case 3: *usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; return "RSA-S";
+ case 1: *usage = GCRY_PK_USAGE_SIGN | GCRY_PK_USAGE_ENCR; return "RSA";
+ case 2: *usage = GCRY_PK_USAGE_ENCR; return "RSA-E";
+ case 3: *usage = GCRY_PK_USAGE_SIGN; return "RSA-S";
default:*usage = 0; return NULL;
}
}
+
+
+
+
+
+