This commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create branch

'GNUPG-1-9-BRANCH'.

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1303 deletions

diff --git a/g10/pkclist.c b/g10/pkclist.c
deleted file mode 100644
index cb1c506e3..000000000
--- a/g10/pkclist.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1303 +0,0 @@
-/* pkclist.c
- * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
- *
- * This file is part of GnuPG.
- *
- * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- * (at your option) any later version.
- *
- * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
- * GNU General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
- */
-
-#include <config.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <assert.h>
-
-#include "options.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "errors.h"
-#include "keydb.h"
-#include "memory.h"
-#include "util.h"
-#include "main.h"
-#include "trustdb.h"
-#include "ttyio.h"
-#include "status.h"
-#include "photoid.h"
-#include "i18n.h"
-
-
-#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)
-
-
-/****************
- * Show the revocation reason as it is stored with the given signature
- */
-static void
-do_show_revocation_reason( PKT_signature *sig )
-{
-    size_t n, nn;
-    const byte *p, *pp;
-    int seq = 0;
-    const char *text;
-
-    while( (p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON,
-				 &n, &seq, NULL )) ) {
-	if( !n )
-	    continue; /* invalid - just skip it */
-
-	if( *p == 0 )
-	    text = _("No reason specified");
-	else if( *p == 0x01 )
-	    text = _("Key is superseded");
-	else if( *p == 0x02 )
-	    text = _("Key has been compromised");
-	else if( *p == 0x03 )
-	    text = _("Key is no longer used");
-	else if( *p == 0x20 )
-	    text = _("User ID is no longer valid");
-	else
-	    text = NULL;
-
-	log_info( _("reason for revocation: ") );
-	if( text )
-	    fputs( text, log_stream() );
-	else
-	    fprintf( log_stream(), "code=%02x", *p );
-	putc( '\n', log_stream() );
-	n--; p++;
-	pp = NULL;
-	do {
-	    /* We don't want any empty lines, so skip them */
-	    while( n && *p == '\n' ) {
-		p++;
-		n--;
-	    }
-	    if( n ) {
-		pp = memchr( p, '\n', n );
-		nn = pp? pp - p : n;
-		log_info( _("revocation comment: ") );
-		print_string( log_stream(), p, nn, 0 );
-		putc( '\n', log_stream() );
-		p += nn; n -= nn;
-	    }
-	} while( pp );
-    }
-}
-
-/* Mode 0: try and find the revocation based on the pk (i.e. check
-   subkeys, etc.)  Mode 1: use only the revocation on the main pk */
-
-void
-show_revocation_reason( PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
-{
-    /* Hmmm, this is not so easy becuase we have to duplicate the code
-     * used in the trustbd to calculate the keyflags.  We need to find
-     * a clean way to check revocation certificates on keys and
-     * signatures.  And there should be no duplicate code.  Because we
-     * enter this function only when the trustdb told us that we have
-     * a revoked key, we could simply look for a revocation cert and
-     * display this one, when there is only one. Let's try to do this
-     * until we have a better solution.  */
-    KBNODE node, keyblock = NULL;
-    byte fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
-    size_t fingerlen;
-    int rc;
-
-    /* get the keyblock */
-    fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fingerprint, &fingerlen );
-    rc = get_keyblock_byfprint( &keyblock, fingerprint, fingerlen );
-    if( rc ) { /* that should never happen */
-	log_debug( "failed to get the keyblock\n");
-	return;
-    }
-
-    for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
-        if( (mode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) ||
-	  ( ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
-	      || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
-	    && !cmp_public_keys( node->pkt->pkt.public_key, pk ) ) )
-	    break;
-    }
-    if( !node ) {
-	log_debug("Oops, PK not in keyblock\n");
-	release_kbnode( keyblock );
-	return;
-    }
-    /* now find the revocation certificate */
-    for( node = node->next; node ; node = node->next ) {
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
-	    break;
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
-	    && (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20
-		|| node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28 ) ) {
-		/* FIXME: we should check the signature here */
-		do_show_revocation_reason ( node->pkt->pkt.signature );
-		break;
-	}
-    }
-
-    /* We didn't find it, so check if the whole key is revoked */
-    if(!node && !mode)
-      show_revocation_reason(pk,1);
-
-    release_kbnode( keyblock );
-}
-
-
-static void
-show_paths (const PKT_public_key *pk, int only_first )
-{
-    log_debug("not yet implemented\n");
-#if 0    
-    void *context = NULL;
-    unsigned otrust, validity;
-    int last_level, level;
-
-    last_level = 0;
-    while( (level=enum_cert_paths( &context, &lid, &otrust, &validity)) != -1){
-	char *p;
-	int c, rc;
-	size_t n;
-	u32 keyid[2];
-	PKT_public_key *pk ;
-
-	if( level < last_level && only_first )
-	    break;
-	last_level = level;
-
-	rc = keyid_from_lid( lid, keyid );
-
-	if( rc ) {
-	    log_error("ooops: can't get keyid for lid %lu\n", lid);
-	    return;
-	}
-
-	pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
-	rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
-	if( rc ) {
-	    log_error("key %08lX: public key not found: %s\n",
-				    (ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc) );
-	    return;
-	}
-
-	tty_printf("%*s%4u%c/%08lX.%lu %s \"",
-		  level*2, "",
-		  nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
-		  (ulong)keyid[1], lid, datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
-
-	c = trust_letter(otrust);
-	if( c )
-	    putchar( c );
-	else
-	    printf( "%02x", otrust );
-	putchar('/');
-	c = trust_letter(validity);
-	if( c )
-	    putchar( c );
-	else
-	    printf( "%02x", validity );
-	putchar(' ');
-
-	p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
-	tty_print_utf8_string( p, n ),
-	m_free(p);
-	tty_printf("\"\n");
-	free_public_key( pk );
-    }
-    enum_cert_paths( &context, NULL, NULL, NULL ); /* release context */
-#endif
-    tty_printf("\n");
-}
-
-
-
-
-/****************
- * mode: 0 = standard
- *       1 = Without key info and additional menu option 'm'
- *           this does also add an option to set the key to ultimately trusted.
- * Returns: 
- *      -2 = nothing changed - caller should show some additional info
- *      -1 = quit operation
- *       0 = nothing changed
- *       1 = new ownertrust now in new_trust
- */
-static int
-do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
-                    unsigned *new_trust, int defer_help )
-{
-  char *p;
-  size_t n;
-  u32 keyid[2];
-  int changed=0;
-  int quit=0;
-  int show=0;
-  int did_help=defer_help;
-
-  keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
-  for(;;) {
-    /* a string with valid answers */
-    const char *ans = _("iImMqQsS");
-
-    if( !did_help ) 
-      {
-        if( !mode ) 
-          {
-            KBNODE keyblock, un;
-
-            tty_printf(_("No trust value assigned to:\n"
-                         "%4u%c/%08lX %s \""),
-                       nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
-                       (ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
-            p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
-            tty_print_utf8_string( p, n ),
-              m_free(p);
-            tty_printf("\"\n");
-
-            keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (keyid);
-            if (!keyblock)
-                BUG ();
-            for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next) {
-                if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
-                    continue;
-                if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
-                    continue;
-                if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
-                    continue;
-		/* Only skip textual primaries */
-                if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary &&
-		    !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
-		    continue;
-                
-		if(opt.show_photos && un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
-                    show_photos(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
-                                un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,pk,NULL);
-                
-		tty_printf ("      %s", _("                aka \""));
-                tty_print_utf8_string (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
-                                       un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
-                tty_printf("\"\n");
-            }
-        
-            print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 2);
-            tty_printf("\n");
-          }
-        tty_printf (_(
-                     "Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly\n"
-                     "verify other users' keys (by looking at passports,\n"
-                     "checking fingerprints from different sources...)?\n\n"));
-        tty_printf (_(" %d = Don't know\n"), 1);
-        tty_printf (_(" %d = I do NOT trust\n"), 2);
-        tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust marginally\n"), 3);
-        tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust fully\n"), 4);
-        if (mode)
-          tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust ultimately\n"), 5);
-#if 0
-	/* not yet implemented */
-        tty_printf (_(" i = please show me more information\n") );
-#endif
-        if( mode )
-          tty_printf(_(" m = back to the main menu\n"));
-        else
-	  {
-	    tty_printf(_(" s = skip this key\n"));
-	    tty_printf(_(" q = quit\n"));
-	  }
-        tty_printf("\n");
-        did_help = 1;
-      }
-    if( strlen(ans) != 8 )
-      BUG();
-    p = cpr_get("edit_ownertrust.value",_("Your decision? "));
-    trim_spaces(p);
-    cpr_kill_prompt();
-    if( !*p )
-      did_help = 0;
-    else if( *p && p[1] )
-      ;
-    else if( !p[1] && (*p >= '1' && *p <= (mode?'5':'4')) ) 
-      {
-        unsigned int trust;
-        switch( *p )
-          {
-          case '1': trust = TRUST_UNDEFINED; break;
-          case '2': trust = TRUST_NEVER    ; break;
-          case '3': trust = TRUST_MARGINAL ; break;
-          case '4': trust = TRUST_FULLY    ; break;
-          case '5': trust = TRUST_ULTIMATE ; break;
-          default: BUG();
-          }
-        if (trust == TRUST_ULTIMATE
-            && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("edit_ownertrust.set_ultimate.okay",
-                                       _("Do you really want to set this key"
-                                         " to ultimate trust? ")))
-          ; /* no */
-        else
-          {
-            *new_trust = trust;
-            changed = 1;
-            break;
-          }
-      }
-#if 0
-    /* not yet implemented */
-    else if( *p == ans[0] || *p == ans[1] ) 
-      {
-        tty_printf(_("Certificates leading to an ultimately trusted key:\n"));
-        show = 1;
-        break;
-      }
-#endif
-    else if( mode && (*p == ans[2] || *p == ans[3] || *p == CONTROL_D ) ) 
-      {
-        break ; /* back to the menu */
-      }
-    else if( !mode && (*p == ans[6] || *p == ans[7] ) )
-      {
-	break; /* skip */
-      }
-    else if( !mode && (*p == ans[4] || *p == ans[5] ) )
-      {
-        quit = 1;
-        break ; /* back to the menu */
-      }
-    m_free(p); p = NULL;
-  }
-  m_free(p);
-  return show? -2: quit? -1 : changed;
-}
-
-/* 
- * Display a menu to change the ownertrust of the key PK (which should
- * be a primary key).  
- * For mode values see do_edit_ownertrust ()
- */
-int
-edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
-{
-  unsigned int trust;
-  int no_help = 0;
-
-  for(;;)
-    {
-      switch ( do_edit_ownertrust (pk, mode, &trust, no_help ) )
-        {
-        case -1: /* quit */
-          return -1;
-        case -2: /* show info */
-          show_paths(pk, 1);
-          no_help = 1;
-          break;
-        case 1: /* trust value set */
-          trust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
-          trust |= get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
-          update_ownertrust (pk, trust );
-          return 1;
-        default:
-          return 0;
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Check whether we can trust this pk which has a trustlevel of TRUSTLEVEL
- * Returns: true if we trust.
- */
-static int
-do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int *trustlevel )
-{
-    unsigned int trustmask = 0;
-
-    /* FIXME: get_pubkey_byname already checks the validity and won't
-     * return keys which are either expired or revoked - so these
-     * question here won't get triggered.  We have to find a solution
-     * for this.  It might make sense to have a function in getkey.c
-     * which does only the basic checks and returns even revoked and
-     * expired keys.  This fnction could then also returhn a list of
-     * keys if the speicified name is ambiguous
-     */
-    if( (*trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) ) {
-	log_info(_("key %08lX: key has been revoked!\n"),
-					(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-	show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
-	if( opt.batch )
-          return 0; /* no */
-
-	if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("revoked_key.override",
-				    _("Use this key anyway? ")) )
-          return 0; /* no */
-	trustmask |= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
-    }
-    if( (*trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) ) {
-	log_info(_("key %08lX: subkey has been revoked!\n"),
-					(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-	show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
-	if( opt.batch )
-	    return 0;
-
-	if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("revoked_key.override",
-				    _("Use this key anyway? ")) )
-	    return 0;
-	trustmask |= TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED;
-    }
-    *trustlevel &= ~trustmask;
-
-    if( opt.always_trust) {
-	if( opt.verbose )
-	    log_info("No trust check due to --always-trust option\n");
-	return 1;
-    }
-
-    switch( (*trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) ) {
-      case TRUST_EXPIRED:
-	log_info(_("%08lX: key has expired\n"),
-				    (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-	return 0; /* no */
-
-      default:
-         log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
-                    *trustlevel);
-         /* fall thru */
-      case TRUST_UNKNOWN: 
-      case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
-        log_info(_("%08lX: There is no indication that this key "
-                   "really belongs to the owner\n"),
-                 (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-	return 0; /* no */
-
-      case TRUST_NEVER:
-	log_info(_("%08lX: We do NOT trust this key\n"),
-					(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-	return 0; /* no */
-
-      case TRUST_MARGINAL:
-	log_info(
-       _("%08lX: It is not sure that this key really belongs to the owner\n"
-	 "but it is accepted anyway\n"), (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-	return 1; /* yes */
-
-      case TRUST_FULLY:
-	if( opt.verbose )
-	    log_info(_("This key probably belongs to the owner\n"));
-	return 1; /* yes */
-
-      case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
-	if( opt.verbose )
-	    log_info(_("This key belongs to us\n"));
-	return 1; /* yes */
-    }
-
-    return 1; /* yes */
-}
-
-
-
-/****************
- * wrapper around do_we_trust, so we can ask whether to use the
- * key anyway.
- */
-static int
-do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
-{
-    int rc;
-
-    rc = do_we_trust( pk, &trustlevel );
-
-    if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) && !rc )
-	return 0;
-    if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) && !rc )
-	return 0;
-
-    if( !opt.batch && !rc ) {
-	char *p;
-	u32 keyid[2];
-	size_t n;
-
-	keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid);
-	tty_printf( "%4u%c/%08lX %s \"",
-		  nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
-		  (ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
-	p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
-	tty_print_utf8_string( p, n ),
-	m_free(p);
-	tty_printf("\"\n");
-        print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 2);
-	tty_printf("\n");
-
-	tty_printf(_(
-"It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named\n"
-"in the user ID.  If you *really* know what you are doing,\n"
-"you may answer the next question with yes\n\n"));
-
-	if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("untrusted_key.override",
-				  _("Use this key anyway? "))  )
-	    rc = 1;
-
-	/* Hmmm: Should we set a flag to tell the user about
-	 *	 his decision the next time he encrypts for this recipient?
-	 */
-    }
-    else if( opt.always_trust && !rc ) {
-	if( !opt.quiet )
-	    log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
-	rc = 1;
-    }
-    return rc;
-}
-
-
-
-/****************
- * Check whether we can trust this signature.
- * Returns: Error if we shall not trust this signatures.
- */
-int
-check_signatures_trust( PKT_signature *sig )
-{
-  PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
-  unsigned int trustlevel;
-  int rc=0;
-
-  if ( opt.always_trust)
-    {
-      if( !opt.quiet )
-        log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
-      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
-        print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
-      goto leave;
-    }
-
-  rc = get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid );
-  if (rc) 
-    { /* this should not happen */
-      log_error("Ooops; the key vanished  - can't check the trust\n");
-      rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
-      goto leave;
-    }
-
-  trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL);
-
-  if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) ) 
-    {
-      write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
-      log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
-      log_info(_("         This could mean that the signature is forgery.\n"));
-      show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
-    }
-  else if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) ) 
-    {
-      write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
-      log_info(_("WARNING: This subkey has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
-      show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
-    }
-  
-  if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
-    log_info (_("Note: This key has been disabled.\n"));
-
-  switch ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) ) 
-    {
-    case TRUST_EXPIRED:
-      log_info(_("Note: This key has expired!\n"));
-      print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
-      break;
-        
-    default:
-      log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
-                 trustlevel);
-      /* fall thru */
-    case TRUST_UNKNOWN: 
-    case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
-      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED );
-      log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
-                 " a trusted signature!\n"));
-      log_info(_("         There is no indication that the "
-                 "signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
-      print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
-      break;
-
-    case TRUST_NEVER:
-      /* currently we won't get that status */
-      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_NEVER );
-      log_info(_("WARNING: We do NOT trust this key!\n"));
-      log_info(_("         The signature is probably a FORGERY.\n"));
-      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
-        print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
-      rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
-      break;
-
-    case TRUST_MARGINAL:
-      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_MARGINAL );
-      log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
-                 " sufficiently trusted signatures!\n"));
-      log_info(_("         It is not certain that the"
-                 " signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
-      print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
-      break;
-
-    case TRUST_FULLY:
-      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_FULLY );
-      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
-        print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
-      break;
-
-    case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
-      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_ULTIMATE );
-      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
-        print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
-      break;
-    }
-
- leave:
-  free_public_key( pk );
-  return rc;
-}
-
-
-void
-release_pk_list( PK_LIST pk_list )
-{
-    PK_LIST pk_rover;
-
-    for( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_rover ) {
-	pk_rover = pk_list->next;
-	free_public_key( pk_list->pk );
-	m_free( pk_list );
-    }
-}
-
-
-static int
-key_present_in_pk_list(PK_LIST pk_list, PKT_public_key *pk)
-{
-    for( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_list->next)
-	if (cmp_public_keys(pk_list->pk, pk) == 0)
-	    return 0;
-
-    return -1;
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Return a malloced string with a default reciepient if there is any
- */
-static char *
-default_recipient(void)
-{
-    PKT_secret_key *sk;
-    byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
-    size_t n;
-    char *p;
-    int i;
-
-    if( opt.def_recipient )
-	return m_strdup( opt.def_recipient );
-    if( !opt.def_recipient_self )
-	return NULL;
-    sk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
-    i = get_seckey_byname( sk, NULL, 0 );
-    if( i ) {
-	free_secret_key( sk );
-	return NULL;
-    }
-    n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN;
-    fingerprint_from_sk( sk, fpr, &n );
-    free_secret_key( sk );
-    p = m_alloc( 2*n+3 );
-    *p++ = '0';
-    *p++ = 'x';
-    for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
-	sprintf( p+2*i, "%02X", fpr[i] );
-    p -= 2;
-    return p;
-}
-
-static int
-expand_id(const char *id,STRLIST *into,unsigned int flags)
-{
-  struct groupitem *groups;
-  int count=0;
-
-  for(groups=opt.grouplist;groups;groups=groups->next)
-    {
-      /* need strcasecmp() here, as this should be localized */
-      if(strcasecmp(groups->name,id)==0)
-	{
-	  STRLIST each,sl;
-
-	  /* this maintains the current utf8-ness */
-	  for(each=groups->values;each;each=each->next)
-	    {
-	      sl=add_to_strlist(into,each->d);
-	      sl->flags=flags;
-	      count++;
-	    }
-
-	  break;
-	}
-    }
-
-  return count;
-}
-
-/* For simplicity, and to avoid potential loops, we only expand once -
-   you can't make an alias that points to an alias. */
-static STRLIST
-expand_group(STRLIST input)
-{
-  STRLIST sl,output=NULL,rover;
-
-  for(rover=input;rover;rover=rover->next)
-    if(expand_id(rover->d,&output,rover->flags)==0)
-      {
-	/* Didn't find any groups, so use the existing string */
-	sl=add_to_strlist(&output,rover->d);
-	sl->flags=rover->flags;
-      }
-
-  return output;
-}
-
-int
-build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
-{
-    PK_LIST pk_list = NULL;
-    PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
-    int rc=0;
-    int any_recipients=0;
-    STRLIST rov,remusr;
-    char *def_rec = NULL;
-
-    if(opt.grouplist)
-      remusr=expand_group(rcpts);
-    else
-      remusr=rcpts;
-
-    /* check whether there are any recipients in the list and build the
-     * list of the encrypt-to ones (we always trust them) */
-    for( rov = remusr; rov; rov = rov->next ) {
-	if( !(rov->flags & 1) )
-	    any_recipients = 1;
-	else if( (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) && !opt.no_encrypt_to ) {
-	    pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
-	    pk->req_usage = use;
-	    if( (rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, rov->d, NULL, NULL )) ) {
-		free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
-		log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
-                write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
-                                              rov->d, strlen (rov->d), -1);
-		goto fail;
-            }
-	    else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use )) ) {
-		/* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
-		 * in the list */
-		if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0) {
-		    free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
-		    log_info(_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"),
-							    rov->d);
-		}
-		else {
-		    PK_LIST r;
-		    r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
-		    r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
-		    r->next = pk_list;
-		    r->mark = 0;
-		    pk_list = r;
-		}
-	    }
-	    else {
-		free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
-		log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
-                write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
-                                              rov->d, strlen (rov->d), -1);
-		goto fail;
-	    }
-	}
-    }
-
-    if( !any_recipients && !opt.batch ) { /* ask */
-	int have_def_rec;
-	char *answer=NULL;
-	STRLIST backlog=NULL;
-
-	def_rec = default_recipient();
-	have_def_rec = !!def_rec;
-	if( !have_def_rec )
-	    tty_printf(_(
-		"You did not specify a user ID. (you may use \"-r\")\n"));
-	for(;;) {
-	    rc = 0;
-	    m_free(answer);
-	    if( have_def_rec ) {
-		answer = def_rec;
-		def_rec = NULL;
-	    }
-	    else if(backlog) {
-	      answer=pop_strlist(&backlog);
-	    }
-	    else {
-		answer = cpr_get_utf8("pklist.user_id.enter",
-			 _("\nEnter the user ID.  End with an empty line: "));
-		trim_spaces(answer);
-		cpr_kill_prompt();
-	    }
-	    if( !answer || !*answer ) {
-	        m_free(answer);
-		break;
-	    }
-	    if(expand_id(answer,&backlog,0))
-	      continue;
-	    if( pk )
-		free_public_key( pk );
-	    pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
-	    pk->req_usage = use;
-	    rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, answer, NULL, NULL );
-	    if( rc )
-		tty_printf(_("No such user ID.\n"));
-	    else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use)) ) {
-		if( have_def_rec ) {
-		    if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0) {
-			free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
-			log_info(_("skipped: public key "
-				   "already set as default recipient\n") );
-		    }
-		    else {
-			PK_LIST r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
-			r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
-			r->next = pk_list;
-			r->mark = 0;
-			pk_list = r;
-		    }
-		    any_recipients = 1;
-		    continue;
-		}
-		else {
-		    int trustlevel;
-
-		    trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL);
-		    if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) {
-			tty_printf(_("Public key is disabled.\n") );
-		    }
-		    else if( do_we_trust_pre( pk, trustlevel ) ) {
-			/* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
-			 * in the list */
-			if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0) {
-			    free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
-			    log_info(_("skipped: public key already set\n") );
-			}
-			else {
-			    PK_LIST r;
-			    char *p;
-			    size_t n;
-			    u32 keyid[2];
-
-			    keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid);
-			    tty_printf("Added %4u%c/%08lX %s \"",
-				       nbits_from_pk( pk ),
-				       pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
-				       (ulong)keyid[1],
-				       datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
-			    p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
-			    tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
-			    m_free(p);
-			    tty_printf("\"\n");
-
-			    r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
-			    r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
-			    r->next = pk_list;
-			    r->mark = 0;
-			    pk_list = r;
-			}
-			any_recipients = 1;
-			continue;
-		    }
-		}
-	    }
-	    m_free(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
-	    have_def_rec = 0;
-	}
-	if( pk ) {
-	    free_public_key( pk );
-	    pk = NULL;
-	}
-    }
-    else if( !any_recipients && (def_rec = default_recipient()) ) {
-	pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
-	pk->req_usage = use;
-	rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, def_rec, NULL, NULL );
-	if( rc )
-	    log_error(_("unknown default recipient `%s'\n"), def_rec );
-	else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use)) ) {
-	  /* Mark any_recipients here since the default recipient
-             would have been used if it wasn't already there.  It
-             doesn't really matter if we got this key from the default
-             recipient or an encrypt-to. */
-	  any_recipients = 1;
-	  if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0)
-	    log_info(_("skipped: public key already set as default recipient\n"));
-	  else {
-	    PK_LIST r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
-	    r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
-	    r->next = pk_list;
-	    r->mark = 0;
-	    pk_list = r;
-	  }
-	}
-	if( pk ) {
-	    free_public_key( pk );
-	    pk = NULL;
-	}
-	m_free(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
-    }
-    else {
-	any_recipients = 0;
-	for(; remusr; remusr = remusr->next ) {
-	    if( (remusr->flags & 1) )
-		continue; /* encrypt-to keys are already handled */
-
-	    pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
-	    pk->req_usage = use;
-	    if( (rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, remusr->d, NULL, NULL )) ) {
-		free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
-		log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), remusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
-                write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
-                                              remusr->d, strlen (remusr->d),
-                                              -1);
-		goto fail;
-	    }
-	    else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use )) ) {
-		int trustlevel;
-
-		trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->namehash);
-		if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) {
-		    free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
-		    log_info(_("%s: skipped: public key is disabled\n"),
-								    remusr->d);
-                    write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
-                                                  remusr->d,
-                                                  strlen (remusr->d),
-                                                  -1);
-		    rc=G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY;
-		    goto fail;
-		}
-		else if( do_we_trust_pre( pk, trustlevel ) ) {
-		    /* note: do_we_trust may have changed the trustlevel */
-
-		    /* We have at least one valid recipient. It doesn't matters
-		     * if this recipient is already present. */
-		    any_recipients = 1;
-
-		    /* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
-		     * in the list */
-		    if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0) {
-			free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
-			log_info(_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"),
-								    remusr->d);
-		    }
-		    else {
-			PK_LIST r;
-			r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
-			r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
-			r->next = pk_list;
-			r->mark = 0;
-			pk_list = r;
-		    }
-		}
-		else { /* we don't trust this pk */
-		    free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
-                    write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "10 ",
-                                                  remusr->d,
-                                                  strlen (remusr->d),
-                                                  -1);
-		    rc=G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY;
-		    goto fail;
-		}
-	    }
-	    else {
-		free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
-                write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
-                                              remusr->d,
-                                              strlen (remusr->d),
-                                              -1);
-		log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), remusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
-		goto fail;
-	    }
-	}
-    }
-
-    if( !rc && !any_recipients ) {
-	log_error(_("no valid addressees\n"));
-        write_status_text (STATUS_NO_RECP, "0");
-	rc = G10ERR_NO_USER_ID;
-    }
-
- fail:
-
-    if( rc )
-	release_pk_list( pk_list );
-    else
-	*ret_pk_list = pk_list;
-    if(opt.grouplist)
-      free_strlist(remusr);
-    return rc;
-}
-
-
-/* In pgp6 mode, disallow all ciphers except IDEA (1), 3DES (2), and
-   CAST5 (3), all hashes except MD5 (1), SHA1 (2), and RIPEMD160 (3),
-   and all compressions except none (0) and ZIP (1).  pgp7 mode
-   expands the cipher list to include AES128 (7), AES192 (8), AES256
-   (9), and TWOFISH (10).  For a true PGP key all of this is unneeded
-   as they are the only items present in the preferences subpacket,
-   but checking here covers the weird case of encrypting to a key that
-   had preferences from a different implementation which was then used
-   with PGP.  I am not completely comfortable with this as the right
-   thing to do, as it slightly alters the list of what the user is
-   supposedly requesting.  It is not against the RFC however, as the
-   preference chosen will never be one that the user didn't specify
-   somewhere ("The implementation may use any mechanism to pick an
-   algorithm in the intersection"), and PGP has no mechanism to fix
-   such a broken preference list, so I'm including it. -dms */
-
-static int
-algo_available( int preftype, int algo, void *hint )
-{
-    if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM ) {
-        if( opt.pgp6 && ( algo != 1 && algo != 2 && algo != 3) )
-	  return 0;
-
-        if( opt.pgp7 && (algo != 1 && algo != 2 && algo != 3 &&
-			 algo != 7 && algo != 8 && algo != 9 && algo != 10) )
-	  return 0;
-
-	return algo && !check_cipher_algo( algo );
-    }
-    else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_HASH ) {
-        int bits=0;
-
-	if(hint)
-	  bits=*(int *)hint;
-
-	if(bits && (bits != md_digest_length(algo)))
-	  return 0;
-
-        if( (opt.pgp6 || opt.pgp7 ) && ( algo != 1 && algo != 2 && algo != 3) )
-	  return 0;
-
-	return algo && !check_digest_algo( algo );
-    }
-    else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP ) {
-        if ( ( opt.pgp6 || opt.pgp7 ) && ( algo !=0 && algo != 1) )
-	  return 0;
-
-	return !check_compress_algo( algo );
-    }
-    else
-	return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-/****************
- * Return -1 if we could not find an algorithm.
- */
-int
-select_algo_from_prefs(PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype, int request, void *hint)
-{
-    PK_LIST pkr;
-    u32 bits[8];
-    const prefitem_t *prefs;
-    int i, j;
-    int compr_hack=0;
-    int any;
-
-    if( !pk_list )
-	return -1;
-
-    memset( bits, ~0, 8 * sizeof *bits );
-    for( pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next ) {
-	u32 mask[8];
-
-	memset( mask, 0, 8 * sizeof *mask );
-	if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM ) {
-	  if( opt.pgp2 &&
-	      pkr->pk->version < 4 &&
-	      pkr->pk->selfsigversion < 4 )
-	    mask[0] |= (1<<1); /* IDEA is implicitly there for v3 keys
-				  with v3 selfsigs (rfc2440:12.1) if
-				  --pgp2 mode is on.  This doesn't
-				  mean it's actually available, of
-				  course. */
-	  else
-	    mask[0] |= (1<<2); /* 3DES is implicitly there for everyone else */
-	}
-	else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_HASH ) {
-	  /* While I am including this code for completeness, note
-	     that currently --pgp2 mode locks the hash at MD5, so this
-	     function will never even be called.  Even if the hash
-	     wasn't locked at MD5, we don't support sign+encrypt in
-	     --pgp2 mode, and that's the only time PREFTYPE_HASH is
-	     used anyway. -dms */
-	  if( opt.pgp2 &&
-	      pkr->pk->version < 4 &&
-	      pkr->pk->selfsigversion < 4 )
-	    mask[0] |= (1<<1); /* MD5 is there for v3 keys with v3
-				  selfsigs when --pgp2 is on. */
-	  else
-	    mask[0] |= (1<<2); /* SHA1 is there for everyone else */
-	}
-	else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP )
-	  mask[0] |= (1<<0); /* Uncompressed is implicit */
-
-        if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
-            prefs = pkr->pk->user_id->prefs;
-        else
-            prefs = pkr->pk->prefs;
-
-	any = 0;
-	if( prefs ) {
-	    for (i=0; prefs[i].type; i++ ) {
-		if( prefs[i].type == preftype ) {
-		    mask[prefs[i].value/32] |= 1 << (prefs[i].value%32);
-		    any = 1;
-		}
-	    }
-	}
-
-	if( (!prefs || !any) && preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP ) {
-	    mask[0] |= 3; /* asume no_compression and old pgp */
-	    compr_hack = 1;
-	}
-
-      #if 0
-	log_debug("pref mask=%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX\n",
-	       (ulong)mask[7], (ulong)mask[6], (ulong)mask[5], (ulong)mask[4],
-	     (ulong)mask[3], (ulong)mask[2], (ulong)mask[1], (ulong)mask[0]);
-      #endif
-	for(i=0; i < 8; i++ )
-	    bits[i] &= mask[i];
-      #if 0
-	log_debug("pref bits=%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX\n",
-	       (ulong)bits[7], (ulong)bits[6], (ulong)bits[5], (ulong)bits[4],
-	     (ulong)bits[3], (ulong)bits[2], (ulong)bits[1], (ulong)bits[0]);
-      #endif
-    }
-    /* usable algorithms are now in bits
-     * We now use the last key from pk_list to select
-     * the algorithm we want to use. there are no
-     * preferences for the last key, we select the one
-     * corresponding to first set bit.
-     */
-    i = -1;
-    any = 0;
-
-    /* Can we use the requested algorithm? */
-    if(request>-1 && (bits[request/32] & (1<<(request%32))) &&
-       algo_available(preftype,request,hint))
-      return request;
-
-    /* If we have personal prefs set, use them instead of the last key */
-    if(preftype==PREFTYPE_SYM && opt.personal_cipher_prefs)
-      prefs=opt.personal_cipher_prefs;
-    else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH && opt.personal_digest_prefs)
-      prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs;
-    else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_ZIP && opt.personal_compress_prefs)
-      prefs=opt.personal_compress_prefs;
-
-    if( prefs ) {
-	for(j=0; prefs[j].type; j++ ) {
-	    if( prefs[j].type == preftype ) {
-                if( (bits[prefs[j].value/32] & (1<<(prefs[j].value%32))) ) {
-		    if( algo_available( preftype, prefs[j].value, hint ) ) {
-			any = 1;
-			i = prefs[j].value;
-			break;
-		    }
-		}
-	    }
-	}
-    }
-    if( !prefs || !any ) {
-	for(j=0; j < 256; j++ )
-	    if( (bits[j/32] & (1<<(j%32))) ) {
-		if( algo_available( preftype, j, hint ) ) {
-		    i = j;
-		    break;
-		}
-	    }
-    }
-
-  #if 0
-    log_debug("prefs of type %d: selected %d\n", preftype, i );
-  #endif
-    if( compr_hack && !i ) {
-	/* selected no compression, but we should check whether
-	 * algorithm 1 is also available (the ordering is not relevant
-	 * in this case). */
-	if( bits[0] & (1<<1) )
-	    i = 1;  /* yep; we can use compression algo 1 */
-    }
-
-    /* "If you are building an authentication system, the recipient
-       may specify a preferred signing algorithm. However, the signer
-       would be foolish to use a weak algorithm simply because the
-       recipient requests it." RFC2440:13.  If we settle on MD5, and
-       SHA1 is also available, use SHA1 instead.  Of course, if the
-       user intentinally chose MD5 (by putting it in their personal
-       prefs), then we should do what they say. */
-
-    if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH &&
-       i==DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 && (bits[0] & (1<<DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1)))
-      {
-	i=DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
-
-	if(opt.personal_digest_prefs)
-	  for(j=0; prefs[j].type; j++ )
-	    if(opt.personal_digest_prefs[j].type==PREFTYPE_HASH &&
-	       opt.personal_digest_prefs[j].value==DIGEST_ALGO_MD5)
-	      {
-		i=DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
-		break;
-	      }
-      }
-
-    return i;
-}
-
-/*
- * Select the MDC flag from the pk_list.  We can only use MDC if all recipients
- * support this feature 
- */
-int
-select_mdc_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
-{
-    PK_LIST pkr;
-
-    if( !pk_list )
-	return 0;
-
-    for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next) {
-        int mdc;
-
-        if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
-            mdc = pkr->pk->user_id->mdc_feature;
-        else
-            mdc = pkr->pk->mdc_feature;
-        if (!mdc)
-            return 0; /* at least one recipient does not support it */
-    }
-    return 1; /* can be used */
-}