Update head to match stable 1.0

1 files changed, 1336 insertions, 2512 deletions

diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c
index 1fd2383c0..85b7dbcb9 100644
--- a/g10/trustdb.c
+++ b/g10/trustdb.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* trustdb.c
- *	Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
@@ -22,599 +22,353 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
 #include <assert.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "errors.h"
 #include "iobuf.h"
 #include "keydb.h"
-#include <gcrypt.h>
+#include "memory.h"
 #include "util.h"
-#include "trustdb.h"
 #include "options.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "main.h"
 #include "i18n.h"
 #include "tdbio.h"
-#include "ttyio.h"
-
-#if MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN > 20
-  #error Must change structure of trustdb
-#endif
-
-struct keyid_list {
-    struct keyid_list *next;
-    u32 keyid[2];
-};
+#include "trustdb.h"
 
-struct local_id_item {
-    struct local_id_item *next;
-    ulong lid;
-    unsigned flag;
-};
 
-struct local_id_table {
-    struct local_id_table *next; /* only used to keep a list of unused tables */
-    struct local_id_item *items[16];
+/*
+ * A structure to store key identification as well as some stuff needed
+ * for validation 
+ */
+struct key_item {
+  struct key_item *next;
+  unsigned int ownertrust;
+  u32 kid[2];
 };
 
 
-typedef struct local_id_table *LOCAL_ID_TABLE;
-
-
-struct enum_cert_paths_ctx {
-   int init;
-   int idx;
-};
-
+typedef struct key_item **KeyHashTable; /* see new_key_hash_table() */
 
-struct recno_list_struct {
-    struct recno_list_struct *next;
-    ulong recno;
-    int type;
-};
-typedef struct recno_list_struct *RECNO_LIST;
-
-
-
-typedef struct trust_node *TN;
-struct trust_node {
-    TN	  back;  /* parent */
-    TN	  list;  /* list of other node (should all be of the same type)*/
-    TN	  next;  /* used to build the list */
-    int   is_uid; /* set if this is an uid node */
-    ulong lid;	 /* key or uid recordnumber */
-    union {
-	struct {
-	    int ownertrust;
-	    int validity;
-	    /* helper */
-	    int buckstop;
-	} k;
-	struct {
-	    int marginal_count;
-	    int fully_count;
-	    int validity;
-	} u;
-    } n;
+/*
+ * Structure to keep track of keys, this is used as an array wherre
+ * the item right after the last one has a keyblock set to NULL. 
+ * Maybe we can drop this thing and replace it by key_item
+ */
+struct key_array {
+  KBNODE keyblock;
 };
 
 
-static TN used_tns;
-static int alloced_tns;
-static int max_alloced_tns;
-
-static struct keyid_list *trusted_key_list;
-
-static LOCAL_ID_TABLE new_lid_table(void);
-static int ins_lid_table_item( LOCAL_ID_TABLE tbl, ulong lid, unsigned flag );
-static int qry_lid_table_flag( LOCAL_ID_TABLE tbl, ulong lid, unsigned *flag );
-
-
-static int propagate_validity( TN root, TN node,
-			       int (*add_fnc)(ulong), unsigned *retflgs );
-
-static void print_user_id( FILE *fp, const char *text, u32 *keyid );
-static int do_check( TRUSTREC *drec, unsigned *trustlevel,
-		     const char *nhash, int (*add_fnc)(ulong),
-						unsigned *retflgs);
-static int get_dir_record( PKT_public_key *pk, TRUSTREC *rec );
-static int do_update_trust_record( KBNODE keyblock, TRUSTREC *drec,
-				   int sigs_only, int *modified );
-static int check_trust_record( TRUSTREC *drec, int sigs_only );
-static void mark_fresh_keys(void);
-
-/* a table used to keep track of ultimately trusted keys
- * which are the ones from our secrings and the trusted keys */
-static LOCAL_ID_TABLE ultikey_table;
-
-
-/* a table to keep track of newly importted keys.  This one is
- * create by the insert_trust_record function and from time to time
- * used to verify key signature which have been done with these new keys */
-static LOCAL_ID_TABLE fresh_imported_keys;
-static int fresh_imported_keys_count;
-#define FRESH_KEY_CHECK_THRESHOLD 200
-
-/* list of unused lid items and tables */
-static LOCAL_ID_TABLE unused_lid_tables;
-static struct local_id_item *unused_lid_items;
-
+/* control information for the trust DB */
 static struct {
     int init;
     int level;
     char *dbname;
 } trustdb_args;
 
-
-/**********************************************
- ***********  record read write  **************
- **********************************************/
-
-
-/****************
- * Read a record but die if it does not exist
- */
-static void
-read_record( ulong recno, TRUSTREC *rec, int rectype )
-{
-    int rc = tdbio_read_record( recno, rec, rectype );
-    if( !rc )
-	return;
-    log_error(_("trust record %lu, req type %d: read failed: %s\n"),
-				    recno, rectype,  gpg_errstr(rc) );
-    tdbio_invalid();
-}
+/* some globals */
+static struct key_item *user_utk_list; /* temp. used to store --trusted-keys */
+static struct key_item *utk_list;      /* all ultimately trusted keys */
 
+static int pending_check_trustdb;
 
-/****************
- * Wirte a record but die on error
- */
-static void
-write_record( TRUSTREC *rec )
-{
-    int rc = tdbio_write_record( rec );
-    if( !rc )
-	return;
-    log_error(_("trust record %lu, type %d: write failed: %s\n"),
-			    rec->recnum, rec->rectype, gpg_errstr(rc) );
-    tdbio_invalid();
-}
-
-/****************
- * Delete a record but die on error
- */
-static void
-delete_record( ulong recno )
-{
-    int rc = tdbio_delete_record( recno );
-    if( !rc )
-	return;
-    log_error(_("trust record %lu: delete failed: %s\n"),
-					      recno, gpg_errstr(rc) );
-    tdbio_invalid();
-}
-
-/****************
- * sync the db
- */
-static void
-do_sync(void)
-{
-    int rc = tdbio_sync();
-    if( !rc )
-	return;
-    log_error(_("trustdb: sync failed: %s\n"), gpg_errstr(rc) );
-    gpg_exit(2);
-}
-
+static int validate_keys (int interactive);
 
 
 /**********************************************
- *****************  helpers  ******************
+ ************* some helpers *******************
  **********************************************/
 
-
-static LOCAL_ID_TABLE
-new_lid_table(void)
+static struct key_item *
+new_key_item (void)
 {
-    LOCAL_ID_TABLE a;
-
-    a = unused_lid_tables;
-    if( a ) {
-	unused_lid_tables = a->next;
-	memset( a, 0, sizeof *a );
-    }
-    else
-	a = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *a );
-    return a;
+  struct key_item *k;
+  
+  k = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *k);
+  return k;
 }
 
-#if 0
 static void
-release_lid_table( LOCAL_ID_TABLE tbl )
+release_key_items (struct key_item *k)
 {
-    struct local_id_item *a, *a2;
-    int i;
-
-    for(i=0; i < 16; i++ ) {
-	for(a=tbl->items[i]; a; a = a2 ) {
-	    a2 = a->next;
-	    a->next = unused_lid_items;
-	    unused_lid_items = a;
-	}
-    }
-    tbl->next = unused_lid_tables;
-    unused_lid_tables = tbl;
-}
-#endif
-
+  struct key_item *k2;
 
-/****************
- * Remove all items from a LID table
- */
-static void
-clear_lid_table( LOCAL_ID_TABLE tbl )
-{
-    struct local_id_item *a, *a2;
-    int i;
-
-    for(i=0; i < 16; i++ ) {
-	for(a=tbl->items[i]; a; a = a2 ) {
-	    a2 = a->next;
-	    a->next = unused_lid_items;
-	    unused_lid_items = a;
-	}
-	tbl->items[i] = NULL;
+  for (; k; k = k2)
+    {
+      k2 = k->next;
+      m_free (k);
     }
 }
 
-
-/****************
- * Add a new item to the table or return 1 if we already have this item
+/*
+ * For fast keylook up we need a hash table.  Each byte of a KeyIDs
+ * should be distributed equally over the 256 possible values (except
+ * for v3 keyIDs but we consider them as not important here). So we
+ * can just use 10 bits to index a table of 1024 key items. 
+ * Possible optimization: Don not use key_items but other hash_table when the
+ * duplicates lists gets too large. 
  */
-static int
-ins_lid_table_item( LOCAL_ID_TABLE tbl, ulong lid, unsigned flag )
+static KeyHashTable 
+new_key_hash_table (void)
 {
-    struct local_id_item *a;
-
-    for( a = tbl->items[lid & 0x0f]; a; a = a->next )
-	if( a->lid == lid )
-	    return 1;
-    a = unused_lid_items;
-    if( a )
-	unused_lid_items = a->next;
-    else
-	a = gcry_xmalloc( sizeof *a );
-    a->lid = lid;
-    a->flag = flag;
-    a->next = tbl->items[lid & 0x0f];
-    tbl->items[lid & 0x0f] = a;
-    return 0;
+  struct key_item **tbl;
+
+  tbl = m_alloc_clear (1024 * sizeof *tbl);
+  return tbl;
 }
 
-static int
-qry_lid_table_flag( LOCAL_ID_TABLE tbl, ulong lid, unsigned *flag )
+static void
+release_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl)
 {
-    struct local_id_item *a;
+  int i;
 
-    for( a = tbl->items[lid & 0x0f]; a; a = a->next )
-	if( a->lid == lid ) {
-	    if( flag )
-		*flag = a->flag;
-	    return 0;
-	}
-    return -1;
+  if (!tbl)
+    return;
+  for (i=0; i < 1024; i++)
+    release_key_items (tbl[i]);
+  m_free (tbl);
 }
 
-
-static TN
-new_tn(void)
+/* 
+ * Returns: True if the keyID is in the given hash table
+ */
+static int
+test_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
 {
-    TN t;
+  struct key_item *k;
 
-    if( used_tns ) {
-	t = used_tns;
-	used_tns = t->next;
-	memset( t, 0, sizeof *t );
-    }
-    else
-	t = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *t );
-    if( ++alloced_tns > max_alloced_tns )
-	max_alloced_tns = alloced_tns;
-    return t;
+  for (k = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)]; k; k = k->next)
+    if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
+      return 1;
+  return 0;
 }
 
-
+/*
+ * Add a new key to the hash table.  The key is identified by its key ID.
+ */
 static void
-release_tn( TN t )
+add_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
 {
-    if( t ) {
-	t->next = used_tns;
-	used_tns = t;
-	alloced_tns--;
-    }
-}
+  struct key_item *k, *kk;
 
+  for (k = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)]; k; k = k->next)
+    if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
+      return; /* already in table */
+  
+  kk = new_key_item ();
+  kk->kid[0] = kid[0];
+  kk->kid[1] = kid[1];
+  kk->next = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)];
+  tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)] = kk;
+}
 
+/*
+ * Release a key_array
+ */
 static void
-release_tn_tree( TN kr )
+release_key_array ( struct key_array *keys )
 {
-    TN	kr2;
+    struct key_array *k;
 
-    for( ; kr; kr = kr2 ) {
-	release_tn_tree( kr->list );
-	kr2 = kr->next;
-	release_tn( kr );
+    if (keys) {
+        for (k=keys; k->keyblock; k++)
+            release_kbnode (k->keyblock);
+        m_free (keys);
     }
 }
 
+
+/*********************************************
+ **********  Initialization  *****************
+ *********************************************/
 
 
-
-/**********************************************
- ****** access by LID and other helpers *******
- **********************************************/
 
-/****************
- * Return the keyid from the primary key identified by LID.
+/*
+ * Used to register extra ultimately trusted keys - this has to be done
+ * before initializing the validation module.
+ * FIXME: Should be replaced by a function to add those keys to the trustdb.
  */
-int
-keyid_from_lid( ulong lid, u32 *keyid )
+void
+register_trusted_key( const char *string )
 {
-    TRUSTREC rec;
-    int rc;
-
-    init_trustdb();
-    keyid[0] = keyid[1] = 0;
-    rc = tdbio_read_record( lid, &rec, 0 );
-    if( rc ) {
-	log_error(_("error reading dir record for LID %lu: %s\n"),
-						    lid, gpg_errstr(rc));
-	return GPGERR_TRUSTDB;
-    }
-    if( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_SDIR )
-	return 0;
-    if( rec.rectype != RECTYPE_DIR ) {
-	log_error(_("lid %lu: expected dir record, got type %d\n"),
-						    lid, rec.rectype );
-	return GPGERR_TRUSTDB;
-    }
-    if( !rec.r.dir.keylist ) {
-	log_error(_("no primary key for LID %lu\n"), lid );
-	return GPGERR_TRUSTDB;
-    }
-    rc = tdbio_read_record( rec.r.dir.keylist, &rec, RECTYPE_KEY );
-    if( rc ) {
-	log_error(_("error reading primary key for LID %lu: %s\n"),
-						    lid, gpg_errstr(rc));
-	return GPGERR_TRUSTDB;
-    }
-    keyid_from_fingerprint( rec.r.key.fingerprint, rec.r.key.fingerprint_len,
-			    keyid );
-
-    return 0;
-}
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+  struct key_item *k;
 
+  if (classify_user_id (string, &desc) != KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID ) {
+    log_error(_("`%s' is not a valid long keyID\n"), string );
+    return;
+  }
 
-ulong
-lid_from_keyblock( KBNODE keyblock )
-{
-    KBNODE node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
-    PKT_public_key *pk;
-    if( !node )
-	BUG();
-    pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
-    if( !pk->local_id ) {
-	TRUSTREC rec;
-	init_trustdb();
-
-	get_dir_record( pk, &rec );
-    }
-    return pk->local_id;
+  k = new_key_item ();
+  k->kid[0] = desc.u.kid[0];
+  k->kid[1] = desc.u.kid[1];
+  k->next = user_utk_list;
+  user_utk_list = k;
 }
 
-
+/*
+ * Helper to add a key to the global list of ultimately trusted keys.
+ * Retruns: true = inserted, false = already in in list.
+ */
 static int
-get_dir_record( PKT_public_key *pk, TRUSTREC *rec )
+add_utk (u32 *kid)
 {
-    int rc=0;
+  struct key_item *k;
 
-    if( pk->local_id ) {
-	read_record( pk->local_id, rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
-    }
-    else { /* no local_id: scan the trustdb */
-	if( (rc=tdbio_search_dir_bypk( pk, rec )) && rc != -1 )
-	    log_error(_("get_dir_record: search_record failed: %s\n"),
-							    gpg_errstr(rc));
+  for (k = utk_list; k; k = k->next) 
+    {
+      if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
+        {
+          return 0;
+        }
     }
-    return rc;
-}
 
-static ulong
-lid_from_keyid_no_sdir( u32 *keyid )
-{
-    PKT_public_key *pk = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *pk );
-    TRUSTREC rec;
-    ulong lid = 0;
-    int rc;
-
-    rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
-    if( !rc ) {
-	if( pk->local_id )
-	    lid = pk->local_id;
-	else {
-	    rc = tdbio_search_dir_bypk( pk, &rec );
-	    if( !rc )
-		lid = rec.recnum;
-	}
-    }
-    free_public_key( pk );
-    return lid;
+  k = new_key_item ();
+  k->kid[0] = kid[0];
+  k->kid[1] = kid[1];
+  k->ownertrust = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
+  k->next = utk_list;
+  utk_list = k;
+  if( opt.verbose > 1 )
+    log_info(_("key %08lX: accepted as trusted key\n"), (ulong)kid[1]);
+  return 1;
 }
 
 
-
-/***********************************************
- *************	Initialization	****************
- ***********************************************/
-
-void
-register_trusted_key( const char *string )
+/****************
+ * Verify that all our secret keys are usable and put them into the utk_list.
+ */
+static void
+verify_own_keys(void)
 {
-    u32 keyid[2];
-    struct keyid_list *r;
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  ulong recnum;
+  int rc;
+  struct key_item *k;
+  int hint_shown = 0;
+
+  if (utk_list)
+    return;
 
-    if( classify_user_id( string, keyid, NULL, NULL, NULL ) != 11 ) {
-        log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid long keyID\n"), string );
-        return;
+  /* scan the trustdb to find all ultimately trusted keys */
+  for (recnum=1; !tdbio_read_record (recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ ) 
+    {
+      if ( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_TRUST 
+           && (rec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+        {
+            byte *fpr = rec.r.trust.fingerprint;
+            int fprlen;
+            u32 kid[2];
+            
+            /* Problem: We do only use fingerprints in the trustdb but
+             * we need the keyID here to indetify the key; we can only
+             * use that ugly hack to distinguish between 16 and 20
+             * butes fpr - it does not work always so we better change
+             * the whole validation code to only work with
+             * fingerprints */
+            fprlen = (!fpr[16] && !fpr[17] && !fpr[18] && !fpr[19])? 16:20;
+            keyid_from_fingerprint (fpr, fprlen, kid);
+            if (!add_utk (kid))
+                log_info(_("key %08lX occurs more than once in the trustdb\n"),
+                            (ulong)kid[1]);
+        }
+    }
+  
+  /* the --trusted-key option is again deprecated; however we automagically
+   * add those keys to the trustdb */
+  for (k = user_utk_list; k; k = k->next) 
+    {
+      if ( add_utk (k->kid) ) 
+        { /* not yet in trustDB as ultimately trusted */
+          PKT_public_key pk;
+
+          memset (&pk, 0, sizeof pk);
+          rc = get_pubkey (&pk, k->kid);
+          if (rc) {
+            log_info(_("key %08lX: no public key for trusted key - skipped\n"),
+                     (ulong)k->kid[1] );
+          }
+          else {
+            update_ownertrust (&pk,
+                               ((get_ownertrust (&pk) & ~TRUST_MASK)
+                                | TRUST_ULTIMATE ));
+            release_public_key_parts (&pk);
+          }
+          if (!hint_shown)
+            {
+              log_info ("the --trusted-key option is now obsolete; "
+                        "use the --edit command instead.\n");
+              log_info ("given keys will be marked as trusted\n");
+              hint_shown = 1;
+            }
+          log_info ("key %08lX marked as ultimately trusted\n",
+                    (ulong)k->kid[1]);
+        }
     }
 
-    for( r = trusted_key_list; r; r = r->next )
-        if( r->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && r->keyid[1] == keyid[1] )
-            return;
-    r = gcry_xmalloc( sizeof *r );
-    r->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
-    r->keyid[1] = keyid[1];
-    r->next = trusted_key_list;
-    trusted_key_list = r;
-}
 
+  /* release the helper table table */
+  release_key_items (user_utk_list);
+  user_utk_list = NULL;
+  return;
+}
 
+
+/*********************************************
+ *********** TrustDB stuff *******************
+ *********************************************/
 
+/*
+ * Read a record but die if it does not exist
+ */
 static void
-add_ultimate_key( PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid )
+read_record (ulong recno, TRUSTREC *rec, int rectype )
 {
-    int rc;
-
-    /* first make sure that the pubkey is in the trustdb */
-    rc = query_trust_record( pk );
-    if( rc == -1 && opt.dry_run )
-	return;
-    if( rc == -1 ) { /* put it into the trustdb */
-        rc = insert_trust_record_by_pk( pk );
-        if( rc ) {
-            log_error(_("key %08lX: can't put it into the trustdb\n"),
-                      (ulong)keyid[1] );
-            return;
-        }
+  int rc = tdbio_read_record (recno, rec, rectype);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error(_("trust record %lu, req type %d: read failed: %s\n"),
+                recno, rec->rectype, g10_errstr(rc) );
+      tdbio_invalid();
     }
-    else if( rc ) {
-        log_error(_("key %08lX: query record failed\n"), (ulong)keyid[1] );
-        return;
+  if (rectype != rec->rectype)
+    {
+      log_error(_("trust record %lu is not of requested type %d\n"),
+                rec->recnum, rectype);
+      tdbio_invalid();
     }
-
-    if( DBG_TRUST )
-        log_debug("key %08lX.%lu: stored into ultikey_table\n",
-                  (ulong)keyid[1], pk->local_id );
-
-    if( ins_lid_table_item( ultikey_table, pk->local_id, 0 ) )
-        log_error(_("key %08lX: already in trusted key table\n"),
-                  (ulong)keyid[1]);
-    else if( opt.verbose > 1 )
-        log_info(_("key %08lX: accepted as trusted key.\n"),
-                 (ulong)keyid[1]);
-
 }
 
-/****************
- * Verify that all our public keys are in the trustdb.
+/*
+ * Write a record and die on error
  */
-static int
-verify_own_keys(void)
+static void
+write_record (TRUSTREC *rec)
 {
-    int rc;
-    void *enum_context = NULL;
-    PKT_secret_key *sk = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *sk );
-    PKT_public_key *pk = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *pk );
-    u32 keyid[2];
-    struct keyid_list *kl;
-
-
-    /* put the trusted keys into the ultikey table */
-    for( kl = trusted_key_list; kl; kl = kl->next ) {
-        keyid[0] = kl->keyid[0];
-        keyid[1] = kl->keyid[1];
-        /* get the public key */
-        memset( pk, 0, sizeof *pk );
-        rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
-        if( rc ) {
-            log_info(_("key %08lX: no public key for trusted key - skipped\n"),
-                                                            (ulong)keyid[1] );
-        }
-        else {
-            add_ultimate_key( pk, keyid );
-            release_public_key_parts( pk );
-        }
+  int rc = tdbio_write_record (rec);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error(_("trust record %lu, type %d: write failed: %s\n"),
+			    rec->recnum, rec->rectype, g10_errstr(rc) );
+      tdbio_invalid();
     }
-
-    /* And now add all secret keys to the ultikey table */
-    while( !(rc=enum_secret_keys( &enum_context, sk, 0 ) ) ) {
-	int have_pk = 0;
-
-	keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
-
-	if( DBG_TRUST )
-	    log_debug("key %08lX: checking secret key\n", (ulong)keyid[1] );
-
-	if( !opt.quiet && is_secret_key_protected( sk ) < 1 )
-	    log_info(_("NOTE: secret key %08lX is NOT protected.\n"),
-							    (ulong)keyid[1] );
-
-        for( kl = trusted_key_list; kl; kl = kl->next ) {
-            if( kl->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && kl->keyid[1] == keyid[1] )
-                goto skip; /* already in trusted key table */
-        }
-
-	/* see whether we can access the public key of this secret key */
-	memset( pk, 0, sizeof *pk );
-	rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
-	if( rc ) {
-	    log_info(_("key %08lX: secret key without public key - skipped\n"),
-							    (ulong)keyid[1] );
-	    goto skip;
-	}
-	have_pk=1;
-
-	if( cmp_public_secret_key( pk, sk ) ) {
-	    log_info(_("key %08lX: secret and public key don't match\n"),
-							    (ulong)keyid[1] );
-	    goto skip;
-	}
-
-	add_ultimate_key( pk, keyid );
-
-      skip:
-	release_secret_key_parts( sk );
-	if( have_pk )
-	    release_public_key_parts( pk );
-    }
-    if( rc != -1 )
-	log_error(_("enumerate secret keys failed: %s\n"), gpg_errstr(rc) );
-    else
-	rc = 0;
-
-    /* release the trusted keyid table */
-    {   struct keyid_list *kl2;
-        for( kl = trusted_key_list; kl; kl = kl2 ) {
-            kl2 = kl->next;
-            gcry_free( kl );
-        }
-        trusted_key_list = NULL;
-    }
-
-    enum_secret_keys( &enum_context, NULL, 0 ); /* free context */
-    free_secret_key( sk );
-    free_public_key( pk );
-    return rc;
 }
 
-
+/*
+ * sync the TrustDb and die on error
+ */
+static void
+do_sync(void)
+{
+    int rc = tdbio_sync ();
+    if(rc)
+      {
+        log_error (_("trustdb: sync failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+        g10_exit(2);
+      }
+}
 
 
 /****************
@@ -629,2198 +383,1268 @@ setup_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname )
     if( trustdb_args.init )
 	return 0;
     trustdb_args.level = level;
-    trustdb_args.dbname = dbname? gcry_xstrdup(dbname): NULL;
+    trustdb_args.dbname = dbname? m_strdup(dbname): NULL;
     return 0;
 }
 
 void
 init_trustdb()
 {
-    int rc=0;
-    int level = trustdb_args.level;
-    const char* dbname = trustdb_args.dbname;
-
-    if( trustdb_args.init )
-	return;
+  int rc=0;
+  int level = trustdb_args.level;
+  const char* dbname = trustdb_args.dbname;
 
-    trustdb_args.init = 1;
-
-    if( !ultikey_table )
-	ultikey_table = new_lid_table();
-
-    if( !level || level==1 ) {
-	rc = tdbio_set_dbname( dbname, !!level );
-	if( !rc ) {
-	    if( !level )
-		return;
+  if( trustdb_args.init )
+    return;
 
-	    /* verify that our own keys are in the trustDB
-	     * or move them to the trustdb. */
-	    rc = verify_own_keys();
+  trustdb_args.init = 1;
 
-	    /* should we check whether there is no other ultimately trusted
-	     * key in the database? */
-	}
+  if ( !level || level==1)
+    {
+      rc = tdbio_set_dbname( dbname, !!level );
+      if( !rc )
+        {
+          if( !level )
+            return;
+          
+          /* verify that our own keys are in the trustDB
+           * or move them to the trustdb. */
+          verify_own_keys();
+          
+          /* should we check whether there is no other ultimately trusted
+           * key in the database? */
+        }
     }
-    else
-	BUG();
-    if( rc )
-	log_fatal("can't init trustdb: %s\n", gpg_errstr(rc) );
+  else
+    BUG();
+  if( rc )
+    log_fatal("can't init trustdb: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
 }
 
 
 
-/****************
- * This function should be called in certain cases to sync the internal state
- * of the trustdb with the file image.	Currently it is needed after
- * a sequence of insert_trust_record() calls.
- */
-void
-sync_trustdb()
-{
-    if( fresh_imported_keys && fresh_imported_keys_count )
-	mark_fresh_keys();
-}
-
-
 
 /***********************************************
  *************	Print helpers	****************
  ***********************************************/
-static void
-print_user_id( FILE *fp, const char *text, u32 *keyid )
-{
-    char *p;
-    size_t n;
-
-    p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
-    if( fp ) {
-	fprintf( fp, "%s \"", text );
-	print_utf8_string( fp, p, n );
-	putc('\"', fp);
-	putc('\n', fp);
-    }
-    else {
-	tty_printf( "%s \"", text );
-	tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
-	tty_printf( "\"\n" );
-    }
-    gcry_free(p);
-}
-
-
 
 /****************
  * This function returns a letter for a trustvalue  Trust flags
  * are ignore.
  */
 int
-trust_letter( unsigned value )
+trust_letter (unsigned int value)
 {
-    switch( (value & TRUST_MASK) ) {
-      case TRUST_UNKNOWN:   return '-';
-      case TRUST_EXPIRED:   return 'e';
-      case TRUST_UNDEFINED: return 'q';
-      case TRUST_NEVER:     return 'n';
-      case TRUST_MARGINAL:  return 'm';
-      case TRUST_FULLY:     return 'f';
-      case TRUST_ULTIMATE:  return 'u';
-      default:		    return  0 ;
+  switch( (value & TRUST_MASK) ) 
+    {
+    case TRUST_UNKNOWN:   return '-';
+    case TRUST_EXPIRED:   return 'e';
+    case TRUST_UNDEFINED: return 'q';
+    case TRUST_NEVER:     return 'n';
+    case TRUST_MARGINAL:  return 'm';
+    case TRUST_FULLY:     return 'f';
+    case TRUST_ULTIMATE:  return 'u';
+    default:              return 0;
     }
 }
 
 
-#if 0
-static void
-print_path( int pathlen, TN ME .........., FILE *fp, ulong highlight )
-{
-    int rc, c, i;
-    u32 keyid[2];
-    char *p;
-    size_t n;
-
-    for( i = 0; i < pathlen; i++ )  {
-	if( highlight )
-	    fputs(highlight == path[i].lid? "* ":"  ", fp );
-	rc = keyid_from_lid( path[i].lid, keyid );
-	if( rc )
-	    fprintf(fp, "????????.%lu:", path[i].lid );
-	else
-	    fprintf(fp,"%08lX.%lu:", (ulong)keyid[1], path[i].lid );
-	c = trust_letter(path[i].otrust);
-	if( c )
-	    putc( c, fp );
-	else
-	    fprintf( fp, "%02x", path[i].otrust );
-	putc('/', fp);
-	c = trust_letter(path[i].trust);
-	if( c )
-	    putc( c, fp );
-	else
-	    fprintf( fp, "%02x", path[i].trust );
-	putc(' ', fp);
-	p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
-	putc(' ', fp);
-	putc('\"', fp);
-	print_utf8_string( fp, p, n > 40? 40:n );
-	putc('\"', fp);
-	gcry_free(p);
-	putc('\n', fp );
-    }
-}
-#endif
-
-
-static void
-print_default_uid( FILE *fp, ulong lid )
-{
-    u32 keyid[2];
-
-    if( !keyid_from_lid( lid, keyid ) )
-	print_user_id( fp, "", keyid );
-}
-
+/****************
+ * Recreate the WoT but do not ask for new ownertrusts.  Special
+ * feature: In batch mode and without a forced yes, this is only done
+ * when a check is due.  This can be used to run the check from a crontab
+ */
+void
+check_trustdb ()
+{
+  init_trustdb();
+  if (opt.batch && !opt.answer_yes)
+    {
+      ulong scheduled;
+
+      scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
+      if (!scheduled)
+        {
+          log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check\n"));
+          return;
+        }
 
-static void
-print_uid_from_keyblock( FILE *fp, KBNODE keyblock, ulong urecno )
-{
-    TRUSTREC urec;
-    KBNODE node;
-    byte uhash[20];
-
-    read_record( urecno, &urec, RECTYPE_UID );
-    for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
-	    PKT_user_id *uidpkt = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
-
-	    if( uidpkt->photo ) {
-		gcry_md_hash_buffer( GCRY_MD_RMD160,  uhash,
-				     uidpkt->photo, uidpkt->photolen );
-	    }
-	    else {
-		gcry_md_hash_buffer( GCRY_MD_RMD160,  uhash,
-				     uidpkt->name, uidpkt->len );
-	    }
-	    if( !memcmp( uhash, urec.r.uid.namehash, 20 ) ) {
-		print_string( fp,  uidpkt->name, uidpkt->len, ':' );
-		return;
-	    }
-	}
+      if (scheduled > make_timestamp ())
+        {
+          log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
+                    strtimestamp (scheduled));
+          return;
+        }
     }
 
-    fputs("[?]", fp );
+  validate_keys (0);
 }
 
 
-
-static void
-dump_tn_tree( FILE *fp, int level, TN tree )
+/*
+ * Recreate the WoT. 
+ */
+void
+update_trustdb()
 {
-    TN kr, ur;
-
-    for( kr=tree; kr; kr = kr->next ) {
-	if( fp ) {
-	    fprintf( fp, "%*s", level*4, "" );
-	    fprintf( fp, "K%lu(ot=%d,val=%d)  ", kr->lid,
-					     kr->n.k.ownertrust,
-					     kr->n.k.validity  );
-	}
-	else {
-	    tty_printf("%*s", level*4, "" );
-	    tty_printf("K%lu(ot=%d,val=%d)  ", kr->lid,
-					     kr->n.k.ownertrust,
-					     kr->n.k.validity  );
-	}
-	print_default_uid( fp, kr->lid );
-	for( ur=kr->list; ur; ur = ur->next ) {
-	    if( fp ) {
-		fprintf(fp, "%*s  ", level*4, "" );
-		fprintf(fp, "U%lu(mc=%d,fc=%d,val=%d)\n", ur->lid,
-						     ur->n.u.marginal_count,
-						     ur->n.u.fully_count,
-						     ur->n.u.validity
-						);
-	    }
-	    else {
-		tty_printf("%*s  ", level*4, "" );
-		tty_printf("U%lu(mc=%d,fc=%d,val=%d)\n", ur->lid,
-						     ur->n.u.marginal_count,
-						     ur->n.u.fully_count,
-						     ur->n.u.validity
-						);
-	    }
-	    dump_tn_tree( fp, level+1, ur->list );
-	}
-    }
+  init_trustdb();
+  validate_keys (1);
 }
 
-/****************
- * Special version of dump_tn_tree, which prints it colon delimited.
- * Format:
- *   level:keyid:type:recno:ot:val:mc:cc:name:
- * With TYPE = U for a user ID
- *	       K for a key
- * The RECNO is either the one of the dir record or the one of the uid record.
- * OT is the the usual trust letter and only availabel on K lines.
- * VAL is the calcualted validity
- * MC is the marginal trust counter and only available on U lines
- * CC is the same for the complete count
- * NAME ist the username and only printed on U lines
- */
-static void
-dump_tn_tree_with_colons( int level, TN tree )
+void
+revalidation_mark (void)
 {
-    TN kr, ur;
-
-    for( kr=tree; kr; kr = kr->next ) {
-	KBNODE kb = NULL;
-	u32 kid[2];
-
-	keyid_from_lid( kr->lid, kid );
-	get_keyblock_bylid( &kb, kr->lid );
-
-	printf( "%d:%08lX%08lX:K:%lu:%c:%c::::\n",
-			level, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1], kr->lid,
-			trust_letter( kr->n.k.ownertrust ),
-			trust_letter( kr->n.k.validity ) );
-	for( ur=kr->list; ur; ur = ur->next ) {
-	    printf( "%d:%08lX%08lX:U:%lu::%c:%d:%d:",
-			level, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1], ur->lid,
-			trust_letter( kr->n.u.validity ),
-			ur->n.u.marginal_count,
-			ur->n.u.fully_count );
-	    print_uid_from_keyblock( stdout, kb, ur->lid );
-	    putchar(':');
-	    putchar('\n');
-	    dump_tn_tree_with_colons( level+1, ur->list );
-	}
-	release_kbnode( kb );
-    }
+  init_trustdb();
+  /* we simply set the time for the next check to 1 (far back in 1970)
+   * so that a --update-trustdb will be scheduled */
+  if (tdbio_write_nextcheck (1))
+      do_sync ();
+  pending_check_trustdb = 1;
 }
 
-
 
 /***********************************************
- *************	trustdb maintenance  ***********
+ ***********  Ownertrust et al. ****************
  ***********************************************/
 
-/****************
- * Create or update shadow dir record and return the LID of the record
- */
-static ulong
-create_shadow_dir( PKT_signature *sig )
-{
-    TRUSTREC sdir;
-    int rc;
-
-    /* first see whether we already have such a record */
-    rc = tdbio_search_sdir( sig->keyid, sig->pubkey_algo, &sdir );
-    if( rc && rc != -1 ) {
-	log_error("tdbio_search_sdir failed: %s\n", gpg_errstr(rc));
-	tdbio_invalid();
-    }
-    if( rc == -1 ) { /* not found: create */
-	memset( &sdir, 0, sizeof sdir );
-	sdir.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
-	sdir.rectype= RECTYPE_SDIR;
-	sdir.r.sdir.lid = sdir.recnum;
-	sdir.r.sdir.keyid[0] = sig->keyid[0];
-	sdir.r.sdir.keyid[1] = sig->keyid[1];
-	sdir.r.sdir.pubkey_algo = sig->pubkey_algo;
-	write_record( &sdir );
-    }
-    return sdir.recnum;
-}
-
-
-static ulong
-find_or_create_lid( PKT_signature *sig )
-{
-    ulong lid;
-
-    lid = lid_from_keyid_no_sdir( sig->keyid );
-    if( !lid )
-	lid = create_shadow_dir( sig );
-    return lid;
+static int 
+read_trust_record (PKT_public_key *pk, TRUSTREC *rec)
+{
+  int rc;
+  
+  init_trustdb();
+  rc = tdbio_search_trust_bypk (pk, rec);
+  if (rc == -1)
+    return -1; /* no record yet */
+  if (rc) 
+    {
+      log_error ("trustdb: searching trust record failed: %s\n",
+                 g10_errstr (rc));
+      return rc; 
+    }
+      
+  if (rec->rectype != RECTYPE_TRUST)
+    {
+      log_error ("trustdb: record %lu is not a trust record\n",
+                 rec->recnum);
+      return G10ERR_TRUSTDB; 
+    }      
+  
+  return 0;
 }
 
 
-
 /****************
- * Check the validity of a key and calculate the keyflags
- * keynode points to
- * a node with a [sub]key.  mainkid has the key ID of the primary key
- * keyblock is the complete keyblock which is needed for signature
- * checking.  LID and PK is only used in verbose mode.
+ * Return the assigned ownertrust value for the given public key.
+ * The key should be the primary key.
  */
-static unsigned int
-check_keybinding( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE keynode, u32 *mainkid,
-		  ulong lid, PKT_public_key *pk )
+unsigned int 
+get_ownertrust ( PKT_public_key *pk)
 {
-    KBNODE node;
-    int keybind_seen = 0;
-    int revoke_seen = 0;
-    unsigned int keyflags=0;
-    int is_main = (keynode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
-    int rc;
-
-    if( DBG_TRUST )
-	log_debug("check_keybinding: %08lX.%lu\n",
-			    (ulong)mainkid[1], lid );
-
-    if( is_main ) {
-	/* a primary key is always valid (user IDs are handled elsewhere)*/
-	keyflags = KEYF_CHECKED | KEYF_VALID;
-    }
-
-    for( node=keynode->next; node; node = node->next ) {
-	PKT_signature *sig;
-
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
-	    break; /* ready */
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
-	    continue; /* don't care about other packets */
-
-	sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
-
-	if( mainkid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || mainkid[1] != sig->keyid[1] )
-	    continue; /* we only care about self-signatures */
-
-	if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 && !keybind_seen && !is_main ) {
-	    /* check until we find a valid keybinding */
-	    rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
-	    if( !rc ) {
-		if( opt.verbose )
-		    log_info(_("key %08lX.%lu: Good subkey binding\n"),
-				     (ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL), lid );
-		keyflags |= KEYF_CHECKED | KEYF_VALID;
-	    }
-	    else {
-		log_info(_(
-		  "key %08lX.%lu: Invalid subkey binding: %s\n"),
-		    (ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL), lid, gpg_errstr(rc) );
-		keyflags |= KEYF_CHECKED;
-		keyflags &= ~KEYF_VALID;
-	    }
-	    keybind_seen = 1;
-	}
-	else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 && !revoke_seen ) {
-	    /* this is a key revocation certificate: check it */
-	    rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
-	    if( !rc ) {
-		if( opt.verbose )
-		    log_info(_("key %08lX.%lu: Valid key revocation\n"),
-				 (ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk, NULL), lid );
-		keyflags |= KEYF_REVOKED;
-	    }
-	    else {
-		log_info(_(
-		  "key %08lX.%lu: Invalid key revocation: %s\n"),
-		  (ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL), lid, gpg_errstr(rc) );
-	    }
-	    revoke_seen = 1;
-	}
-	else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 && !revoke_seen && !is_main ) {
-	    /* this is a subkey revocation certificate: check it */
-	    rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
-	    if( !rc ) {
-		if( opt.verbose )
-		    log_info(_(
-			"key %08lX.%lu: Valid subkey revocation\n"),
-			 (ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL), lid );
-		keyflags |= KEYF_REVOKED;
-	    }
-	    else {
-		log_info(_(
-		  "key %08lX.%lu: Invalid subkey binding: %s\n"),
-		  (ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL), lid, gpg_errstr(rc) );
-	    }
-	    revoke_seen = 1;
-	}
-	/* Hmmm: should we handle direct key signatures here? */
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  int rc;
+  
+  rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
+  if (rc == -1)
+    return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */
+  if (rc) 
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+      return rc; /* actually never reached */
     }
-
-    return keyflags;
+  
+  return rec.r.trust.ownertrust;
 }
 
-
-static ulong
-make_key_records( KBNODE keyblock, ulong lid, u32 *keyid, int *mainrev )
+/*
+ * Same as get_ownertrust but return a trust letter instead of an value.
+ */
+int
+get_ownertrust_info (PKT_public_key *pk)
 {
-    TRUSTREC *krecs, **kend, *k, *k2;
-    KBNODE  node;
-    PKT_public_key *pk;
-    byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
-    size_t fprlen;
-    ulong keyrecno;
-
-    *mainrev = 0;
-    krecs = NULL; kend = &krecs;
-    for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
-	    && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
-	    continue;
-	pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
-	fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fpr, &fprlen );
-
-	/* create the key record */
-	k = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *k );
-	k->rectype = RECTYPE_KEY;
-	k->r.key.lid = lid;
-	k->r.key.pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo;
-	k->r.key.fingerprint_len = fprlen;
-	memcpy(k->r.key.fingerprint, fpr, fprlen );
-	k->recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
-	*kend = k;
-	kend = &k->next;
-
-	k->r.key.keyflags = check_keybinding( keyblock, node, keyid, lid, pk );
-	if( (k->r.key.keyflags & KEYF_REVOKED)
-	    && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
-	    *mainrev = 1;
-    }
+    unsigned int otrust;
+    int c;
 
-    keyrecno = krecs? krecs->recnum : 0;
-    /* write the keylist and release the memory */
-    for( k = krecs; k ; k = k2 ) {
-	if( k->next )
-	    k->r.key.next = k->next->recnum;
-	write_record( k );
-	k2 = k->next;
-	gcry_free( k );
-    }
-    return keyrecno;
+    otrust = get_ownertrust (pk);
+    c = trust_letter( (otrust & TRUST_MASK) );
+    if( !c )
+	c = '?';
+    return c;
 }
 
-
-/****************
- * Check the validity of a user ID and calculate the uidflags
- * keynode points to  a node with a user ID.
- * mainkid has the key ID of the primary key, keyblock is the complete
- * keyblock which is needed for signature checking.
- * Returns: The uid flags and the self-signature which is considered to
- * be the most current.
+/*
+ * Set the trust value of the given public key to the new value.
+ * The key should be a primary one.
  */
-static unsigned int
-check_uidsigs( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE keynode, u32 *mainkid, ulong lid,
-						  PKT_signature **bestsig )
-{
-    KBNODE node;
-    unsigned int uidflags = 0;
-    PKT_signature *sig;
-    PKT_signature *selfsig = NULL; /* the latest valid self signature */
-    int rc;
-
-    if( DBG_TRUST ) {
-	PKT_user_id *uid;
-	log_debug("check_uidsigs: %08lX.%lu \"",
-			    (ulong)mainkid[1], lid );
-	assert(keynode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
-	uid = keynode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
-	print_string( log_stream(), uid->name, uid->len, '\"' );
-	fputs("\"\n", log_stream());
+void
+update_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int new_trust )
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  int rc;
+  
+  rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
+  if (!rc)
+    {
+      if (DBG_TRUST)
+        log_debug ("update ownertrust from %u to %u\n",
+                   (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust, new_trust );
+      if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust != new_trust)
+        {
+          rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
+          write_record( &rec );
+          revalidation_mark ();
+          do_sync ();
+        }
     }
+  else if (rc == -1)
+    { /* no record yet - create a new one */
+      size_t dummy;
 
-    /* first we check only the selfsignatures */
-    for( node=keynode->next; node; node = node->next ) {
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
-	    || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
-	    break; /* ready */
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
-	    continue; /* don't care about other packets */
-	sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
-	if( mainkid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || mainkid[1] != sig->keyid[1] )
-	    continue; /* we only care about self-signatures for now */
-
-	if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 ) { /* regular self signature */
-	    rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
-	    if( !rc ) {
-		if( opt.verbose )
-		    log_info( "uid %08lX.%lu: %s\n",
-		       (ulong)mainkid[1], lid, _("Good self-signature") );
-		uidflags |= UIDF_CHECKED | UIDF_VALID;
-		if( !selfsig )
-		    selfsig = sig; /* use the first valid sig */
-		else if( sig->timestamp > selfsig->timestamp
-			 && sig->sig_class >= selfsig->sig_class )
-		    selfsig = sig; /* but this one is newer */
-	    }
-	    else {
-		log_info( "uid %08lX: %s: %s\n",
-			   (ulong)mainkid[1], _("Invalid self-signature"),
-			   gpg_errstr(rc) );
-		uidflags |= UIDF_CHECKED;
-	    }
-	}
-    }
+      if (DBG_TRUST)
+        log_debug ("insert ownertrust %u\n", new_trust );
 
-    /* and now check for revocations - we must do this after the
-     * self signature check because a self-signature which is newer
-     * than a revocation makes the revocation invalid.
-     * RFC2440 is quiet about tis but I feel this is reasonable for
-     * non-primary-key revocations. */
-    for( node=keynode->next; node; node = node->next ) {
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
-	    || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
-	    break; /* ready */
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
-	    continue; /* don't care about other packets */
-	sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
-	if( mainkid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || mainkid[1] != sig->keyid[1] )
-	    continue; /* we only care about self-signatures for now */
-
-	if( sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) { /* cert revocation */
-	    rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
-	    if( !rc && selfsig && selfsig->timestamp > sig->timestamp ) {
-		log_info( "uid %08lX.%lu: %s\n",
-		       (ulong)mainkid[1], lid,
-		       _("Valid user ID revocation skipped "
-			 "due to a newer self signature") );
-	    }
-	    else if( !rc ) {
-		if( opt.verbose )
-		    log_info( "uid %08lX.%lu: %s\n",
-		       (ulong)mainkid[1], lid, _("Valid user ID revocation") );
-		uidflags |= UIDF_CHECKED | UIDF_VALID | UIDF_REVOKED;
-	    }
-	    else {
-		log_info("uid %08lX: %s: %s\n",
-			    (ulong)mainkid[1], _("Invalid user ID revocation"),
-						    gpg_errstr(rc) );
-	    }
-	}
+      memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
+      rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
+      rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
+      fingerprint_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
+      rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
+      write_record (&rec);
+      revalidation_mark ();
+      do_sync ();
+      rc = 0;
+    }
+  else 
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
     }
-
-    *bestsig = selfsig;
-    return uidflags;
 }
 
-
-static unsigned int
-check_sig_record( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE signode,
-		  ulong siglid, int sigidx, u32 *keyid, ulong lid,
-		  u32 *r_expiretime, int *mod_down, int *mod_up )
-{
-    PKT_signature *sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
-    unsigned int sigflag = 0;
-    TRUSTREC tmp;
-    int revocation=0, expired=0, rc;
-
-    if( DBG_TRUST )
-	log_debug("check_sig_record: %08lX.%lu %lu[%d]\n",
-			    (ulong)keyid[1], lid, siglid, sigidx );
-    *r_expiretime = 0;
-    if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 ) /* regular certification */
-	;
-    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) /* cert revocation */
-	revocation = 1;
-    else
-	return SIGF_CHECKED | SIGF_IGNORED;
-
-    read_record( siglid, &tmp, 0 );
-    if( tmp.rectype == RECTYPE_DIR ) {
-	/* the public key is in the trustdb: check sig */
-	rc = check_key_signature2( keyblock, signode, NULL,
-					     r_expiretime, &expired );
-	if( !rc ) { /* valid signature */
-	    if( opt.verbose )
-		log_info("sig %08lX.%lu/%lu[%d]/%08lX: %s\n",
-			(ulong)keyid[1], lid, siglid, sigidx,
-						(ulong)sig->keyid[1],
-			revocation? _("Valid certificate revocation")
-				  : _("Good certificate") );
-	    sigflag |= SIGF_CHECKED | SIGF_VALID;
-	    if( expired ) {
-		sigflag |= SIGF_EXPIRED;
-		/* We have to reset the expiretime, so that this signature
-		 * does not get checked over and over due to the reached
-		 * expiretime */
-		*r_expiretime = 0;
-	    }
-	    if( revocation ) {
-		sigflag |= SIGF_REVOKED;
-		*mod_down = 1;
-	    }
-	    else
-		*mod_up = 1;
-	}
-	else if( rc == GPGERR_NO_PUBKEY ) {
-	    /* This may happen if the key is still in the trustdb
-	     * but not available in the keystorage */
-	    sigflag |= SIGF_NOPUBKEY;
-	    *mod_down = 1;
-	    if( revocation )
-		sigflag |= SIGF_REVOKED;
-	}
-	else {
-	    log_info("sig %08lX.%lu/%lu[%d]/%08lX: %s: %s\n",
-			(ulong)keyid[1], lid, siglid, sigidx,
-						(ulong)sig->keyid[1],
-			revocation? _("Invalid certificate revocation")
-				   : _("Invalid certificate"),
-					    gpg_errstr(rc));
-	    sigflag |= SIGF_CHECKED;
-	    if( revocation ) {
-		sigflag |= SIGF_REVOKED;
-		*mod_down = 1;
-	    }
-	}
-    }
-    else if( tmp.rectype == RECTYPE_SDIR ) {
-	/* better check that it is the right one */
-	if(    tmp.r.sdir.keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0]
-	    && tmp.r.sdir.keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
-	    && (!tmp.r.sdir.pubkey_algo
-		 || tmp.r.sdir.pubkey_algo == sig->pubkey_algo ))
-	    sigflag |= SIGF_NOPUBKEY;
-	else
-	    log_error(_("sig record %lu[%d] points to wrong record.\n"),
-			 siglid, sigidx );
+/* Clear the ownertrust value.  Return true if a changed actually happend. */
+int
+clear_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  TRUSTREC rec;
+  int rc;
+  
+  rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
+  if (!rc)
+    {
+      if (DBG_TRUST)
+        log_debug ("clearing ownertrust (old value %u)\n",
+                   (unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust);
+      if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust)
+        {
+          rec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
+          write_record( &rec );
+          revalidation_mark ();
+          do_sync ();
+          return 1;
+        }
     }
-    else {
-	log_error(_("sig record %lu[%d] points to wrong record.\n"),
-		    siglid, sigidx );
-	tdbio_invalid();
+  else if (rc != -1)
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
     }
-
-    return sigflag;
+  return 0;
 }
 
-/****************
- * Make the sig records for the given uid record
- * We don't set flags here or even check the signatures; this will
- * happen latter.
+/* 
+ * Note: Caller has to do a sync 
  */
-static ulong
-make_sig_records( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE uidnode,
-		  ulong lid, u32 *mainkid, u32 *min_expire,
-					int *mod_down, int *mod_up  )
-{
-    TRUSTREC *srecs, **s_end, *s=NULL, *s2;
-    KBNODE  node;
-    PKT_signature *sig;
-    ulong sigrecno, siglid;
-    int i, sigidx = 0;
-    u32 expiretime;
-
-    srecs = NULL; s_end = &srecs;
-    for( node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next ) {
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
-	    || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
-	    break; /* ready */
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
-	    continue; /* don't care about other packets */
-	sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
-	if( mainkid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && mainkid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
-	    continue; /* we don't care about self-signatures here */
-
-	siglid = find_or_create_lid( sig );
-	/* smash dups */
-	/* FIXME: Here we have a problem:
-	 *  We can't distinguish between a certification and a certification
-	 *  revocation without looking at class of the signature - we have
-	 *  to see how we can store the sigclass in the sigrecord..
-	 *  Argg- I hope I can get rid of this ugly trustdb ASAP.
-	 */
-	for( s2 = s; s2 ; s2 = s2->next ) {
-	    for(i=0; i < sigidx; i++ ) {
-		if( s2->r.sig.sig[i].lid == siglid )
-		    goto leaveduptest;
-	    }
-	}
-	for( s2 = srecs; s2 ; s2 = s2->next ) {
-	    for(i=0; i < SIGS_PER_RECORD; i++ ) {
-		if( s2->r.sig.sig[i].lid == siglid )
-		    goto leaveduptest;
-	    }
-	}
-      leaveduptest:
-	if( s2 ) {
-	    log_info( "sig %08lX.%lu: %s\n", (ulong)mainkid[1], lid,
-				    _("duplicated certificate - deleted") );
-	    continue;
-	}
+static void
+update_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, const byte *namehash,
+                 int depth, int validity)
+{
+  TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
+  int rc;
+  ulong recno;
+  
+  rc = read_trust_record (pk, &trec);
+  if (rc && rc != -1)
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+      return;
+    }
+  if (rc == -1) /* no record yet - create a new one */
+    { 
+      size_t dummy;
+
+      rc = 0;
+      memset (&trec, 0, sizeof trec);
+      trec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
+      trec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
+      fingerprint_from_pk (pk, trec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
+      trec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
+      }
+
+  /* locate an existing one */
+  recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
+  while (recno)
+    {
+      read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
+      if ( !memcmp (vrec.r.valid.namehash, namehash, 20) )
+        break;
+      recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
+    }
+
+  if (!recno) /* insert a new validity record */
+    {
+      memset (&vrec, 0, sizeof vrec);
+      vrec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
+      vrec.rectype = RECTYPE_VALID;
+      memcpy (vrec.r.valid.namehash, namehash, 20);
+      vrec.r.valid.next = trec.r.trust.validlist;
+    }
+  vrec.r.valid.validity = validity;
+  write_record (&vrec);
+  trec.r.trust.depth = depth;
+  trec.r.trust.validlist = vrec.recnum;
+  write_record (&trec);
+}
+
+
+/* reset validity for all user IDs.  Caller must sync. */
+static int
+clear_validity (PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+  TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
+  int rc;
+  ulong recno;
+  int any = 0;
+  
+  rc = read_trust_record (pk, &trec);
+  if (rc && rc != -1)
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+      return 0;
+    }
+  if (rc == -1) /* no record yet - no need to clerar it then ;-) */
+    return 0;
 
-	/* create the sig record */
-	if( !sigidx ) {
-	    s = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *s );
-	    s->rectype = RECTYPE_SIG;
-	    s->r.sig.lid = lid;
-	}
-	s->r.sig.sig[sigidx].lid = siglid;
-	s->r.sig.sig[sigidx].flag= check_sig_record( keyblock, node,
-						     siglid, sigidx,
-						     mainkid, lid, &expiretime,
-						     mod_down, mod_up );
-
-	sigidx++;
-	if( sigidx == SIGS_PER_RECORD ) {
-	    s->recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
-	    *s_end = s;
-	    s_end = &s->next;
-	    sigidx = 0;
-	}
-	/* keep track of signers pk expire time */
-	if( expiretime && (!*min_expire || *min_expire > expiretime ) )
-	    *min_expire = expiretime;
-    }
-    if( sigidx ) {
-       s->recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
-       *s_end = s;
-       s_end = &s->next;
+  /* reset validity for all user IDs */
+  recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
+  while (recno)
+    {
+      read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
+      if ((vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK))
+        {
+          vrec.r.valid.validity &= ~TRUST_MASK;
+          write_record (&vrec);
+          any = 1;
+        }
+      recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
     }
 
-    sigrecno = srecs? srecs->recnum : 0;
-    /* write the keylist and release the memory */
-    for( s = srecs; s ; s = s2 ) {
-	if( s->next )
-	    s->r.sig.next = s->next->recnum;
-	write_record( s );
-	s2 = s->next;
-	gcry_free( s );
-    }
-    return sigrecno;
+  return any;
 }
 
 
+
+/***********************************************
+ *********  Query trustdb values  **************
+ ***********************************************/
 
-/****************
- * Make a preference record (or a list of them) according to the supplied
- * signature.
- * Returns: The record number of the first pref record.
+/*
+ * Return the validity information for PK.  If the namehash is not
+ * NULL, the validity of the corresponsing user ID is returned,
+ * otherwise, a reasonable value for the entire key is returned. 
  */
-static ulong
-make_pref_record( PKT_signature *sig, ulong lid )
-{
-    static struct {
-	sigsubpkttype_t subpkttype;
-	int preftype;
-    } ptable[] = {
-	{ SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM,	PREFTYPE_SYM	},
-	{ SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH,	PREFTYPE_HASH	},
-	{ SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR, PREFTYPE_COMPR	},
-	{ 0, 0 }
-    };
-    TRUSTREC *precs, **p_end, *p=NULL, *p2;
-    ulong precno;
-    int k, idx=0;
-    const byte *s;
-    size_t n;
-
-  #if (ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD % 2) != 0
-    #error ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD must have an even value
-  #endif
-
-    precs = NULL; p_end = &precs;
-    for(k=0; ptable[k].subpkttype; k++ ) {
-	s = parse_sig_subpkt2( sig, ptable[k].subpkttype, &n );
-	if( !s )
-	    continue;
-	for( ; n; n--, s++ ) {
-	    if( !idx ) {
-		p = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *p );
-		p->rectype = RECTYPE_PREF;
-		p->r.pref.lid = lid;
-	    }
-	    p->r.pref.data[idx++] = ptable[k].preftype;
-	    p->r.pref.data[idx++] = *s;
-	    if( idx >= ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD ) {
-		p->recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
-		*p_end = p;
-		p_end = &p->next;
-		idx = 0;
-	    }
-	}
-    }
-    if( idx ) {
-       p->recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
-       *p_end = p;
-       p_end = &p->next;
-    }
-
-    precno = precs? precs->recnum : 0;
-    /* write the precs and release the memory */
-    for( p = precs; p ; p = p2 ) {
-	if( p->next )
-	    p->r.pref.next = p->next->recnum;
-	write_record( p );
-	p2 = p->next;
-	gcry_free( p );
+unsigned int
+get_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, const byte *namehash)
+{
+  static int did_nextcheck;
+  TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
+  int rc;
+  ulong recno;
+  unsigned int validity;
+  u32 kid[2];
+  PKT_public_key *main_pk;
+  
+  init_trustdb ();
+  if (!did_nextcheck)
+    {
+      ulong scheduled;
+
+      did_nextcheck = 1;
+      scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
+      if (scheduled && scheduled <= make_timestamp ())
+        {
+          if (opt.no_auto_check_trustdb) 
+            {
+              pending_check_trustdb = 1;
+              log_info ("please do a --check-trustdb\n");
+            }
+          else
+            {
+              log_info (_("checking the trustdb\n"));
+              validate_keys (0);
+            }
+        }
     }
-    return precno;
-}
-
-
-static ulong
-make_uid_records( KBNODE keyblock, ulong lid, u32 *keyid, u32 *min_expire,
-						 int *mod_down, int *mod_up )
-{
-    TRUSTREC *urecs, **uend, *u, *u2;
-    KBNODE  node;
-    PKT_user_id *uid;
-    byte uidhash[20];
-    ulong uidrecno;
-
-    urecs = NULL; uend = &urecs;
-    for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
-	PKT_signature *bestsig;
-
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
-	    continue;
-	uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
-	if( uid->photo ) {
-	    gcry_md_hash_buffer( GCRY_MD_RMD160,  uidhash,
-				 uid->photo, uid->photolen );
-	}
-	else {
-	    gcry_md_hash_buffer( GCRY_MD_RMD160,  uidhash,
-				 uid->name, uid->len );
-	}
 
-	/* create the uid record */
-	u = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *u );
-	u->rectype = RECTYPE_UID;
-	u->r.uid.lid = lid;
-	memcpy(u->r.uid.namehash, uidhash, 20 );
-	u->recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
-	*uend = u;
-	uend = &u->next;
-
-	u->r.uid.uidflags = check_uidsigs( keyblock, node, keyid,
-						     lid, &bestsig );
-	if( (u->r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_CHECKED)
-	    && (u->r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_VALID) ) {
-	    u->r.uid.prefrec = bestsig? make_pref_record( bestsig, lid ) : 0;
+  keyid_from_pk (pk, kid);
+  if (pk->main_keyid[0] != kid[0] || pk->main_keyid[1] != kid[1])
+    { /* this is a subkey - get the mainkey */
+      main_pk = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *main_pk);
+      rc = get_pubkey (main_pk, pk->main_keyid);
+      if (rc)
+        {
+          log_error ("error getting main key %08lX of subkey %08lX: %s\n",
+                     (ulong)pk->main_keyid[1], (ulong)kid[1], g10_errstr(rc));
+          validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN; 
+          goto leave;
 	}
-
-	/* the next test is really bad because we should modify
-	 * out modification timestamps only if we really have a change.
-	 * But because we are deleting the uid records first it is somewhat
-	 * difficult to track those changes.  fixme */
-	if(   !( u->r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_VALID )
-	    || ( u->r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_REVOKED ) )
-	    *mod_down=1;
-	else
-	    *mod_up=1;
-
-	/* create the list of signatures */
-	u->r.uid.siglist = make_sig_records( keyblock, node,
-					     lid, keyid, min_expire,
-					     mod_down, mod_up );
-    }
-
-    uidrecno = urecs? urecs->recnum : 0;
-    /* write the uidlist and release the memory */
-    for( u = urecs; u ; u = u2 ) {
-	if( u->next )
-	    u->r.uid.next = u->next->recnum;
-	write_record( u );
-	u2 = u->next;
-	gcry_free( u );
     }
-    return uidrecno;
+  else
+    main_pk = pk;
+
+  rc = read_trust_record (main_pk, &trec);
+  if (rc && rc != -1)
+    {
+      tdbio_invalid ();
+      return 0;
+    }
+  if (rc == -1) /* no record found */
+    {
+      validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN; 
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+  /* loop over all user IDs */
+  recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
+  validity = 0;
+  while (recno)
+    {
+      read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
+      if ( validity < (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK) )
+        validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
+      if ( namehash && !memcmp (vrec.r.valid.namehash, namehash, 20) )
+        break;
+      recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
+    }
+  
+  if (recno) /* okay, use the user ID associated one */
+    validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
+
+  if ( (trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
+    validity |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
+
+ leave:
+  /* set some flags direct from the key */
+  if (main_pk->is_revoked)
+    validity |= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
+  if (main_pk != pk && pk->is_revoked)
+    validity |= TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED;
+  /* Note: expiration is a trust value and not a flag - don't know why
+   * I initially designed it that way */
+  if (main_pk->has_expired || pk->has_expired)
+    validity = (validity & ~TRUST_MASK) | TRUST_EXPIRED;
+  
+  if (pending_check_trustdb)
+    validity |= TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK;
+
+  if (main_pk != pk)
+    free_public_key (main_pk);
+  return validity;
 }
 
 
-
-/****************
- * Update all the info from the public keyblock.
- * The key must already exist in the keydb.
- */
 int
-update_trust_record( KBNODE keyblock, int recheck, int *modified )
+get_validity_info (PKT_public_key *pk, const byte *namehash)
 {
-    TRUSTREC drec;
-    int rc;
+    int trustlevel;
+    int c;
 
-    /* NOTE: We don't need recheck anymore, but this might chnage again in
-     * the future */
-    if( opt.dry_run )
-	return 0;
-    if( modified )
-	*modified = 0;
-    init_trustdb();
-    rc = get_dir_record( find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
-					    ->pkt->pkt.public_key, &drec );
-    if( rc )
-	return rc;
-
-    rc = do_update_trust_record( keyblock, &drec, 0, modified );
-    return rc;
+    trustlevel = get_validity (pk, namehash);
+    if( trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED )
+	return 'd';
+    if( trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED )
+	return 'r';
+    c = trust_letter ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) );
+    if( !c )
+	c = '?';
+    return c;
 }
 
-/****************
- * Same as update_trust_record, but this functions expects the dir record.
- * On exit the dir record will reflect any changes made.
- * With sigs_only set only foreign key signatures are checked.
- */
-static int
-do_update_trust_record( KBNODE keyblock, TRUSTREC *drec,
-			int sigs_only, int *modified )
-{
-    PKT_public_key *primary_pk;
-    TRUSTREC krec, urec, prec, helprec;
-    int i, rc = 0;
-    u32 keyid[2]; /* keyid of primary key */
-    int mod_up = 0;
-    int mod_down = 0;
-    ulong recno, r2;
-    u32 expiretime;
-
-    primary_pk = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )->pkt->pkt.public_key;
-    if( !primary_pk->local_id )
-	primary_pk->local_id = drec->recnum;
-
-    keyid_from_pk( primary_pk, keyid );
-    if( DBG_TRUST )
-	log_debug("do_update_trust_record: %08lX.%lu\n",
-					(ulong)keyid[1], drec->recnum );
-
-    rc = tdbio_begin_transaction();
-    if( rc )
-	return rc;
-
-    /* delete the old stuff FIXME: implementend sigs_only */
-    for( recno=drec->r.dir.keylist; recno; recno = krec.r.key.next ) {
-	read_record( recno, &krec, RECTYPE_KEY );
-	delete_record( recno );
-    }
-    drec->r.dir.keylist = 0;
-    for( recno=drec->r.dir.uidlist; recno; recno = urec.r.uid.next ) {
-	read_record( recno, &urec, RECTYPE_UID );
-	for(r2=urec.r.uid.prefrec ; r2; r2 = prec.r.pref.next ) {
-	    read_record( r2, &prec, RECTYPE_PREF );
-	    delete_record( r2 );
-	}
-	for(r2=urec.r.uid.siglist ; r2; r2 = helprec.r.sig.next ) {
-	    read_record( r2, &helprec, RECTYPE_SIG );
-	    delete_record( r2 );
-	}
-	delete_record( recno );
-    }
-    drec->r.dir.uidlist = 0;
-
-
-    /* insert new stuff */
-    drec->r.dir.dirflags &= ~DIRF_REVOKED;
-    drec->r.dir.dirflags &= ~DIRF_NEWKEYS;
-    drec->r.dir.keylist = make_key_records( keyblock, drec->recnum, keyid, &i );
-    if( i ) /* primary key has been revoked */
-	drec->r.dir.dirflags |= DIRF_REVOKED;
-    expiretime = 0;
-    drec->r.dir.uidlist = make_uid_records( keyblock, drec->recnum, keyid,
-					    &expiretime, &mod_down, &mod_up );
-    if( rc )
-	rc = tdbio_cancel_transaction();
-    else {
-	if( modified && tdbio_is_dirty() )
-	    *modified = 1;
-	drec->r.dir.dirflags |= DIRF_CHECKED;
-	drec->r.dir.valcheck = 0;
-	drec->r.dir.checkat = expiretime;
-	write_record( drec );
-	tdbio_write_modify_stamp( mod_up, mod_down );
-	rc = tdbio_end_transaction();
-    }
-    return rc;
-}
 
 
 
-/****************
- * Insert a trust record into the TrustDB
- * This function assumes that the record does not yet exist.
- */
-int
-insert_trust_record( KBNODE keyblock )
+void
+list_trust_path( const char *username )
 {
-    TRUSTREC dirrec;
-    TRUSTREC shadow;
-    KBNODE node;
-    int rc = 0;
-    PKT_public_key *pk;
-
-
-    if( opt.dry_run )
-	return 0;
-
-    init_trustdb();
-
-    pk = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )->pkt->pkt.public_key;
-    if( pk->local_id ) {
-	log_debug("insert_trust_record with pk->local_id=%lu (2)\n",
-							pk->local_id );
-	rc = update_trust_record( keyblock, 1, NULL );
-	return rc;
-    }
-
-    /* We have to look for a shadow dir record which must be reused
-     * as the dir record. */
-    rc = tdbio_search_sdir( pk->keyid, pk->pubkey_algo, &shadow );
-    if( rc && rc != -1 ) {
-	log_error(_("tdbio_search_dir failed: %s\n"), gpg_errstr(rc));
-	tdbio_invalid();
-    }
-    memset( &dirrec, 0, sizeof dirrec );
-    dirrec.rectype = RECTYPE_DIR;
-    if( !rc ) /* we have a shadow dir record - convert to dir record */
-	dirrec.recnum = shadow.recnum;
-    else
-	dirrec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
-    dirrec.r.dir.lid = dirrec.recnum;
-    write_record( &dirrec );
-
-    /* put the LID into the keyblock */
-    pk->local_id = dirrec.r.dir.lid;
-    for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
-	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
-	    || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
-	    PKT_public_key *a_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
-	    a_pk->local_id = dirrec.r.dir.lid;
-	}
-	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
-	    PKT_signature *a_sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
-	    a_sig->local_id = dirrec.r.dir.lid;
-	}
-    }
-
-
-    /* mark tdb as modified upwards */
-    tdbio_write_modify_stamp( 1, 0 );
-
-    /* and put all the other stuff into the keydb */
-    rc = do_update_trust_record( keyblock, &dirrec, 0, NULL );
-
-    do_sync();
-
-    /* keep track of new keys */
-    if( !fresh_imported_keys )
-	fresh_imported_keys = new_lid_table();
-    ins_lid_table_item( fresh_imported_keys, pk->local_id, 0 );
-    if( ++fresh_imported_keys_count > FRESH_KEY_CHECK_THRESHOLD )
-	mark_fresh_keys();
-
-    return rc;
 }
 
 
 
 
 /****************
- * Insert a trust record indentified by a PK into the TrustDB
+ * Enumerate all keys, which are needed to build all trust paths for
+ * the given key.  This function does not return the key itself or
+ * the ultimate key (the last point in cerificate chain).  Only
+ * certificate chains which ends up at an ultimately trusted key
+ * are listed.	If ownertrust or validity is not NULL, the corresponding
+ * value for the returned LID is also returned in these variable(s).
+ *
+ *  1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
+ *  2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function.
+ *     Set lid to the key you want to enumerate and pass it by reference.
+ *  3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
+ *     to indicate EOF. LID does contain the next key used to build the web
+ *  4) Always call this function a last time with LID set to NULL,
+ *     so that it can free its context.
+ *
+ * Returns: -1 on EOF or the level of the returned LID
  */
 int
-insert_trust_record_by_pk( PKT_public_key *pk )
-{
-    KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
-    byte fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
-    size_t fingerlen;
-    int rc;
-
-    /* get the keyblock */
-    fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fingerprint, &fingerlen );
-    rc = get_keyblock_byfprint( &keyblock, fingerprint, fingerlen );
-    if( rc ) { /* that should never happen */
-	log_debug( "insert_trust_record_by_pk: keyblock not found: %s\n",
-							  gpg_errstr(rc) );
-    }
-    else {
-	rc = insert_trust_record( keyblock );
-	if( !rc ) /* copy the LID into the PK */
-	    pk->local_id = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
-					    ->pkt->pkt.public_key->local_id;
-    }
-
-    release_kbnode( keyblock );
-    return rc;
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Check one trust record.  This function is called for every
- * directory record which is to be checked.  The supplied
- * dir record is modified according to the performed actions.
- * Currently we only do an update_trust_record.
- */
-static int
-check_trust_record( TRUSTREC *drec, int sigs_only )
+enum_cert_paths( void **context, ulong *lid,
+		 unsigned *ownertrust, unsigned *validity )
 {
-    KBNODE keyblock;
-    int modified, rc;
-
-    rc = get_keyblock_bylid( &keyblock, drec->recnum );
-    if( rc ) {
-	log_debug( "check_trust_record %lu: keyblock not found: %s\n",
-					      drec->recnum, gpg_errstr(rc) );
-	return rc;
-    }
-
-    rc = do_update_trust_record( keyblock, drec, sigs_only, &modified );
-    release_kbnode( keyblock );
-
-    return rc;
+    return -1;
 }
 
 
 /****************
- * Walk over the keyrings and create trustdb records for all keys
- * which are not currently in the trustdb.
- * It is intended to be used after a fast-import operation.
+ * Print the current path
  */
 void
-update_trustdb()
+enum_cert_paths_print( void **context, FILE *fp,
+				       int refresh, ulong selected_lid )
 {
-    KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
-    KBPOS kbpos;
-    int rc;
-
-    if( opt.dry_run )
-	return;
-
-    init_trustdb();
-    rc = enum_keyblocks_begin( &kbpos, 0 );
-    if( !rc ) {
-	ulong count=0, err_count=0, new_count=0;
-
-	while( !(rc = enum_keyblocks_next( kbpos, 1, &keyblock )) ) {
-	    /*int modified;*/
-	    TRUSTREC drec;
-	    PKT_public_key *pk = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
-					->pkt->pkt.public_key;
-
-	    rc = get_dir_record( pk, &drec );
-	    if( rc == -1 ) { /* not in trustdb: insert */
-		rc = insert_trust_record( keyblock );
-		if( rc && !pk->local_id ) {
-		    log_error(_("lid ?: insert failed: %s\n"),
-						     gpg_errstr(rc) );
-		    err_count++;
-		}
-		else if( rc ) {
-		    log_error(_("lid %lu: insert failed: %s\n"),
-				       pk->local_id, gpg_errstr(rc) );
-		    err_count++;
-		}
-		else {
-		    if( opt.verbose )
-			log_info(_("lid %lu: inserted\n"), pk->local_id );
-		    new_count++;
-		}
-	    }
-	    else if( rc ) {
-		log_error(_("error reading dir record: %s\n"), gpg_errstr(rc));
-		err_count++;
-	    }
-
-	    release_kbnode( keyblock ); keyblock = NULL;
-	    if( !(++count % 100) )
-		log_info(_("%lu keys so far processed\n"), count);
-	}
-	log_info(_("%lu keys processed\n"), count);
-	if( err_count )
-	    log_info(_("\t%lu keys with errors\n"), err_count);
-	if( new_count )
-	    log_info(_("\t%lu keys inserted\n"), new_count);
-    }
-    if( rc && rc != -1 )
-	log_error(_("enumerate keyblocks failed: %s\n"), gpg_errstr(rc));
-
-    enum_keyblocks_end( kbpos ); 
-    release_kbnode( keyblock );
+    return;
 }
 
 
+
+/****************************************
+ *********** NEW NEW NEW ****************
+ ****************************************/
 
-/****************
- * Do all required checks in the trustdb.  This function walks over all
- * records in the trustdb and does scheduled processing.
- */
-void
-check_trustdb( const char *username )
+static int
+ask_ownertrust (u32 *kid)
 {
-    TRUSTREC rec;
-    ulong recnum;
-    ulong count=0, upd_count=0, err_count=0, skip_count=0, sigonly_count=0;
-    ulong current_time = make_timestamp();
-
-    if( username )
-	log_info("given user IDs ignored in check_trustdb\n");
-
-    init_trustdb();
-
-    for(recnum=0; !tdbio_read_record( recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ ) {
-	int sigs_only;
-
-	if( rec.rectype != RECTYPE_DIR )
-	    continue; /* we only want the dir records */
-
-	if( count && !(count % 100) && !opt.quiet )
-	    log_info(_("%lu keys so far processed\n"), count);
-	count++;
-	sigs_only = 0;
-
-	if( !(rec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_CHECKED) )
-	    ;
-	else if( !rec.r.dir.checkat || rec.r.dir.checkat > current_time ) {
-	    if( !(rec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_NEWKEYS) ) {
-		skip_count++;
-		continue;  /* not scheduled for checking */
-	    }
-	    sigs_only = 1; /* new public keys - check them */
-	    sigonly_count++;
-	}
-
-	if( !rec.r.dir.keylist ) {
-	    log_info(_("lid %lu: dir record w/o key - skipped\n"), recnum);
-	    skip_count++;
-	    continue;
-	}
+  PKT_public_key *pk;
+  int rc;
+  int ot;
 
-	check_trust_record( &rec, sigs_only );
+  pk = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
+  rc = get_pubkey (pk, kid);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error (_("public key %08lX not found: %s\n"),
+                 (ulong)kid[1], g10_errstr(rc) );
+      return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
     }
-
-    log_info(_("%lu keys processed\n"), count);
-    if( sigonly_count )
-	log_info(_("\t%lu due to new pubkeys\n"), sigonly_count);
-    if( skip_count )
-	log_info(_("\t%lu keys skipped\n"), skip_count);
-    if( err_count )
-	log_info(_("\t%lu keys with errors\n"), err_count);
-    if( upd_count )
-	log_info(_("\t%lu keys updated\n"), upd_count);
+ 
+  ot=edit_ownertrust(pk,0);
+  if(ot>0)
+    ot = get_ownertrust (pk);
+  else if(ot==0)
+    ot = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
+  else
+    ot = -1; /* quit */
+  free_public_key( pk );
+  return ot;
 }
 
 
-
-/***********************************************
- *********  Trust calculation  *****************
- ***********************************************/
-
-/****************
- * Find all certification paths of a given LID.
- * Limit the search to MAX_DEPTH.  stack is a helper variable which
- * should have been allocated with size max_depth, stack[0] should
- * be setup to the key we are investigating, so the minimal depth
- * we should ever see in this function is 1.
- * Returns: a new tree
- * certchain_set must be a valid set or point to NULL; this function
- * may modifiy it.
- *
- * Hmmm: add a fastscan mode which stops at valid validity nodes.
- */
-static TN
-build_cert_tree( ulong lid, int depth, int max_depth, TN helproot )
+static void
+mark_keyblock_seen (KeyHashTable tbl, KBNODE node)
 {
-    TRUSTREC dirrec;
-    TRUSTREC uidrec;
-    ulong uidrno;
-    TN keynode;
-
-    if( depth >= max_depth )
-	return NULL;
-
-    keynode = new_tn();
-    if( !helproot )
-	helproot = keynode;
-    keynode->lid = lid;
-    if( !qry_lid_table_flag( ultikey_table, lid, NULL ) ) {
-	/* this is an ultimately trusted key;
-	 * which means that we have found the end of the chain:
-	 * We do this here prior to reading the dir record
-	 * because we don't really need the info from that record */
-	keynode->n.k.ownertrust = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
-	keynode->n.k.buckstop	= 1;
-	return keynode;
-    }
-    read_record( lid, &dirrec, 0 );
-    if( dirrec.rectype != RECTYPE_DIR ) {
-	if( dirrec.rectype != RECTYPE_SDIR )
-	    log_debug("lid %lu, has rectype %d"
-		      " - skipped\n", lid, dirrec.rectype );
-	gcry_free(keynode);
-	return NULL;
-    }
-
-    if( dirrec.r.dir.checkat && dirrec.r.dir.checkat <= make_timestamp() ) {
-	check_trust_record( &dirrec, 0 );
-    }
-    else if( (dirrec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_NEWKEYS) ) {
-	check_trust_record( &dirrec, 1 );
-    }
-
-    keynode->n.k.ownertrust = dirrec.r.dir.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK;
-
-    /* loop over all user ids */
-    for( uidrno = dirrec.r.dir.uidlist; uidrno; uidrno = uidrec.r.uid.next ) {
-	TRUSTREC sigrec;
-	ulong sigrno;
-	TN uidnode = NULL;
-
-	read_record( uidrno, &uidrec, RECTYPE_UID );
-
-	if( !(uidrec.r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_CHECKED) )
-	    continue; /* user id has not been checked */
-	if( !(uidrec.r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_VALID) )
-	    continue; /* user id is not valid */
-	if( (uidrec.r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_REVOKED) )
-	    continue; /* user id has been revoked */
-
-	/* loop over all signature records */
-	for(sigrno=uidrec.r.uid.siglist; sigrno; sigrno = sigrec.r.sig.next ) {
-	    int i;
-	    TN tn;
-
-	    read_record( sigrno, &sigrec, RECTYPE_SIG );
-
-	    for(i=0; i < SIGS_PER_RECORD; i++ ) {
-		if( !sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].lid )
-		    continue; /* skip deleted sigs */
-		if( !(sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].flag & SIGF_CHECKED) )
-		    continue; /* skip unchecked signatures */
-		if( !(sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].flag & SIGF_VALID) )
-		    continue; /* skip invalid signatures */
-		if( (sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].flag & SIGF_EXPIRED) )
-		    continue; /* skip expired signatures */
-		if( (sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].flag & SIGF_REVOKED) )
-		    continue; /* skip revoked signatures */
-		/* check for cycles */
-		for( tn=keynode; tn && tn->lid != sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].lid;
-							  tn = tn->back )
-		    ;
-		if( tn )
-		    continue; /* cycle found */
-
-		tn = build_cert_tree( sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].lid,
-				      depth+1, max_depth, helproot );
-		if( !tn )
-		    continue; /* cert chain too deep or error */
-
-		if( !uidnode ) {
-		    uidnode = new_tn();
-		    uidnode->back = keynode;
-		    uidnode->lid = uidrno;
-		    uidnode->is_uid = 1;
-		    uidnode->next = keynode->list;
-		    keynode->list = uidnode;
-		}
-
-		tn->back = uidnode;
-		tn->next = uidnode->list;
-		uidnode->list = tn;
-		if( tn->n.k.buckstop ) {
-		    /* ultimately trusted key found:
-		     * no need to check more signatures of this uid */
-		    sigrec.r.sig.next = 0;
-		    break;
-		}
-	    }
-	} /* end loop over sig recs */
-    } /* end loop over user ids */
+  for ( ;node; node = node->next )
+    if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+        || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+      {
+        u32 aki[2];
 
-    if( !keynode->list ) {
-	release_tn_tree( keynode );
-	keynode = NULL;
-    }
-
-    return keynode;
+        keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki);
+        add_key_hash_table (tbl, aki);
+      }
 }
 
 
+
 static void
-upd_one_ownertrust( ulong lid, unsigned new_trust, unsigned *retflgs )
-{
-    TRUSTREC rec;
-
-    read_record( lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
-    if( DBG_TRUST )
-	log_debug("upd_one_ownertrust of %lu from %u to %u\n",
-			   lid, (unsigned)rec.r.dir.ownertrust, new_trust );
-    if( retflgs ) {
-	if( (new_trust & TRUST_MASK) > (rec.r.dir.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK) )
-	    *retflgs |= 16; /* modified up */
-	else
-	    *retflgs |= 32; /* modified down */
+dump_key_array (int depth, struct key_array *keys)
+{
+  struct key_array *kar;
+
+  for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
+    {
+      KBNODE node = kar->keyblock;
+      u32 kid[2];
+
+      keyid_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
+      printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:K::%c::::\n",
+              depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1], '?');
+
+      for (; node; node = node->next)
+        {
+          if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+            {
+              int len = node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len;
+
+              if (len > 30)
+                len = 30;
+              printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:U:::%c:::",
+                      depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1],
+                      (node->flag & 4)? 'f':
+                      (node->flag & 2)? 'm':
+                      (node->flag & 1)? 'q':'-');
+              print_string (stdout,  node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, len, ':');
+              putchar (':');
+              putchar ('\n');
+            }
+        }
     }
+}  
 
-    /* we preserve the disabled state here */
-    if( (rec.r.dir.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
-	rec.r.dir.ownertrust = new_trust | TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
-    else
-	rec.r.dir.ownertrust = new_trust & ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
-    write_record( &rec );
-}
 
-/****************
- * Update the ownertrust in the complete tree.
- */
 static void
-propagate_ownertrust( TN kr, ulong lid, unsigned trust )
-{
-    TN ur;
-
-    for( ; kr; kr = kr->next ) {
-	if( kr->lid == lid )
-	    kr->n.k.ownertrust = trust;
-	for( ur=kr->list; ur; ur = ur->next )
-	    propagate_ownertrust( ur->list, lid, trust );
+store_validation_status (int depth, KBNODE keyblock)
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  byte namehash[20];
+  int status;
+  int any = 0;
+
+  for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+        {
+          PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+
+          if (node->flag & 4)
+            status = TRUST_FULLY;
+          else if (node->flag & 2)
+            status = TRUST_MARGINAL;
+          else if (node->flag & 1)
+            status = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
+          else
+            status = 0;
+          
+          if (status)
+            {
+              if( uid->attrib_data )
+                rmd160_hash_buffer (namehash,uid->attrib_data,uid->attrib_len);
+              else
+                rmd160_hash_buffer (namehash, uid->name, uid->len );
+              
+              update_validity (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
+                               namehash, depth, status);
+              any = 1;
+            }
+        }
     }
-}
 
-/****************
- * Calculate the validity of all keys in the tree and especially
- * the one of the top key.  If add_fnc is not NULL, it is used to
- * ask for missing ownertrust values (but only if this will help
- * us to increase the validity.
- * add_fnc is expected to take the LID of the key under question
- * and return a ownertrust value or an error:  positive values
- * are assumed to be the new ownertrust value; a 0 does mean no change,
- * a -1 is a request to cancel this validation procedure, a -2 requests
- * a listing of the sub-tree using the tty functions.
- *
- *
- * Returns: 0 = okay
+  if (any)
+    do_sync ();
+}  
+
+/*
+ * check whether the signature sig is in the klist k
  */
-static int
-propagate_validity( TN root, TN node, int (*add_fnc)(ulong), unsigned *retflgs )
+static struct key_item *
+is_in_klist (struct key_item *k, PKT_signature *sig)
 {
-    TN kr, ur;
-    int max_validity = 0;
-
-    assert( !node->is_uid );
-    if( node->n.k.ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE ) {
-	/* this is one of our keys */
-	assert( !node->list ); /* it should be a leaf */
-	node->n.k.validity = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
-	if( retflgs )
-	    *retflgs |= 1;  /* found a path to an ultimately trusted key */
-	return 0;
+  for (; k; k = k->next)
+    {
+      if (k->kid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && k->kid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
+        return k;
     }
-
-    /* loop over all user ids */
-    for( ur=node->list; ur && max_validity <= TRUST_FULLY; ur = ur->next ) {
-	assert( ur->is_uid );
-	/* loop over all signators */
-	for(kr=ur->list; kr && max_validity <= TRUST_FULLY; kr = kr->next ) {
-	    if( propagate_validity( root, kr, add_fnc, retflgs ) )
-		return -1; /* quit */
-	    if( kr->n.k.validity == TRUST_ULTIMATE ) {
-		ur->n.u.fully_count = opt.completes_needed;
-	    }
-	    else if( kr->n.k.validity == TRUST_FULLY ) {
-		if( add_fnc && !kr->n.k.ownertrust ) {
-		    int rc;
-
-		    if( retflgs )
-			*retflgs |= 2; /* found key with undefined ownertrust*/
-		    do {
-			rc = add_fnc( kr->lid );
-			switch( rc ) {
-			  case TRUST_NEVER:
-			  case TRUST_MARGINAL:
-			  case TRUST_FULLY:
-			    propagate_ownertrust( root, kr->lid, rc );
-			    upd_one_ownertrust( kr->lid, rc, retflgs );
-			    if( retflgs )
-				*retflgs |= 4; /* changed */
-			    break;
-			  case -1:
-			    return -1; /* cancel */
-			  case -2:
-			    dump_tn_tree( NULL, 0, kr );
-			    tty_printf("\n");
-			    break;
-			  default:
-			    break;
-			}
-		    } while( rc == -2 );
-		}
-		if( kr->n.k.ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY )
-		    ur->n.u.fully_count++;
-		else if( kr->n.k.ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL )
-		    ur->n.u.marginal_count++;
-	    }
-
-	    if( ur->n.u.fully_count >= opt.completes_needed
-		|| ur->n.u.marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
-		ur->n.u.validity = TRUST_FULLY;
-	    else if( ur->n.u.fully_count || ur->n.u.marginal_count )
-		ur->n.u.validity = TRUST_MARGINAL;
-
-	    if( ur->n.u.validity >= max_validity )
-		max_validity = ur->n.u.validity;
-	}
-    }
-
-    node->n.k.validity = max_validity;
-    return 0;
+  return NULL;
 }
 
-
-
-/****************
- * Given the directory record of a key, check whether we can
- * find a path to an ultimately trusted key.  We do this by
- * checking all key signatures up to a some depth.
+/*
+ * Mark the signature of the given UID which are used to certify it.
+ * To do this, we first revmove all signatures which are not valid and
+ * from the remain ones we look for the latest one.  If this is not a
+ * certification revocation signature we mark the signature by setting
+ * node flag bit 8.  Note that flag bits 9 and 10 are used for internal
+ * purposes.  
  */
-static int
-verify_key( int max_depth, TRUSTREC *drec, const char *namehash,
-			    int (*add_fnc)(ulong), unsigned *retflgs )
-{
-    TN tree;
-    int keytrust;
-    int pv_result;
-
-    tree = build_cert_tree( drec->r.dir.lid, 0, opt.max_cert_depth, NULL );
-    if( !tree )
-	return TRUST_UNDEFINED;
-    pv_result = propagate_validity( tree, tree, add_fnc, retflgs );
-    if( namehash && tree->n.k.validity != TRUST_ULTIMATE ) {
-	/* find the matching user id.
-	 * We don't do this here if the key is ultimately trusted; in
-	 * this case there will be no lids for the user IDs and frankly
-	 * it does not make sense to compare by the name if we do
-	 * have the secret key.
-	 * fixme: the way we handle this is too inefficient */
-	TN ur;
-	TRUSTREC rec;
-
-	keytrust = 0;
-	for( ur=tree->list; ur; ur = ur->next ) {
-	    read_record( ur->lid, &rec, RECTYPE_UID );
-	    if( !memcmp( namehash, rec.r.uid.namehash, 20 ) ) {
-		keytrust = ur->n.u.validity;
-		break;
-	    }
-	}
-    }
-    else
-	keytrust = tree->n.k.validity;
-
-    /* update the cached validity values */
-    if( !pv_result
-	&& keytrust >= TRUST_UNDEFINED
-	&& tdbio_db_matches_options()
-	&& ( !drec->r.dir.valcheck || drec->r.dir.validity != keytrust ) ) {
-	TN ur;
-	TRUSTREC rec;
-
-	for( ur=tree->list; ur; ur = ur->next ) {
-	    read_record( ur->lid, &rec, RECTYPE_UID );
-	    if( rec.r.uid.validity != ur->n.u.validity ) {
-		rec.r.uid.validity = ur->n.u.validity;
-		write_record( &rec );
-	    }
-	}
+static void
+mark_usable_uid_certs (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE uidnode,
+                       u32 *main_kid, struct key_item *klist,
+                       u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
+{
+  KBNODE node;
+  PKT_signature *sig;
+  
+  /* first check all signatures */
+  for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1<<10);
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+          || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+        break; /* ready */
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
+        continue;
+      
+      sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+      if (sig->keyid[0] == main_kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == main_kid[1])
+        continue; /* ignore self-signatures */
+      if (!IS_UID_SIG(sig) && !IS_UID_REV(sig))
+        continue; /* we only look at these signature classes */
+      if (!is_in_klist (klist, sig))
+        continue;  /* no need to check it then */
+      if (check_key_signature (keyblock, node, NULL))
+        continue; /* ignore invalid signatures */
+      node->flag |= 1<<9;
+    }      
+  /* reset the remaining flags */
+  for (; node; node = node->next)
+      node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1 << 10);
+
+  /* kbnode flag usage: bit 9 is here set for signatures to consider,
+   * bit 10 will be set by the loop to keep track of keyIDs already
+   * processed, bit 8 will be set for the usable signatures */
+
+  /* for each cert figure out the latest valid one */
+  for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      KBNODE n, signode;
+      u32 kid[2];
+      u32 sigdate;
+      
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+        break;
+      if ( !(node->flag & (1<<9)) )
+        continue; /* not a node to look at */
+      if ( (node->flag & (1<<10)) )
+        continue; /* signature with a keyID already processed */
+      node->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
+      sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+      signode = node;
+      sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+      kid[0] = sig->keyid[0]; kid[1] = sig->keyid[1];
+      for (n=uidnode->next; n; n = n->next)
+        {
+          if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+            break;
+          if ( !(n->flag & (1<<9)) )
+            continue;
+          if ( (n->flag & (1<<10)) )
+            continue; /* shortcut already processed signatures */
+          sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
+          if (kid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || kid[1] != sig->keyid[1])
+            continue;
+          n->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
+
+	  /* If signode is nonrevocable and unexpired and n isn't,
+             then take signode (skip).  It doesn't matter which is
+             older: if signode was older then we don't want to take n
+             as signode is nonrevocable.  If n was older then we're
+             automatically fine. */
+	  
+	  if(((IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
+	       !signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
+	       (signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
+		signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
+	     (!(IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
+		!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
+		(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
+		 n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
+	    continue;
 
-	drec->r.dir.validity = tree->n.k.validity;
-	drec->r.dir.valcheck = make_timestamp();
-	write_record( drec );
-	do_sync();
+	  /* If n is nonrevocable and unexpired and signode isn't,
+             then take n.  Again, it doesn't matter which is older: if
+             n was older then we don't want to take signode as n is
+             nonrevocable.  If signode was older then we're
+             automatically fine. */
+	  
+	  if((!(IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
+		!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
+		(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
+		 signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
+	     ((IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
+	       !n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
+	       (n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
+		n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
+            {
+              signode = n;
+              sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+	      continue;
+            }
+
+	  /* At this point, if it's newer, it goes in as the only
+             remaining possibilities are signode and n are both either
+             revocable or expired or both nonrevocable and unexpired.
+             If the timestamps are equal take the later ordered
+             packet, presuming that the key packets are hopefully in
+             their original order. */
+
+          if (sig->timestamp >= sigdate)
+            {
+              signode = n;
+              sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+            }
+        }
+      sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+      if (IS_UID_SIG (sig))
+        { /* this seems to be a usable one which is not revoked. 
+           * Just need to check whether there is an expiration time,
+           * We do the expired certification after finding a suitable
+           * certification, the assumption is that a signator does not
+           * want that after the expiration of his certificate the
+           * system falls back to an older certification which has a
+           * different expiration time */
+          const byte *p;
+          u32 expire;
+                    
+          p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL );
+          expire = p? sig->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p) : 0;
+
+          if (expire==0 || expire > curtime )
+            {
+              signode->flag |= (1<<8); /* yeah, found a good cert */
+              if (expire && expire < *next_expire)
+                *next_expire = expire;
+            }
+        }
     }
-
-    release_tn_tree( tree );
-    return keytrust;
 }
 
 
-/****************
- * we have the pubkey record and all needed informations are in the trustdb
- * but nothing more is known.
+/*
+ * Return true if the key is signed by one of the keys in the given
+ * key ID list.  User IDs with a valid signature are marked by node
+ * flags as follows:
+ *  flag bit 0: There is at least one signature
+ *           1: There is marginal confidence that this is a legitimate uid
+ *           2: There is full confidence that this is a legitimate uid.
+ *           8: Used for internal purposes.
+ *           9: Ditto (in mark_usable_uid_certs())
+ *          10: Ditto (ditto)
+ * This function assumes that all kbnode flags are cleared on entry.
  */
 static int
-do_check( TRUSTREC *dr, unsigned *validity,
-	  const char *namehash, int (*add_fnc)(ulong), unsigned *retflgs )
-{
-    if( !dr->r.dir.keylist ) {
-	log_error(_("Ooops, no keys\n"));
-	return GPGERR_TRUSTDB;
-    }
-    if( !dr->r.dir.uidlist ) {
-	log_error(_("Ooops, no user IDs\n"));
-	return GPGERR_TRUSTDB;
+validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist,
+                       u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
+{
+  struct key_item *kr;
+  KBNODE node, uidnode=NULL;
+  PKT_public_key *pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+  u32 main_kid[2];
+  int issigned=0, any_signed = 0, fully_count =0, marginal_count = 0;
+
+  keyid_from_pk(pk, main_kid);
+  for (node=kb; node; node = node->next)
+    {
+      if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+        {
+          if (uidnode && issigned)
+            {
+              if (fully_count >= opt.completes_needed
+                  || marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
+                uidnode->flag |= 4; 
+              else if (fully_count || marginal_count)
+                uidnode->flag |= 2;
+              uidnode->flag |= 1;
+              any_signed = 1;
+            }
+          uidnode = node;
+          issigned = 0;
+          fully_count = marginal_count = 0;
+          mark_usable_uid_certs (kb, uidnode, main_kid, klist, 
+                                 curtime, next_expire);
+        }
+      else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE 
+               && (node->flag & (1<<8)) )
+        {
+          PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+          
+          kr = is_in_klist (klist, sig);
+          if (kr)
+            {
+              if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+                fully_count = opt.completes_needed;
+              else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
+                fully_count++;
+              else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
+                marginal_count++;
+              issigned = 1;
+            }
+        }
     }
 
-    if( retflgs )
-	*retflgs &= ~(16|32);  /* reset the 2 special flags */
-
-    if( (dr->r.dir.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
-	*validity = 0; /* no need to check further */
-    else if( namehash ) {
-	/* Fixme: use a cache */
-	*validity = verify_key( opt.max_cert_depth, dr, namehash,
-							add_fnc, retflgs );
-    }
-    else if( !add_fnc
-	&& tdbio_db_matches_options()
-	    /* FIXME, TODO: This comparision is WRONG ! */
-	&& dr->r.dir.valcheck
-	    > tdbio_read_modify_stamp( (dr->r.dir.validity < TRUST_FULLY) )
-	&& dr->r.dir.validity )
-	*validity = dr->r.dir.validity;
-    else
-	*validity = verify_key( opt.max_cert_depth, dr, NULL,
-							add_fnc, retflgs );
-
-    if( !(*validity & TRUST_MASK) )
-	*validity = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
-
-    if( (dr->r.dir.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
-	*validity |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
-
-    if( dr->r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_REVOKED )
-	*validity |= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
-
-    /* If we have changed some ownertrusts, set the trustdb timestamps
-     * and do a sync */
-    if( retflgs && (*retflgs & (16|32)) ) {
-	tdbio_write_modify_stamp( (*retflgs & 16), (*retflgs & 32) );
-	do_sync();
+  if (uidnode && issigned)
+    {
+      if (fully_count >= opt.completes_needed
+               || marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
+        uidnode->flag |= 4; 
+      else if (fully_count || marginal_count)
+        uidnode->flag |= 2;
+      uidnode->flag |= 1;
+      any_signed = 1;
     }
 
-
-    return 0;
+  return any_signed;
 }
 
 
-
-/***********************************************
- *********  Change trustdb values **************
- ***********************************************/
-
-int
-update_ownertrust( ulong lid, unsigned new_trust )
-{
-    TRUSTREC rec;
-
-    init_trustdb();
-    read_record( lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
-    if( DBG_TRUST )
-	log_debug("update_ownertrust of %lu from %u to %u\n",
-			   lid, (unsigned)rec.r.dir.ownertrust, new_trust );
-    rec.r.dir.ownertrust = new_trust;
-    write_record( &rec );
-    do_sync();
-    return 0;
-}
-
-
-int
-clear_trust_checked_flag( PKT_public_key *pk )
-{
-    TRUSTREC rec;
-    int rc;
-
-    if( opt.dry_run )
-	return 0;
-
-    init_trustdb();
-    rc = get_dir_record( pk, &rec );
-    if( rc )
-	return rc;
-
-    /* check whether they are already reset */
-    if( !(rec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_CHECKED) && !rec.r.dir.valcheck )
-	return 0;
-
-    /* reset the flag */
-    rec.r.dir.dirflags &= ~DIRF_CHECKED;
-    rec.r.dir.valcheck = 0;
-    write_record( &rec );
-    do_sync();
-    return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-
-
-/***********************************************
- *********  Query trustdb values  **************
- ***********************************************/
-
-
-/****************
- * This function simply looks for the key in the trustdb
- * and makes sure that pk->local_id is set to the correct value.
- * Return: 0 = found
- *	   -1 = not found
- *	  other = error
- */
-int
-query_trust_record( PKT_public_key *pk )
+static int
+search_skipfnc (void *opaque, u32 *kid)
 {
-    TRUSTREC rec;
-    init_trustdb();
-    return get_dir_record( pk, &rec );
+  return test_key_hash_table ((KeyHashTable)opaque, kid);
 }
 
 
-/****************
- * Get the trustlevel for this PK.
- * Note: This does not ask any questions
- * Returns: 0 okay of an errorcode
- *
- * It operates this way:
- *  locate the pk in the trustdb
- *	found:
- *	    Do we have a valid cache record for it?
- *		yes: return trustlevel from cache
- *		no:  make a cache record and all the other stuff
- *	not found:
- *	    try to insert the pubkey into the trustdb and check again
- *
- * Problems: How do we get the complete keyblock to check that the
- *	     cache record is actually valid?  Think we need a clever
- *	     cache in getkey.c	to keep track of this stuff. Maybe it
- *	     is not necessary to check this if we use a local pubring. Hmmmm.
+/*
+ * Scan all keys and return a key_array of all suitable keys from
+ * kllist.  The caller has to pass keydb handle so that we don't use
+ * to create our own.  Returns either a key_array or NULL in case of
+ * an error.  No results found are indicated by an empty array.
+ * Caller hast to release the returned array.  
  */
-int
-check_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned *r_trustlevel,
-	     const byte *namehash, int (*add_fnc)(ulong), unsigned *retflgs )
-{
-    TRUSTREC rec;
-    unsigned trustlevel = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
-    int rc=0;
-    u32 cur_time;
-    u32 keyid[2];
-
-
-    init_trustdb();
-    keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
-
-    /* get the pubkey record */
-    if( pk->local_id ) {
-	read_record( pk->local_id, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
-    }
-    else { /* no local_id: scan the trustdb */
-	if( (rc=tdbio_search_dir_bypk( pk, &rec )) && rc != -1 ) {
-	    log_error(_("check_trust: search dir record failed: %s\n"),
-							    gpg_errstr(rc));
-	    return rc;
-	}
-	else if( rc == -1 && opt.dry_run )
-	    return GPGERR_GENERAL;
-	else if( rc == -1 ) { /* not found - insert */
-	    rc = insert_trust_record_by_pk( pk );
-	    if( rc ) {
-		log_error(_("key %08lX: insert trust record failed: %s\n"),
-					  (ulong)keyid[1], gpg_errstr(rc));
-		goto leave;
-	    }
-	    log_info(_("key %08lX.%lu: inserted into trustdb\n"),
-					  (ulong)keyid[1], pk->local_id );
-	    /* and re-read the dir record */
-	    read_record( pk->local_id, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
-	}
-    }
-    cur_time = make_timestamp();
-    if( pk->timestamp > cur_time ) {
-	log_info(_("key %08lX.%lu: created in future "
-		   "(time warp or clock problem)\n"),
-					  (ulong)keyid[1], pk->local_id );
-	if( !opt.ignore_time_conflict )
-	    return GPGERR_TIME_CONFLICT;
-    }
+static struct key_array *
+validate_key_list (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable visited,
+                   struct key_item *klist, u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
+{
+  KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+  struct key_array *keys = NULL;
+  size_t nkeys, maxkeys;
+  int rc;
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+  
+  maxkeys = 1000;
+  keys = m_alloc ((maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
+  nkeys = 0;
+  
+  rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+      m_free (keys);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+  memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
+  desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
+  desc.skipfnc = search_skipfnc;
+  desc.skipfncvalue = visited;
+  rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1);
+  if (rc == -1)
+    {
+      keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
+      return keys;
+    }
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+      m_free (keys);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  
+  desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT; /* change mode */
+  do
+    {
+      PKT_public_key *pk;
+        
+      rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
+      if (rc) 
+        {
+          log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+          m_free (keys);
+          return NULL;
+        }
+      
+      if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) 
+        {
+          log_debug ("ooops: invalid pkttype %d encountered\n",
+                     keyblock->pkt->pkttype);
+          dump_kbnode (keyblock);
+          release_kbnode(keyblock);
+          continue;
+        }
 
-    if( !(rec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_CHECKED) )
-	check_trust_record( &rec, 0 );
-    else if( rec.r.dir.checkat && rec.r.dir.checkat <= cur_time )
-	check_trust_record( &rec, 0 );
-    else if( (rec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_NEWKEYS) )
-	check_trust_record( &rec, 1 );
-
-    if( pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate <= cur_time ) {
-	log_info(_("key %08lX.%lu: expired at %s\n"),
-			(ulong)keyid[1], pk->local_id,
-			     asctimestamp( pk->expiredate) );
-	trustlevel = TRUST_EXPIRED;
-    }
-    else {
-	rc = do_check( &rec, &trustlevel, namehash, add_fnc, retflgs );
-	if( rc ) {
-	    log_error(_("key %08lX.%lu: trust check failed: %s\n"),
-			    (ulong)keyid[1], pk->local_id, gpg_errstr(rc));
-	    return rc;
-	}
-    }
+      /* prepare the keyblock for further processing */
+      merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock); 
+      clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock);
+      pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+      if (pk->has_expired || pk->is_revoked)
+        {
+          /* it does not make sense to look further at those keys */
+          mark_keyblock_seen (visited, keyblock);
+        }
+      else if (validate_one_keyblock (keyblock, klist, curtime, next_expire))
+        {
+          if (pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= curtime
+              && pk->expiredate < *next_expire)
+            *next_expire = pk->expiredate;
+
+          if (nkeys == maxkeys) {
+            maxkeys += 1000;
+            keys = m_realloc (keys, (maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
+          }
+          keys[nkeys++].keyblock = keyblock;
+          /* this key is signed - don't check it again */
+          mark_keyblock_seen (visited, keyblock);
+          keyblock = NULL;
+        }
 
-    /* is a subkey has been requested, we have to check its keyflags */
-    if( !rc ) {
-	TRUSTREC krec;
-	byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN] = {0}; /* to avoid compiler warnings */
-	size_t fprlen = 0;
-	ulong recno;
-	int kcount=0;
-
-	for( recno = rec.r.dir.keylist; recno; recno = krec.r.key.next ) {
-	    read_record( recno, &krec, RECTYPE_KEY );
-	    if( ++kcount == 1 )
-		continue; /* skip the primary key */
-	    if( kcount == 2 ) /* now we need the fingerprint */
-		fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fpr, &fprlen );
-
-	    if( krec.r.key.fingerprint_len == fprlen
-		&& !memcmp( krec.r.key.fingerprint, fpr, fprlen ) ) {
-		/* found the subkey */
-		if( (krec.r.key.keyflags & KEYF_REVOKED) )
-		    trustlevel |= TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED;
-		/* should we check for keybinding here??? */
-		/* Hmmm: Maybe this whole checking stuff should not go
-		 * into the trustdb, but be done direct from the keyblock.
-		 * Chnage this all when we add an abstarction layer around
-		 * the way certificates are handled by different standards */
-		break;
-	    }
-	}
+      release_kbnode (keyblock);
+      keyblock = NULL;
+    } 
+  while ( !(rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1)) );
+  if (rc && rc != -1) 
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+      m_free (keys);
+      return NULL;
     }
 
-
-  leave:
-    if( DBG_TRUST )
-	log_debug("check_trust() returns trustlevel %04x.\n", trustlevel);
-    *r_trustlevel = trustlevel;
-    return 0;
-}
+  keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
+  return keys;
+} 
 
 
-/****************
- * scan the whole trustdb and mark all signature records whose keys
- * are freshly imported.
- */
 static void
-mark_fresh_keys()
-{
-    TRUSTREC dirrec, rec;
-    ulong recnum, lid;
-    int i;
-
-    memset( &dirrec, 0, sizeof dirrec );
-
-    for(recnum=0; !tdbio_read_record( recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ ) {
-	if( rec.rectype != RECTYPE_SIG )
-	    continue;
-	/* if we have already have the dir record, we can check it now */
-	if( dirrec.recnum == rec.r.sig.lid
-	    && (dirrec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_NEWKEYS) )
-	    continue; /* flag is already set */
-
-	for(i=0; i < SIGS_PER_RECORD; i++ ) {
-	    if( !(lid=rec.r.sig.sig[i].lid) )
-		continue; /* skip deleted sigs */
-	    if( !(rec.r.sig.sig[i].flag & SIGF_CHECKED) )
-		continue; /* skip checked signatures */
-	    if( qry_lid_table_flag( fresh_imported_keys, lid, NULL ) )
-		continue; /* not in the list of new keys */
-	    read_record( rec.r.sig.lid, &dirrec, RECTYPE_DIR );
-	    if( !(dirrec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_NEWKEYS) ) {
-		dirrec.r.dir.dirflags |= DIRF_NEWKEYS;
-		write_record( &dirrec );
-	    }
-	    break;
-	}
-    }
-
-    do_sync();
-
-    clear_lid_table( fresh_imported_keys );
-    fresh_imported_keys_count = 0;
-}
-
-
-
-int
-query_trust_info( PKT_public_key *pk, const byte *namehash )
-{
-    unsigned trustlevel;
-    int c;
-
-    init_trustdb();
-    if( check_trust( pk, &trustlevel, namehash, NULL, NULL ) )
-	return '?';
-    if( trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED )
-	return 'd';
-    if( trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED )
-	return 'r';
-    c = trust_letter( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) );
-    if( !c )
-	c = '?';
-    return c;
-}
-
-
-
-/****************
- * Return the assigned ownertrust value for the given LID
- */
-unsigned
-get_ownertrust( ulong lid )
-{
-    TRUSTREC rec;
-
-    init_trustdb();
-    read_record( lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
-    return rec.r.dir.ownertrust;
-}
-
-int
-get_ownertrust_info( ulong lid )
-{
-    unsigned otrust;
-    int c;
-
-    init_trustdb();
-    otrust = get_ownertrust( lid );
-    c = trust_letter( (otrust & TRUST_MASK) );
-    if( !c )
-	c = '?';
-    return c;
-}
-
-
-
-void
-list_trust_path( const char *username )
-{
-    int rc;
-    ulong lid;
-    TRUSTREC rec;
-    TN tree;
-    PKT_public_key *pk = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *pk );
-
-    init_trustdb();
-    if( (rc = get_pubkey_byname(NULL, pk, username, NULL )) )
-	log_error(_("user '%s' not found: %s\n"), username, gpg_errstr(rc) );
-    else if( (rc=tdbio_search_dir_bypk( pk, &rec )) && rc != -1 )
-	log_error(_("problem finding '%s' in trustdb: %s\n"),
-					    username, gpg_errstr(rc));
-    else if( rc == -1 ) {
-	log_info(_("user '%s' not in trustdb - inserting\n"), username);
-	rc = insert_trust_record_by_pk( pk );
-	if( rc )
-	    log_error(_("failed to put '%s' into trustdb: %s\n"),
-						    username, gpg_errstr(rc));
-	else {
-	    assert( pk->local_id );
-	}
+reset_unconnected_keys (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable visited)
+{
+  int rc;
+  KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+  KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
+  int count = 0, nreset = 0;
+  
+  rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
+  if (rc)
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+      return;
+    }
+
+  memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
+  desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
+  desc.skipfnc = search_skipfnc;
+  desc.skipfncvalue = visited;
+  rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1);
+  if (rc && rc != -1 )
+    log_error ("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+  else if (!rc)
+    {
+      desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT; /* change mode */
+      do
+        {
+          rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
+          if (rc) 
+            {
+              log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+              break;
+            }
+          count++;
+
+          if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) /* paranoid assertion*/
+            {
+              nreset += clear_validity (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key);
+              release_kbnode (keyblock);
+            } 
+        }
+      while ( !(rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1)) );
+      if (rc && rc != -1) 
+        log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
     }
-    lid = pk->local_id;
-
-    tree = build_cert_tree( lid, 0, opt.max_cert_depth, NULL );
-    if( tree )
-	propagate_validity( tree, tree, NULL, NULL );
-    if( opt.with_colons )
-	dump_tn_tree_with_colons( 0, tree );
-    else
-	dump_tn_tree( stdout, 0, tree );
-    /*printf("(alloced tns=%d  max=%d)\n", alloced_tns, max_alloced_tns );*/
-    release_tn_tree( tree );
-    /*printf("Ownertrust=%c Validity=%c\n", get_ownertrust_info( lid ),
-					  query_trust_info( pk, NULL ) ); */
-
-    free_public_key( pk );
-
-}
+  if (opt.verbose)
+    log_info ("%d unconnected keys (%d trust records cleared)\n",
+              count, nreset);
+  do_sync ();
+} 
 
 
-
-
-/****************
- * Enumerate all keys, which are needed to build all trust paths for
- * the given key.  This function does not return the key itself or
- * the ultimate key (the last point in cerificate chain).  Only
- * certificate chains which ends up at an ultimately trusted key
- * are listed.	If ownertrust or validity is not NULL, the corresponding
- * value for the returned LID is also returned in these variable(s).
+/*
+ * Run the key validation procedure.
  *
- *  1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
- *  2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function.
- *     Set lid to the key you want to enumerate and pass it by reference.
- *  3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
- *     to indicate EOF. LID does contain the next key used to build the web
- *  4) Always call this function a last time with LID set to NULL,
- *     so that it can free its context.
+ * This works this way:
+ * Step 1: Find all ultimately trusted keys (UTK).
+ *         mark them all as seen and put them into klist.
+ * Step 2: loop max_cert_times
+ * Step 3:   if OWNERTRUST of any key in klist is undefined
+ *             ask user to assign ownertrust
+ * Step 4:   Loop over all keys in the keyDB which are not marked seen 
+ * Step 5:     if key is revoked or expired
+ *                mark key as seen
+ *                continue loop at Step 4
+ * Step 6:     For each user ID of that key signed by a key in klist
+ *                Calculate validity by counting trusted signatures.
+ *                Set validity of user ID
+ * Step 7:     If any signed user ID was found
+ *                mark key as seen
+ *             End Loop
+ * Step 8:   Build a new klist from all fully trusted keys from step 6
+ *           End Loop
+ *         Ready  
  *
- * Returns: -1 on EOF or the level of the returned LID
- */
-int
-enum_cert_paths( void **context, ulong *lid,
-		 unsigned *ownertrust, unsigned *validity )
-{
-    return -1;
-  #if 0
-    struct enum_cert_paths_ctx *ctx;
-    fixme: .....   tsl;
-
-    init_trustdb();
-    if( !lid ) {  /* release the context */
-	if( *context ) {
-	    FIXME: ........tsl2;
-
-	    ctx = *context;
-	    for(tsl = ctx->tsl_head; tsl; tsl = tsl2 ) {
-		tsl2 = tsl->next;
-		gcry_free( tsl );
-	    }
-	    *context = NULL;
-	}
-	return -1;
-    }
-
-    if( !*context ) {
-	FIXME .... *tmppath;
-	TRUSTREC rec;
-
-	if( !*lid )
-	    return -1;
-
-	ctx = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *ctx );
-	*context = ctx;
-	/* collect the paths */
-      #if 0
-	read_record( *lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
-	tmppath = gcry_xcalloc( 1, (opt.max_cert_depth+1)* sizeof *tmppath );
-	tsl = NULL;
-	collect_paths( 0, opt.max_cert_depth, 1, &rec, tmppath, &tsl );
-	gcry_free( tmppath );
-	sort_tsl_list( &tsl );
-      #endif
-	/* setup the context */
-	ctx->tsl_head = tsl;
-	ctx->tsl = ctx->tsl_head;
-	ctx->idx = 0;
-    }
-    else
-	ctx = *context;
-
-    while( ctx->tsl && ctx->idx >= ctx->tsl->pathlen )	{
-	ctx->tsl = ctx->tsl->next;
-	ctx->idx = 0;
-    }
-    tsl = ctx->tsl;
-    if( !tsl )
-	return -1; /* eof */
-
-    if( ownertrust )
-	*ownertrust = tsl->path[ctx->idx].otrust;
-    if( validity )
-	*validity = tsl->path[ctx->idx].trust;
-    *lid = tsl->path[ctx->idx].lid;
-    ctx->idx++;
-    return ctx->idx-1;
-  #endif
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Print the current path
  */
-void
-enum_cert_paths_print( void **context, FILE *fp,
-				       int refresh, ulong selected_lid )
-{
-    return;
-  #if 0
-    struct enum_cert_paths_ctx *ctx;
-    FIXME......... tsl;
-
-    if( !*context )
-	return;
-    init_trustdb();
-    ctx = *context;
-    if( !ctx->tsl )
-	return;
-    tsl = ctx->tsl;
-
-    if( !fp )
-	fp = stderr;
-
-    if( refresh ) { /* update the ownertrust and if possible the validity */
-	int i;
-	int match = tdbio_db_matches_options();
-
-	for( i = 0; i < tsl->pathlen; i++ )  {
-	    TRUSTREC rec;
-
-	    read_record( tsl->path[i].lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
-	    tsl->path[i].otrust = rec.r.dir.ownertrust;
-	    /* update validity only if we have it in the cache
-	     * calculation is too time consuming */
-	    if( match && rec.r.dir.valcheck && rec.r.dir.validity ) {
-		tsl->path[i].trust = rec.r.dir.validity;
-		if( rec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_REVOKED )
-		    tsl->path[i].trust = TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
+static int
+validate_keys (int interactive)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+  int quit=0;
+  struct key_item *klist = NULL;
+  struct key_item *k;
+  struct key_array *keys = NULL;
+  struct key_array *kar;
+  KEYDB_HANDLE kdb = NULL;
+  KBNODE node;
+  int depth;
+  int key_count;
+  int ot_unknown, ot_undefined, ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate;
+  KeyHashTable visited;
+  u32 start_time, next_expire;
+
+  start_time = make_timestamp ();
+  next_expire = 0xffffffff; /* set next expire to the year 2106 */
+  visited = new_key_hash_table ();
+  /* Fixme: Instead of always building a UTK list, we could just build it
+   * here when needed */
+  if (!utk_list)
+    {
+      log_info ("no ultimately trusted keys found\n");
+      goto leave;
+    }
+
+
+  /* mark all UTKs as visited and set validity to ultimate */
+  for (k=utk_list; k; k = k->next)
+    {
+      KBNODE keyblock;
+      PKT_public_key *pk;
+
+      keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (k->kid);
+      if (!keyblock)
+        {
+          log_error (_("public key of ultimately"
+                       " trusted key %08lX not found\n"), (ulong)k->kid[1]);
+          continue;
+        }
+      mark_keyblock_seen (visited, keyblock);
+      pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+      for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+        {
+          if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+            {
+              byte namehash[20];
+              PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+              
+              if( uid->attrib_data )
+                rmd160_hash_buffer (namehash,uid->attrib_data,uid->attrib_len);
+              else
+                rmd160_hash_buffer (namehash, uid->name, uid->len );
+              update_validity (pk, namehash, 0, TRUST_ULTIMATE);
+            }
+        }
+      if ( pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= start_time
+           && pk->expiredate < next_expire)
+        next_expire = pk->expiredate;
+      
+      release_kbnode (keyblock);
+      do_sync ();
+    }
+
+
+  klist = utk_list;
+  kdb = keydb_new (0);
+
+  for (depth=0; depth < opt.max_cert_depth; depth++)
+    {
+      /* See whether we should assign ownertrust values to the keys in
+         utk_list.  */
+      ot_unknown = ot_undefined = ot_never = 0;
+      ot_marginal = ot_full = ot_ultimate = 0;
+      for (k=klist; k; k = k->next)
+        {
+          if (interactive && k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
+              k->ownertrust = ask_ownertrust (k->kid);
+	  if (k->ownertrust == -1)
+	    {
+	      quit=1;
+	      goto leave;
 	    }
-	}
-    }
+	  else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
+            ot_unknown++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNDEFINED)
+            ot_undefined++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_NEVER)
+            ot_never++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
+            ot_marginal++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
+            ot_full++;
+          else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+            ot_ultimate++;
+        }
 
-    print_path( tsl->pathlen, tsl->path, fp, selected_lid );
-  #endif
-}
+      /* Find all keys which are signed by a key in kdlist */
+      keys = validate_key_list (kdb, visited, klist, start_time, &next_expire);
+      if (!keys) 
+        {
+          log_error ("validate_key_list failed\n");
+          rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
+          goto leave;
+        }
 
 
-/*
- * Return an allocated buffer with the preference values for
- * the key with LID and the userid which is identified by the
- * HAMEHASH or the first one if namehash is NULL.  ret_n receives
- * the length of the allocated buffer.	Structure of the buffer is
- * a repeated sequences of 2 bytes; where the first byte describes the
- * type of the preference and the second one the value.  The constants
- * PREFTYPE_xxxx should be used to reference a type.
- */
-byte *
-get_pref_data( ulong lid, const byte *namehash, size_t *ret_n )
-{
-    TRUSTREC rec;
-    ulong recno;
-
-    init_trustdb();
-    read_record( lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
-    for( recno=rec.r.dir.uidlist; recno; recno = rec.r.uid.next ) {
-	read_record( recno, &rec, RECTYPE_UID );
-	if( rec.r.uid.prefrec
-	    && ( !namehash || !memcmp(namehash, rec.r.uid.namehash, 20) ))  {
-	    byte *buf;
-	    /* found the correct one or the first one */
-	    read_record( rec.r.uid.prefrec, &rec, RECTYPE_PREF );
-	    if( rec.r.pref.next )
-		log_info(_("WARNING: can't yet handle long pref records\n"));
-	    buf = gcry_xmalloc( ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD );
-	    memcpy( buf, rec.r.pref.data, ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD );
-	    *ret_n = ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD;
-	    return buf;
-	}
+      for (key_count=0, kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++, key_count++)
+        ;
+
+      /* Store the calculated valididation status somewhere */
+      if (opt.verbose > 1)
+        dump_key_array (depth, keys);
+
+      log_info (_("checking at depth %d signed=%d"
+                  " ot(-/q/n/m/f/u)=%d/%d/%d/%d/%d/%d\n"), 
+                depth, key_count, ot_unknown, ot_undefined,
+                ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate ); 
+
+      for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
+          store_validation_status (depth, kar->keyblock);
+
+      /* Build a new kdlist from all fully valid keys in KEYS */
+      if (klist != utk_list)
+        release_key_items (klist);
+      klist = NULL;
+      for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
+        {
+          for (node=kar->keyblock; node; node = node->next)
+            {
+              if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & 4))
+                {
+                  k = new_key_item ();
+                  keyid_from_pk (kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, k->kid);
+                  k->ownertrust = get_ownertrust (kar->keyblock
+                                                  ->pkt->pkt.public_key);
+                  k->next = klist;
+                  klist = k;
+                  break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+      release_key_array (keys);
+      keys = NULL;
+      if (!klist)
+        break; /* no need to dive in deeper */
+    }
+
+  reset_unconnected_keys (kdb, visited);
+
+ leave:
+  keydb_release (kdb);
+  release_key_array (keys);
+  release_key_items (klist);
+  release_key_hash_table (visited);
+  if (!rc && !quit) /* mark trustDB as checked */
+    {
+      if (next_expire == 0xffffffff || next_expire < start_time )
+        tdbio_write_nextcheck (0); 
+      else
+        {
+          tdbio_write_nextcheck (next_expire); 
+          log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
+                    strtimestamp (next_expire));
+        }
+      do_sync ();
+      pending_check_trustdb = 0;
     }
-    return NULL;
+  return rc;
 }
 
 
-
-/****************
- * Check whether the algorithm is in one of the pref records
- */
-int
-is_algo_in_prefs( ulong lid, int preftype, int algo )
-{
-    TRUSTREC rec;
-    ulong recno;
-    int i;
-    byte *pref;
-
-    init_trustdb();
-    read_record( lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
-    for( recno=rec.r.dir.uidlist; recno; recno = rec.r.uid.next ) {
-	read_record( recno, &rec, RECTYPE_UID );
-	if( rec.r.uid.prefrec ) {
-	    read_record( rec.r.uid.prefrec, &rec, RECTYPE_PREF );
-	    if( rec.r.pref.next )
-		log_info(_("WARNING: can't yet handle long pref records\n"));
-	    pref = rec.r.pref.data;
-	    for(i=0; i+1 < ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD; i+=2 ) {
-		if( pref[i] == preftype && pref[i+1] == algo )
-		    return 1;
-	    }
-	}
-    }
-    return 0;
-}
-