Nuked almost all trailing white space.post-nuke-of-trailing-ws

We better do this once and for all instead of cluttering all future
commits with diffs of trailing white spaces.  In the majority of cases
blank or single lines are affected and thus this change won't disturb
a git blame too much.  For future commits the pre-commit scripts
checks that this won't happen again.

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/g13/mount.c b/g13/mount.c
index 2ab5cc636..387bb6f32 100644
--- a/g13/mount.c
+++ b/g13/mount.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 
 /* Parse the header prefix and return the length of the entire header.  */
 static gpg_error_t
-parse_header (const char *filename, 
+parse_header (const char *filename,
               const unsigned char *packet, size_t packetlen,
               size_t *r_headerlen)
 {
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ parse_header (const char *filename,
       return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
     }
   if (packet[17] || packet[18]
-      || packet[26] || packet[27] || packet[28] || packet[29] 
+      || packet[26] || packet[27] || packet[28] || packet[29]
       || packet[30] || packet[31])
     log_info ("WARNING: unknown meta information in `%s'\n", filename);
   if (packet[19])
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ parse_header (const char *filename,
       log_error ("bad length given in container `%s'\n", filename);
       return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
     }
-     
+
   *r_headerlen = len;
   return 0;
 }
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ read_keyblob_prefix (const char *filename, estream_t *r_fp, size_t *r_headerlen)
   gpg_error_t err;
   estream_t fp;
   unsigned char packet[32];
-  
+
   *r_fp = NULL;
 
   fp = es_fopen (filename, "rb");
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ read_keyblob_prefix (const char *filename, estream_t *r_fp, size_t *r_headerlen)
       log_error ("error reading `%s': %s\n", filename, gpg_strerror (err));
       return err;
     }
-  
+
   /* Read the header.  It is defined as 32 bytes thus we read it in one go.  */
   if (es_fread (packet, 32, 1, fp) != 1)
     {
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ read_keyblob_prefix (const char *filename, estream_t *r_fp, size_t *r_headerlen)
       es_fclose (fp);
       return err;
     }
-  
+
   err = parse_header (filename, packet, 32, r_headerlen);
   if (err)
     es_fclose (fp);
@@ -134,21 +134,21 @@ read_keyblob_prefix (const char *filename, estream_t *r_fp, size_t *r_headerlen)
 /* Read the keyblob at FILENAME.  The caller should have acquired a
    lockfile and checked that the file exists.  */
 static gpg_error_t
-read_keyblob (const char *filename, 
+read_keyblob (const char *filename,
               void **r_enckeyblob, size_t *r_enckeybloblen)
 {
   gpg_error_t err;
   estream_t fp = NULL;
   size_t headerlen, msglen;
   void *msg = NULL;
-  
+
   *r_enckeyblob = NULL;
   *r_enckeybloblen = 0;
 
   err = read_keyblob_prefix (filename, &fp, &headerlen);
   if (err)
     goto leave;
-  
+
   if (opt.verbose)
     log_info ("header length of `%s' is %zu\n", filename, headerlen);
 
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ g13_mount_container (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *filename, const char *mountpoint)
   /* Check again that the file exists.  */
   {
     struct stat sb;
-    
+
     if (stat (filename, &sb))
       {
         err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ g13_umount_container (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *filename, const char *mountpoint)
   err = mountinfo_find_mount (filename, mountpoint, &rid);
   if (err)
     return err;
-  
+
   runner = runner_find_by_rid (rid);
   if (!runner)
     {
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ g13_umount_container (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *filename, const char *mountpoint)
 
   runner_cancel (runner);
   runner_release (runner);
-  
+
   return 0;
 }
 
@@ -414,5 +414,3 @@ g13_is_container (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *filename)
     es_fclose (fp);
   return err;
 }
-
-