diff options
author | Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> | 2020-11-30 09:57:35 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> | 2020-11-30 10:12:46 +0100 |
commit | 806547d9d243b26c2275fc00c645ee39d258b49b (patch) | |
tree | 0ccced5e6db9e77058da72dd2d3c14154efd3d21 /scd | |
parent | card: Let the APDU command prints a description of the status word. (diff) | |
download | gnupg2-806547d9d243b26c2275fc00c645ee39d258b49b.tar.xz gnupg2-806547d9d243b26c2275fc00c645ee39d258b49b.zip |
scd:nks: Minor additions to the basic IDLM application support.
* scd/app-nks.c (filelist): Use special value -1 for IDLM pubkeys.
(keygripstr_from_pk_file): Handle special value.
(do_readcert): Ditto.
(do_writecert): Ditto.
--
This allows to get information about the keys from the card. However
the do_readkey still requires a fallback to readcert. This does not
work because there are no certificates yet on the card. The fix is to
fully implement do_readkey.
Diffstat (limited to 'scd')
-rw-r--r-- | scd/app-nks.c | 40 |
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/scd/app-nks.c b/scd/app-nks.c index 7ed3be75f..348b0c1dc 100644 --- a/scd/app-nks.c +++ b/scd/app-nks.c @@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ static struct int fid; /* File ID. */ int nks_ver; /* 0 for NKS version 2, 3 for version 3, etc. */ int certtype; /* Type of certificate or 0 if it is not a certificate. */ - int iskeypair; /* If true has the FID of the corresponding certificate. */ + int iskeypair; /* If true has the FID of the corresponding certificate. + * If no certificate is known a value of -1 is used. */ int isauthkey; /* True if file is a key usable for authentication. */ int issignkey; /* True if file is a key usable for signing. */ int isencrkey; /* True if file is a key usable for decryption. */ @@ -161,12 +162,12 @@ static struct { 2, 0xC001, 15,100 }, /* EF.C.ICC.QES (Cert) */ { 2, 0xC00E, 15,111 }, /* EF.C.RCA.QES (RootCA */ - { 3, 0x4E03, 3, 100 }, /* EK_PK_03 */ - { 3, 0x4E04, 3, 100 }, /* EK_PK_04 */ - { 3, 0x4E05, 3, 100 }, /* EK_PK_05 */ - { 3, 0x4E06, 3, 100 }, /* EK_PK_06 */ - { 3, 0x4E07, 3, 100 }, /* EK_PK_07 */ - { 3, 0x4E08, 3, 100 }, /* EK_PK_08 */ + { 3, 0x4E03, 3, 0, -1 }, /* EK_PK_03 */ + { 3, 0x4E04, 3, 0, -1 }, /* EK_PK_04 */ + { 3, 0x4E05, 3, 0, -1 }, /* EK_PK_05 */ + { 3, 0x4E06, 3, 0, -1 }, /* EK_PK_06 */ + { 3, 0x4E07, 3, 0, -1 }, /* EK_PK_07 */ + { 3, 0x4E08, 3, 0, -1 }, /* EK_PK_08 */ { 0, 0 } }; @@ -272,7 +273,8 @@ get_dispserialno (app_t app) * used and Read Record needs to be replaced by read binary. Given * all the ECC parameters required, we don't do that but rely that the * corresponding certificate at CFID is already available and get the - * public key from there. If R_ALGO is not NULL the public key + * public key from there. Note that a CFID of 1 is indicates that a + * certificate is not known. If R_ALGO is not NULL the public key * algorithm for the returned KEYGRIP is stored there. If R_ALGOSTR * is not NULL the public key algo string (e.g. "rsa2048") is stored * there. */ @@ -292,7 +294,8 @@ keygripstr_from_pk_file (app_t app, int pkfid, int cfid, char *r_gripstr, struct fid_cache_s *ci; for (ci = app->app_local->fid_cache; ci; ci = ci->next) - if (ci->fid && ((cfid && ci->fid == cfid) || (!cfid && ci->fid == pkfid))) + if (ci->fid && ((cfid > 0 && ci->fid == cfid) + || (!(cfid > 0) && ci->fid == pkfid))) { if (!ci->got_keygrip) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); @@ -316,6 +319,12 @@ keygripstr_from_pk_file (app_t app, int pkfid, int cfid, char *r_gripstr, unsigned char *cert, *pk; size_t certlen, pklen; + if (cfid == -1) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + goto leave; + } + /* Fall back to certificate reading. */ err = readcert_from_ef (app, cfid, &cert, &certlen); if (err) @@ -456,7 +465,8 @@ keygripstr_from_pk_file (app_t app, int pkfid, int cfid, char *r_gripstr, /* FIXME: We need to implement not_found caching. */ for (ci = app->app_local->fid_cache; ci; ci = ci->next) if (ci->fid - && ((cfid && ci->fid == cfid) || (!cfid && ci->fid == pkfid))) + && ((cfid > 0 && ci->fid == cfid) + || (!(cfid > 0) && ci->fid == pkfid))) { /* Update the keygrip. */ memcpy (ci->keygripstr, r_gripstr, 2*KEYGRIP_LEN+1); @@ -477,7 +487,7 @@ keygripstr_from_pk_file (app_t app, int pkfid, int cfid, char *r_gripstr, ; /* Out of memory - it is a cache, so we ignore it. */ else { - ci->fid = cfid? cfid : pkfid; + ci->fid = (cfid > 0)? cfid : pkfid; memcpy (ci->keygripstr, r_gripstr, 2*KEYGRIP_LEN+1); ci->algo = algo; ci->got_keygrip = 1; @@ -1049,7 +1059,7 @@ do_readcert (app_t app, const char *certid, return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); fid = xtoi_4 (certid); for (i=0; filelist[i].fid; i++) - if ((filelist[i].certtype || filelist[i].iskeypair) + if ((filelist[i].certtype || filelist[i].iskeypair > 0) && filelist[i].nks_app_id == nks_app_id && filelist[i].fid == fid) break; @@ -1061,7 +1071,7 @@ do_readcert (app_t app, const char *certid, because we sometime use the key directly or let the caller retrieve the key from the certificate. The rationale for that is to support not-yet stored certificates. */ - if (filelist[i].iskeypair) + if (filelist[i].iskeypair > 0) fid = filelist[i].iskeypair; return readcert_from_ef (app, fid, cert, certlen); @@ -1178,7 +1188,7 @@ do_writecert (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); fid = xtoi_4 (certid); for (i=0; filelist[i].fid; i++) - if ((filelist[i].certtype || filelist[i].iskeypair) + if ((filelist[i].certtype || filelist[i].iskeypair > 0) && filelist[i].nks_app_id == nks_app_id && filelist[i].fid == fid) break; @@ -1189,7 +1199,7 @@ do_writecert (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, * the corresponding certificate. This makes it easier for the user * to figure out which CERTID to use. For example gpg-card shows * the id of the key and not of the certificate. */ - if (filelist[i].iskeypair) + if (filelist[i].iskeypair > 0) fid = filelist[i].iskeypair; /* We have no selective flush mechanism and given the rare use of |