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authorWerner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>2006-10-16 19:33:03 +0200
committerWerner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>2006-10-16 19:33:03 +0200
commitd7160c2e3455109bbad77796ab3f701e4d07f345 (patch)
tree1ab7c5ace7c91749586cd289b4f33f21013850c1 /sm/certchain.c
parent* gpg.texi: Document --s2k-count. (diff)
downloadgnupg2-d7160c2e3455109bbad77796ab3f701e4d07f345.tar.xz
gnupg2-d7160c2e3455109bbad77796ab3f701e4d07f345.zip
Fixed aegypten bug 299
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r--sm/certchain.c75
1 files changed, 71 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/sm/certchain.c b/sm/certchain.c
index bd130494b..d251e047e 100644
--- a/sm/certchain.c
+++ b/sm/certchain.c
@@ -41,9 +41,53 @@
#include "i18n.h"
+/* Object to keep track of certain root certificates. */
+struct marktrusted_info_s
+{
+ struct marktrusted_info_s *next;
+ unsigned char fpr[20];
+};
+static struct marktrusted_info_s *marktrusted_info;
+
+
static int get_regtp_ca_info (ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen);
+/* This function returns true if we already asked during this session
+ whether the root certificate CERT shall be marked as trusted. */
+static int
+already_asked_marktrusted (ksba_cert_t cert)
+{
+ unsigned char fpr[20];
+ struct marktrusted_info_s *r;
+
+ gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, NULL);
+ /* No context switches in the loop! */
+ for (r=marktrusted_info; r; r= r->next)
+ if (!memcmp (r->fpr, fpr, 20))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Flag certificate CERT as already asked whether it shall be marked
+ as trusted. */
+static void
+set_already_asked_marktrusted (ksba_cert_t cert)
+{
+ unsigned char fpr[20];
+ struct marktrusted_info_s *r;
+
+ gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, NULL);
+ for (r=marktrusted_info; r; r= r->next)
+ if (!memcmp (r->fpr, fpr, 20))
+ return; /* Already marked. */
+ r = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *r);
+ if (!r)
+ return;
+ memcpy (r->fpr, fpr, 20);
+ r->next = marktrusted_info;
+ marktrusted_info = r;
+}
/* If LISTMODE is true, print FORMAT using LISTMODE to FP. If
LISTMODE is false, use the string to print an log_info or, if
@@ -883,28 +927,51 @@ gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
expired it does not make much sense to ask the user
whether we wants to trust the root certificate. He
should do this only if the certificate under question
- will then be usable. */
- if (!lm && !any_expired)
+ will then be usable. We also check whether the agent
+ is at all enabled to allo marktrusted and don't call
+ it in this session again if it is not. */
+ if ( !any_expired
+ && (!lm || !already_asked_marktrusted (subject_cert)))
{
+ static int no_more_questions; /* during this session. */
int rc2;
char *fpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (subject_cert,
GCRY_MD_SHA1);
log_info (_("fingerprint=%s\n"), fpr? fpr : "?");
xfree (fpr);
- rc2 = gpgsm_agent_marktrusted (ctrl, subject_cert);
+ if (no_more_questions)
+ rc2 = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ else
+ rc2 = gpgsm_agent_marktrusted (ctrl, subject_cert);
if (!rc2)
{
log_info (_("root certificate has now"
" been marked as trusted\n"));
rc = 0;
}
- else
+ else if (!lm)
{
gpgsm_dump_cert ("issuer", subject_cert);
log_info ("after checking the fingerprint, you may want "
"to add it manually to the list of trusted "
"certificates.\n");
}
+
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc2) == GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+ {
+ if (!no_more_questions)
+ log_info (_("interactive marking as trusted "
+ "not enabled in gpg-agent\n"));
+ no_more_questions = 1;
+ }
+ else if (gpg_err_code (rc2) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED)
+ {
+ log_info (_("interactive marking as trusted "
+ "disabled for this session\n"));
+ no_more_questions = 1;
+ }
+ else
+ set_already_asked_marktrusted (subject_cert);
}
}
else