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-rw-r--r--g10/passphrase.c110
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 55 deletions
diff --git a/g10/passphrase.c b/g10/passphrase.c
index 9f1218b6b..8065810c9 100644
--- a/g10/passphrase.c
+++ b/g10/passphrase.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ encode_s2k_iterations (int iterations)
if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER)
log_error (_("problem with the agent: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
/* Default to 65536 which we used up to 2.0.13. */
- return 96;
+ return 96;
}
else if (mycnt >= 65011712)
return 255; /* Largest possible value. */
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ encode_s2k_iterations (int iterations)
if (iterations >= 65011712)
return 255;
-
+
/* Need count to be in the range 16-31 */
for (count=iterations>>6; count>=32; count>>=1)
c++;
@@ -96,13 +96,13 @@ encode_s2k_iterations (int iterations)
if (S2K_DECODE_COUNT(result) < iterations)
result++;
-
+
return result;
}
-/* Hash a passphrase using the supplied s2k.
+/* Hash a passphrase using the supplied s2k.
Always needs: dek->algo, s2k->mode, s2k->hash_algo. */
static void
hash_passphrase ( DEK *dek, char *pw, STRING2KEY *s2k)
@@ -119,20 +119,20 @@ hash_passphrase ( DEK *dek, char *pw, STRING2KEY *s2k)
if (gcry_md_open (&md, s2k->hash_algo, 1))
BUG ();
- for (pass=0; used < dek->keylen ; pass++ )
+ for (pass=0; used < dek->keylen ; pass++ )
{
- if ( pass )
+ if ( pass )
{
gcry_md_reset (md);
for (i=0; i < pass; i++ ) /* Preset the hash context. */
gcry_md_putc (md, 0 );
}
- if ( s2k->mode == 1 || s2k->mode == 3 )
+ if ( s2k->mode == 1 || s2k->mode == 3 )
{
int len2 = pwlen + 8;
ulong count = len2;
-
+
if ( s2k->mode == 3 )
{
count = S2K_DECODE_COUNT(s2k->count);
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ hash_passphrase ( DEK *dek, char *pw, STRING2KEY *s2k)
/* A little bit complicated because we need a ulong for count. */
while ( count > len2 ) /* maybe iterated+salted */
- {
+ {
gcry_md_write ( md, s2k->salt, 8 );
gcry_md_write ( md, pw, pwlen );
count -= len2;
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ read_passphrase_from_fd( int fd )
int i, len;
char *pw;
- if ( !opt.batch )
+ if ( !opt.batch )
{ /* Not used but we have to do a dummy read, so that it won't end
up at the begin of the message if the quite usual trick to
prepend the passphtrase to the message is used. */
@@ -240,12 +240,12 @@ read_passphrase_from_fd( int fd )
while (!(read (fd, buf, 1) != 1 || *buf == '\n' ))
;
*buf = 0;
- return;
+ return;
}
- for (pw = NULL, i = len = 100; ; i++ )
+ for (pw = NULL, i = len = 100; ; i++ )
{
- if (i >= len-1 )
+ if (i >= len-1 )
{
char *pw2 = pw;
len += 100;
@@ -311,35 +311,35 @@ passphrase_get ( u32 *keyid, int mode, const char *cacheid, int repeat,
if( keyid && get_pubkey( pk, keyid ) )
{
if (pk)
- free_public_key( pk );
+ free_public_key( pk );
pk = NULL; /* oops: no key for some reason */
}
-
+
orig_codeset = i18n_switchto_utf8 ();
if (custom_description)
atext = native_to_utf8 (custom_description);
else if ( !mode && pk && keyid )
- {
+ {
char *uid;
size_t uidlen;
- const char *algo_name = gcry_pk_algo_name ( pk->pubkey_algo );
+ const char *algo_name = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( pk->pubkey_algo );
const char *timestr;
char *maink;
-
+
if ( !algo_name )
algo_name = "?";
#define KEYIDSTRING _(" (main key ID %s)")
maink = xmalloc ( strlen (KEYIDSTRING) + keystrlen() + 20 );
- if( keyid[2] && keyid[3] && keyid[0] != keyid[2]
+ if( keyid[2] && keyid[3] && keyid[0] != keyid[2]
&& keyid[1] != keyid[3] )
sprintf( maink, KEYIDSTRING, keystr(&keyid[2]) );
else
*maink = 0;
-
- uid = get_user_id ( keyid, &uidlen );
+
+ uid = get_user_id ( keyid, &uidlen );
timestr = strtimestamp (pk->timestamp);
#undef KEYIDSTRING
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ passphrase_get ( u32 *keyid, int mode, const char *cacheid, int repeat,
"%u-bit %s key, ID %s,\n" \
"created %s%s.\n" )
- atext = xmalloc ( 100 + strlen (PROMPTSTRING)
+ atext = xmalloc ( 100 + strlen (PROMPTSTRING)
+ uidlen + 15 + strlen(algo_name) + keystrlen()
+ strlen (timestr) + strlen (maink) );
sprintf (atext, PROMPTSTRING,
@@ -362,16 +362,16 @@ passphrase_get ( u32 *keyid, int mode, const char *cacheid, int repeat,
#undef PROMPTSTRING
- {
+ {
size_t dummy;
fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fpr, &dummy );
have_fpr = 1;
}
-
+
}
else
atext = xstrdup ( _("Enter passphrase\n") );
-
+
if (!mode && cacheid)
my_cacheid = cacheid;
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ passphrase_get ( u32 *keyid, int mode, const char *cacheid, int repeat,
rc = agent_get_passphrase (my_cacheid, tryagain_text, my_prompt, atext,
repeat, check, &pw);
-
+
xfree (my_prompt);
xfree (atext); atext = NULL;
@@ -396,14 +396,14 @@ passphrase_get ( u32 *keyid, int mode, const char *cacheid, int repeat,
if (!rc)
;
- else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
+ else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
|| gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
{
log_info (_("cancelled by user\n") );
if (canceled)
*canceled = 1;
}
- else
+ else
{
log_error (_("problem with the agent: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
/* Due to limitations in the API of the upper layers they
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ passphrase_get ( u32 *keyid, int mode, const char *cacheid, int repeat,
definitely not happen and let it continue without requiring a
passphrase. Given that now all the upper layers handle a
cancel correctly, we simply set the cancel flag now for all
- errors from the agent. */
+ errors from the agent. */
if (canceled)
*canceled = 1;
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ passphrase_clear_cache ( u32 *keyid, const char *cacheid, int algo )
int rc;
(void)algo;
-
+
if (!cacheid)
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ passphrase_clear_cache ( u32 *keyid, const char *cacheid, int algo )
byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
char hexfprbuf[2*20+1];
size_t dummy;
-
+
pk = xcalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
if ( !keyid || get_pubkey( pk, keyid ) )
{
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ passphrase_clear_cache ( u32 *keyid, const char *cacheid, int algo )
NULL, sets it to true.
MODE 0: Allow cached passphrase
- 1: Ignore cached passphrase
+ 1: Ignore cached passphrase
2: Ditto, but create a new key
3: Allow cached passphrase; use the S2K salt as the cache ID
4: Ditto, but create a new key
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ passphrase_clear_cache ( u32 *keyid, const char *cacheid, int algo )
DEK *
passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k, int mode,
- const char *tryagain_text,
+ const char *tryagain_text,
const char *custdesc, const char *custprompt,
int *canceled)
{
@@ -499,11 +499,11 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
if (!canceled)
canceled = &dummy_canceled;
*canceled = 0;
-
+
if ( !s2k )
{
assert (mode != 3 && mode != 4);
- /* This is used for the old rfc1991 mode
+ /* This is used for the old rfc1991 mode
* Note: This must match the code in encode.c with opt.rfc1991 set */
s2k = &help_s2k;
s2k->mode = 0;
@@ -529,16 +529,16 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
/* If we do not have a passphrase available in NEXT_PW and status
information are request, we print them now. */
- if ( !next_pw && is_status_enabled() )
+ if ( !next_pw && is_status_enabled() )
{
char buf[50];
-
+
if ( keyid )
{
u32 used_kid[2];
char *us;
-
- if ( keyid[2] && keyid[3] )
+
+ if ( keyid[2] && keyid[3] )
{
used_kid[0] = keyid[2];
used_kid[1] = keyid[3];
@@ -548,16 +548,16 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
used_kid[0] = keyid[0];
used_kid[1] = keyid[1];
}
-
+
us = get_long_user_id_string ( keyid );
write_status_text ( STATUS_USERID_HINT, us );
xfree(us);
-
+
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf -1, "%08lX%08lX %08lX%08lX %d 0",
(ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1],
(ulong)used_kid[0], (ulong)used_kid[1],
pubkey_algo );
-
+
write_status_text ( STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE, buf );
}
else
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
{
PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
char *p;
-
+
p = get_user_id_native(keyid);
tty_printf ("\n");
tty_printf (_("You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for\n"
@@ -585,8 +585,8 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
if ( !get_pubkey( pk, keyid ) )
{
- const char *s = gcry_pk_algo_name ( pk->pubkey_algo );
-
+ const char *s = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( pk->pubkey_algo );
+
tty_printf (_("%u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s"),
nbits_from_pk( pk ), s?s:"?", keystr(keyid),
strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) );
@@ -610,19 +610,19 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
free_public_key( pk );
}
- if ( next_pw )
+ if ( next_pw )
{
/* Simply return the passphrase we already have in NEXT_PW. */
pw = next_pw;
next_pw = NULL;
}
- else if ( have_static_passphrase () )
+ else if ( have_static_passphrase () )
{
/* Return the passphrase we have stored in FD_PASSWD. */
pw = xmalloc_secure ( strlen(fd_passwd)+1 );
strcpy ( pw, fd_passwd );
}
- else
+ else
{
if ((mode == 3 || mode == 4) && (s2k->mode == 1 || s2k->mode == 3))
{
@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
return NULL;
}
}
-
+
if ( !pw || !*pw )
write_status( STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE );
@@ -689,15 +689,15 @@ gpg_format_keydesc (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode, int escaped)
char *maink;
char *desc;
const char *prompt;
-
- algo_name = gcry_pk_algo_name (pk->pubkey_algo);
+
+ algo_name = openpgp_pk_algo_name (pk->pubkey_algo);
timestr = strtimestamp (pk->timestamp);
- uid = get_user_id (pk->keyid, &uidlen);
+ uid = get_user_id (pk->keyid, &uidlen);
orig_codeset = i18n_switchto_utf8 ();
if (pk->main_keyid[0] && pk->main_keyid[1]
- && pk->keyid[0] != pk->main_keyid[0]
+ && pk->keyid[0] != pk->main_keyid[0]
&& pk->keyid[1] != pk->main_keyid[1])
maink = xtryasprintf (_(" (main key ID %s)"), keystr (pk->main_keyid));
else
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ gpg_format_keydesc (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode, int escaped)
"created %s%s.\n"),
prompt,
(int)uidlen, uid,
- nbits_from_pk (pk), algo_name,
+ nbits_from_pk (pk), algo_name,
keystr (pk->keyid), timestr,
maink?maink:"" );
xfree (maink);
@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ gpg_format_keydesc (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode, int escaped)
if (escaped)
{
char *tmp = percent_plus_escape (desc);
- xfree (desc);
+ xfree (desc);
desc = tmp;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-01 20:38:54 +0100