diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'g10')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/armor.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/call-agent.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/call-dirmngr.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/call-keyboxd.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/card-util.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/encrypt.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/export.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/getkey.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/gpg.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/import.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/key-clean.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/keyedit.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/keygen.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/keyid.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/options.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/packet.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/pkclist.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/pkglue.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/sig-check.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/sign.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/tofu.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/trustdb.c | 2 |
22 files changed, 38 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/g10/armor.c b/g10/armor.c index 81af15339..ed5ef5d2e 100644 --- a/g10/armor.c +++ b/g10/armor.c @@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ armor_filter( void *opaque, int control, *ret_len = n; } else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) { - /* We need some space for the faked packet. The minmum + /* We need some space for the faked packet. The minimum * required size is the PARTIAL_CHUNK size plus a byte for the * length itself */ if( size < PARTIAL_CHUNK+1 ) @@ -1495,7 +1495,7 @@ armor_filter( void *opaque, int control, else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE ) { if( afx->cancel ) ; - else if( afx->status ) { /* pad, write cecksum, and bottom line */ + else if( afx->status ) { /* pad, write checksum, and bottom line */ gcry_md_final (afx->crc_md); crc = get_afx_crc (afx); idx = afx->idx; diff --git a/g10/call-agent.c b/g10/call-agent.c index cfd4c086a..3a4d35b07 100644 --- a/g10/call-agent.c +++ b/g10/call-agent.c @@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ learn_status_cb (void *opaque, const char *line) * Used by: * card-util.c * keyedit_menu - * card_store_key_with_backup (Woth force to remove secret key data) + * card_store_key_with_backup (With force to remove secret key data) */ int agent_scd_learn (struct agent_card_info_s *info, int force) @@ -2316,7 +2316,7 @@ agent_probe_secret_key (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk) else if (!result && result2) return 0; /* Only first key available - return no key. */ else if (result && !result2) - return 0; /* Only second key not availabale - return no key. */ + return 0; /* Only second key not available - return no key. */ else if (result == 4 || result == 2) return result; /* First key on card - don't care where the second is. */ else @@ -2345,7 +2345,7 @@ agent_probe_any_secret_key (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock) return err; /* If we have not yet issued a "HAVEKEY --list" do that now. We use - * a more or less arbitray limit of 1000 keys. */ + * a more or less arbitrary limit of 1000 keys. */ if (ctrl && !ctrl->secret_keygrips && !ctrl->no_more_secret_keygrips) { membuf_t data; diff --git a/g10/call-dirmngr.c b/g10/call-dirmngr.c index d00f61450..ed2cf9dc2 100644 --- a/g10/call-dirmngr.c +++ b/g10/call-dirmngr.c @@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ ks_status_cb (void *opaque, const char *line) { /* This is an LDAP config entry like * "foo:389:user:pass:base:flags" - * we strip off everything beyound the port. */ + * we strip off everything beyond the port. */ if ((p = strchr (p+1, ':'))) { if (p[-1] == ':') diff --git a/g10/call-keyboxd.c b/g10/call-keyboxd.c index bc3806f0b..378c3d7ef 100644 --- a/g10/call-keyboxd.c +++ b/g10/call-keyboxd.c @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ /* Data used to keep track of keybox daemon sessions. This allows us - * to use several sessions with the keyboxd and also to re-use already + * to use several sessions with the keyboxd and also to reuse already * established sessions. Note that gpg.h defines the type * keyboxd_local_t for this structure. */ struct keyboxd_local_s @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ keydb_search_reset (KEYDB_HANDLE hd) -/* Status callback for SEARCH and NEXT operaions. */ +/* Status callback for SEARCH and NEXT operations. */ static gpg_error_t search_status_cb (void *opaque, const char *line) { diff --git a/g10/card-util.c b/g10/card-util.c index 7df505f62..e8a5c1935 100644 --- a/g10/card-util.c +++ b/g10/card-util.c @@ -1778,7 +1778,7 @@ card_generate_subkey (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock) /* Store the key at NODE into the smartcard and modify NODE to carry the serialno stuff instead of the actual secret key parameters. USE is the usage for that key; 0 means any usage. If - PROCESSED_KEYS is not NULL it is a poiter to an strlist which will + PROCESSED_KEYS is not NULL it is a pointer to an strlist which will be filled with the keygrips of successfully stored keys. */ int card_store_subkey (KBNODE node, int use, strlist_t *processed_keys) diff --git a/g10/encrypt.c b/g10/encrypt.c index 8ce6164ce..3fc10a7b8 100644 --- a/g10/encrypt.c +++ b/g10/encrypt.c @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ encrypt_store (const char *filename) } -/* Create and setup a DEK structure and print approriate warnings. +/* Create and setup a DEK structure and print appropriate warnings. * PK_LIST gives the list of public keys. Always returns a DEK. The * actual session needs to be added later. */ static DEK * @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ create_dek_with_warnings (pk_list_t pk_list) /* In case 3DES has been selected, print a warning if any key * does not have a preference for AES. This should help to - * indentify why encrypting to several recipients falls back to + * identify why encrypting to several recipients falls back to * 3DES. */ if (opt.verbose && dek->algo == CIPHER_ALGO_3DES) warn_missing_aes_from_pklist (pk_list); @@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ write_pubkey_enc (ctrl_t ctrl, * the structure DEK and want to encode this session key in an * integer value of n bits. pubkey_nbits gives us the number of * bits we have to use. We then encode the session key in some - * way and we get it back in the big intger value FRAME. Then + * way and we get it back in the big integer value FRAME. Then * we use FRAME, the public key PK->PKEY and the algorithm * number PK->PUBKEY_ALGO and pass it to pubkey_encrypt which * returns the encrypted value in the array ENC->DATA. This diff --git a/g10/export.c b/g10/export.c index 2417edef1..5865ae23a 100644 --- a/g10/export.c +++ b/g10/export.c @@ -2134,7 +2134,7 @@ do_export_revocs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, u32 *keyid, continue; sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; - /* We are only interested in revocation certifcates. */ + /* We are only interested in revocation certificates. */ if (!(IS_KEY_REV (sig) || IS_UID_REV (sig) || IS_SUBKEY_REV (sig))) continue; diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c index f2d1e7d7b..015420173 100644 --- a/g10/getkey.c +++ b/g10/getkey.c @@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ leave: /* Same as get_pubkey but if the key was not found the function tries - * to import it from LDAP. FIXME: We should not need this but swicth + * to import it from LDAP. FIXME: We should not need this but switch * to a fingerprint lookup. */ gpg_error_t get_pubkey_with_ldap_fallback (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid) @@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ get_pubkey_byname (ctrl_t ctrl, enum get_pubkey_modes mode, /* If we are called due to --locate-external-key Check whether NAME * is a fingerprint and then try to lookup that key by configured * method which support lookup by fingerprint. FPRBUF carries the - * parsed fingerpint iff IS_FPR is true. */ + * parsed fingerprint iff IS_FPR is true. */ is_fpr = 0; if (!is_mbox && mode == GET_PUBKEY_NO_LOCAL) { @@ -2525,7 +2525,7 @@ parse_key_usage (PKT_signature * sig) /* Apply information from SIGNODE (which is the valid self-signature * associated with that UID) to the UIDNODE: - * - wether the UID has been revoked + * - whether the UID has been revoked * - assumed creation date of the UID * - temporary store the keyflags here * - temporary store the key expiration time here @@ -2003,7 +2003,7 @@ gpgconf_list (void) * compliance mode. This does not test all parameters but the basic * conditions like a proper RNG and Libgcrypt. AS of now we always * return 0 because this version of gnupg has not yet received an - * appoval. */ + * approval. */ es_printf ("compliance_de_vs:%lu:%d:\n", GC_OPT_FLAG_DEFAULT, 0 /*gnupg_rng_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS)*/); @@ -2609,7 +2609,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv) pargs.argc = &argc; pargs.argv = &argv; /* We are re-using the struct, thus the reset flag. We OR the - * flags so that the internal intialized flag won't be cleared. */ + * flags so that the internal initialized flag won't be cleared. */ pargs.flags |= (ARGPARSE_FLAG_RESET | ARGPARSE_FLAG_KEEP | ARGPARSE_FLAG_SYS @@ -2619,7 +2619,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv) /* By this point we have a homedir, and cannot change it. */ check_permissions (gnupg_homedir (), 0); - /* The configuraton directories for use by gpgrt_argparser. */ + /* The configuration directories for use by gpgrt_argparser. */ gpgrt_set_confdir (GPGRT_CONFDIR_SYS, gnupg_sysconfdir ()); gpgrt_set_confdir (GPGRT_CONFDIR_USER, gnupg_homedir ()); diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c index bbeeebdfe..bd13c6302 100644 --- a/g10/import.c +++ b/g10/import.c @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ parse_import_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,int noisy) int rc; int saved_self_sigs_only, saved_import_clean; - /* We need to set flags indicating wether the user has set certain + /* We need to set flags indicating whether the user has set certain * options or if they came from the default. */ saved_self_sigs_only = (*options & IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY); saved_self_sigs_only &= ~IMPORT_SELF_SIGS_ONLY; diff --git a/g10/key-clean.c b/g10/key-clean.c index ca8ca40d9..16d725079 100644 --- a/g10/key-clean.c +++ b/g10/key-clean.c @@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ clean_all_subkeys (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int noisy, int clean_level, /* Do the selected cleaning. */ if (clean_level > KEY_CLEAN_NONE) { - /* Clean enitre subkeys. */ + /* Clean entire subkeys. */ for (node = first_subkey; node; node = node->next) { if (is_deleted_kbnode (node)) diff --git a/g10/keyedit.c b/g10/keyedit.c index 81ea06c24..f41e53f6d 100644 --- a/g10/keyedit.c +++ b/g10/keyedit.c @@ -1445,7 +1445,7 @@ keyedit_menu (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, strlist_t locusr, inhibits that and flushing the cache right before the stale check is not easy to implement. Thus we take the easy way out and run the stale check as early as possible. Note, that for - non- W32 platforms it is run indirectly trough a call to + non- W32 platforms it is run indirectly through a call to get_validity (). */ check_trustdb_stale (ctrl); #endif @@ -2894,7 +2894,7 @@ find_by_primary_fpr (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fpr, } -/* Unattended key signing function. If the key specifified by FPR is +/* Unattended key signing function. If the key specified by FPR is available and FPR is the primary fingerprint all user ids of the key are signed using the default signing key. If UIDS is an empty list all usable UIDs are signed, if it is not empty, only those @@ -3153,7 +3153,7 @@ keyedit_quick_revsig (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, const char *sigtorev, unsigned int sigcount = 0; kbnode_t *sigarray; - /* Allocate an array large enogh for all signatures. */ + /* Allocate an array large enough for all signatures. */ for (n=node; n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next) sigcount++; sigarray = xtrycalloc (sigcount, sizeof *sigarray); diff --git a/g10/keygen.c b/g10/keygen.c index 0c37f27f8..f6498e9fc 100644 --- a/g10/keygen.c +++ b/g10/keygen.c @@ -4470,7 +4470,7 @@ parse_parameter_usage (const char *fname, /* Parse the revocation key specified by NAME, check that the public * key exists (so that we can get the required public key algorithm), - * and return a parameter wit the revocation key information. On + * and return a parameter with the revocation key information. On * error print a diagnostic and return NULL. */ static struct para_data_s * prepare_desig_revoker (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name) @@ -4790,7 +4790,7 @@ proc_parameter_file (ctrl_t ctrl, struct para_data_s *para, const char *fname, if (parse_revocation_key (fname, para, pREVOKER)) return -1; - /* Check and appened revokers from the config file. */ + /* Check and append revokers from the config file. */ for (sl = opt.desig_revokers; sl; sl = sl->next) { r = prepare_desig_revoker (ctrl, sl->d); diff --git a/g10/keyid.c b/g10/keyid.c index 08f684829..d0317105d 100644 --- a/g10/keyid.c +++ b/g10/keyid.c @@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ do_hash_public_key (gcry_md_hd_t md, PKT_public_key *pk, int use_v5) { /* Ugly: We need to re-construct the wire format of the * key parameter. It would be easier to use a second - * index for pp and nn which we could bump independet of + * index for pp and nn which we could bump independent of * i. */ const char *p; @@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ nbits_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk) case 800: nbits = 512; break; case 1184: nbits = 768; break; case 1568: nbits = 1024; break; - default: nbits = 0; break; /* Unkown version. */ + default: nbits = 0; break; /* Unknown version. */ } return nbits; } @@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ fingerprint_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, byte *array, size_t *ret_len) * Return a byte array with the fingerprint for the given PK/SK The * length of the array is returned in ret_len. Caller must free the * array or provide an array of length MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN. This - * version creates a v5 fingerprint even vor v4 keys. + * version creates a v5 fingerprint even for v4 keys. */ byte * v5_fingerprint_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, byte *array, size_t *ret_len) diff --git a/g10/options.h b/g10/options.h index ae429fcc1..644eff359 100644 --- a/g10/options.h +++ b/g10/options.h @@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ EXTERN_UNLESS_MAIN_MODULE int memory_stat_debug_mode; #define COMPAT_T7014_OLD 2 /* Use initial T7014 test data. */ -/* Compliance test macors. */ +/* Compliance test macros. */ #define GNUPG (opt.compliance==CO_GNUPG || opt.compliance==CO_DE_VS) #define RFC2440 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC2440) #define RFC4880 (opt.compliance==CO_RFC4880) diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h index 459e38dda..e10baba4d 100644 --- a/g10/packet.h +++ b/g10/packet.h @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ typedef struct const byte *trust_regexp; struct revocation_key *revkey; int numrevkeys; - int help_counter; /* Used internally bu some functions. */ + int help_counter; /* Used internally by some functions. */ char *signers_uid; /* Malloced value of the SIGNERS_UID * subpacket or NULL. This string has * already been sanitized. */ diff --git a/g10/pkclist.c b/g10/pkclist.c index 42e124e9e..afc8f56bc 100644 --- a/g10/pkclist.c +++ b/g10/pkclist.c @@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ check_signatures_trust (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, PKT_public_key *pk, targetuid = NULL; if (uidbased) { - u32 tmpcreated = 0; /* Helper to find the lates user ID. */ + u32 tmpcreated = 0; /* Helper to find the latest user ID. */ PKT_user_id *tmpuid; for (n=keyblock; n; n = n->next) diff --git a/g10/pkglue.c b/g10/pkglue.c index f4efa8fc5..9db8f46de 100644 --- a/g10/pkglue.c +++ b/g10/pkglue.c @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ do_encrypt_kem (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_mpi_t data, int seskey_algo, { if (!strcmp (ecc_oid, "1.3.6.1.4.1.3029.1.5.1")) log_info ("Warning: " - "legacy OID for cv25519 accepted during develpment\n"); + "legacy OID for cv25519 accepted during development\n"); ecc_pubkey = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[1], &nbits); ecc_pubkey_len = (nbits+7)/8; if (ecc_pubkey_len == 33 && *ecc_pubkey == 0x40) diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c index 06329f659..e85e9914f 100644 --- a/g10/sig-check.c +++ b/g10/sig-check.c @@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ check_signature_over_key_or_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *signer, if (ret_pk) { signer = ret_pk; - /* FIXME: Using memset here is probematic because it + /* FIXME: Using memset here is problematic because it * assumes that there are no allocated fields in * SIGNER. */ memset (signer, 0, sizeof (*signer)); diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c index 67ea5a038..399d5d76d 100644 --- a/g10/sign.c +++ b/g10/sign.c @@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ hash_for (PKT_public_key *pk) like a new DSA key that just happens to have a 160-bit q (i.e. allow truncation). If q is not 160, by definition it must be a new DSA key. We ignore the personal_digest_prefs - for ECDSA because they should always macth the curve and + for ECDSA because they should always match the curve and truncated hashes are not useful either. Even worse, smartcards may reject non matching hash lengths for curves (e.g. using SHA-512 with brainpooolP385r1 on a Yubikey). */ @@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr, if (opt.verbose) log_info (_("signing:") ); - /* Must walk reverse trough this list. */ + /* Must walk reverse through this list. */ for (sl = strlist_last(filenames); sl; sl = strlist_prev( filenames, sl)) diff --git a/g10/tofu.c b/g10/tofu.c index 83786a08d..fff911293 100644 --- a/g10/tofu.c +++ b/g10/tofu.c @@ -3655,7 +3655,7 @@ tofu_wot_trust_combine (int tofu_base, int wot_base) || wot == TRUST_FULLY || wot == TRUST_ULTIMATE); - /* We first consider negative trust policys. These trump positive + /* We first consider negative trust policies. These trump positive trust policies. */ if (tofu == TRUST_NEVER || wot == TRUST_NEVER) /* TRUST_NEVER trumps everything else. */ diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c index 6de9f6b66..88b94389f 100644 --- a/g10/trustdb.c +++ b/g10/trustdb.c @@ -1505,7 +1505,7 @@ list_trust_path( const char *username ) /**************** * Enumerate all keys, which are needed to build all trust paths for * the given key. This function does not return the key itself or - * the ultimate key (the last point in cerificate chain). Only + * the ultimate key (the last point in certificate chain). Only * certificate chains which ends up at an ultimately trusted key * are listed. If ownertrust or validity is not NULL, the corresponding * value for the returned LID is also returned in these variable(s). |