diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'scd/app-openpgp.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | scd/app-openpgp.c | 104 |
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/scd/app-openpgp.c b/scd/app-openpgp.c index 6f48cb8ce..a633feab6 100644 --- a/scd/app-openpgp.c +++ b/scd/app-openpgp.c @@ -1095,9 +1095,9 @@ get_public_key (app_t app, int keyno) { /* We may simply read the public key out of these cards. */ err = iso7816_read_public_key - (app->slot, (const unsigned char*)(keyno == 0? "\xB6" : - keyno == 1? "\xB8" : "\xA4"), - 2, + (app->slot, 0, (const unsigned char*)(keyno == 0? "\xB6" : + keyno == 1? "\xB8" : "\xA4"), 2, + 0, &buffer, &buflen); if (err) { @@ -2530,6 +2530,9 @@ do_genkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keynostr, unsigned int flags, int keyno = atoi (keynostr); int force = (flags & 1); time_t start_at; + int exmode; + int le_value; + unsigned int keybits; if (keyno < 1 || keyno > 3) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); @@ -2550,22 +2553,44 @@ do_genkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keynostr, unsigned int flags, if (rc) return rc; + /* Because we send the key parameter back via status lines we need + to put a limit on the max. allowed keysize. 2048 bit will + already lead to a 527 byte long status line and thus a 4096 bit + key would exceed the Assuan line length limit. */ + keybits = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].n_bits; + if (keybits > 3072) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE); + /* Prepare for key generation by verifying the Admin PIN. */ rc = verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); if (rc) goto leave; - -#if 1 + + /* Test whether we will need extended length mode. (1900 is an + arbitrary length which for sure fits into a short apdu.) */ + if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && keybits > 1900) + { + exmode = 1; /* Use extended length w/o a limit. */ + le_value = app->app_local->extcap.max_rsp_data; + /* No need to check le_value because it comes from a 16 bit + value and thus can't create an overflow on a 32 bit + system. */ + } + else + { + exmode = 0; + le_value = 256; /* Use legacy value. */ + } + log_info (_("please wait while key is being generated ...\n")); start_at = time (NULL); rc = iso7816_generate_keypair -#else -# warning key generation temporary replaced by reading an existing key. - rc = iso7816_read_public_key -#endif - (app->slot, (const unsigned char*)(keyno == 0? "\xB6" : - keyno == 1? "\xB8" : "\xA4"), - 2, +/* # warning key generation temporary replaced by reading an existing key. */ +/* rc = iso7816_read_public_key */ + (app->slot, exmode, + (const unsigned char*)(keyno == 0? "\xB6" : + keyno == 1? "\xB8" : "\xA4"), 2, + le_value, &buffer, &buflen); if (rc) { @@ -2575,6 +2600,7 @@ do_genkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keynostr, unsigned int flags, } log_info (_("key generation completed (%d seconds)\n"), (int)(time (NULL) - start_at)); + keydata = find_tlv (buffer, buflen, 0x7F49, &keydatalen); if (!keydata) { @@ -2590,7 +2616,7 @@ do_genkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keynostr, unsigned int flags, log_error (_("response does not contain the RSA modulus\n")); goto leave; } -/* log_printhex ("RSA n:", m, mlen); */ + /* log_printhex ("RSA n:", m, mlen); */ send_key_data (ctrl, "n", m, mlen); e = find_tlv (keydata, keydatalen, 0x0082, &elen); @@ -2600,7 +2626,7 @@ do_genkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keynostr, unsigned int flags, log_error (_("response does not contain the RSA public exponent\n")); goto leave; } -/* log_printhex ("RSA e:", e, elen); */ + /* log_printhex ("RSA e:", e, elen); */ send_key_data (ctrl, "e", e, elen); created_at = createtime? createtime : gnupg_get_time (); @@ -2995,6 +3021,7 @@ do_decipher (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, const char *s; int n; const char *fpr = NULL; + int exmode; if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr || !indatalen) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); @@ -3030,7 +3057,7 @@ do_decipher (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, the card. This is allows for a meaningful error message in case the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information known to gpg was not updated. If there is no fingerprint, the - decryption will won't produce the right plaintext anyway. */ + decryption won't produce the right plaintext anyway. */ rc = fpr? check_against_given_fingerprint (app, fpr, 2) : 0; if (rc) return rc; @@ -3039,6 +3066,8 @@ do_decipher (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, if (!rc) { size_t fixuplen; + unsigned char *fixbuf = NULL; + int padind = 0; /* We might encounter a couple of leading zeroes in the cryptogram. Due to internal use of MPIs thease leading @@ -3049,39 +3078,46 @@ do_decipher (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, probability anyway broken. */ if (indatalen >= (128-16) && indatalen < 128) /* 1024 bit key. */ fixuplen = 128 - indatalen; - else if (indatalen >= (256-16) && indatalen < 256) /* 2048 bit key. */ - fixuplen = 256 - indatalen; else if (indatalen >= (192-16) && indatalen < 192) /* 1536 bit key. */ fixuplen = 192 - indatalen; + else if (indatalen >= (256-16) && indatalen < 256) /* 2048 bit key. */ + fixuplen = 256 - indatalen; + else if (indatalen >= (384-16) && indatalen < 384) /* 3072 bit key. */ + fixuplen = 384 - indatalen; else fixuplen = 0; + if (fixuplen) { - unsigned char *fixbuf; - /* While we have to prepend stuff anyway, we can also include the padding byte here so that iso1816_decipher - does not need to do yet another data mangling. */ + does not need to do another data mangling. */ fixuplen++; + fixbuf = xtrymalloc (fixuplen + indatalen); if (!fixbuf) - rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); - else - { - memset (fixbuf, 0, fixuplen); - memcpy (fixbuf+fixuplen, indata, indatalen); - rc = iso7816_decipher (app->slot, 0, - fixbuf, fixuplen+indatalen, -1, - outdata, outdatalen); - xfree (fixbuf); - } - + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + memset (fixbuf, 0, fixuplen); + memcpy (fixbuf+fixuplen, indata, indatalen); + indata = fixbuf; + indatalen = fixuplen + indatalen; + padind = -1; /* Already padded. */ } + + if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && indatalen > 254 ) + exmode = 1; /* Extended length w/o a limit. */ + else if (app->app_local->cardcap.cmd_chaining && indatalen > 254) + exmode = -254; /* Command chaining with max. 254 bytes. */ else - rc = iso7816_decipher (app->slot, 0, - indata, indatalen, 0, - outdata, outdatalen); + exmode = 0; + + rc = iso7816_decipher (app->slot, exmode, + indata, indatalen, padind, + outdata, outdatalen); + xfree (fixbuf); } + return rc; } |