Format of "---with-colons" listings =================================== sec::1024:17:6C7EE1B8621CC013:1998-07-07:0:::Werner Koch : ssb::1536:20:5CE086B5B5A18FF4:1998-07-07:0::: 1. Field: Type of record pub = public key sub = subkey (secondary key) sec = secret key ssb = secret subkey (secondary key) uid = user id (only field 10 is used). fpr = fingerprint: (fingerprint is in field 10) pkd = public key data (special field format, see below) 2. Field: A letter describing the calculated trust, see doc/FAQ This is a single letter, but be prepared that additional information may follow in some future versions. (not used for secret keys) 3. Field: length of key in bits. 4. Field: Algorithm: 1 = RSA 16 = ElGamal (encrypt only) 17 = DSA (sometimes called DH, sign only) 20 = ElGamal (sign and encrypt) 5. Field: KeyID 6. Field: Creation Date (in UTC) 7. Field: Key expiration date or empty if none. 8. Field: Local ID: record number of the dir record in the trustdb this value is only valid as long as the trustdb is not deleted. May be later used to lookup the key: You will be able to use "# as the user id. This is needed because keyids may not be unique - a program may use this number to access keys later. 9. Field: Ownertrust (primary public keys only) This is a single letter, but be prepared that additional information may follow in some future versions. 10. Field: User-ID. The value is quoted like a C string to avoid control characters (the colon is quoted "\x3a"). More fields may be added later. If field 1 has the tag "pkd", a listing looks like this: pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB: ! ! !-- the value ! !------ for infomation number of bits in the value !--------- index (eg. DSA goes from 0 to 3: p,q,g,y) Format of the "--status-fd" output ================================== Every line is prefixed with "[GNUPG:] ", followed by a keyword with the type of the status line and a some arguments depending on the type (maybe none); an application should always be prepared to see more arguments in future versions. GOODSIG The signature with the keyid is good. BADSIG The signature with the keyid has not been verified okay. ERRSIG \ It was not possible to check the signature. This may be caused by a missing public key or an unsupported algorithm. A RC of 4 indicates unknown algorithm, a 9 indicates a missing public key. The other fields give more information about this signature. sig_class is a 2 byte hex-value. VALIDSIG The signature with the keyid is good. This is the same as GOODSIG but has the fingerprint as the argument. Both status lines ere emitted for a good signature. sig-timestamp is the signature creation time in seconds after the epoch. SIG_ID This is emitted only for signatures of class 0 or 1 which have been verified okay. The string is a signature id and may be used in applications to detect replay attacks of signed messages. Note that only DLP algorithms give unique ids - others may yield duplicated ones when they have been created in the same second. ENC_TO The message is encrypted to this keyid. keytype is the numerical value of the public key algorithm, kenlength is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known (which is currently always the case). NODATA No data has been found. Codes for what are: 1 - No armored data. 2 - Expected a packet but did not found one. 3 - Invalid packet found, this may indicate a non OpenPGP message. You may see more than one of these status lines. TRUST_UNDEFINED TRUST_NEVER TRUST_MARGINAL TRUST_FULLY TRUST_ULTIMATE For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted to indicate how trustworthy the signature is. No arguments yet. SIGEXPIRED The signature key has expired. No arguments yet. KEYREVOKED The used key has been revoked by his owner. No arguments yet. BADARMOR The ASCII armor is corrupted. No arguments yet. RSA_OR_IDEA The RSA or IDEA algorithms has been used in the data. A program might want to fallback to another program to handle the data if GnuPG failed. SHM_INFO SHM_GET SHM_GET_BOOL SHM_GET_HIDDEN NEED_PASSPHRASE Issued whenever a passphrase is needed. keytype is the numerical value of the public key algorithm or 0 if this is not applicable, keylength is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known (this is currently always the case). NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed. MISSING_PASSPHRASE BAD_PASSPHRASE The supplied passphrase was wrong GOOD_PASSPHRASE The supplied passphrase was good and the secret key material is therefore usuable. DECRYPTION_FAILED The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message. DECRYPTION_OKAY The decryption process succeeded. This means, that either the correct secret key has been used or the correct passphrase for a conventional encrypted message was given. The program itself may return an errorcode becuase it may not be possible to verify a signature for some reasons. NO_PUBKEY NO_SECKEY The key is not available Key generation ============== Key generation shows progress by printing different characters to stderr: "." Last 10 Miller-Rabin tests failed "+" Miller-Rabin test succeeded "!" Reloading the pool with fresh prime numbers "^" Checking a new value for the generator "<" Size of one factor decreased ">" Size of one factor increased The prime number for ElGamal is generated this way: 1) Make a prime number q of 160, 200, 240 bits (depending on the keysize) 2) Select the length of the other prime factors to be at least the size of q and calculate the number of prime factors needed 3) Make a pool of prime numbers, each of the length determined in step 2 4) Get a new permutation out of the pool or continue with step 3 if we have tested all permutations. 5) Calculate a candidate prime p = 2 * q * p[1] * ... * p[n] + 1 6) Check that this prime has the correct length (this may change q if it seems not to be possible to make a prime of the desired length) 7) Check whether this is a prime using trial divisions and the Miller-Rabin test. 8) Continue with step 4 if we did not find a prime in step 7. 9) Find a generator for that prime. This algorithm is based on Lim and Lee's suggestion from the Crypto '97 proceedings p. 260. Layout of the TrustDB ===================== The TrustDB is built from fixed length records, where the first byte describes the record type. All numeric values are stored in network byte order. The length of each record is 40 bytes. The first record of the DB is always of type 2 and this is the only record of this type. Record type 0: -------------- Unused record, can be reused for any purpose. Record type 1: -------------- Version information for this TrustDB. This is always the first record of the DB and the only one with type 1. 1 byte value 1 3 bytes 'gpg' magic value 1 byte Version of the TrustDB (2) 1 byte marginals needed 1 byte completes needed 1 byte max_cert_depth The three items are used to check whether the cached validity value from the dir record can be used. 1 u32 locked flags 1 u32 timestamp of trustdb creation 1 u32 timestamp of last modification which may affect the validity of keys in the trustdb. This value is checked against the validity timestamp in the dir records. 1 u32 timestamp of last validation (Used to keep track of the time, when this TrustDB was checked against the pubring) 1 u32 record number of keyhashtable 1 u32 first free record 1 u32 record number of shadow directory hash table It does not make sense to combine this table with the key table because the keyid is not in every case a part of the fingerprint. 4 bytes reserved for version extension record Record type 2: (directory record) -------------- Informations about a public key certificate. These are static values which are never changed without user interaction. 1 byte value 2 1 byte reserved 1 u32 LID . (This is simply the record number of this record.) 1 u32 List of key-records (the first one is the primary key) 1 u32 List of uid-records 1 u32 cache record 1 byte ownertrust 1 byte dirflag 1 byte maximum validity of all the user ids 1 u32 time of last validity check. 1 u32 Must check when this time has been reached. (0 = no check required) Record type 3: (key record) -------------- Informations about a primary public key. (This is mainly used to lookup a trust record) 1 byte value 3 1 byte reserved 1 u32 LID 1 u32 next - next key record 7 bytes reserved 1 byte keyflags 1 byte pubkey algorithm 1 byte length of the fingerprint (in bytes) 20 bytes fingerprint of the public key (This is the value we use to identify a key) Record type 4: (uid record) -------------- Informations about a userid We do not store the userid but the hash value of the userid because that is sufficient. 1 byte value 4 1 byte reserved 1 u32 LID points to the directory record. 1 u32 next next userid 1 u32 pointer to preference record 1 u32 siglist list of valid signatures 1 byte uidflags 1 byte validity of the key calculated over this user id 20 bytes ripemd160 hash of the username. Record type 5: (pref record) -------------- Informations about preferences 1 byte value 5 1 byte reserved 1 u32 LID; points to the directory record (and not to the uid record!). (or 0 for standard preference record) 1 u32 next 30 byte preference data Record type 6 (sigrec) ------------- Used to keep track of key signatures. Self-signatures are not stored. If a public key is not in the DB, the signature points to a shadow dir record, which in turn has a list of records which might be interested in this key (and the signature record here is one). 1 byte value 6 1 byte reserved 1 u32 LID points back to the dir record 1 u32 next next sigrec of this uid or 0 to indicate the last sigrec. 6 times 1 u32 Local_id of signators dir or shadow dir record 1 byte Flag: Bit 0 = checked: Bit 1 is valid (we have a real directory record for this) 1 = valid is set (but my be revoked) Record type 8: (shadow directory record) -------------- This record is used to reserved a LID for a public key. We need this to create the sig records of other keys, even if we do not yet have the public key of the signature. This record (the record number to be more precise) will be reused as the dir record when we import the real public key. 1 byte value 8 1 byte reserved 1 u32 LID (This is simply the record number of this record.) 2 u32 keyid 1 byte pubkey algorithm 3 byte reserved 1 u32 hintlist A list of records which have references to this key. This is used for fast access to signature records which are not yet checked. Note, that this is only a hint and the actual records may not anymore hold signature records for that key but that the code cares about this. 18 byte reserved Record Type 10 (hash table) -------------- Due to the fact that we use fingerprints to lookup keys, we can implement quick access by some simple hash methods, and avoid the overhead of gdbm. A property of fingerprints is that they can be used directly as hash values. (They can be considered as strong random numbers.) What we use is a dynamic multilevel architecture, which combines hashtables, record lists, and linked lists. This record is a hashtable of 256 entries; a special property is that all these records are stored consecutively to make one big table. The hash value is simple the 1st, 2nd, ... byte of the fingerprint (depending on the indirection level). When used to hash shadow directory records, a different table is used and indexed by the keyid. 1 byte value 10 1 byte reserved n u32 recnum; n depends on the record length: n = (reclen-2)/4 which yields 9 for the current record length of 40 bytes. the total number of such record which makes up the table is: m = (256+n-1) / n which is 29 for a record length of 40. To look up a key we use the first byte of the fingerprint to get the recnum from this hashtable and look up the addressed record: - If this record is another hashtable, we use 2nd byte to index this hash table and so on. - if this record is a hashlist, we walk all entries until we found one a matching one. - if this record is a key record, we compare the fingerprint and to decide whether it is the requested key; Record type 11 (hash list) -------------- see hash table for an explanation. This is also used for other purposes. 1 byte value 11 1 byte reserved 1 u32 next next hash list record n times n = (reclen-5)/5 1 u32 recnum For the current record length of 40, n is 7 Record type 254 (free record) --------------- All these records form a linked list of unused records. 1 byte value 254 1 byte reserved (0) 1 u32 next_free Packet Headers =============== GNUPG uses PGP 2 packet headers and also understands OpenPGP packet header. There is one enhancement used with the old style packet headers: CTB bits 10, the "packet-length length bits", have values listed in the following table: 00 - 1-byte packet-length field 01 - 2-byte packet-length field 10 - 4-byte packet-length field 11 - no packet length supplied, unknown packet length As indicated in this table, depending on the packet-length length bits, the remaining 1, 2, 4, or 0 bytes of the packet structure field are a "packet-length field". The packet-length field is a whole number field. The value of the packet-length field is defined to be the value of the whole number field. A value of 11 is currently used in one place: on compressed data. That is, a compressed data block currently looks like , where , binary 10 1000 11, is an indefinite-length packet. The proper interpretation is "until the end of the enclosing structure", although it should never appear outermost (where the enclosing structure is a file). + This will be changed with another version, where the new meaning of + the value 11 (see below) will also take place. + + A value of 11 for other packets enables a special length encoding, + which is used in case, where the length of the following packet can + not be determined prior to writing the packet; especially this will + be used if large amounts of data are processed in filter mode. + + It works like this: After the CTB (with a length field of 11) a + marker field is used, which gives the length of the following datablock. + This is a simple 2 byte field (MSB first) containing the amount of data + following this field, not including this length field. After this datablock + another length field follows, which gives the size of the next datablock. + A value of 0 indicates the end of the packet. The maximum size of a + data block is limited to 65534, thereby reserving a value of 0xffff for + future extensions. These length markers must be inserted into the data + stream just before writing the data out. + + This 2 byte filed is large enough, because the application must buffer + this amount of data to prepend the length marker before writing it out. + Data block sizes larger than about 32k doesn't make any sense. Note + that this may also be used for compressed data streams, but we must use + another packet version to tell the application that it can not assume, + that this is the last packet. Usage of gdbm files for keyrings ================================ The key to store the keyblock is it's fingerprint, other records are used for secondary keys. fingerprints are always 20 bytes where 16 bit fingerprints are appended with zero. The first byte of the key gives some information on the type of the key. 1 = key is a 20 bit fingerprint (16 bytes fpr are padded with zeroes) data is the keyblock 2 = key is the complete 8 byte keyid data is a list of 20 byte fingerprints 3 = key is the short 4 byte keyid data is a list of 20 byte fingerprints 4 = key is the email address data is a list of 20 byte fingerprints Data is prepended with a type byte: 1 = keyblock 2 = list of 20 byte padded fingerprints 3 = list of list fingerprints (but how to we key them?) Other Notes =========== * For packet version 3 we calculate the keyids this way: RSA := low 64 bits of n ELGAMAL := build a v3 pubkey packet (with CTB 0x99) and calculate a rmd160 hash value from it. This is used as the fingerprint and the low 64 bits are the keyid. * Revocation certificates consist only of the signature packet; "import" knows how to handle this. The rationale behind it is to keep them small. Keyserver Message Format ========================= The keyserver may be contacted by a Unix Domain socket or via TCP. The format of a request is: ==== command-tag "Content-length:" digits CRLF ======= Where command-tag is NOOP GET PUT DELETE The format of a response is: ====== "GNUPG/1.0" status-code status-text "Content-length:" digits CRLF ============ followed by bytes of data Status codes are: o 1xx: Informational - Request received, continuing process o 2xx: Success - The action was successfully received, understood, and accepted o 4xx: Client Error - The request contains bad syntax or cannot be fulfilled o 5xx: Server Error - The server failed to fulfill an apparently valid request Ich werde jetzt doch das HKP Protokoll implementieren: Naja, die Doku ist so gut wie nichtexistent, da gebe ich Dir recht. In kurzen Worten: (Minimal-)HTTP-Server auf Port 11371, versteht ein GET auf /pks/lookup, wobei die Query-Parameter (Key-Value-Paare mit = zwischen Key und Value; die Paare sind hinter ? und durch & getrennt). Gültige Operationen sind: - - op (Operation) mit den Möglichkeiten index (gleich wie -kv bei PGP), vindex (-kvv) und get (-kxa) - - search: Liste der Worte, die im Key vorkommen müssen. Worte sind mit Worttrennzeichen wie Space, Punkt, @, ... getrennt, Worttrennzeichen werden nicht betrachtet, die Reihenfolge der Worte ist egal. - - exact: (on=aktiv, alles andere inaktiv) Nur die Schlüssel zurückgeben, die auch den "search"-String beinhalten (d.h. Wortreihenfolge und Sonderzeichen sind wichtig) - - fingerprint (Bei [v]index auch den Fingerprint ausgeben), "on" für aktiv, alles andere inaktiv Neu (wird von GNUPG benutzt): /pks/lookup/?op= Zusätzlich versteht der Keyserver auch ein POST auf /pks/add, womit man Keys hochladen kann.