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/* pkclist.c - create a list of public keys
 * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
 *               2008, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 *
 * This file is part of GnuPG.
 *
 * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
 * (at your option) any later version.
 *
 * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
 * GNU General Public License for more details.
 *
 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
 * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 */

#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>

#include "gpg.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "../common/status.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "../common/util.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "../common/ttyio.h"
#include "../common/status.h"
#include "photoid.h"
#include "../common/i18n.h"
#include "tofu.h"

#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)

static void
send_status_inv_recp (int reason, const char *name)
{
  char buf[40];

  snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%d ", reason);
  write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, buf,
                                name, strlen (name),
                                -1);
}


/****************
 * Show the revocation reason as it is stored with the given signature
 */
static void
do_show_revocation_reason( PKT_signature *sig )
{
    size_t n, nn;
    const byte *p, *pp;
    int seq = 0;
    const char *text;

    while( (p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON,
				 &n, &seq, NULL )) ) {
	if( !n )
	    continue; /* invalid - just skip it */

	if( *p == 0 )
	    text = _("No reason specified");
	else if( *p == 0x01 )
	    text = _("Key is superseded");
	else if( *p == 0x02 )
	    text = _("Key has been compromised");
	else if( *p == 0x03 )
	    text = _("Key is no longer used");
	else if( *p == 0x20 )
	    text = _("User ID is no longer valid");
	else
	    text = NULL;

	log_info ( _("reason for revocation: "));
	if (text)
          log_printf ("%s\n", text);
	else
          log_printf ("code=%02x\n", *p );
	n--; p++;
	pp = NULL;
	do {
	    /* We don't want any empty lines, so skip them */
	    while( n && *p == '\n' ) {
		p++;
		n--;
	    }
	    if( n ) {
		pp = memchr( p, '\n', n );
		nn = pp? pp - p : n;
		log_info ( _("revocation comment: ") );
		es_write_sanitized (log_get_stream(), p, nn, NULL, NULL);
		log_printf ("\n");
		p += nn; n -= nn;
	    }
	} while( pp );
    }
}

/* Mode 0: try and find the revocation based on the pk (i.e. check
   subkeys, etc.)  Mode 1: use only the revocation on the main pk */

void
show_revocation_reason (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, int mode)
{
    /* Hmmm, this is not so easy because we have to duplicate the code
     * used in the trustbd to calculate the keyflags.  We need to find
     * a clean way to check revocation certificates on keys and
     * signatures.  And there should be no duplicate code.  Because we
     * enter this function only when the trustdb told us that we have
     * a revoked key, we could simply look for a revocation cert and
     * display this one, when there is only one. Let's try to do this
     * until we have a better solution.  */
    KBNODE node, keyblock = NULL;
    byte fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
    size_t fingerlen;
    int rc;

    /* get the keyblock */
    fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fingerprint, &fingerlen );
    rc = get_pubkey_byfprint (ctrl, NULL, &keyblock, fingerprint, fingerlen);
    if( rc ) { /* that should never happen */
	log_debug( "failed to get the keyblock\n");
	return;
    }

    for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
        if( (mode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) ||
	  ( ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
	      || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
	    && !cmp_public_keys( node->pkt->pkt.public_key, pk ) ) )
	    break;
    }
    if( !node ) {
	log_debug("Oops, PK not in keyblock\n");
	release_kbnode( keyblock );
	return;
    }
    /* now find the revocation certificate */
    for( node = node->next; node ; node = node->next ) {
	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
	    break;
	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
	    && (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20
		|| node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28 ) ) {
		/* FIXME: we should check the signature here */
		do_show_revocation_reason ( node->pkt->pkt.signature );
		break;
	}
    }

    /* We didn't find it, so check if the whole key is revoked */
    if(!node && !mode)
      show_revocation_reason (ctrl, pk, 1);

    release_kbnode( keyblock );
}


/****************
 * mode: 0 = standard
 *       1 = Without key info and additional menu option 'm'
 *           this does also add an option to set the key to ultimately trusted.
 * Returns:
 *      -2 = nothing changed - caller should show some additional info
 *      -1 = quit operation
 *       0 = nothing changed
 *       1 = new ownertrust now in new_trust
 */
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
static int
do_edit_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
                    unsigned *new_trust, int defer_help )
{
  char *p;
  u32 keyid[2];
  int changed=0;
  int quit=0;
  int show=0;
  int min_num;
  int did_help=defer_help;
  unsigned int minimum = tdb_get_min_ownertrust (ctrl, pk, 0);

  switch(minimum)
    {
    default:
    case TRUST_UNDEFINED: min_num=1; break;
    case TRUST_NEVER:     min_num=2; break;
    case TRUST_MARGINAL:  min_num=3; break;
    case TRUST_FULLY:     min_num=4; break;
    }

  keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
  for(;;) {
    /* A string with valid answers.

       TRANSLATORS: These are the allowed answers in lower and
       uppercase.  Below you will find the matching strings which
       should be translated accordingly and the letter changed to
       match the one in the answer string.

         i = please show me more information
         m = back to the main menu
         s = skip this key
	 q = quit
    */
    const char *ans = _("iImMqQsS");

    if( !did_help )
      {
        if( !mode )
          {
            KBNODE keyblock, un;

            tty_printf (_("No trust value assigned to:\n"));
            print_key_line (ctrl, NULL, pk, 0);

	    p = get_user_id_native (ctrl, keyid);
	    tty_printf (_("      \"%s\"\n"),p);
	    xfree (p);

            keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (ctrl, keyid);
            if (!keyblock)
                BUG ();
            for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
	      {
                if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
		  continue;
                if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked)
		  continue;
                if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
		  continue;
		/* Only skip textual primaries */
                if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary
		    && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
		  continue;

		if((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
		   && un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
		  show_photos (ctrl,
                               un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
                               un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs, pk,
                               un->pkt->pkt.user_id);

		p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
				 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);

		tty_printf(_("  aka \"%s\"\n"),p);
	      }

            print_fingerprint (ctrl, NULL, pk, 2);
            tty_printf("\n");
	    release_kbnode (keyblock);
          }

	if(opt.trust_model==TM_DIRECT)
	  {
	    tty_printf(_("How much do you trust that this key actually "
			 "belongs to the named user?\n"));
	    tty_printf("\n");
	  }
	else
	  {
	    /* This string also used in keyedit.c:trustsig_prompt */
	    tty_printf(_("Please decide how far you trust this user to"
			 " correctly verify other users' keys\n"
			 "(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from"
			 " different sources, etc.)\n"));
	    tty_printf("\n");
	  }

	if(min_num<=1)
	  tty_printf (_("  %d = I don't know or won't say\n"), 1);
	if(min_num<=2)
	  tty_printf (_("  %d = I do NOT trust\n"), 2);
	if(min_num<=3)
	  tty_printf (_("  %d = I trust marginally\n"), 3);
	if(min_num<=4)
	  tty_printf (_("  %d = I trust fully\n"), 4);
        if (mode)
          tty_printf (_("  %d = I trust ultimately\n"), 5);
#if 0
	/* not yet implemented */
        tty_printf ("  i = please show me more information\n");
#endif
        if( mode )
          tty_printf(_("  m = back to the main menu\n"));
        else
	  {
	    tty_printf(_("  s = skip this key\n"));
	    tty_printf(_("  q = quit\n"));
	  }
        tty_printf("\n");
	if(minimum)
	  tty_printf(_("The minimum trust level for this key is: %s\n\n"),
		     trust_value_to_string(minimum));
        did_help = 1;
      }
    if( strlen(ans) != 8 )
      BUG();
    p = cpr_get("edit_ownertrust.value",_("Your decision? "));
    trim_spaces(p);
    cpr_kill_prompt();
    if( !*p )
      did_help = 0;
    else if( *p && p[1] )
      ;
    else if( !p[1] && ((*p >= '0'+min_num) && *p <= (mode?'5':'4')) )
      {
        unsigned int trust;
        switch( *p )
          {
          case '1': trust = TRUST_UNDEFINED; break;
          case '2': trust = TRUST_NEVER    ; break;
          case '3': trust = TRUST_MARGINAL ; break;
          case '4': trust = TRUST_FULLY    ; break;
          case '5': trust = TRUST_ULTIMATE ; break;
          default: BUG();
          }
        if (trust == TRUST_ULTIMATE
            && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("edit_ownertrust.set_ultimate.okay",
                                       _("Do you really want to set this key"
                                         " to ultimate trust? (y/N) ")))
          ; /* no */
        else
          {
            *new_trust = trust;
            changed = 1;
            break;
          }
      }
#if 0
    /* not yet implemented */
    else if( *p == ans[0] || *p == ans[1] )
      {
        tty_printf(_("Certificates leading to an ultimately trusted key:\n"));
        show = 1;
        break;
      }
#endif
    else if( mode && (*p == ans[2] || *p == ans[3] || *p == CONTROL_D ) )
      {
        break ; /* back to the menu */
      }
    else if( !mode && (*p == ans[6] || *p == ans[7] ) )
      {
	break; /* skip */
      }
    else if( !mode && (*p == ans[4] || *p == ans[5] ) )
      {
        quit = 1;
        break ; /* back to the menu */
      }
    xfree(p); p = NULL;
  }
  xfree(p);
  return show? -2: quit? -1 : changed;
}
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/


/*
 * Display a menu to change the ownertrust of the key PK (which should
 * be a primary key).
 * For mode values see do_edit_ownertrust ()
 */
#ifndef NO_TRUST_MODELS
int
edit_ownertrust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
{
  unsigned int trust = 0;
  int no_help = 0;

  for(;;)
    {
      switch ( do_edit_ownertrust (ctrl, pk, mode, &trust, no_help ) )
        {
        case -1: /* quit */
          return -1;
        case -2: /* show info */
          no_help = 1;
          break;
        case 1: /* trust value set */
          trust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
          trust |= get_ownertrust (ctrl, pk) & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
          update_ownertrust (ctrl, pk, trust );
          return 1;
        default:
          return 0;
        }
    }
}
#endif /*!NO_TRUST_MODELS*/


/****************
 * Check whether we can trust this pk which has a trustlevel of TRUSTLEVEL
 * Returns: true if we trust.
 */
static int
do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
{
  /* We should not be able to get here with a revoked or expired
     key */
  if(trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED
     || trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED
     || (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_EXPIRED)
    BUG();

  if( opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS )
    {
      if( opt.verbose )
	log_info("No trust check due to '--trust-model always' option\n");
      return 1;
    }

  switch(trustlevel & TRUST_MASK)
    {
    default:
      log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
		 trustlevel);
      /* fall through */
    case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
    case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
      log_info(_("%s: There is no assurance this key belongs"
		 " to the named user\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
      return 0; /* no */

    case TRUST_MARGINAL:
      log_info(_("%s: There is limited assurance this key belongs"
		 " to the named user\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
      return 1; /* yes */

    case TRUST_FULLY:
      if( opt.verbose )
	log_info(_("This key probably belongs to the named user\n"));
      return 1; /* yes */

    case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
      if( opt.verbose )
	log_info(_("This key belongs to us\n"));
      return 1; /* yes */

    case TRUST_NEVER:
      /* This can be returned by TOFU, which can return negative
         assertions.  */
      log_info(_("%s: This key is bad!  It has been marked as untrusted!\n"),
               keystr_from_pk(pk));
      return 0; /* no */
    }

  return 1; /*NOTREACHED*/
}


/****************
 * wrapper around do_we_trust, so we can ask whether to use the
 * key anyway.
 */
static int
do_we_trust_pre (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
{
  int rc;

  rc = do_we_trust( pk, trustlevel );

  if( !opt.batch && !rc )
    {
      print_pubkey_info (ctrl, NULL,pk);
      print_fingerprint (ctrl, NULL, pk, 2);
      tty_printf("\n");

      if ((trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_NEVER)
        tty_printf(
          _("This key is bad!  It has been marked as untrusted!  If you\n"
            "*really* know what you are doing, you may answer the next\n"
            "question with yes.\n"));
      else
        tty_printf(
          _("It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named\n"
            "in the user ID.  If you *really* know what you are doing,\n"
            "you may answer the next question with yes.\n"));

      tty_printf("\n");


      if (is_status_enabled ())
        {
          u32 kid[2];
          char *hint_str;

          keyid_from_pk (pk, kid);
          hint_str = get_long_user_id_string (ctrl, kid);
          write_status_text ( STATUS_USERID_HINT, hint_str );
          xfree (hint_str);
        }

      if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("untrusted_key.override",
				_("Use this key anyway? (y/N) "))  )
	rc = 1;

      /* Hmmm: Should we set a flag to tell the user about
       *	 his decision the next time he encrypts for this recipient?
       */
    }

  return rc;
}


/* Write a TRUST_foo status line inclduing the validation model.  */
static void
write_trust_status (int statuscode, int trustlevel)
{
#ifdef NO_TRUST_MODELS
  write_status (statuscode);
#else /* NO_TRUST_MODELS */
  int tm;

  /* For the combined tofu+pgp method, we return the trust model which
   * was responsible for the trustlevel.  */
  if (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP)
    tm = (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_TOFU_BASED)? TM_TOFU : TM_PGP;
  else
    tm = opt.trust_model;
  write_status_strings (statuscode, "0 ", trust_model_string (tm), NULL);
#endif /* NO_TRUST_MODELS */
}


/****************
 * Check whether we can trust this signature.
 * Returns an error code if we should not trust this signature.
 */
int
check_signatures_trust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig)
{
  PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
  unsigned int trustlevel = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
  int rc=0;

  rc = get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, sig->keyid );
  if (rc)
    { /* this should not happen */
      log_error("Ooops; the key vanished  - can't check the trust\n");
      rc = GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
      goto leave;
    }

  if ( opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS )
    {
      if( !opt.quiet )
        log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
        print_fingerprint (ctrl, NULL, pk, 1);
      goto leave;
    }

  if(pk->flags.maybe_revoked && !pk->flags.revoked)
    log_info(_("WARNING: this key might be revoked (revocation key"
	       " not present)\n"));

  trustlevel = get_validity (ctrl, NULL, pk, NULL, sig, 1);

  if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) )
    {
      write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
      if(pk->flags.revoked == 2)
	log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its"
		   " designated revoker!\n"));
      else
	log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
      log_info(_("         This could mean that the signature is forged.\n"));
      show_revocation_reason (ctrl, pk, 0);
    }
  else if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) )
    {
      write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
      log_info(_("WARNING: This subkey has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
      show_revocation_reason (ctrl, pk, 0);
    }

  if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
    log_info (_("Note: This key has been disabled.\n"));

  /* If we have PKA information adjust the trustlevel. */
  if (sig->pka_info && sig->pka_info->valid)
    {
      unsigned char fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
      PKT_public_key *primary_pk;
      size_t fprlen;
      int okay;


      primary_pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *primary_pk);
      get_pubkey (ctrl, primary_pk, pk->main_keyid);
      fingerprint_from_pk (primary_pk, fpr, &fprlen);
      free_public_key (primary_pk);

      if ( fprlen == 20 && !memcmp (sig->pka_info->fpr, fpr, 20) )
        {
          okay = 1;
          write_status_text (STATUS_PKA_TRUST_GOOD, sig->pka_info->email);
          log_info (_("Note: Verified signer's address is '%s'\n"),
                    sig->pka_info->email);
        }
      else
        {
          okay = 0;
          write_status_text (STATUS_PKA_TRUST_BAD, sig->pka_info->email);
          log_info (_("Note: Signer's address '%s' "
                      "does not match DNS entry\n"), sig->pka_info->email);
        }

      switch ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) )
        {
        case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
        case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
        case TRUST_MARGINAL:
          if (okay && opt.verify_options&VERIFY_PKA_TRUST_INCREASE)
            {
              trustlevel = ((trustlevel & ~TRUST_MASK) | TRUST_FULLY);
              log_info (_("trustlevel adjusted to FULL"
                          " due to valid PKA info\n"));
            }
          /* fall through */
        case TRUST_FULLY:
          if (!okay)
            {
              trustlevel = ((trustlevel & ~TRUST_MASK) | TRUST_NEVER);
              log_info (_("trustlevel adjusted to NEVER"
                          " due to bad PKA info\n"));
            }
          break;
        }
    }

  /* Now let the user know what up with the trustlevel. */
  switch ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) )
    {
    case TRUST_EXPIRED:
      log_info(_("Note: This key has expired!\n"));
      print_fingerprint (ctrl, NULL, pk, 1);
      break;

    default:
      log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
                 trustlevel);
      /* fall through */
    case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
    case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
      write_trust_status (STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED, trustlevel);
      log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
                 " a trusted signature!\n"));
      log_info(_("         There is no indication that the "
                 "signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
      print_fingerprint (ctrl, NULL, pk, 1);
      break;

    case TRUST_NEVER:
      /* This level can be returned by TOFU, which supports negative
       * assertions.  */
      write_trust_status (STATUS_TRUST_NEVER, trustlevel);
      log_info(_("WARNING: We do NOT trust this key!\n"));
      log_info(_("         The signature is probably a FORGERY.\n"));
      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
        print_fingerprint (ctrl, NULL, pk, 1);
      rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
      break;

    case TRUST_MARGINAL:
      write_trust_status (STATUS_TRUST_MARGINAL, trustlevel);
      log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
                 " sufficiently trusted signatures!\n"));
      log_info(_("         It is not certain that the"
                 " signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
      print_fingerprint (ctrl, NULL, pk, 1);
      break;

    case TRUST_FULLY:
      write_trust_status (STATUS_TRUST_FULLY, trustlevel);
      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
        print_fingerprint (ctrl, NULL, pk, 1);
      break;

    case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
      write_trust_status (STATUS_TRUST_ULTIMATE, trustlevel);
      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
        print_fingerprint (ctrl, NULL, pk, 1);
      break;
    }

 leave:
  free_public_key( pk );
  return rc;
}


void
release_pk_list (pk_list_t pk_list)
{
  PK_LIST pk_rover;

  for ( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_rover)
    {
      pk_rover = pk_list->next;
      free_public_key ( pk_list->pk );
      xfree ( pk_list );
    }
}


static int
key_present_in_pk_list(PK_LIST pk_list, PKT_public_key *pk)
{
    for( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_list->next)
	if (cmp_public_keys(pk_list->pk, pk) == 0)
	    return 0;

    return -1;
}


/*
 * Return a malloced string with a default recipient if there is any
 * Fixme: We don't distinguish between malloc failure and no-default-recipient.
 */
static char *
default_recipient (ctrl_t ctrl)
{
  PKT_public_key *pk;
  char *result;

  if (opt.def_recipient)
    return xtrystrdup (opt.def_recipient);

  if (!opt.def_recipient_self)
    return NULL;
  pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk );
  if (!pk)
    return NULL;
  if (get_seckey_default (ctrl, pk))
    {
      free_public_key (pk);
      return NULL;
    }
  result = hexfingerprint (pk, NULL, 0);
  free_public_key (pk);
  return result;
}


static int
expand_id(const char *id,strlist_t *into,unsigned int flags)
{
  struct groupitem *groups;
  int count=0;

  for(groups=opt.grouplist;groups;groups=groups->next)
    {
      /* need strcasecmp() here, as this should be localized */
      if(strcasecmp(groups->name,id)==0)
	{
	  strlist_t each,sl;

	  /* this maintains the current utf8-ness */
	  for(each=groups->values;each;each=each->next)
	    {
	      sl=add_to_strlist(into,each->d);
	      sl->flags=flags;
	      count++;
	    }

	  break;
	}
    }

  return count;
}

/* For simplicity, and to avoid potential loops, we only expand once -
 * you can't make an alias that points to an alias.  */
static strlist_t
expand_group (strlist_t input)
{
  strlist_t output = NULL;
  strlist_t sl, rover;

  for (rover = input; rover; rover = rover->next)
    if (!(rover->flags & PK_LIST_FROM_FILE)
        && !expand_id(rover->d,&output,rover->flags))
      {
	/* Didn't find any groups, so use the existing string */
	sl=add_to_strlist(&output,rover->d);
	sl->flags=rover->flags;
      }

  return output;
}


/* Helper for build_pk_list to find and check one key.  This helper is
 * also used directly in server mode by the RECIPIENTS command.  On
 * success the new key is added to PK_LIST_ADDR.  NAME is the user id
 * of the key.  USE the requested usage and a set MARK_HIDDEN will
 * mark the key in the updated list as a hidden recipient.  If
 * FROM_FILE is true, NAME is not a user ID but the name of a file
 * holding a key. */
gpg_error_t
find_and_check_key (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, unsigned int use,
                    int mark_hidden, int from_file, pk_list_t *pk_list_addr)
{
  int rc;
  PKT_public_key *pk;
  KBNODE keyblock = NULL;

  if (!name || !*name)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_USER_ID);

  pk = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
  if (!pk)
    return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
  pk->req_usage = use;

  if (from_file)
    rc = get_pubkey_fromfile (ctrl, pk, name);
  else
    rc = get_best_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, pk, name, &keyblock, 0, 0);
  if (rc)
    {
      int code;

      /* Key not found or other error. */
      log_error (_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), name, gpg_strerror (rc) );
      switch (gpg_err_code (rc))
        {
        case GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY:
        case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:   code =  1; break;
        case GPG_ERR_INV_USER_ID: code = 14; break;
        default: code = 0; break;
        }
      send_status_inv_recp (code, name);
      free_public_key (pk);
      return rc;
    }

  rc = openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (pk->pubkey_algo, use);
  if (rc)
    {
      /* Key found but not usable for us (e.g. sign-only key). */
      release_kbnode (keyblock);
      send_status_inv_recp (3, name); /* Wrong key usage */
      log_error (_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), name, gpg_strerror (rc) );
      free_public_key (pk);
      return rc;
    }

  /* Key found and usable.  Check validity. */
  if (!from_file)
    {
      int trustlevel;

      trustlevel = get_validity (ctrl, keyblock, pk, pk->user_id, NULL, 1);
      release_kbnode (keyblock);
      if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
        {
          /* Key has been disabled. */
          send_status_inv_recp (13, name);
          log_info (_("%s: skipped: public key is disabled\n"), name);
          free_public_key (pk);
          return GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY;
        }

      if ( !do_we_trust_pre (ctrl, pk, trustlevel) )
        {
          /* We don't trust this key.  */
          send_status_inv_recp (10, name);
          free_public_key (pk);
          return GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY;
        }
    }

  /* Skip the actual key if the key is already present in the
     list.  */
  if (!key_present_in_pk_list (*pk_list_addr, pk))
    {
      if (!opt.quiet)
        log_info (_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"), name);
      free_public_key (pk);
    }
  else
    {
      pk_list_t r;

      r = xtrymalloc (sizeof *r);
      if (!r)
        {
          rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
          free_public_key (pk);
          return rc;
        }
      r->pk = pk;
      r->next = *pk_list_addr;
      r->flags = mark_hidden? 1:0;
      *pk_list_addr = r;
    }

  return 0;
}



/* This is the central function to collect the keys for recipients.
 * It is thus used to prepare a public key encryption. encrypt-to
 * keys, default keys and the keys for the actual recipients are all
 * collected here.  When not in batch mode and no recipient has been
 * passed on the commandline, the function will also ask for
 * recipients.
 *
 * RCPTS is a string list with the recipients; NULL is an allowed
 * value but not very useful.  Group expansion is done on these names;
 * they may be in any of the user Id formats we can handle.  The flags
 * bits for each string in the string list are used for:
 *
 * - PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO :: This is an encrypt-to recipient.
 * - PK_LIST_HIDDEN     :: This is a hidden recipient.
 * - PK_LIST_FROM_FILE  :: The argument is a file with a key.
 *
 * On success a list of keys is stored at the address RET_PK_LIST; the
 * caller must free this list.  On error the value at this address is
 * not changed.
 */
int
build_pk_list (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list)
{
  PK_LIST pk_list = NULL;
  PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
  int rc=0;
  int any_recipients=0;
  strlist_t rov,remusr;
  char *def_rec = NULL;
  char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];

  /* Try to expand groups if any have been defined. */
  if (opt.grouplist)
    remusr = expand_group (rcpts);
  else
    remusr = rcpts;

  /* XXX: Change this function to use get_pubkeys instead of
     get_pubkey_byname to detect ambiguous key specifications and warn
     about duplicate keyblocks.  For ambiguous key specifications on
     the command line or provided interactively, prompt the user to
     select the best key.  If a key specification is ambiguous and we
     are in batch mode, die.  */

  if (opt.encrypt_to_default_key)
    {
      static int warned;

      const char *default_key = parse_def_secret_key (ctrl);
      if (default_key)
        {
          PK_LIST r = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r);

          r->pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *r->pk);
          r->pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;

          rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, r->pk, default_key,
                                   NULL, NULL, 0, 1);
          if (rc)
            {
              xfree (r->pk);
              xfree (r);

              log_error (_("can't encrypt to '%s'\n"), default_key);
              if (!opt.quiet)
                log_info (_("(check argument of option '%s')\n"),
                          "--default-key");
            }
          else
            {
              r->next = pk_list;
              r->flags = 0;
              pk_list = r;
            }
        }
      else if (opt.def_secret_key)
        {
          if (! warned)
            log_info (_("option '%s' given, but no valid default keys given\n"),
                      "--encrypt-to-default-key");
          warned = 1;
        }
      else
        {
          if (! warned)
            log_info (_("option '%s' given, but option '%s' not given\n"),
                      "--encrypt-to-default-key", "--default-key");
          warned = 1;
        }
    }

  /* Check whether there are any recipients in the list and build the
   * list of the encrypt-to ones (we always trust them). */
  for ( rov = remusr; rov; rov = rov->next )
    {
      if ( !(rov->flags & PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO) )
        {
          /* This is a regular recipient; i.e. not an encrypt-to
             one. */
          any_recipients = 1;

          /* Hidden recipients are not allowed while in PGP mode,
             issue a warning and switch into GnuPG mode. */
          if ((rov->flags & PK_LIST_HIDDEN) && (PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8))
            {
              log_info(_("option '%s' may not be used in %s mode\n"),
                       "--hidden-recipient",
                       gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));

              compliance_failure();
            }
        }
      else if (!opt.no_encrypt_to)
        {
          /* --encrypt-to has not been disabled.  Check this
             encrypt-to key. */
          pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
          pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;

          /* We explicitly allow encrypt-to to an disabled key; thus
             we pass 1 for the second last argument and 1 as the last
             argument to disable AKL. */
          if ( (rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl,
                                        NULL, pk, rov->d, NULL, NULL, 1, 1)) )
            {
              free_public_key ( pk ); pk = NULL;
              log_error (_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, gpg_strerror (rc) );
              send_status_inv_recp (0, rov->d);
              goto fail;
            }
          else if ( !(rc=openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (pk->pubkey_algo,
                                                PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)) )
            {
              /* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
               * in the list.  Add it to our list if not. */
              if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0)
                {
                  free_public_key (pk); pk = NULL;
                  if (!opt.quiet)
                    log_info (_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"),
                              rov->d);
                }
              else
                {
                  PK_LIST r;
                  r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
                  r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
                  r->next = pk_list;
                  r->flags = (rov->flags&PK_LIST_HIDDEN)?1:0;
                  pk_list = r;

                  /* Hidden encrypt-to recipients are not allowed while
                     in PGP mode, issue a warning and switch into
                     GnuPG mode. */
                  if ((r->flags&PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO) && (PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8))
                    {
                      log_info(_("option '%s' may not be used in %s mode\n"),
                               "--hidden-encrypt-to",
                               gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));

                      compliance_failure();
                    }
                }
            }
          else
            {
              /* The public key is not usable for encryption. */
              free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
              log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, gpg_strerror (rc) );
              send_status_inv_recp (3, rov->d); /* Wrong key usage */
              goto fail;
            }
        }
    }

  /* If we don't have any recipients yet and we are not in batch mode
     drop into interactive selection mode. */
  if ( !any_recipients && !opt.batch )
    {
      int have_def_rec;
      char *answer = NULL;
      strlist_t backlog = NULL;

      if (pk_list)
        any_recipients = 1;
      def_rec = default_recipient(ctrl);
      have_def_rec = !!def_rec;
      if ( !have_def_rec )
        tty_printf(_("You did not specify a user ID. (you may use \"-r\")\n"));

      for (;;)
        {
          rc = 0;
          xfree(answer);
          if ( have_def_rec )
            {
              /* A default recipient is taken as the first entry. */
              answer = def_rec;
              def_rec = NULL;
            }
          else if (backlog)
            {
              /* This is part of our trick to expand and display groups. */
              answer = strlist_pop (&backlog);
            }
          else
            {
              /* Show the list of already collected recipients and ask
                 for more. */
              PK_LIST iter;

              tty_printf("\n");
              tty_printf(_("Current recipients:\n"));
              for (iter=pk_list;iter;iter=iter->next)
                {
                  u32 keyid[2];

                  keyid_from_pk(iter->pk,keyid);
                  tty_printf ("%s/%s %s \"",
                              pubkey_string (iter->pk,
                                             pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
                              keystr(keyid),
                              datestr_from_pk (iter->pk));

                  if (iter->pk->user_id)
                    tty_print_utf8_string(iter->pk->user_id->name,
                                          iter->pk->user_id->len);
                  else
                    {
                      size_t n;
                      char *p = get_user_id (ctrl, keyid, &n, NULL);
                      tty_print_utf8_string ( p, n );
                      xfree(p);
                    }
                  tty_printf("\"\n");
                }

              answer = cpr_get_utf8("pklist.user_id.enter",
                                    _("\nEnter the user ID.  "
                                      "End with an empty line: "));
              trim_spaces(answer);
              cpr_kill_prompt();
            }

          if ( !answer || !*answer )
            {
              xfree(answer);
              break;  /* No more recipients entered - get out of loop. */
            }

          /* Do group expand here too.  The trick here is to continue
             the loop if any expansion occurred.  The code above will
             then list all expanded keys. */
          if (expand_id(answer,&backlog,0))
            continue;

          /* Get and check key for the current name. */
          free_public_key (pk);
          pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
          pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
          rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, pk, answer, NULL, NULL, 0, 0 );
          if (rc)
            tty_printf(_("No such user ID.\n"));
          else if ( !(rc=openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (pk->pubkey_algo,
                                                PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)) )
            {
              if ( have_def_rec )
                {
                  /* No validation for a default recipient. */
                  if (!key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk))
                    {
                      free_public_key (pk);
                      pk = NULL;
                      log_info (_("skipped: public key "
                                  "already set as default recipient\n") );
                    }
                  else
                    {
                      PK_LIST r = xmalloc (sizeof *r);
                      r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
                      r->next = pk_list;
                      r->flags = 0; /* No throwing default ids. */
                      pk_list = r;
                    }
                  any_recipients = 1;
                  continue;
                }
              else
                { /* Check validity of this key. */
                  int trustlevel;

                  trustlevel =
                    get_validity (ctrl, NULL, pk, pk->user_id, NULL, 1);
                  if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
                    {
                      tty_printf (_("Public key is disabled.\n") );
                    }
                  else if ( do_we_trust_pre (ctrl, pk, trustlevel) )
                    {
                      /* Skip the actual key if the key is already
                       * present in the list */
                      if (!key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk))
                        {
                          free_public_key (pk);
                          pk = NULL;
                          log_info(_("skipped: public key already set\n") );
                        }
                      else
                        {
                          PK_LIST r;
                          r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
                          r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
                          r->next = pk_list;
                          r->flags = 0; /* No throwing interactive ids. */
                          pk_list = r;
                        }
                      any_recipients = 1;
                      continue;
                    }
                }
            }
          xfree(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
          have_def_rec = 0;
        }
      if ( pk )
        {
          free_public_key( pk );
          pk = NULL;
        }
    }
  else if ( !any_recipients && (def_rec = default_recipient(ctrl)) )
    {
      /* We are in batch mode and have only a default recipient. */
      pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
      pk->req_usage = PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;

      /* The default recipient is allowed to be disabled; thus pass 1
         as second last argument.  We also don't want an AKL. */
      rc = get_pubkey_byname (ctrl, NULL, pk, def_rec, NULL, NULL, 1, 1);
      if (rc)
        log_error(_("unknown default recipient \"%s\"\n"), def_rec );
      else if ( !(rc=openpgp_pk_test_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo,
                                           PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)) )
        {
          /* Mark any_recipients here since the default recipient
             would have been used if it wasn't already there.  It
             doesn't really matter if we got this key from the default
             recipient or an encrypt-to. */
          any_recipients = 1;
          if (!key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk))
            log_info (_("skipped: public key already set "
                        "as default recipient\n"));
          else
            {
              PK_LIST r = xmalloc( sizeof *r );
              r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
              r->next = pk_list;
              r->flags = 0; /* No throwing default ids. */
              pk_list = r;
            }
        }
      if ( pk )
        {
          free_public_key( pk );
          pk = NULL;
        }
      xfree(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
    }
  else
    {
      /* General case: Check all keys. */
      any_recipients = 0;
      for (; remusr; remusr = remusr->next )
        {
          if ( (remusr->flags & PK_LIST_ENCRYPT_TO) )
            continue; /* encrypt-to keys are already handled. */

          rc = find_and_check_key (ctrl, remusr->d, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC,
                                   !!(remusr->flags&PK_LIST_HIDDEN),
                                   !!(remusr->flags&PK_LIST_FROM_FILE),
                                   &pk_list);
          if (rc)
            goto fail;
          any_recipients = 1;
        }
    }

  if ( !rc && !any_recipients )
    {
      log_error(_("no valid addressees\n"));
      write_status_text (STATUS_NO_RECP, "0");
      rc = GPG_ERR_NO_USER_ID;
    }

#ifdef USE_TOFU
  if (! rc && (opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU_PGP || opt.trust_model == TM_TOFU))
    {
      PK_LIST iter;
      for (iter = pk_list; iter; iter = iter->next)
        {
          int rc2;

          /* Note: we already resolved any conflict when looking up
             the key.  Don't annoy the user again if she selected
             accept once.  */
          rc2 = tofu_register_encryption (ctrl, iter->pk, NULL, 0);
          if (rc2)
            log_info ("WARNING: Failed to register encryption to %s"
                      " with TOFU engine\n",
                      keystr (pk_main_keyid (iter->pk)));
          else if (DBG_TRUST)
            log_debug ("Registered encryption to %s with TOFU DB.\n",
                      keystr (pk_main_keyid (iter->pk)));
        }
    }
#endif /*USE_TOFU*/

 fail:

  if ( rc )
    release_pk_list( pk_list );
  else
    *ret_pk_list = pk_list;
  if (opt.grouplist)
    free_strlist(remusr);
  return rc;
}


/* In pgp6 mode, disallow all ciphers except IDEA (1), 3DES (2), and
   CAST5 (3), all hashes except MD5 (1), SHA1 (2), and RIPEMD160 (3),
   and all compressions except none (0) and ZIP (1).  pgp7 and pgp8
   mode expands the cipher list to include AES128 (7), AES192 (8),
   AES256 (9), and TWOFISH (10).  pgp8 adds the SHA-256 hash (8).  For
   a true PGP key all of this is unneeded as they are the only items
   present in the preferences subpacket, but checking here covers the
   weird case of encrypting to a key that had preferences from a
   different implementation which was then used with PGP.  I am not
   completely comfortable with this as the right thing to do, as it
   slightly alters the list of what the user is supposedly requesting.
   It is not against the RFC however, as the preference chosen will
   never be one that the user didn't specify somewhere ("The
   implementation may use any mechanism to pick an algorithm in the
   intersection"), and PGP has no mechanism to fix such a broken
   preference list, so I'm including it. -dms */

int
algo_available( preftype_t preftype, int algo, const union pref_hint *hint)
{
  if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM )
    {
      if(PGP6 && (algo != CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA
		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5))
	return 0;

      if(PGP7 && (algo != CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA
		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5
		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES
		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES192
		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES256
		  && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH))
	return 0;

      /* PGP8 supports all the ciphers we do.. */

      return algo && !openpgp_cipher_test_algo ( algo );
    }
  else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_HASH )
    {
      if (hint && hint->digest_length)
	{
	  if (hint->digest_length!=20 || opt.flags.dsa2)
	    {
	      /* If --enable-dsa2 is set or the hash isn't 160 bits
		 (which implies DSA2), then we'll accept a hash that
		 is larger than we need.  Otherwise we won't accept
		 any hash that isn't exactly the right size. */
	      if (hint->digest_length > gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo))
		return 0;
	    }
	  else if (hint->digest_length != gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo))
	    return 0;
	}

      if((PGP6 || PGP7) && (algo != DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
			    && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
			    && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160))
	return 0;


      if(PGP8 && (algo != DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
		  && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
		  && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160
		  && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256))
	return 0;

      return algo && !openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
    }
  else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP )
    {
      if((PGP6 || PGP7) && (algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE
			    && algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP))
	return 0;

      /* PGP8 supports all the compression algos we do */

      return !check_compress_algo( algo );
    }
  else
    return 0;
}

/****************
 * Return -1 if we could not find an algorithm.
 */
int
select_algo_from_prefs(PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype,
		       int request, const union pref_hint *hint)
{
  PK_LIST pkr;
  u32 bits[8];
  const prefitem_t *prefs;
  int result=-1,i;
  u16 scores[256];

  if( !pk_list )
    return -1;

  memset(bits,0xFF,sizeof(bits));
  memset(scores,0,sizeof(scores));

  for( pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next )
    {
      u32 mask[8];
      int rank=1,implicit=-1;

      memset(mask,0,sizeof(mask));

      switch(preftype)
	{
	case PREFTYPE_SYM:
	  /* IDEA is implicitly there for v3 keys with v3 selfsigs if
	     --pgp2 mode is on.  This was a 2440 thing that was
	     dropped from 4880 but is still relevant to GPG's 1991
	     support.  All this doesn't mean IDEA is actually
	     available, of course. */
          implicit=CIPHER_ALGO_3DES;
	  break;

	case PREFTYPE_AEAD:
          /* No implicit algo.  */
          break;

	case PREFTYPE_HASH:
	  /* While I am including this code for completeness, note
	     that currently --pgp2 mode locks the hash at MD5, so this
	     code will never even be called.  Even if the hash wasn't
	     locked at MD5, we don't support sign+encrypt in --pgp2
	     mode, and that's the only time PREFTYPE_HASH is used
	     anyway. -dms */

          implicit=DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;

	  break;

	case PREFTYPE_ZIP:
	  /* Uncompressed is always an option. */
	  implicit=COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE;
	}

      if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
	prefs = pkr->pk->user_id->prefs;
      else
	prefs = pkr->pk->prefs;

      if( prefs )
	{
	  for (i=0; prefs[i].type; i++ )
	    {
	      if( prefs[i].type == preftype )
		{
		  /* Make sure all scores don't add up past 0xFFFF
		     (and roll around) */
		  if(rank+scores[prefs[i].value]<=0xFFFF)
		    scores[prefs[i].value]+=rank;
		  else
		    scores[prefs[i].value]=0xFFFF;

		  mask[prefs[i].value/32] |= 1<<(prefs[i].value%32);

		  rank++;

		  /* We saw the implicit algorithm, so we don't need
		     tack it on the end ourselves. */
		  if(implicit==prefs[i].value)
		    implicit=-1;
		}
	    }
	}

      if(rank==1 && preftype==PREFTYPE_ZIP)
	{
	  /* If the compression preferences are not present, they are
	     assumed to be ZIP, Uncompressed (RFC4880:13.3.1) */
	  scores[1]=1; /* ZIP is first choice */
	  scores[0]=2; /* Uncompressed is second choice */
	  mask[0]|=3;
	}

      /* If the key didn't have the implicit algorithm listed
	 explicitly, add it here at the tail of the list. */
      if(implicit>-1)
	{
	  scores[implicit]+=rank;
	  mask[implicit/32] |= 1<<(implicit%32);
	}

      for(i=0;i<8;i++)
	bits[i]&=mask[i];
    }

  /* We've now scored all of the algorithms, and the usable ones have
     bits set.  Let's pick the winner. */

  /* The caller passed us a request.  Can we use it? */
  if(request>-1 && (bits[request/32] & (1<<(request%32))) &&
     algo_available(preftype,request,hint))
    result=request;

  if(result==-1)
    {
      /* If we have personal prefs set, use them. */
      prefs=NULL;
      if(preftype==PREFTYPE_SYM && opt.personal_cipher_prefs)
	prefs=opt.personal_cipher_prefs;
      else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_AEAD && opt.personal_aead_prefs)
	prefs=opt.personal_aead_prefs;
      else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH && opt.personal_digest_prefs)
	prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs;
      else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_ZIP && opt.personal_compress_prefs)
	prefs=opt.personal_compress_prefs;

      if( prefs )
	for(i=0; prefs[i].type; i++ )
	  {
	    if(bits[prefs[i].value/32] & (1<<(prefs[i].value%32))
	       && algo_available( preftype, prefs[i].value, hint))
	      {
		result = prefs[i].value;
		break;
	      }
	  }
    }

  if(result==-1)
    {
      unsigned int best=-1;

      /* At this point, we have not selected an algorithm due to a
	 special request or via personal prefs.  Pick the highest
	 ranked algorithm (i.e. the one with the lowest score). */

      if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH && scores[DIGEST_ALGO_MD5])
	{
	  /* "If you are building an authentication system, the recipient
	     may specify a preferred signing algorithm. However, the
	     signer would be foolish to use a weak algorithm simply
	     because the recipient requests it." (RFC4880:14).  If any
	     other hash algorithm is available, pretend that MD5 isn't.
	     Note that if the user intentionally chose MD5 by putting it
	     in their personal prefs, then we do what the user said (as we
	     never reach this code). */

	  for(i=DIGEST_ALGO_MD5+1;i<256;i++)
	    if(scores[i])
	      {
		scores[DIGEST_ALGO_MD5]=0;
		break;
	      }
	}

      for(i=0;i<256;i++)
	{
	  /* Note the '<' here.  This means in case of a tie, we will
	     favor the lower algorithm number.  We have a choice
	     between the lower number (probably an older algorithm
	     with more time in use), or the higher number (probably a
	     newer algorithm with less time in use).  Older is
	     probably safer here, even though the newer algorithms
	     tend to be "stronger". */
	  if(scores[i] && scores[i]<best
	     && (bits[i/32] & (1<<(i%32)))
	     && algo_available(preftype,i,hint))
	    {
	      best=scores[i];
	      result=i;
	    }
	}
    }

  return result;
}

/*
 * Select the MDC flag from the pk_list.  We can only use MDC if all
 * recipients support this feature.
 */
int
select_mdc_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
{
  PK_LIST pkr;

  if ( !pk_list )
    return 0;

  for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next)
    {
      int mdc;

      if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
        mdc = pkr->pk->user_id->flags.mdc;
      else
        mdc = pkr->pk->flags.mdc;
      if (!mdc)
        return 0;  /* At least one recipient does not support it. */
    }
  return 1; /* Can be used. */
}


/* Select the AEAD flag from the pk_list.  We can only use AEAD if all
 * recipients support this feature.  Returns the AEAD to be used or 0
 * if AEAD shall not be used.  */
aead_algo_t
select_aead_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
{
  pk_list_t pkr;
  int aead;

  if (!pk_list)
    return 0;

  for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next)
    {
      if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
        aead = pkr->pk->user_id->flags.aead;
      else
        aead = pkr->pk->flags.aead;
      if (!aead)
        return 0;  /* At least one recipient does not support it. */
    }

  return default_aead_algo (); /* Yes, AEAD can be used. */
}


/* Print a warning for all keys in PK_LIST missing the AEAD feature
 * flag or AEAD algorithms. */
void
warn_missing_aead_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
{
  PK_LIST pkr;

  for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next)
    {
      int mdc;

      if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
        mdc = pkr->pk->user_id->flags.aead;
      else
        mdc = pkr->pk->flags.aead;
      if (!mdc)
        log_info (_("Note: key %s has no %s feature\n"),
                  keystr_from_pk (pkr->pk), "AEAD");
    }
}

void
warn_missing_aes_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
{
  PK_LIST pkr;

  for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next)
    {
      const prefitem_t *prefs;
      int i;
      int gotit = 0;

      prefs = pkr->pk->user_id? pkr->pk->user_id->prefs : pkr->pk->prefs;
      if (prefs)
        {
          for (i=0; !gotit && prefs[i].type; i++ )
            if (prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM
                && prefs[i].value == CIPHER_ALGO_AES)
              gotit++;
	}
      if (!gotit)
        log_info (_("Note: key %s has no preference for %s\n"),
                  keystr_from_pk (pkr->pk), "AES");
    }
}