security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check

The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real
ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have
a retval convention.

Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor.

[ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ]

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

7 files changed, 20 insertions, 20 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5eff459b3833..145909165dbf 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ struct audit_krule;
 extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
 		       int cap, int audit);
 extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
-extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
 extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
 extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  *
- * @ptrace_may_access:
+ * @ptrace_access_check:
  *	Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
  *	@child process.
  *	Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
@@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
  *	current process before allowing the current process to present itself
  *	to the @parent process for tracing.
- *	The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_may_access
+ *	The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_access_check
  *	checks before it is allowed to trace this one.
  *	@parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
@@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 struct security_operations {
 	char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
 
-	int (*ptrace_may_access) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+	int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 	int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent);
 	int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
 		       kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1617,7 +1617,7 @@ extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops);
 extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
 
 /* Security operations */
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
 		    kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1798,10 +1798,10 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static inline int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 					     unsigned int mode)
 {
-	return cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	return cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 }
 
 static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 61c78b2c07ba..9a4184e04f29 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 	if (!dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	return security_ptrace_may_access(task, mode);
+	return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
 }
 
 bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 21b6cead6a8e..f218dd361647 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
 
 void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_may_access);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 48b7e0228fa3..aa97704564d4 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
 }
 
 /**
- * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
+ * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
  *			   another
  * @child: The process to be accessed
  * @mode: The mode of attachment.
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
  * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
  * granted, -ve if denied.
  */
-int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dc7674fbfc7a..4501c5e1f988 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -124,9 +124,9 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 
 /* Security operations */
 
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
-	return security_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 }
 
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d6f64783acd1..e3b4f3083dd7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1854,12 +1854,12 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
 
 /* Hook functions begin here. */
 
-static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 				     unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -5315,7 +5315,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.name =				"selinux",
 
-	.ptrace_may_access =		selinux_ptrace_may_access,
+	.ptrace_access_check =		selinux_ptrace_access_check,
 	.ptrace_traceme =		selinux_ptrace_traceme,
 	.capget =			selinux_capget,
 	.capset =			selinux_capset,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0023182078c7..1c9bdbcbe3d2 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  */
 
 /**
- * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
  * @ctp: child task pointer
  * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
  *
@@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  *
  * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
  */
-static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
+static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	char *sp, *tsp;
 
-	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3032,7 +3032,7 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.name =				"smack",
 
-	.ptrace_may_access =		smack_ptrace_may_access,
+	.ptrace_access_check =		smack_ptrace_access_check,
 	.ptrace_traceme =		smack_ptrace_traceme,
 	.syslog = 			smack_syslog,