[PATCH] audit: rename AUDIT_SE_* constants

This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds
additional definitions used by the following patch.  The renaming
avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions.

Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>

 include/linux/audit.h          |   15 ++++++++----
 kernel/auditfilter.c           |   50 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 kernel/auditsc.c               |   10 ++++----
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |   32 +++++++++++++-------------
 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

4 files changed, 56 insertions, 51 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index a489104ae3a4..c211f0a2abb4 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -151,12 +151,17 @@
 #define AUDIT_PERS	10
 #define AUDIT_ARCH	11
 #define AUDIT_MSGTYPE	12
-#define AUDIT_SE_USER	13	/* security label user */
-#define AUDIT_SE_ROLE	14	/* security label role */
-#define AUDIT_SE_TYPE	15	/* security label type */
-#define AUDIT_SE_SEN	16	/* security label sensitivity label */
-#define AUDIT_SE_CLR	17	/* security label clearance label */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_USER	13	/* security label user */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE	14	/* security label role */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE	15	/* security label type */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN	16	/* security label sensitivity label */
+#define AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR	17	/* security label clearance label */
 #define AUDIT_PPID	18
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_USER	19
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE	20
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE	21
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW	22
+#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH	23
 
 				/* These are ONLY useful when checking
 				 * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index e98db08fc6df..40a9931a13e2 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -470,11 +470,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 		case AUDIT_ARG2:
 		case AUDIT_ARG3:
 			break;
-		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
-		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
 			if (IS_ERR(str))
 				goto exit_free;
@@ -611,11 +611,11 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
 		data->fields[i] = f->type;
 		data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
 		switch(f->type) {
-		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
-		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
 				audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
 			break;
@@ -654,11 +654,11 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
 			return 1;
 
 		switch(a->fields[i].type) {
-		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
-		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 			if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
 				return 1;
 			break;
@@ -774,11 +774,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
 	 * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
 	for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
 		switch (new->fields[i].type) {
-		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
-		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 			err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
 						       &old->fields[i]);
 			break;
@@ -1537,11 +1537,11 @@ static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
 	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
 		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
 		switch (f->type) {
-		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
-		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 			return 1;
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 316657855165..1d24fade17e6 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -321,11 +321,11 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			if (ctx)
 				result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
 			break;
-		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
-		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 			/* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
 			   a temporary error.  We simply treat this as a
 			   match for now to avoid losing information that
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e9548bc049e1..92e80b99d183 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1845,15 +1845,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
 
 	switch (field) {
-	case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-	case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-	case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
 		/* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
 		if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
-	case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-	case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 		/* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
 		if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -1874,29 +1874,29 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
 	tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
 
 	switch (field) {
-	case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 		userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
 		if (!userdatum)
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 		else
 			tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
 		break;
-	case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
 		if (!roledatum)
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 		else
 			tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
 		break;
-	case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
 		typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
 		if (!typedatum)
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 		else
 			tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
 		break;
-	case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-	case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 		rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1948,7 +1948,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
 	/* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
 	   without a match */
 	switch (field) {
-	case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 		switch (op) {
 		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
 			match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
@@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
 			break;
 		}
 		break;
-	case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		switch (op) {
 		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
 			match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
@@ -1968,7 +1968,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
 			break;
 		}
 		break;
-	case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
 		switch (op) {
 		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
 			match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
@@ -1978,9 +1978,9 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
 			break;
 		}
 		break;
-	case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-	case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
-		level = (field == AUDIT_SE_SEN ?
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+		level = (field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ?
 		         &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
 		switch (op) {
 		case AUDIT_EQUAL: