Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
  SELinux, and integrity code.

  The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
  which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures.  Support for reading
  keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
  selinux: Remove security_ops extern
  security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
  VFS: refactor vfs_read()
  ima: require signature based appraisal
  integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
  ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
  Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
  Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
  ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
  ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
  ima: added error messages to template-related functions
  ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
  ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
  ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
  ima: report policy load status
  ima: use path names cache
  ...

21 files changed, 374 insertions, 155 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 4a337daf0c09..1de833556d22 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1376,6 +1376,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" }
 			Default: "ima-ng"
 
+	ima_template_fmt=
+	                [IMA] Define a custom template format.
+			Format: { "field1|...|fieldN" }
+
 	ima.ahash_minsize= [IMA] Minimum file size for asynchronous hash usage
 			Format: <min_file_size>
 			Set the minimal file size for using asynchronous hash.
diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt
index a4e102dddfea..839b5dad9226 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.txt
@@ -27,25 +27,22 @@ Managing templates with these structures is very simple. To support
 a new data type, developers define the field identifier and implement
 two functions, init() and show(), respectively to generate and display
 measurement entries. Defining a new template descriptor requires
-specifying the template format, a string of field identifiers separated
-by the '|' character. While in the current implementation it is possible
-to define new template descriptors only by adding their definition in the
-template specific code (ima_template.c), in a future version it will be
-possible to register a new template on a running kernel by supplying to IMA
-the desired format string. In this version, IMA initializes at boot time
-all defined template descriptors by translating the format into an array
-of template fields structures taken from the set of the supported ones.
+specifying the template format (a string of field identifiers separated
+by the '|' character) through the 'ima_template_fmt' kernel command line
+parameter. At boot time, IMA initializes the chosen template descriptor
+by translating the format into an array of template fields structures taken
+from the set of the supported ones.
 
 After the initialization step, IMA will call ima_alloc_init_template()
 (new function defined within the patches for the new template management
 mechanism) to generate a new measurement entry by using the template
 descriptor chosen through the kernel configuration or through the newly
-introduced 'ima_template=' kernel command line parameter. It is during this
-phase that the advantages of the new architecture are clearly shown:
-the latter function will not contain specific code to handle a given template
-but, instead, it simply calls the init() method of the template fields
-associated to the chosen template descriptor and store the result (pointer
-to allocated data and data length) in the measurement entry structure.
+introduced 'ima_template' and 'ima_template_fmt' kernel command line parameters.
+It is during this phase that the advantages of the new architecture are
+clearly shown: the latter function will not contain specific code to handle
+a given template but, instead, it simply calls the init() method of the template
+fields associated to the chosen template descriptor and store the result
+(pointer to allocated data and data length) in the measurement entry structure.
 
 The same mechanism is employed to display measurements entries.
 The functions ima[_ascii]_measurements_show() retrieve, for each entry,
@@ -86,4 +83,6 @@ currently the following methods are supported:
  - select a template descriptor among those supported in the kernel
    configuration ('ima-ng' is the default choice);
  - specify a template descriptor name from the kernel command line through
-   the 'ima_template=' parameter.
+   the 'ima_template=' parameter;
+ - register a new template descriptor with custom format through the kernel
+   command line parameter 'ima_template_fmt='.
diff --git a/fs/read_write.c b/fs/read_write.c
index 7d9318c3d43c..c0805c93b6fa 100644
--- a/fs/read_write.c
+++ b/fs/read_write.c
@@ -412,6 +412,23 @@ ssize_t new_sync_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *p
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(new_sync_read);
 
+ssize_t __vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
+		   loff_t *pos)
+{
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	if (file->f_op->read)
+		ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos);
+	else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
+		ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
+	else if (file->f_op->read_iter)
+		ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
+	else
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
 {
 	ssize_t ret;
@@ -426,12 +443,7 @@ ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
 	ret = rw_verify_area(READ, file, pos, count);
 	if (ret >= 0) {
 		count = ret;
-		if (file->f_op->read)
-			ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos);
-		else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
-			ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
-		else
-			ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
+		ret = __vfs_read(file, buf, count, pos);
 		if (ret > 0) {
 			fsnotify_access(file);
 			add_rchar(current, ret);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 8f7fc8db4679..88157253b9e6 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1582,6 +1582,7 @@ ssize_t rw_copy_check_uvector(int type, const struct iovec __user * uvector,
 			      struct iovec *fast_pointer,
 			      struct iovec **ret_pointer);
 
+extern ssize_t __vfs_read(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t vfs_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t vfs_readv(struct file *, const struct iovec __user *,
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index 83222cebd47b..c2d6082a1a4c 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ enum integrity_status {
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
 extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
 extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
+extern void __init integrity_load_keys(void);
 
 #else
 static inline struct integrity_iint_cache *
@@ -36,5 +37,10 @@ static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	return;
 }
+
+static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
+{
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index ed7e7ad5fee0..8a914b758e5d 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
 
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/bugs.h>
@@ -1031,8 +1032,11 @@ static noinline void __init kernel_init_freeable(void)
 	 * Ok, we have completed the initial bootup, and
 	 * we're essentially up and running. Get rid of the
 	 * initmem segments and start the user-mode stuff..
+	 *
+	 * rootfs is available now, try loading the public keys
+	 * and default modules
 	 */
 
-	/* rootfs is available now, try loading default modules */
+	integrity_load_keys();
 	load_default_modules();
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 8d4fbff8b87c..5e3bd72b299a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <linux/digsig.h>
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
-int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
+int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	int err = 0;
@@ -84,3 +84,37 @@ int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 	}
 	return err;
 }
+
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+	char *data;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!keyring[id])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	rc = integrity_read_file(path, &data);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1),
+				   "asymmetric",
+				   NULL,
+				   data,
+				   rc,
+				   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				    KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(key);
+		pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate (%d): %s\n",
+		       rc, path);
+	} else {
+		pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s': %s\n",
+			  key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description, path);
+		key_ref_put(key);
+	}
+	kfree(data);
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index c5ee1a7c5e8a..f589c9a05da2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -162,9 +162,14 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 					(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
 					calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
 		if (!rc) {
-			/* we probably want to replace rsa with hmac here */
-			evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
-				   xattr_value_len);
+			/* Replace RSA with HMAC if not mounted readonly and
+			 * not immutable
+			 */
+			if (!IS_RDONLY(dentry->d_inode) &&
+			    !IS_IMMUTABLE(dentry->d_inode))
+				evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
+						    xattr_value,
+						    xattr_value_len);
 		}
 		break;
 	default:
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index a521edf4cbd6..dbb6d141c3db 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include "integrity.h"
 
 static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
 static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
 
-int iint_initialized;
-
 /*
  * __integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode
  */
@@ -166,7 +166,89 @@ static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
 	iint_cache =
 	    kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache),
 			      0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
-	iint_initialized = 1;
 	return 0;
 }
 security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init);
+
+
+/*
+ * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file
+ *
+ * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
+ * It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked.
+ * It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA.
+ *
+ */
+int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
+			  char *addr, unsigned long count)
+{
+	mm_segment_t old_fs;
+	char __user *buf = (char __user *)addr;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	old_fs = get_fs();
+	set_fs(get_ds());
+	ret = __vfs_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
+	set_fs(old_fs);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * integrity_read_file - read entire file content into the buffer
+ *
+ * This is function opens a file, allocates the buffer of required
+ * size, read entire file content to the buffer and closes the file
+ *
+ * It is used only by init code.
+ *
+ */
+int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	loff_t size;
+	char *buf;
+	int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(file);
+		pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+	if (size <= 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, 0, buf, size);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		kfree(buf);
+	else if (rc != size)
+		rc = -EIO;
+	else
+		*data = buf;
+out:
+	fput(file);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * integrity_load_keys - load integrity keys hook
+ *
+ * Hooks is called from init/main.c:kernel_init_freeable()
+ * when rootfs is ready
+ */
+void __init integrity_load_keys(void)
+{
+	ima_load_x509();
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index e099875643c5..b80a93ec1ccc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -131,3 +131,28 @@ config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	help
 	   This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
 	   keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
+
+config IMA_LOAD_X509
+	bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring"
+	depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	default n
+	help
+	   File signature verification is based on the public keys
+	   loaded on the .ima trusted keyring. These public keys are
+	   X509 certificates signed by a trusted key on the
+	   .system keyring.  This option enables X509 certificate
+	   loading from the kernel onto the '.ima' trusted keyring.
+
+config IMA_X509_PATH
+	string "IMA X509 certificate path"
+	depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
+	default "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
+	help
+	   This option defines IMA X509 certificate path.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
+	bool "Require signed user-space initialization"
+	depends on IMA_LOAD_X509
+	default n
+	help
+	   This option requires user-space init to be signed.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index f92be1b14089..b8a27c5052d4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -173,8 +173,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
 {
 	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE;
 
-	if (!ima_appraise)
-		flags &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
+	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
 	return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags);
 }
@@ -325,11 +324,11 @@ const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf)
 {
 	char *pathname = NULL;
 
-	*pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+	*pathbuf = __getname();
 	if (*pathbuf) {
 		pathname = d_absolute_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
 		if (IS_ERR(pathname)) {
-			kfree(*pathbuf);
+			__putname(*pathbuf);
 			*pathbuf = NULL;
 			pathname = NULL;
 		}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 78d66dae15f4..686355fea7fd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -67,36 +67,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ahash_bufsize, "Maximum ahash buffer size");
 static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
 static struct crypto_ahash *ima_ahash_tfm;
 
-/**
- * ima_kernel_read - read file content
- *
- * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
- * It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked.
- * It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA.
- *
- */
-static int ima_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
-			   char *addr, unsigned long count)
-{
-	mm_segment_t old_fs;
-	char __user *buf = addr;
-	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
-
-	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
-		return -EBADF;
-
-	old_fs = get_fs();
-	set_fs(get_ds());
-	if (file->f_op->read)
-		ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, &offset);
-	else if (file->f_op->aio_read)
-		ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
-	else if (file->f_op->read_iter)
-		ret = new_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
-	set_fs(old_fs);
-	return ret;
-}
-
 int __init ima_init_crypto(void)
 {
 	long rc;
@@ -324,7 +294,8 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
 		}
 		/* read buffer */
 		rbuf_len = min_t(loff_t, i_size - offset, rbuf_size[active]);
-		rc = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf[active], rbuf_len);
+		rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf[active],
+					   rbuf_len);
 		if (rc != rbuf_len)
 			goto out3;
 
@@ -414,7 +385,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
 	while (offset < i_size) {
 		int rbuf_len;
 
-		rbuf_len = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
+		rbuf_len = integrity_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
 		if (rbuf_len < 0) {
 			rc = rbuf_len;
 			break;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index da92fcc08d15..461215e5fd31 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
 	struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
 	struct ima_template_entry *e;
+	char *template_name;
 	int namelen;
 	u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
 	bool is_ima_template = false;
@@ -128,6 +129,9 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	if (e == NULL)
 		return -1;
 
+	template_name = (e->template_desc->name[0] != '\0') ?
+	    e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
+
 	/*
 	 * 1st: PCRIndex
 	 * PCR used is always the same (config option) in
@@ -139,14 +143,14 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3rd: template name size */
-	namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
+	namelen = strlen(template_name);
 	ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
 
 	/* 4th:  template name */
-	ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
+	ima_putc(m, template_name, namelen);
 
 	/* 5th:  template length (except for 'ima' template) */
-	if (strcmp(e->template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0)
+	if (strcmp(template_name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0)
 		is_ima_template = true;
 
 	if (!is_ima_template)
@@ -200,6 +204,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	/* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
 	struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
 	struct ima_template_entry *e;
+	char *template_name;
 	int i;
 
 	/* get entry */
@@ -207,6 +212,9 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	if (e == NULL)
 		return -1;
 
+	template_name = (e->template_desc->name[0] != '\0') ?
+	    e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
+
 	/* 1st: PCR used (config option) */
 	seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
 
@@ -214,7 +222,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	ima_print_digest(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3th:  template name */
-	seq_printf(m, " %s", e->template_desc->name);
+	seq_printf(m, " %s", template_name);
 
 	/* 4th:  template specific data */
 	for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
@@ -288,7 +296,12 @@ static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count;
 static struct dentry *violations;
 static struct dentry *ima_policy;
 
-static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
+enum ima_fs_flags {
+	IMA_FS_BUSY,
+};
+
+static unsigned long ima_fs_flags;
+
 /*
  * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
  */
@@ -297,9 +310,9 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 	/* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
 	if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
 		return -EACCES;
-	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&policy_opencount))
-		return 0;
-	return -EBUSY;
+	if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags))
+		return -EBUSY;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -311,10 +324,16 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
  */
 static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
+	const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed";
+
+	pr_info("IMA: policy update %s\n", cause);
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
+			    "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0);
+
 	if (!valid_policy) {
 		ima_delete_rules();
 		valid_policy = 1;
-		atomic_set(&policy_opencount, 1);
+		clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	ima_update_policy();
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 9164fc8cac84..5e4c29d174ee 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
+#define IMA_X509_PATH	CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
+#else
+#define IMA_X509_PATH	"/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
+#endif
+
 /* name for boot aggregate entry */
 static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
 int ima_used_chip;
@@ -91,6 +97,17 @@ err_out:
 	return result;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
+void __init ima_load_x509(void)
+{
+	int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
+
+	ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
+	integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, IMA_X509_PATH);
+	ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
+}
+#endif
+
 int __init ima_init(void)
 {
 	u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 62f59eca32d3..eeee00dce729 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 
-	if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return;
 
 	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
@@ -246,7 +246,8 @@ out_digsig:
 		rc = -EACCES;
 	kfree(xattr_value);
 out_free:
-	kfree(pathbuf);
+	if (pathbuf)
+		__putname(pathbuf);
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index cdc620b2152f..d1eefb9d65fb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -100,7 +100,13 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
 	{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
+#else
+	/* force signature */
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
+	 .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
 };
 
 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
@@ -356,19 +362,8 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
  */
 void ima_update_policy(void)
 {
-	static const char op[] = "policy_update";
-	const char *cause = "already-exists";
-	int result = 1;
-	int audit_info = 0;
-
-	if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
-		ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
-		ima_update_policy_flag();
-		cause = "complete";
-		result = 0;
-	}
-	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
-			    NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info);
+	ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
+	ima_update_policy_flag();
 }
 
 enum {
@@ -686,13 +681,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 	ssize_t result, len;
 	int audit_info = 0;
 
-	/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
-	if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) {
-		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
-				    NULL, op, "already-exists",
-				    -EACCES, audit_info);
-		return -EACCES;
-	}
+	p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
+	len = strlen(p) + 1;
+	p += strspn(p, " \t");
+
+	if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
+		return len;
 
 	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!entry) {
@@ -703,14 +697,6 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
 
-	p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
-	len = strlen(p) + 1;
-
-	if (*p == '#') {
-		kfree(entry);
-		return len;
-	}
-
 	result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
 	if (result) {
 		kfree(entry);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index e854862c9337..0b7404ebfa80 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
 	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
 	{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
 	{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
+	{.name = "", .fmt = ""},	/* placeholder for a custom format */
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
@@ -41,19 +42,28 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
 
 static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
 static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
+static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
+				     struct ima_template_field ***fields,
+				     int *num_fields);
 
 static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
 	int template_len = strlen(str);
 
+	if (ima_template)
+		return 1;
+
 	/*
 	 * Verify that a template with the supplied name exists.
 	 * If not, use CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE.
 	 */
 	template_desc = lookup_template_desc(str);
-	if (!template_desc)
+	if (!template_desc) {
+		pr_err("template %s not found, using %s\n",
+		       str, CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE);
 		return 1;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Verify whether the current hash algorithm is supported
@@ -70,6 +80,25 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("ima_template=", ima_template_setup);
 
+static int __init ima_template_fmt_setup(char *str)
+{
+	int num_templates = ARRAY_SIZE(defined_templates);
+
+	if (ima_template)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (template_desc_init_fields(str, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
+		pr_err("format string '%s' not valid, using template %s\n",
+		       str, CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	defined_templates[num_templates - 1].fmt = str;
+	ima_template = defined_templates + num_templates - 1;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_template_fmt=", ima_template_fmt_setup);
+
 static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -113,43 +142,46 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 				     struct ima_template_field ***fields,
 				     int *num_fields)
 {
-	char *c, *template_fmt_copy, *template_fmt_ptr;
+	const char *template_fmt_ptr;
+	struct ima_template_field *found_fields[IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX];
 	int template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt);
-	int i, result = 0;
+	int i, len;
 
-	if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX)
+	if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX) {
+		pr_err("format string '%s' contains too many fields\n",
+		       template_fmt);
 		return -EINVAL;
-
-	/* copying is needed as strsep() modifies the original buffer */
-	template_fmt_copy = kstrdup(template_fmt, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (template_fmt_copy == NULL)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	*fields = kzalloc(template_num_fields * sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (*fields == NULL) {
-		result = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out;
 	}
 
-	template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt_copy;
-	for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_ptr, "|")) != NULL &&
-	     i < template_num_fields; i++) {
-		struct ima_template_field *f = lookup_template_field(c);
+	for (i = 0, template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt; i < template_num_fields;
+	     i++, template_fmt_ptr += len + 1) {
+		char tmp_field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN + 1];
+
+		len = strchrnul(template_fmt_ptr, '|') - template_fmt_ptr;
+		if (len == 0 || len > IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN) {
+			pr_err("Invalid field with length %d\n", len);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 
-		if (!f) {
-			result = -ENOENT;
-			goto out;
+		memcpy(tmp_field_id, template_fmt_ptr, len);
+		tmp_field_id[len] = '\0';
+		found_fields[i] = lookup_template_field(tmp_field_id);
+		if (!found_fields[i]) {
+			pr_err("field '%s' not found\n", tmp_field_id);
+			return -ENOENT;
 		}
-		(*fields)[i] = f;
 	}
-	*num_fields = i;
-out:
-	if (result < 0) {
-		kfree(*fields);
-		*fields = NULL;
+
+	if (fields && num_fields) {
+		*fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (*fields == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(*fields));
+		*num_fields = i;
 	}
-	kfree(template_fmt_copy);
-	return result;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
@@ -163,8 +195,15 @@ struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void)
 int __init ima_init_template(void)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template = ima_template_desc_current();
+	int result;
+
+	result = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
+					   &(template->fields),
+					   &(template->num_fields));
+	if (result < 0)
+		pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n",
+		       (strlen(template->name) ?
+		       template->name : template->fmt), result);
 
-	return template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
-					 &(template->fields),
-					 &(template->num_fields));
+	return result;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 9d1c2ebfe12a..0fc9519fefa9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
  */
 struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
 
+int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
+			  char *addr, unsigned long count);
+int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data);
+
 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM		0
 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE	1
 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA		2
@@ -130,7 +134,8 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 			    const char *digest, int digestlen);
 
-int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
+int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path);
 #else
 
 static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
@@ -144,6 +149,7 @@ static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
@@ -157,6 +163,14 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
+void __init ima_load_x509(void);
+#else
+static inline void ima_load_x509(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
 /* declarations */
 void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
@@ -170,6 +184,3 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 {
 }
 #endif
-
-/* set during initialization */
-extern int iint_initialized;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c603b20356ad..6da7532893a1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -95,8 +95,6 @@
 #include "audit.h"
 #include "avc_ss.h"
 
-extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
-
 /* SECMARK reference count */
 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 5b970ffde024..1158430f5bb9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -142,8 +142,7 @@ int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject, struct smack_known *object,
 	 * Tasks cannot be assigned the internet label.
 	 * An internet subject can access any object.
 	 */
-	if (object == &smack_known_web ||
-	    subject == &smack_known_web)
+	if (object == &smack_known_web || subject == &smack_known_web)
 		goto out_audit;
 	/*
 	 * A star object can be accessed by any subject.
@@ -157,10 +156,11 @@ int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject, struct smack_known *object,
 	if (subject->smk_known == object->smk_known)
 		goto out_audit;
 	/*
-	 * A hat subject can read any object.
-	 * A floor object can be read by any subject.
+	 * A hat subject can read or lock any object.
+	 * A floor object can be read or locked by any subject.
 	 */
-	if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) {
+	if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request ||
+	    (request & MAY_LOCK) == request) {
 		if (object == &smack_known_floor)
 			goto out_audit;
 		if (subject == &smack_known_hat)
@@ -452,10 +452,9 @@ char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len)
 		return NULL;
 
 	smack = kzalloc(i + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (smack != NULL) {
-		strncpy(smack, string, i + 1);
-		smack[i] = '\0';
-	}
+	if (smack != NULL)
+		strncpy(smack, string, i);
+
 	return smack;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 433ae61e7f42..f1b17a476e12 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #define SMK_SENDING	2
 
 LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
+static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
@@ -240,7 +241,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
 {
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
 
-	isp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_smack), GFP_NOFS);
+	isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (isp == NULL)
 		return NULL;
 
@@ -767,7 +768,7 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
  */
 static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	kfree(inode->i_security);
+	kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, inode->i_security);
 	inode->i_security = NULL;
 }
 
@@ -4264,10 +4265,16 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
 	if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
 		return 0;
 
+	smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
+	if (!smack_inode_cache)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
 				GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (tsp == NULL)
+	if (tsp == NULL) {
+		kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	printk(KERN_INFO "Smack:  Initializing.\n");