diff options
author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2020-11-20 20:39:39 +0100 |
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committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2020-11-20 20:39:39 +0100 |
commit | 7ef95e3dbcee74caa303fe4b23c451ae4462f609 (patch) | |
tree | 619b7f4bf2e7f3d1ccf2ddf2cf62264c9c1ca570 | |
parent | seccomp: Remove bogus __user annotations (diff) | |
parent | selftests/seccomp: sh: Fix register names (diff) | |
download | linux-7ef95e3dbcee74caa303fe4b23c451ae4462f609.tar.xz linux-7ef95e3dbcee74caa303fe4b23c451ae4462f609.zip |
Merge branch 'for-linus/seccomp' into for-next/seccomp
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/ptrace.c | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 8 |
3 files changed, 11 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 43d6179508d6..79de1294f8eb 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -264,17 +264,11 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state) return ret; } -static bool ptrace_has_cap(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - unsigned int mode) +static bool ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode) { - int ret; - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) - ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); - else - ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NONE); - - return ret == 0; + return ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); + return ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); } /* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */ @@ -326,7 +320,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) && gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid)) goto ok; - if (ptrace_has_cap(cred, tcred->user_ns, mode)) + if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode)) goto ok; rcu_read_unlock(); return -EPERM; @@ -345,7 +339,7 @@ ok: mm = task->mm; if (mm && ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) && - !ptrace_has_cap(cred, mm->user_ns, mode))) + !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode))) return -EPERM; return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode); diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 0e0e369d2fcb..c09fc2ad4bac 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ #include <linux/filter.h> #include <linux/pid.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> -#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/anon_inodes.h> @@ -649,8 +649,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) * behavior of privileged children. */ if (!task_no_new_privs(current) && - security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(), - CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0) + !ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c index 4a180439ee9e..26c72f2b61b1 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c @@ -1758,10 +1758,10 @@ TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally) * and the code is stored as a positive value. \ */ \ if (_result < 0) { \ - SYSCALL_RET(_regs) = -result; \ + SYSCALL_RET(_regs) = -_result; \ (_regs).ccr |= 0x10000000; \ } else { \ - SYSCALL_RET(_regs) = result; \ + SYSCALL_RET(_regs) = _result; \ (_regs).ccr &= ~0x10000000; \ } \ } while (0) @@ -1804,8 +1804,8 @@ TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally) #define SYSCALL_RET(_regs) (_regs).a[(_regs).windowbase * 4 + 2] #elif defined(__sh__) # define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs -# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).gpr[3] -# define SYSCALL_RET(_regs) (_regs).gpr[0] +# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).regs[3] +# define SYSCALL_RET(_regs) (_regs).regs[0] #else # error "Do not know how to find your architecture's registers and syscalls" #endif |