[PATCH] LSM: remove BSD secure level security module

This code has suffered from broken core design and lack of developer
attention.  Broken security modules are too dangerous to leave around.  It
is time to remove this one.

Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

4 files changed, 0 insertions, 781 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/seclvl.txt b/Documentation/seclvl.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 97274d122d0e..000000000000
--- a/Documentation/seclvl.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-BSD Secure Levels Linux Security Module
-Michael A. Halcrow <mike@halcrow.us>
-
-
-Introduction
-
-Under the BSD Secure Levels security model, sets of policies are
-associated with levels. Levels range from -1 to 2, with -1 being the
-weakest and 2 being the strongest. These security policies are
-enforced at the kernel level, so not even the superuser is able to
-disable or circumvent them. This hardens the machine against attackers
-who gain root access to the system.
-
-
-Levels and Policies
-
-Level -1 (Permanently Insecure):
- - Cannot increase the secure level
-
-Level 0 (Insecure):
- - Cannot ptrace the init process
-
-Level 1 (Default):
- - /dev/mem and /dev/kmem are read-only
- - IMMUTABLE and APPEND extended attributes, if set, may not be unset
- - Cannot load or unload kernel modules
- - Cannot write directly to a mounted block device
- - Cannot perform raw I/O operations
- - Cannot perform network administrative tasks
- - Cannot setuid any file
-
-Level 2 (Secure):
- - Cannot decrement the system time
- - Cannot write to any block device, whether mounted or not
- - Cannot unmount any mounted filesystems
-
-
-Compilation
-
-To compile the BSD Secure Levels LSM, seclvl.ko, enable the
-SECURITY_SECLVL configuration option.  This is found under Security
-options -> BSD Secure Levels in the kernel configuration menu.
-
-
-Basic Usage
-
-Once the machine is in a running state, with all the necessary modules
-loaded and all the filesystems mounted, you can load the seclvl.ko
-module:
-
-# insmod seclvl.ko
-
-The module defaults to secure level 1, except when compiled directly
-into the kernel, in which case it defaults to secure level 0. To raise
-the secure level to 2, the administrator writes ``2'' to the
-seclvl/seclvl file under the sysfs mount point (assumed to be /sys in
-these examples):
-
-# echo -n "2" > /sys/seclvl/seclvl
-
-Alternatively, you can initialize the module at secure level 2 with
-the initlvl module parameter:
-
-# insmod seclvl.ko initlvl=2
-
-At this point, it is impossible to remove the module or reduce the
-secure level.  If the administrator wishes to have the option of doing
-so, he must provide a module parameter, sha1_passwd, that specifies
-the SHA1 hash of the password that can be used to reduce the secure
-level to 0.
-
-To generate this SHA1 hash, the administrator can use OpenSSL:
-
-# echo -n "boogabooga" | openssl sha1
-abeda4e0f33defa51741217592bf595efb8d289c
-
-In order to use password-instigated secure level reduction, the SHA1
-crypto module must be loaded or compiled into the kernel:
-
-# insmod sha1.ko
-
-The administrator can then insmod the seclvl module, including the
-SHA1 hash of the password:
-
-# insmod seclvl.ko
-         sha1_passwd=abeda4e0f33defa51741217592bf595efb8d289c
-
-To reduce the secure level, write the password to seclvl/passwd under
-your sysfs mount point:
-
-# echo -n "boogabooga" > /sys/seclvl/passwd
-
-The September 2004 edition of Sys Admin Magazine has an article about
-the BSD Secure Levels LSM.  I encourage you to refer to that article
-for a more in-depth treatment of this security module:
-
-http://www.samag.com/documents/s=9304/sam0409a/0409a.htm
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 67785df264e5..460e5c9cf496 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -93,18 +93,6 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
 	  
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
-config SECURITY_SECLVL
-	tristate "BSD Secure Levels"
-	depends on SECURITY
-	select CRYPTO
-	select CRYPTO_SHA1
-	help
-	  Implements BSD Secure Levels as an LSM.  See
-	  <file:Documentation/seclvl.txt> for instructions on how to use this
-	  module.
-
-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 
 endmenu
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 8cbbf2f36709..ef87df2f50a4 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -16,4 +16,3 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o dummy.o inode.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES)	+= commoncap.o capability.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= commoncap.o root_plug.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SECLVL)		+= seclvl.o
diff --git a/security/seclvl.c b/security/seclvl.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 8f6291991fbc..000000000000
--- a/security/seclvl.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,671 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * BSD Secure Levels LSM
- *
- * Maintainers:
- *	Michael A. Halcrow <mike@halcrow.us>
- *	Serge Hallyn <hallyn@cs.wm.edu>
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
- * Copyright (c) 2002 International Business Machines <robb@austin.ibm.com>
- * Copyright (c) 2006 Davi E. M. Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com>
- *
- *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- *	the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- *	(at your option) any later version.
- */
-
-#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/netlink.h>
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <linux/namei.h>
-#include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/capability.h>
-#include <linux/time.h>
-#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
-#include <linux/kobject.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
-#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
-#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
-#include <linux/gfp.h>
-#include <linux/sysfs.h>
-
-#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE 20
-
-/**
- * Module parameter that defines the initial secure level.
- *
- * When built as a module, it defaults to seclvl 1, which is the
- * behavior of BSD secure levels.  Note that this default behavior
- * wrecks havoc on a machine when the seclvl module is compiled into
- * the kernel.	In that case, we default to seclvl 0.
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SECLVL_MODULE
-static int initlvl = 1;
-#else
-static int initlvl;
-#endif
-module_param(initlvl, int, 0);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(initlvl, "Initial secure level (defaults to 1)");
-
-/* Module parameter that defines the verbosity level */
-static int verbosity;
-module_param(verbosity, int, 0);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(verbosity, "Initial verbosity level (0 or 1; defaults to "
-		 "0, which is Quiet)");
-
-/**
- * Optional password which can be passed in to bring seclvl to 0
- * (i.e., for halt/reboot).  Defaults to NULL (the passwd attribute
- * file will not be registered in sysfs).
- *
- * This gets converted to its SHA1 hash when stored.  It's probably
- * not a good idea to use this parameter when loading seclvl from a
- * script; use sha1_passwd instead.
- */
-
-#define MAX_PASSWD_SIZE	32
-static char passwd[MAX_PASSWD_SIZE];
-module_param_string(passwd, passwd, sizeof(passwd), 0);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(passwd,
-		 "Plaintext of password that sets seclvl=0 when written to "
-		 "(sysfs mount point)/seclvl/passwd\n");
-
-/**
- * SHA1 hashed version of the optional password which can be passed in
- * to bring seclvl to 0 (i.e., for halt/reboot).  Must be in
- * hexadecimal format (40 characters).	Defaults to NULL (the passwd
- * attribute file will not be registered in sysfs).
- *
- * Use the sha1sum utility to generate the SHA1 hash of a password:
- *
- * echo -n "secret" | sha1sum
- */
-#define MAX_SHA1_PASSWD	41
-static char sha1_passwd[MAX_SHA1_PASSWD];
-module_param_string(sha1_passwd, sha1_passwd, sizeof(sha1_passwd), 0);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(sha1_passwd,
-		 "SHA1 hash (40 hexadecimal characters) of password that "
-		 "sets seclvl=0 when plaintext password is written to "
-		 "(sysfs mount point)/seclvl/passwd\n");
-
-static int hideHash = 1;
-module_param(hideHash, int, 0);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(hideHash, "When set to 0, reading seclvl/passwd from sysfs "
-		 "will return the SHA1-hashed value of the password that "
-		 "lowers the secure level to 0.\n");
-
-#define MY_NAME "seclvl"
-
-/**
- * This time-limits log writes to one per second.
- */
-#define seclvl_printk(verb, type, fmt, arg...)			\
-	do {							\
-		if (verbosity >= verb) {			\
-			static unsigned long _prior;		\
-			unsigned long _now = jiffies;		\
-			if ((_now - _prior) > HZ) {		\
-				printk(type "%s: %s: " fmt,	\
-					MY_NAME, __FUNCTION__ ,	\
-					## arg);		\
-				_prior = _now;			\
-			}					\
-		}						\
-	} while (0)
-
-/**
- * The actual security level.  Ranges between -1 and 2 inclusive.
- */
-static int seclvl;
-
-/**
- * flag to keep track of how we were registered
- */
-static int secondary;
-
-/**
- * Verifies that the requested secure level is valid, given the current
- * secure level.
- */
-static int seclvl_sanity(int reqlvl)
-{
-	if ((reqlvl < -1) || (reqlvl > 2)) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to set seclvl out of "
-			      "range: [%d]\n", reqlvl);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if ((seclvl == 0) && (reqlvl == -1))
-		return 0;
-	if (reqlvl < seclvl) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to lower seclvl to "
-			      "[%d]\n", reqlvl);
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * security level advancement rules:
- *   Valid levels are -1 through 2, inclusive.
- *   From -1, stuck.  [ in case compiled into kernel ]
- *   From 0 or above, can only increment.
- */
-static void do_seclvl_advance(void *data, u64 val)
-{
-	int ret;
-	int newlvl = (int)val;
-
-	ret = seclvl_sanity(newlvl);
-	if (ret)
-		return;
-
-	if (newlvl > 2) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Cannot advance to seclvl "
-			      "[%d]\n", newlvl);
-		return;
-	}
-	if (seclvl == -1) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Not allowed to advance to "
-			      "seclvl [%d]\n", seclvl);
-		return;
-	}
-	seclvl = newlvl;  /* would it be more "correct" to set *data? */
-	return;
-}
-
-static u64 seclvl_int_get(void *data)
-{
-	return *(int *)data;
-}
-
-DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(seclvl_file_ops, seclvl_int_get, do_seclvl_advance, "%lld\n");
-
-static unsigned char hashedPassword[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-
-/**
- * Converts a block of plaintext of into its SHA1 hashed value.
- *
- * It would be nice if crypto had a wrapper to do this for us linear
- * people...
- */
-static int
-plaintext_to_sha1(unsigned char *hash, const char *plaintext, unsigned int len)
-{
-	struct hash_desc desc;
-	struct scatterlist sg;
-	int err;
-
-	if (len > PAGE_SIZE) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Plaintext password too large (%d "
-			      "characters).  Largest possible is %lu "
-			      "bytes.\n", len, PAGE_SIZE);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash("sha1", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
-	if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR,
-			      "Failed to load transform for SHA1\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	sg_init_one(&sg, (u8 *)plaintext, len);
-	desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
-	err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, len, hash);
-	crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
-	return err;
-}
-
-/**
- * Called whenever the user writes to the sysfs passwd handle to this kernel
- * object.  It hashes the password and compares the hashed results.
- */
-static ssize_t
-passwd_write_file(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
-				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-	char *p;
-	int len;
-	unsigned char tmp[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-
-	if (!*passwd && !*sha1_passwd) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Attempt to password-unlock the "
-			      "seclvl module, but neither a plain text "
-			      "password nor a SHA1 hashed password was "
-			      "passed in as a module parameter!  This is a "
-			      "bug, since it should not be possible to be in "
-			      "this part of the module; please tell a "
-			      "maintainer about this event.\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	if (*ppos != 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	p = kmalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!p)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	len = -EFAULT;
-	if (copy_from_user(p, buf, count))
-		goto out;
-	
-	len = count;
-	/* ``echo "secret" > seclvl/passwd'' includes a newline */
-	if (p[len - 1] == '\n')
-		len--;
-	/* Hash the password, then compare the hashed values */
-	if ((len = plaintext_to_sha1(tmp, p, len))) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error hashing password: rc = "
-			      "[%d]\n", len);
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	len = -EPERM;
-	if (memcmp(hashedPassword, tmp, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
-		goto out;
-
-	seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO,
-		      "Password accepted; seclvl reduced to 0.\n");
-	seclvl = 0;
-	len = count;
-
-out:
-	kfree (p);
-	return len;
-}
-
-static struct file_operations passwd_file_ops = {
-	.write = passwd_write_file,
-};
-
-/**
- * Explicitely disallow ptrace'ing the init process.
- */
-static int seclvl_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
-{
-	if (seclvl >= 0 && child->pid == 1) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to ptrace "
-			      "the init process dissallowed in "
-			      "secure level %d\n", seclvl);
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Capability checks for seclvl.  The majority of the policy
- * enforcement for seclvl takes place here.
- */
-static int seclvl_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
-{
-	int rc = 0;
-
-	/* init can do anything it wants */
-	if (tsk->pid == 1)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (seclvl > 0) {
-		rc = -EPERM;
-
-		if (cap == CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE)
-			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to modify "
-				      "the IMMUTABLE and/or APPEND extended "
-				      "attribute on a file with the IMMUTABLE "
-				      "and/or APPEND extended attribute set "
-				      "denied in seclvl [%d]\n", seclvl);
-		else if (cap == CAP_SYS_RAWIO)
-			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform "
-				      "raw I/O while in secure level [%d] "
-				      "denied\n", seclvl);
-		else if (cap == CAP_NET_ADMIN)
-			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform "
-				      "network administrative task while "
-				      "in secure level [%d] denied\n", seclvl);
-		else if (cap == CAP_SETUID)
-			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to setuid "
-				      "while in secure level [%d] denied\n",
-				      seclvl);
-		else if (cap == CAP_SETGID)
-			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to setgid "
-				      "while in secure level [%d] denied\n",
-				      seclvl);
-		else if (cap == CAP_SYS_MODULE)
-			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform "
-				      "a module operation while in secure "
-				      "level [%d] denied\n", seclvl);
-		else
-			rc = 0;
-	}
-
-	if (!rc) {
-		if (!(cap_is_fs_cap(cap) ? tsk->fsuid == 0 : tsk->euid == 0))
-			rc = -EPERM;
-	}
-
-	if (rc)
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Capability denied\n");
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * Disallow reversing the clock in seclvl > 1
- */
-static int seclvl_settime(struct timespec *tv, struct timezone *tz)
-{
-	if (tv && seclvl > 1) {
-		struct timespec now;
-		now = current_kernel_time();
-		if (tv->tv_sec < now.tv_sec ||
-		    (tv->tv_sec == now.tv_sec && tv->tv_nsec < now.tv_nsec)) {
-			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to decrement "
-				      "time in secure level %d denied: "
-				      "current->pid = [%d], "
-				      "current->group_leader->pid = [%d]\n",
-				      seclvl, current->pid,
-				      current->group_leader->pid);
-			return -EPERM;
-		}		/* if attempt to decrement time */
-	}			/* if seclvl > 1 */
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* claim the blockdev to exclude mounters, release on file close */
-static int seclvl_bd_claim(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	int holder;
-	struct block_device *bdev = NULL;
-	dev_t dev = inode->i_rdev;
-	bdev = open_by_devnum(dev, FMODE_WRITE);
-	if (bdev) {
-		if (bd_claim(bdev, &holder)) {
-			blkdev_put(bdev);
-			return -EPERM;
-		}
-		/* claimed, mark it to release on close */
-		inode->i_security = current;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* release the blockdev if you claimed it */
-static void seclvl_bd_release(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	if (inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_security == current) {
-		struct block_device *bdev = inode->i_bdev;
-		if (bdev) {
-			bd_release(bdev);
-			blkdev_put(bdev);
-			inode->i_security = NULL;
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * Security for writes to block devices is regulated by this seclvl
- * function.  Deny all writes to block devices in seclvl 2.  In
- * seclvl 1, we only deny writes to *mounted* block devices.
- */
-static int
-seclvl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
-{
-	if (current->pid != 1 && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) {
-		switch (seclvl) {
-		case 2:
-			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Write to block device "
-				      "denied in secure level [%d]\n", seclvl);
-			return -EPERM;
-		case 1:
-			if (seclvl_bd_claim(inode)) {
-				seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING,
-					      "Write to mounted block device "
-					      "denied in secure level [%d]\n",
-					      seclvl);
-				return -EPERM;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * The SUID and SGID bits cannot be set in seclvl >= 1
- */
-static int seclvl_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
-{
-	if (seclvl > 0) {
-		if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)
-			if (iattr->ia_mode & S_ISUID ||
-			    iattr->ia_mode & S_ISGID) {
-				seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to "
-					      "modify SUID or SGID bit "
-					      "denied in seclvl [%d]\n",
-					      seclvl);
-				return -EPERM;
-			}
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* release busied block devices */
-static void seclvl_file_free_security(struct file *filp)
-{
-	struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_dentry;
-
-	if (dentry)
-		seclvl_bd_release(dentry->d_inode);
-}
-
-/**
- * Cannot unmount in secure level 2
- */
-static int seclvl_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
-{
-	if (current->pid != 1 && seclvl == 2) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to unmount in secure "
-			      "level %d\n", seclvl);
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static struct security_operations seclvl_ops = {
-	.ptrace = seclvl_ptrace,
-	.capable = seclvl_capable,
-	.inode_permission = seclvl_inode_permission,
-	.inode_setattr = seclvl_inode_setattr,
-	.file_free_security = seclvl_file_free_security,
-	.settime = seclvl_settime,
-	.sb_umount = seclvl_umount,
-};
-
-/**
- * Process the password-related module parameters
- */
-static int processPassword(void)
-{
-	int rc = 0;
-	if (*passwd) {
-		char *p;
-
-		if (*sha1_passwd) {
-			seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: Both "
-				      "passwd and sha1_passwd "
-				      "were set, but they are mutually "
-				      "exclusive.\n");
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-
-		p = kstrdup(passwd, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (p == NULL)
-			return -ENOMEM;
-
-		if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(hashedPassword, p, strlen(p))))
-			seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: SHA1 support not "
-				      "in kernel\n");
-
-		kfree (p);
-		/* All static data goes to the BSS, which zero's the
-		 * plaintext password out for us. */
-	} else if (*sha1_passwd) {	// Base 16
-		int i;
-		i = strlen(sha1_passwd);
-		if (i != (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2)) {
-			seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Received [%d] bytes; "
-				      "expected [%d] for the hexadecimal "
-				      "representation of the SHA1 hash of "
-				      "the password.\n",
-				      i, (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2));
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-		while ((i -= 2) + 2) {
-			unsigned char tmp;
-			tmp = sha1_passwd[i + 2];
-			sha1_passwd[i + 2] = '\0';
-			hashedPassword[i / 2] = (unsigned char)
-			    simple_strtol(&sha1_passwd[i], NULL, 16);
-			sha1_passwd[i + 2] = tmp;
-		}
-	}
-	return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * securityfs registrations
- */
-struct dentry *dir_ino, *seclvl_ino, *passwd_ino;
-
-static int seclvlfs_register(void)
-{
-	int rc = 0;
-
-	dir_ino = securityfs_create_dir("seclvl", NULL);
-
-	if (IS_ERR(dir_ino))
-		return PTR_ERR(dir_ino);
-
-	seclvl_ino = securityfs_create_file("seclvl", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
-				dir_ino, &seclvl, &seclvl_file_ops);
-	if (IS_ERR(seclvl_ino)) {
-		rc = PTR_ERR(seclvl_ino);
-		goto out_deldir;
-	}
-	if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd) {
-		passwd_ino = securityfs_create_file("passwd", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
-				dir_ino, NULL, &passwd_file_ops);
-		if (IS_ERR(passwd_ino)) {
-			rc = PTR_ERR(passwd_ino);
-			goto out_delf;
-		}
-	}
-	return rc;
-
-out_delf:
-	securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
-
-out_deldir:
-	securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-static void seclvlfs_unregister(void)
-{
-	securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
-
-	if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd)
-		securityfs_remove(passwd_ino);
-
-	securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
-}
-
-/**
- * Initialize the seclvl module.
- */
-static int __init seclvl_init(void)
-{
-	int rc = 0;
-	static char once;
-
-	if (verbosity < 0 || verbosity > 1) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "Error: bad verbosity [%d]; only 0 or 1 "
-		       "are valid values\n", verbosity);
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto exit;
-	}
-	if (initlvl < -1 || initlvl > 2) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: bad initial securelevel "
-			      "[%d].\n", initlvl);
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto exit;
-	}
-	seclvl = initlvl;
-	if ((rc = processPassword())) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error processing the password "
-			      "module parameter(s): rc = [%d]\n", rc);
-		goto exit;
-	}
-
-	if ((rc = seclvlfs_register())) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error registering with sysfs\n");
-		goto exit;
-	}
-	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
-	if (register_security(&seclvl_ops)) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR,
-			      "seclvl: Failure registering with the "
-			      "kernel.\n");
-		/* try registering with primary module */
-		rc = mod_reg_security(MY_NAME, &seclvl_ops);
-		if (rc) {
-			seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "seclvl: Failure "
-				      "registering with primary security "
-				      "module.\n");
-			seclvlfs_unregister();
-			goto exit;
-		}		/* if primary module registered */
-		secondary = 1;
-	}			/* if we registered ourselves with the security framework */
-
-	seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO, "seclvl: Successfully initialized.\n");
-
-	if (once) {
-		once = 1;
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO, "seclvl is going away. It has been "
-				"buggy for ages. Also, be warned that "
-				"Securelevels are useless.");
-	}
- exit:
-	if (rc)
-		printk(KERN_ERR "seclvl: Error during initialization: rc = "
-		       "[%d]\n", rc);
-	return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * Remove the seclvl module.
- */
-static void __exit seclvl_exit(void)
-{
-	seclvlfs_unregister();
-
-	if (secondary)
-		mod_unreg_security(MY_NAME, &seclvl_ops);
-	else if (unregister_security(&seclvl_ops))
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO,
-			      "seclvl: Failure unregistering with the "
-			      "kernel\n");
-}
-
-module_init(seclvl_init);
-module_exit(seclvl_exit);
-
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Michael A. Halcrow <mike@halcrow.us>");
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("LSM implementation of the BSD Secure Levels");
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");