diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-12-14 22:57:44 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-12-14 22:57:44 +0100 |
| commit | 683b96f4d1d132fcefa4a0bd11916649800d7361 (patch) | |
| tree | 95ba7e1c1edc15639be080773b4c32d2be60b0a4 | |
| parent | Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert... (diff) | |
| parent | Yama: allow access for the current ptrace parent (diff) | |
| download | linux-683b96f4d1d132fcefa4a0bd11916649800d7361.tar.xz linux-683b96f4d1d132fcefa4a0bd11916649800d7361.zip | |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Generally pretty quiet for this release. Highlights:
Yama:
- allow ptrace access for original parent after re-parenting
TPM:
- add documentation
- many bugfixes & cleanups
- define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements
Integrity:
- Harden against malformed xattrs
SELinux:
- bugfixes & cleanups
Smack:
- Remove unnecessary smack_known_invalid label
- Do not apply star label in smack_setprocattr hook
- parse mnt opts after privileges check (fixes unpriv DoS vuln)"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (56 commits)
Yama: allow access for the current ptrace parent
tpm: adjust return value of tpm_read_log
tpm: vtpm_proxy: conditionally call tpm_chip_unregister
tpm: Fix handling of missing event log
tpm: Check the bios_dir entry for NULL before accessing it
tpm: return -ENODEV if np is not set
tpm: cleanup of printk error messages
tpm: replace of_find_node_by_name() with dev of_node property
tpm: redefine read_log() to handle ACPI/OF at runtime
tpm: fix the missing .owner in tpm_bios_measurements_ops
tpm: have event log use the tpm_chip
tpm: drop tpm1_chip_register(/unregister)
tpm: replace dynamically allocated bios_dir with a static array
tpm: replace symbolic permission with octal for securityfs files
char: tpm: fix kerneldoc tpm2_unseal_trusted name typo
tpm_tis: Allow tpm_tis to be bound using DT
tpm, tpm_vtpm_proxy: add kdoc comments for VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV
tpm: Only call pm_runtime_get_sync if device has a parent
tpm: define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements
Documentation: tpm: add the Physical TPM device tree binding documentation
...
43 files changed, 832 insertions, 567 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/ibmvtpm.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/ibmvtpm.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d89f99971368 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/ibmvtpm.txt @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +* Device Tree Bindings for IBM Virtual Trusted Platform Module(vtpm) + +Required properties: + +- compatible : property name that conveys the platform architecture + identifiers, as 'IBM,vtpm' +- device_type : specifies type of virtual device +- interrupts : property specifying the interrupt source number and + sense code associated with this virtual I/O Adapters +- ibm,my-drc-index : integer index for the connector between the device + and its parent - present only if Dynamic + Reconfiguration(DR) Connector is enabled +- ibm,#dma-address-cells: specifies the number of cells that are used to + encode the physical address field of dma-window + properties +- ibm,#dma-size-cells : specifies the number of cells that are used to + encode the size field of dma-window properties +- ibm,my-dma-window : specifies DMA window associated with this virtual + IOA +- ibm,loc-code : specifies the unique and persistent location code + associated with this virtual I/O Adapters +- linux,sml-base : 64-bit base address of the reserved memory allocated + for the firmware event log +- linux,sml-size : size of the memory allocated for the firmware event log + +Example (IBM Virtual Trusted Platform Module) +--------------------------------------------- + + vtpm@30000003 { + ibm,#dma-size-cells = <0x2>; + compatible = "IBM,vtpm"; + device_type = "IBM,vtpm"; + ibm,my-drc-index = <0x30000003>; + ibm,#dma-address-cells = <0x2>; + linux,sml-base = <0xc60e 0x0>; + interrupts = <0xa0003 0x0>; + ibm,my-dma-window = <0x10000003 0x0 0x0 0x0 0x10000000>; + ibm,loc-code = "U8286.41A.10082DV-V3-C3"; + reg = <0x30000003>; + linux,sml-size = <0xbce10200>; + }; diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm-i2c.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm-i2c.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8cb638b7e89c --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm-i2c.txt @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +* Device Tree Bindings for I2C based Trusted Platform Module(TPM) + +Required properties: + +- compatible : 'manufacturer,model', eg. nuvoton,npct650 +- label : human readable string describing the device, eg. "tpm" +- linux,sml-base : 64-bit base address of the reserved memory allocated for + the firmware event log +- linux,sml-size : size of the memory allocated for the firmware event log + +Example (for OpenPower Systems with Nuvoton TPM 2.0 on I2C) +---------------------------------------------------------- + +tpm@57 { + reg = <0x57>; + label = "tpm"; + compatible = "nuvoton,npct650", "nuvoton,npct601"; + linux,sml-base = <0x7f 0xfd450000>; + linux,sml-size = <0x10000>; + status = "okay"; +}; diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm_tis_mmio.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm_tis_mmio.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..41d740545189 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/security/tpm/tpm_tis_mmio.txt @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +Trusted Computing Group MMIO Trusted Platform Module + +The TCG defines multi vendor standard for accessing a TPM chip, this +is the standard protocol defined to access the TPM via MMIO. Typically +this interface will be implemented over Intel's LPC bus. + +Refer to the 'TCG PC Client Specific TPM Interface Specification (TIS)' TCG +publication for the specification. + +Required properties: + +- compatible: should contain a string below for the chip, followed by + "tcg,tpm-tis-mmio". Valid chip strings are: + * "atmel,at97sc3204" +- reg: The location of the MMIO registers, should be at least 0x5000 bytes +- interrupt-parent/interrupts: An optional interrupt indicating command completion. + +Example: + + tpm_tis@90000 { + compatible = "atmel,at97sc3204", "tcg,tpm-tis-mmio"; + reg = <0x90000 0x5000>; + interrupt-parent = <&EIC0>; + interrupts = <1 2>; + }; diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt b/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt index 324ddf5223b3..b20a993a32af 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt @@ -32,8 +32,6 @@ Usage: (40 ascii zeros) blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... (40 ascii zeros) - blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... - (40 ascii zeros) pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default) pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig index 9faa0b1e7766..277186d3b668 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ config TCG_TIS_CORE config TCG_TIS tristate "TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface / TPM 2.0 FIFO Interface" - depends on X86 + depends on X86 || OF select TCG_TIS_CORE ---help--- If you have a TPM security chip that is compliant with the diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile index a385fb8c17de..a05b1ebd0b26 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile @@ -2,16 +2,10 @@ # Makefile for the kernel tpm device drivers. # obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o -tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o -tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o - -ifdef CONFIG_ACPI - tpm-y += tpm_eventlog.o tpm_acpi.o -else -ifdef CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM - tpm-y += tpm_eventlog.o tpm_of.o -endif -endif +tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o \ + tpm_eventlog.o +tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o tpm_acpi.o +tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += tpm_of.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_CORE) += tpm_tis_core.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS) += tpm_tis.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_SPI) += tpm_tis_spi.o diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index e5950131bd90..7a4869151d3b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev) idr_remove(&dev_nums_idr, chip->dev_num); mutex_unlock(&idr_lock); + kfree(chip->log.bios_event_log); kfree(chip); } @@ -276,27 +277,6 @@ static void tpm_del_char_device(struct tpm_chip *chip) up_write(&chip->ops_sem); } -static int tpm1_chip_register(struct tpm_chip *chip) -{ - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) - return 0; - - tpm_sysfs_add_device(chip); - - chip->bios_dir = tpm_bios_log_setup(dev_name(&chip->dev)); - - return 0; -} - -static void tpm1_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip) -{ - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) - return; - - if (chip->bios_dir) - tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip->bios_dir); -} - static void tpm_del_legacy_sysfs(struct tpm_chip *chip) { struct attribute **i; @@ -363,20 +343,20 @@ int tpm_chip_register(struct tpm_chip *chip) return rc; } - rc = tpm1_chip_register(chip); - if (rc) + tpm_sysfs_add_device(chip); + + rc = tpm_bios_log_setup(chip); + if (rc != 0 && rc != -ENODEV) return rc; tpm_add_ppi(chip); rc = tpm_add_char_device(chip); if (rc) { - tpm1_chip_unregister(chip); + tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip); return rc; } - chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_REGISTERED; - rc = tpm_add_legacy_sysfs(chip); if (rc) { tpm_chip_unregister(chip); @@ -402,12 +382,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_register); */ void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - if (!(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_REGISTERED)) - return; - tpm_del_legacy_sysfs(chip); - - tpm1_chip_unregister(chip); + tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip); tpm_del_char_device(chip); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_unregister); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index 3a9149cf0110..a2688ac2b48f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/freezer.h> +#include <linux/pm_runtime.h> #include "tpm.h" #include "tpm_eventlog.h" @@ -356,6 +357,9 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz, if (!(flags & TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED)) mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex); + if (chip->dev.parent) + pm_runtime_get_sync(chip->dev.parent); + rc = chip->ops->send(chip, (u8 *) buf, count); if (rc < 0) { dev_err(&chip->dev, @@ -397,6 +401,9 @@ out_recv: dev_err(&chip->dev, "tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error %zd\n", rc); out: + if (chip->dev.parent) + pm_runtime_put_sync(chip->dev.parent); + if (!(flags & TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED)) mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex); return rc; @@ -437,26 +444,29 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getcap_header = { .ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_CAP }; -ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap, +ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap, const char *desc) { struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd; int rc; tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header; - if (subcap_id == CAP_VERSION_1_1 || subcap_id == CAP_VERSION_1_2) { - tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = subcap_id; + if (subcap_id == TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_1 || + subcap_id == TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_2) { + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = cpu_to_be32(subcap_id); /*subcap field not necessary */ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(0); tpm_cmd.header.in.length -= cpu_to_be32(sizeof(__be32)); } else { if (subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM || subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL) - tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_FLAG; + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = + cpu_to_be32(TPM_CAP_FLAG); else - tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP; + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = + cpu_to_be32(TPM_CAP_PROP); tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4); - tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = subcap_id; + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = cpu_to_be32(subcap_id); } rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0, desc); @@ -488,12 +498,14 @@ static int tpm_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be16 startup_type) int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd; + cap_t cap; unsigned long new_timeout[4]; unsigned long old_timeout[4]; - struct duration_t *duration_cap; ssize_t rc; + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_HAVE_TIMEOUTS) + return 0; + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { /* Fixed timeouts for TPM2 */ chip->timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A); @@ -506,46 +518,30 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip) msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_MEDIUM); chip->duration[TPM_LONG] = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_LONG); + + chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_HAVE_TIMEOUTS; return 0; } - tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header; - tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP; - tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4); - tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT; - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0, - NULL); - + rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT, &cap, + "attempting to determine the timeouts"); if (rc == TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT) { /* The TPM is not started, we are the first to talk to it. Execute a startup command. */ - dev_info(&chip->dev, "Issuing TPM_STARTUP"); + dev_info(&chip->dev, "Issuing TPM_STARTUP\n"); if (tpm_startup(chip, TPM_ST_CLEAR)) return rc; - tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header; - tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP; - tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4); - tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT; - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, - 0, NULL); + rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT, &cap, + "attempting to determine the timeouts"); } - if (rc) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, - "A TPM error (%zd) occurred attempting to determine the timeouts\n", - rc); - goto duration; - } - - if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.return_code) != 0 || - be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length) - != sizeof(tpm_cmd.header.out) + sizeof(u32) + 4 * sizeof(u32)) - return -EINVAL; + if (rc) + return rc; - old_timeout[0] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.a); - old_timeout[1] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.b); - old_timeout[2] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.c); - old_timeout[3] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.d); + old_timeout[0] = be32_to_cpu(cap.timeout.a); + old_timeout[1] = be32_to_cpu(cap.timeout.b); + old_timeout[2] = be32_to_cpu(cap.timeout.c); + old_timeout[3] = be32_to_cpu(cap.timeout.d); memcpy(new_timeout, old_timeout, sizeof(new_timeout)); /* @@ -583,29 +579,17 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip) chip->timeout_c = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[2]); chip->timeout_d = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[3]); -duration: - tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header; - tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP; - tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4); - tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION; - - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0, - "attempting to determine the durations"); + rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION, &cap, + "attempting to determine the durations"); if (rc) return rc; - if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.return_code) != 0 || - be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length) - != sizeof(tpm_cmd.header.out) + sizeof(u32) + 3 * sizeof(u32)) - return -EINVAL; - - duration_cap = &tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.duration; chip->duration[TPM_SHORT] = - usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_short)); + usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(cap.duration.tpm_short)); chip->duration[TPM_MEDIUM] = - usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_medium)); + usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(cap.duration.tpm_medium)); chip->duration[TPM_LONG] = - usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_long)); + usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(cap.duration.tpm_long)); /* The Broadcom BCM0102 chipset in a Dell Latitude D820 gets the above * value wrong and apparently reports msecs rather than usecs. So we @@ -619,6 +603,8 @@ duration: chip->duration_adjusted = true; dev_info(&chip->dev, "Adjusting TPM timeout parameters."); } + + chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_HAVE_TIMEOUTS; return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_timeouts); @@ -726,6 +712,14 @@ int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read); +#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND cpu_to_be32(20) +#define EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 34 +static const struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = { + .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, + .length = cpu_to_be32(34), + .ordinal = TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND +}; + /** * tpm_pcr_extend - extend pcr value with hash * @chip_num: tpm idx # or AN& @@ -736,14 +730,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read); * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing * the module usage count. */ -#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND cpu_to_be32(20) -#define EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 34 -static const struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = { - .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, - .length = cpu_to_be32(34), - .ordinal = TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND -}; - int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) { struct tpm_cmd_t cmd; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c index a76ab4af9fb2..848ad6580b46 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static ssize_t caps_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, be32_to_cpu(cap.manufacturer_id)); /* Try to get a TPM version 1.2 TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO */ - rc = tpm_getcap(chip, CAP_VERSION_1_2, &cap, + rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_2, &cap, "attempting to determine the 1.2 version"); if (!rc) { str += sprintf(str, @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static ssize_t caps_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMinor); } else { /* Otherwise just use TPM_STRUCT_VER */ - rc = tpm_getcap(chip, CAP_VERSION_1_1, &cap, + rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_1, &cap, "attempting to determine the 1.1 version"); if (rc) return 0; @@ -284,6 +284,9 @@ static const struct attribute_group tpm_dev_group = { void tpm_sysfs_add_device(struct tpm_chip *chip) { + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) + return; + /* The sysfs routines rely on an implicit tpm_try_get_ops, device_del * is called before ops is null'd and the sysfs core synchronizes this * removal so that no callbacks are running or can run again diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 4d183c97f6a6..1ae976894257 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -35,11 +35,14 @@ #include <linux/cdev.h> #include <linux/highmem.h> +#include "tpm_eventlog.h" + enum tpm_const { TPM_MINOR = 224, /* officially assigned */ TPM_BUFSIZE = 4096, TPM_NUM_DEVICES = 65536, TPM_RETRY = 50, /* 5 seconds */ + TPM_NUM_EVENT_LOG_FILES = 3, }; enum tpm_timeout { @@ -139,10 +142,15 @@ enum tpm2_startup_types { #define TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN 3 enum tpm_chip_flags { - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_REGISTERED = BIT(0), TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 = BIT(1), TPM_CHIP_FLAG_IRQ = BIT(2), TPM_CHIP_FLAG_VIRTUAL = BIT(3), + TPM_CHIP_FLAG_HAVE_TIMEOUTS = BIT(4), +}; + +struct tpm_chip_seqops { + struct tpm_chip *chip; + const struct seq_operations *seqops; }; struct tpm_chip { @@ -156,6 +164,10 @@ struct tpm_chip { struct rw_semaphore ops_sem; const struct tpm_class_ops *ops; + struct tpm_bios_log log; + struct tpm_chip_seqops bin_log_seqops; + struct tpm_chip_seqops ascii_log_seqops; + unsigned int flags; int dev_num; /* /dev/tpm# */ @@ -171,7 +183,7 @@ struct tpm_chip { unsigned long duration[3]; /* jiffies */ bool duration_adjusted; - struct dentry **bios_dir; + struct dentry *bios_dir[TPM_NUM_EVENT_LOG_FILES]; const struct attribute_group *groups[3]; unsigned int groups_cnt; @@ -282,21 +294,20 @@ typedef union { } cap_t; enum tpm_capabilities { - TPM_CAP_FLAG = cpu_to_be32(4), - TPM_CAP_PROP = cpu_to_be32(5), - CAP_VERSION_1_1 = cpu_to_be32(0x06), - CAP_VERSION_1_2 = cpu_to_be32(0x1A) + TPM_CAP_FLAG = 4, + TPM_CAP_PROP = 5, + TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_1 = 0x06, + TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_2 = 0x1A, }; enum tpm_sub_capabilities { - TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR = cpu_to_be32(0x101), - TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER = cpu_to_be32(0x103), - TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM = cpu_to_be32(0x108), - TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL = cpu_to_be32(0x109), - TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER = cpu_to_be32(0x111), - TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT = cpu_to_be32(0x115), - TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION = cpu_to_be32(0x120), - + TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR = 0x101, + TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER = 0x103, + TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM = 0x108, + TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL = 0x109, + TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER = 0x111, + TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT = 0x115, + TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION = 0x120, }; struct tpm_getcap_params_in { @@ -484,7 +495,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz, unsigned int flags); ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *cmd, int len, unsigned int flags, const char *desc); -ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap, +ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap, const char *desc); int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *); int tpm1_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 7df55d58c939..da5b782a9731 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, } /** - * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key + * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key * @chip_num: TPM chip to use * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form * @options: authentication values and other options diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c index 565a9478cb94..b7718c95fd0b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c @@ -6,10 +6,11 @@ * Stefan Berger <stefanb@us.ibm.com> * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com> * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> + * Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> * * Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net> * - * Access to the eventlog extended by the TCG BIOS of PC platform + * Access to the event log extended by the TCG BIOS of PC platform * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License @@ -45,29 +46,28 @@ struct acpi_tcpa { }; /* read binary bios log */ -int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log) +int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip) { struct acpi_tcpa *buff; acpi_status status; void __iomem *virt; u64 len, start; + struct tpm_bios_log *log; - if (log->bios_event_log != NULL) { - printk(KERN_ERR - "%s: ERROR - Eventlog already initialized\n", - __func__); - return -EFAULT; - } + log = &chip->log; + + /* Unfortuntely ACPI does not associate the event log with a specific + * TPM, like PPI. Thus all ACPI TPMs will read the same log. + */ + if (!chip->acpi_dev_handle) + return -ENODEV; /* Find TCPA entry in RSDT (ACPI_LOGICAL_ADDRESSING) */ status = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TCPA, 1, (struct acpi_table_header **)&buff); - if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - Could not get TCPA table\n", - __func__); - return -EIO; - } + if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) + return -ENODEV; switch(buff->platform_class) { case BIOS_SERVER: @@ -81,29 +81,29 @@ int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log) break; } if (!len) { - printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - TCPA log area empty\n", __func__); + dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: TCPA log area empty\n", __func__); return -EIO; } /* malloc EventLog space */ log->bios_event_log = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!log->bios_event_log) { - printk("%s: ERROR - Not enough Memory for BIOS measurements\n", - __func__); + if (!log->bios_event_log) return -ENOMEM; - } log->bios_event_log_end = log->bios_event_log + len; virt = acpi_os_map_iomem(start, len); - if (!virt) { - kfree(log->bios_event_log); - printk("%s: ERROR - Unable to map memory\n", __func__); - return -EIO; - } + if (!virt) + goto err; memcpy_fromio(log->bios_event_log, virt, len); acpi_os_unmap_iomem(virt, len); return 0; + +err: + kfree(log->bios_event_log); + log->bios_event_log = NULL; + return -EIO; + } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c index a7c870af916c..717b6b47c042 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include <linux/highmem.h> #include <linux/rculist.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/pm_runtime.h> #include "tpm.h" #define ACPI_SIG_TPM2 "TPM2" @@ -83,7 +84,71 @@ struct crb_priv { u32 cmd_size; }; -static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(crb_pm, tpm_pm_suspend, tpm_pm_resume); +/** + * crb_go_idle - request tpm crb device to go the idle state + * + * @dev: crb device + * @priv: crb private data + * + * Write CRB_CTRL_REQ_GO_IDLE to TPM_CRB_CTRL_REQ + * The device should respond within TIMEOUT_C by clearing the bit. + * Anyhow, we do not wait here as a consequent CMD_READY request + * will be handled correctly even if idle was not completed. + * + * The function does nothing for devices with ACPI-start method. + * + * Return: 0 always + */ +static int __maybe_unused crb_go_idle(struct device *dev, struct crb_priv *priv) +{ + if (priv->flags & CRB_FL_ACPI_START) + return 0; + + iowrite32(CRB_CTRL_REQ_GO_IDLE, &priv->cca->req); + /* we don't really care when this settles */ + + return 0; +} + +/** + * crb_cmd_ready - request tpm crb device to enter ready state + * + * @dev: crb device + * @priv: crb private data + * + * Write CRB_CTRL_REQ_CMD_READY to TPM_CRB_CTRL_REQ + * and poll till the device acknowledge it by clearing the bit. + * The device should respond within TIMEOUT_C. + * + * The function does nothing for devices with ACPI-start method + * + * Return: 0 on success -ETIME on timeout; + */ +static int __maybe_unused crb_cmd_ready(struct device *dev, + struct crb_priv *priv) +{ + ktime_t stop, start; + + if (priv->flags & CRB_FL_ACPI_START) + return 0; + + iowrite32(CRB_CTRL_REQ_CMD_READY, &priv->cca->req); + + start = ktime_get(); + stop = ktime_add(start, ms_to_ktime(TPM2_TIMEOUT_C)); + do { + if (!(ioread32(&priv->cca->req) & CRB_CTRL_REQ_CMD_READY)) + return 0; + usleep_range(50, 100); + } while (ktime_before(ktime_get(), stop)); + + if (ioread32(&priv->cca->req) & CRB_CTRL_REQ_CMD_READY) { + dev_warn(dev, "cmdReady timed out\n"); + return -ETIME; + } + + return 0; +} static u8 crb_status(struct tpm_chip *chip) { @@ -196,21 +261,6 @@ static const struct tpm_class_ops tpm_crb = { .req_complete_val = CRB_DRV_STS_COMPLETE, }; -static int crb_init(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv) -{ - struct tpm_chip *chip; - - chip = tpmm_chip_alloc(&device->dev, &tpm_crb); - if (IS_ERR(chip)) - return PTR_ERR(chip); - - dev_set_drvdata(&chip->dev, priv); - chip->acpi_dev_handle = device->handle; - chip->flags = TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2; - - return tpm_chip_register(chip); -} - static int crb_check_resource(struct acpi_resource *ares, void *data) { struct resource *io_res = data; @@ -249,6 +299,7 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv, struct list_head resources; struct resource io_res; struct device *dev = &device->dev; + u32 pa_high, pa_low; u64 cmd_pa; u32 cmd_size; u64 rsp_pa; @@ -276,12 +327,27 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv, if (IS_ERR(priv->cca)) return PTR_ERR(priv->cca); - cmd_pa = ((u64) ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_high) << 32) | - (u64) ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_low); + /* + * PTT HW bug w/a: wake up the device to access + * possibly not retained registers. + */ + ret = crb_cmd_ready(dev, priv); + if (ret) + return ret; + + pa_high = ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_high); + pa_low = ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_low); + cmd_pa = ((u64)pa_high << 32) | pa_low; cmd_size = ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size); + + dev_dbg(dev, "cmd_hi = %X cmd_low = %X cmd_size %X\n", + pa_high, pa_low, cmd_size); + priv->cmd = crb_map_res(dev, priv, &io_res, cmd_pa, cmd_size); - if (IS_ERR(priv->cmd)) - return PTR_ERR(priv->cmd); + if (IS_ERR(priv->cmd)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(priv->cmd); + goto out; + } memcpy_fromio(&rsp_pa, &priv->cca->rsp_pa, 8); rsp_pa = le64_to_cpu(rsp_pa); @@ -289,7 +355,8 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv, if (cmd_pa != rsp_pa) { priv->rsp = crb_map_res(dev, priv, &io_res, rsp_pa, rsp_size); - return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(priv->rsp); + ret = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(priv->rsp); + goto out; } /* According to the PTP specification, overlapping command and response @@ -297,18 +364,25 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv, */ if (cmd_size != rsp_size) { dev_err(dev, FW_BUG "overlapping command and response buffer sizes are not identical"); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; } + priv->cmd_size = cmd_size; priv->rsp = priv->cmd; - return 0; + +out: + crb_go_idle(dev, priv); + + return ret; } static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device) { struct acpi_table_tpm2 *buf; struct crb_priv *priv; + struct tpm_chip *chip; struct device *dev = &device->dev; acpi_status status; u32 sm; @@ -346,7 +420,33 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device) if (rc) return rc; - return crb_init(device, priv); + chip = tpmm_chip_alloc(dev, &tpm_crb); + if (IS_ERR(chip)) + return PTR_ERR(chip); + + dev_set_drvdata(&chip->dev, priv); + chip->acpi_dev_handle = device->handle; + chip->flags = TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2; + + rc = crb_cmd_ready(dev, priv); + if (rc) + return rc; + + pm_runtime_get_noresume(dev); + pm_runtime_set_active(dev); + pm_runtime_enable(dev); + + rc = tpm_chip_register(chip); + if (rc) { + crb_go_idle(dev, priv); + pm_runtime_put_noidle(dev); + pm_runtime_disable(dev); + return rc; + } + + pm_runtime_put(dev); + + return 0; } static int crb_acpi_remove(struct acpi_device *device) @@ -356,9 +456,34 @@ static int crb_acpi_remove(struct acpi_device *device) tpm_chip_unregister(chip); + pm_runtime_disable(dev); + return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PM +static int crb_pm_runtime_suspend(struct device *dev) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct crb_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev); + + return crb_go_idle(dev, priv); +} + +static int crb_pm_runtime_resume(struct device *dev) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct crb_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev); + + return crb_cmd_ready(dev, priv); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PM */ + +static const struct dev_pm_ops crb_pm = { + SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(tpm_pm_suspend, tpm_pm_resume) + SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(crb_pm_runtime_suspend, crb_pm_runtime_resume, NULL) +}; + static struct acpi_device_id crb_device_ids[] = { {"MSFT0101", 0}, {"", 0}, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c index e7228863290e..11bb1138a828 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c @@ -7,10 +7,11 @@ * Stefan Berger <stefanb@us.ibm.com> * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com> * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> + * Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> * * Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net> * - * Access to the eventlog created by a system's firmware / BIOS + * Access to the event log created by a system's firmware / BIOS * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License @@ -72,7 +73,8 @@ static const char* tcpa_pc_event_id_strings[] = { static void *tpm_bios_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) { loff_t i; - struct tpm_bios_log *log = m->private; + struct tpm_chip *chip = m->private; + struct tpm_bios_log *log = &chip->log; void *addr = log->bios_event_log; void *limit = log->bios_event_log_end; struct tcpa_event *event; @@ -119,7 +121,8 @@ static void *tpm_bios_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) { struct tcpa_event *event = v; - struct tpm_bios_log *log = m->private; + struct tpm_chip *chip = m->private; + struct tpm_bios_log *log = &chip->log; void *limit = log->bios_event_log_end; u32 converted_event_size; u32 converted_event_type; @@ -260,13 +263,10 @@ static int tpm_binary_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) static int tpm_bios_measurements_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { - struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; - struct tpm_bios_log *log = seq->private; + struct seq_file *seq = (struct seq_file *)file->private_data; + struct tpm_chip *chip = (struct tpm_chip *)seq->private; - if (log) { - kfree(log->bios_event_log); - kfree(log); - } + put_device(&chip->dev); return seq_release(inode, file); } @@ -304,151 +304,159 @@ static int tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return 0; } -static const struct seq_operations tpm_ascii_b_measurments_seqops = { +static const struct seq_operations tpm_ascii_b_measurements_seqops = { .start = tpm_bios_measurements_start, .next = tpm_bios_measurements_next, .stop = tpm_bios_measurements_stop, .show = tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_show, }; -static const struct seq_operations tpm_binary_b_measurments_seqops = { +static const struct seq_operations tpm_binary_b_measurements_seqops = { .start = tpm_bios_measurements_start, .next = tpm_bios_measurements_next, .stop = tpm_bios_measurements_stop, .show = tpm_binary_bios_measurements_show, }; -static int tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, +static int tpm_bios_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { int err; - struct tpm_bios_log *log; struct seq_file *seq; - - log = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tpm_bios_log), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!log) - return -ENOMEM; - - if ((err = read_log(log))) - goto out_free; + struct tpm_chip_seqops *chip_seqops; + const struct seq_operations *seqops; + struct tpm_chip *chip; + + inode_lock(inode); + if (!inode->i_private) { + inode_unlock(inode); + return -ENODEV; + } + chip_seqops = (struct tpm_chip_seqops *)inode->i_private; + seqops = chip_seqops->seqops; + chip = chip_seqops->chip; + get_device(&chip->dev); + inode_unlock(inode); /* now register seq file */ - err = seq_open(file, &tpm_ascii_b_measurments_seqops); + err = seq_open(file, seqops); if (!err) { seq = file->private_data; - seq->private = log; - } else { - goto out_free; + seq->private = chip; } -out: return err; -out_free: - kfree(log->bios_event_log); - kfree(log); - goto out; } -static const struct file_operations tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_ops = { - .open = tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_open, +static const struct file_operations tpm_bios_measurements_ops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .open = tpm_bios_measurements_open, .read = seq_read, .llseek = seq_lseek, .release = tpm_bios_measurements_release, }; -static int tpm_binary_bios_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, - struct file *file) +static int tpm_read_log(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - int err; - struct tpm_bios_log *log; - struct seq_file *seq; - - log = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tpm_bios_log), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!log) - return -ENOMEM; + int rc; - if ((err = read_log(log))) - goto out_free; - - /* now register seq file */ - err = seq_open(file, &tpm_binary_b_measurments_seqops); - if (!err) { - seq = file->private_data; - seq->private = log; - } else { - goto out_free; + if (chip->log.bios_event_log != NULL) { + dev_dbg(&chip->dev, + "%s: ERROR - event log already initialized\n", + __func__); + return -EFAULT; } -out: - return err; -out_free: - kfree(log->bios_event_log); - kfree(log); - goto out; -} - -static const struct file_operations tpm_binary_bios_measurements_ops = { - .open = tpm_binary_bios_measurements_open, - .read = seq_read, - .llseek = seq_lseek, - .release = tpm_bios_measurements_release, -}; + rc = tpm_read_log_acpi(chip); + if (rc != -ENODEV) + return rc; -static int is_bad(void *p) -{ - if (!p) - return 1; - if (IS_ERR(p) && (PTR_ERR(p) != -ENODEV)) - return 1; - return 0; + return tpm_read_log_of(chip); } -struct dentry **tpm_bios_log_setup(const char *name) +/* + * tpm_bios_log_setup() - Read the event log from the firmware + * @chip: TPM chip to use. + * + * If an event log is found then the securityfs files are setup to + * export it to userspace, otherwise nothing is done. + * + * Returns -ENODEV if the firmware has no event log or securityfs is not + * supported. + */ +int tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - struct dentry **ret = NULL, *tpm_dir, *bin_file, *ascii_file; - - tpm_dir = securityfs_create_dir(name, NULL); - if (is_bad(tpm_dir)) - goto out; - - bin_file = + const char *name = dev_name(&chip->dev); + unsigned int cnt; + int rc = 0; + + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) + return 0; + + rc = tpm_read_log(chip); + if (rc) + return rc; + + cnt = 0; + chip->bios_dir[cnt] = securityfs_create_dir(name, NULL); + /* NOTE: securityfs_create_dir can return ENODEV if securityfs is + * compiled out. The caller should ignore the ENODEV return code. + */ + if (IS_ERR(chip->bios_dir[cnt])) + goto err; + cnt++; + + chip->bin_log_seqops.chip = chip; + chip->bin_log_seqops.seqops = &tpm_binary_b_measurements_seqops; + + chip->bios_dir[cnt] = securityfs_create_file("binary_bios_measurements", - S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, tpm_dir, NULL, - &tpm_binary_bios_measurements_ops); - if (is_bad(bin_file)) - goto out_tpm; + 0440, chip->bios_dir[0], + (void *)&chip->bin_log_seqops, + &tpm_bios_measurements_ops); + if (IS_ERR(chip->bios_dir[cnt])) + goto err; + cnt++; + + chip->ascii_log_seqops.chip = chip; + chip->ascii_log_seqops.seqops = &tpm_ascii_b_measurements_seqops; - ascii_file = + chip->bios_dir[cnt] = securityfs_create_file("ascii_bios_measurements", - S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, tpm_dir, NULL, - &tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_ops); - if (is_bad(ascii_file)) - goto out_bin; - - ret = kmalloc(3 * sizeof(struct dentry *), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ret) - goto out_ascii; - - ret[0] = ascii_file; - ret[1] = bin_file; - ret[2] = tpm_dir; - - return ret; - -out_ascii: - securityfs_remove(ascii_file); -out_bin: - securityfs_remove(bin_file); -out_tpm: - securityfs_remove(tpm_dir); -out: - return NULL; + 0440, chip->bios_dir[0], + (void *)&chip->ascii_log_seqops, + &tpm_bios_measurements_ops); + if (IS_ERR(chip->bios_dir[cnt])) + goto err; + cnt++; + + return 0; + +err: + rc = PTR_ERR(chip->bios_dir[cnt]); + chip->bios_dir[cnt] = NULL; + tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip); + return rc; } -void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct dentry **lst) +void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip) { int i; - - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) - securityfs_remove(lst[i]); + struct inode *inode; + + /* securityfs_remove currently doesn't take care of handling sync + * between removal and opening of pseudo files. To handle this, a + * workaround is added by making i_private = NULL here during removal + * and to check it during open(), both within inode_lock()/unlock(). + * This design ensures that open() either safely gets kref or fails. + */ + for (i = (TPM_NUM_EVENT_LOG_FILES - 1); i >= 0; i--) { + if (chip->bios_dir[i]) { + inode = d_inode(chip->bios_dir[i]); + inode_lock(inode); + inode->i_private = NULL; + inode_unlock(inode); + securityfs_remove(chip->bios_dir[i]); + } + } } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h index 8de62b09be51..1660d74ea79a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h @@ -73,20 +73,24 @@ enum tcpa_pc_event_ids { HOST_TABLE_OF_DEVICES, }; -int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log); - -#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_IBMVTPM_MODULE) || \ - defined(CONFIG_ACPI) -extern struct dentry **tpm_bios_log_setup(const char *); -extern void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct dentry **); +#if defined(CONFIG_ACPI) +int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip); #else -static inline struct dentry **tpm_bios_log_setup(const char *name) +static inline int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - return NULL; + return -ENODEV; } -static inline void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct dentry **dir) +#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_OF) +int tpm_read_log_of(struct tpm_chip *chip); +#else +static inline int tpm_read_log_of(struct tpm_chip *chip) { + return -ENODEV; } #endif +int tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip); +void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip); + #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c index 570f30c5c5f4..7dee42d7b5e0 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ * Copyright 2012 IBM Corporation * * Author: Ashley Lai <ashleydlai@gmail.com> + * Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> * * Maintained by: <tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net> * @@ -20,55 +21,38 @@ #include "tpm.h" #include "tpm_eventlog.h" -int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log) +int tpm_read_log_of(struct tpm_chip *chip) { struct device_node *np; const u32 *sizep; const u64 *basep; + struct tpm_bios_log *log; - if (log->bios_event_log != NULL) { - pr_err("%s: ERROR - Eventlog already initialized\n", __func__); - return -EFAULT; - } - - np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "vtpm"); - if (!np) { - pr_err("%s: ERROR - IBMVTPM not supported\n", __func__); + log = &chip->log; + if (chip->dev.parent && chip->dev.parent->of_node) + np = chip->dev.parent->of_node; + else return -ENODEV; - } sizep = of_get_property(np, "linux,sml-size", NULL); - if (sizep == NULL) { - pr_err("%s: ERROR - SML size not found\n", __func__); - goto cleanup_eio; - } - if (*sizep == 0) { - pr_err("%s: ERROR - event log area empty\n", __func__); - goto cleanup_eio; - } - basep = of_get_property(np, "linux,sml-base", NULL); - if (basep == NULL) { - pr_err("%s: ERROR - SML not found\n", __func__); - goto cleanup_eio; + if (sizep == NULL && basep == NULL) + return -ENODEV; + if (sizep == NULL || basep == NULL) + return -EIO; + + if (*sizep == 0) { + dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: Event log area empty\n", __func__); + return -EIO; } log->bios_event_log = kmalloc(*sizep, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!log->bios_event_log) { - pr_err("%s: ERROR - Not enough memory for BIOS measurements\n", - __func__); - of_node_put(np); + if (!log->bios_event_log) return -ENOMEM; - } log->bios_event_log_end = log->bios_event_log + *sizep; memcpy(log->bios_event_log, __va(*basep), *sizep); - of_node_put(np); return 0; - -cleanup_eio: - of_node_put(np); - return -EIO; } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c index eaf5730d79eb..0127af130cb1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ #include <linux/wait.h> #include <linux/acpi.h> #include <linux/freezer.h> +#include <linux/of.h> +#include <linux/of_device.h> #include "tpm.h" #include "tpm_tis_core.h" @@ -354,12 +356,21 @@ static int tpm_tis_plat_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_OF +static const struct of_device_id tis_of_platform_match[] = { + {.compatible = "tcg,tpm-tis-mmio"}, + {}, +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, tis_of_platform_match); +#endif + static struct platform_driver tis_drv = { .probe = tpm_tis_plat_probe, .remove = tpm_tis_plat_remove, .driver = { .name = "tpm_tis", .pm = &tpm_tis_pm, + .of_match_table = of_match_ptr(tis_of_platform_match), }, }; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c index e3bf31b37138..7993678954a2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c @@ -180,12 +180,19 @@ static int recv_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count) struct tpm_tis_data *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev); int size = 0, burstcnt, rc; - while (size < count && - wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, + while (size < count) { + rc = wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL | TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c, - &priv->read_queue, true) == 0) { - burstcnt = min_t(int, get_burstcount(chip), count - size); + &priv->read_queue, true); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + burstcnt = get_burstcount(chip); + if (burstcnt < 0) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "Unable to read burstcount\n"); + return burstcnt; + } + burstcnt = min_t(int, burstcnt, count - size); rc = tpm_tis_read_bytes(priv, TPM_DATA_FIFO(priv->locality), burstcnt, buf + size); @@ -229,8 +236,11 @@ static int tpm_tis_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count) goto out; } - wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c, - &priv->int_queue, false); + if (wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c, + &priv->int_queue, false) < 0) { + size = -ETIME; + goto out; + } status = tpm_tis_status(chip); if (status & TPM_STS_DATA_AVAIL) { /* retry? */ dev_err(&chip->dev, "Error left over data\n"); @@ -271,7 +281,13 @@ static int tpm_tis_send_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len) } while (count < len - 1) { - burstcnt = min_t(int, get_burstcount(chip), len - count - 1); + burstcnt = get_burstcount(chip); + if (burstcnt < 0) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "Unable to read burstcount\n"); + rc = burstcnt; + goto out_err; + } + burstcnt = min_t(int, burstcnt, len - count - 1); rc = tpm_tis_write_bytes(priv, TPM_DATA_FIFO(priv->locality), burstcnt, buf + count); if (rc < 0) @@ -279,8 +295,11 @@ static int tpm_tis_send_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len) count += burstcnt; - wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c, - &priv->int_queue, false); + if (wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c, + &priv->int_queue, false) < 0) { + rc = -ETIME; + goto out_err; + } status = tpm_tis_status(chip); if (!itpm && (status & TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT) == 0) { rc = -EIO; @@ -293,8 +312,11 @@ static int tpm_tis_send_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len) if (rc < 0) goto out_err; - wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c, - &priv->int_queue, false); + if (wait_for_tpm_stat(chip, TPM_STS_VALID, chip->timeout_c, + &priv->int_queue, false) < 0) { + rc = -ETIME; + goto out_err; + } status = tpm_tis_status(chip); if (!itpm && (status & TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT) != 0) { rc = -EIO; @@ -755,20 +777,20 @@ int tpm_tis_core_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_tis_data *priv, int irq, if (intfcaps & TPM_INTF_DATA_AVAIL_INT) dev_dbg(dev, "\tData Avail Int Support\n"); - /* Very early on issue a command to the TPM in polling mode to make - * sure it works. May as well use that command to set the proper - * timeouts for the driver. - */ - if (tpm_get_timeouts(chip)) { - dev_err(dev, "Could not get TPM timeouts and durations\n"); - rc = -ENODEV; - goto out_err; - } - /* INTERRUPT Setup */ init_waitqueue_head(&priv->read_queue); init_waitqueue_head(&priv->int_queue); if (irq != -1) { + /* Before doing irq testing issue a command to the TPM in polling mode + * to make sure it works. May as well use that command to set the + * proper timeouts for the driver. + */ + if (tpm_get_timeouts(chip)) { + dev_err(dev, "Could not get TPM timeouts and durations\n"); + rc = -ENODEV; + goto out_err; + } + if (irq) { tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(chip, intmask, IRQF_SHARED, irq); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c index 9a940332c157..5463b58af26e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright (C) 2015, 2016 IBM Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Corporation * * Author: Stefan Berger <stefanb@us.ibm.com> * @@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ struct proxy_dev { long state; /* internal state */ #define STATE_OPENED_FLAG BIT(0) #define STATE_WAIT_RESPONSE_FLAG BIT(1) /* waiting for emulator response */ +#define STATE_REGISTERED_FLAG BIT(2) size_t req_len; /* length of queued TPM request */ size_t resp_len; /* length of queued TPM response */ @@ -369,12 +371,9 @@ static void vtpm_proxy_work(struct work_struct *work) rc = tpm_chip_register(proxy_dev->chip); if (rc) - goto err; - - return; - -err: - vtpm_proxy_fops_undo_open(proxy_dev); + vtpm_proxy_fops_undo_open(proxy_dev); + else + proxy_dev->state |= STATE_REGISTERED_FLAG; } /* @@ -515,7 +514,8 @@ static void vtpm_proxy_delete_device(struct proxy_dev *proxy_dev) */ vtpm_proxy_fops_undo_open(proxy_dev); - tpm_chip_unregister(proxy_dev->chip); + if (proxy_dev->state & STATE_REGISTERED_FLAG) + tpm_chip_unregister(proxy_dev->chip); vtpm_proxy_delete_proxy_dev(proxy_dev); } @@ -524,6 +524,50 @@ static void vtpm_proxy_delete_device(struct proxy_dev *proxy_dev) * Code related to the control device /dev/vtpmx */ +/** + * vtpmx_ioc_new_dev - handler for the %VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV ioctl + * @file: /dev/vtpmx + * @ioctl: the ioctl number + * @arg: pointer to the struct vtpmx_proxy_new_dev + * + * Creates an anonymous file that is used by the process acting as a TPM to + * communicate with the client processes. The function will also add a new TPM + * device through which data is proxied to this TPM acting process. The caller + * will be provided with a file descriptor to communicate with the clients and + * major and minor numbers for the TPM device. + */ +static long vtpmx_ioc_new_dev(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, + unsigned long arg) +{ + void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg; + struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev __user *vtpm_new_dev_p; + struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev vtpm_new_dev; + struct file *vtpm_file; + + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + vtpm_new_dev_p = argp; + + if (copy_from_user(&vtpm_new_dev, vtpm_new_dev_p, + sizeof(vtpm_new_dev))) + return -EFAULT; + + vtpm_file = vtpm_proxy_create_device(&vtpm_new_dev); + if (IS_ERR(vtpm_file)) + return PTR_ERR(vtpm_file); + + if (copy_to_user(vtpm_new_dev_p, &vtpm_new_dev, + sizeof(vtpm_new_dev))) { + put_unused_fd(vtpm_new_dev.fd); + fput(vtpm_file); + return -EFAULT; + } + + fd_install(vtpm_new_dev.fd, vtpm_file); + return 0; +} + /* * vtpmx_fops_ioctl: ioctl on /dev/vtpmx * @@ -531,34 +575,11 @@ static void vtpm_proxy_delete_device(struct proxy_dev *proxy_dev) * Returns 0 on success, a negative error code otherwise. */ static long vtpmx_fops_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int ioctl, - unsigned long arg) + unsigned long arg) { - void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg; - struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev __user *vtpm_new_dev_p; - struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev vtpm_new_dev; - struct file *file; - switch (ioctl) { case VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV: - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - vtpm_new_dev_p = argp; - if (copy_from_user(&vtpm_new_dev, vtpm_new_dev_p, - sizeof(vtpm_new_dev))) - return -EFAULT; - file = vtpm_proxy_create_device(&vtpm_new_dev); - if (IS_ERR(file)) - return PTR_ERR(file); - if (copy_to_user(vtpm_new_dev_p, &vtpm_new_dev, - sizeof(vtpm_new_dev))) { - put_unused_fd(vtpm_new_dev.fd); - fput(file); - return -EFAULT; - } - - fd_install(vtpm_new_dev.fd, file); - return 0; - + return vtpmx_ioc_new_dev(f, ioctl, arg); default: return -ENOIOCTLCMD; } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c b/drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c index 50072cc4fe5c..5aaa268f3a78 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c @@ -307,7 +307,6 @@ static int tpmfront_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev, rv = setup_ring(dev, priv); if (rv) { chip = dev_get_drvdata(&dev->dev); - tpm_chip_unregister(chip); ring_free(priv); return rv; } diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 9b99df4893a4..2e5b2e379cdf 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -1667,7 +1667,8 @@ const struct inode_operations proc_pid_link_inode_operations = { /* building an inode */ -struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb, struct task_struct *task) +struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb, + struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode) { struct inode * inode; struct proc_inode *ei; @@ -1681,6 +1682,7 @@ struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb, struct task_struct *t /* Common stuff */ ei = PROC_I(inode); + inode->i_mode = mode; inode->i_ino = get_next_ino(); inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode); inode->i_op = &proc_def_inode_operations; @@ -2007,7 +2009,9 @@ proc_map_files_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct proc_inode *ei; struct inode *inode; - inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task); + inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, S_IFLNK | + ((mode & FMODE_READ ) ? S_IRUSR : 0) | + ((mode & FMODE_WRITE) ? S_IWUSR : 0)); if (!inode) return -ENOENT; @@ -2016,12 +2020,6 @@ proc_map_files_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, inode->i_op = &proc_map_files_link_inode_operations; inode->i_size = 64; - inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK; - - if (mode & FMODE_READ) - inode->i_mode |= S_IRUSR; - if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) - inode->i_mode |= S_IWUSR; d_set_d_op(dentry, &tid_map_files_dentry_operations); d_add(dentry, inode); @@ -2375,12 +2373,11 @@ static int proc_pident_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode; struct proc_inode *ei; - inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task); + inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, p->mode); if (!inode) goto out; ei = PROC_I(inode); - inode->i_mode = p->mode; if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) set_nlink(inode, 2); /* Use getattr to fix if necessary */ if (p->iop) @@ -3062,11 +3059,10 @@ static int proc_pid_instantiate(struct inode *dir, { struct inode *inode; - inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task); + inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); if (!inode) goto out; - inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO; inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations; inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE; @@ -3354,11 +3350,10 @@ static int proc_task_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr) { struct inode *inode; - inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task); + inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); if (!inode) goto out; - inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO; inode->i_op = &proc_tid_base_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &proc_tid_base_operations; inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE; diff --git a/fs/proc/fd.c b/fs/proc/fd.c index d21dafef3102..4274f83bf100 100644 --- a/fs/proc/fd.c +++ b/fs/proc/fd.c @@ -183,14 +183,13 @@ proc_fd_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct proc_inode *ei; struct inode *inode; - inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task); + inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, S_IFLNK); if (!inode) goto out; ei = PROC_I(inode); ei->fd = fd; - inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK; inode->i_op = &proc_pid_link_inode_operations; inode->i_size = 64; @@ -322,14 +321,13 @@ proc_fdinfo_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct proc_inode *ei; struct inode *inode; - inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task); + inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, S_IFREG | S_IRUSR); if (!inode) goto out; ei = PROC_I(inode); ei->fd = fd; - inode->i_mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUSR; inode->i_fop = &proc_fdinfo_file_operations; d_set_d_op(dentry, &tid_fd_dentry_operations); diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h index 109876a24d2c..2de5194ba378 100644 --- a/fs/proc/internal.h +++ b/fs/proc/internal.h @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ extern int proc_pid_statm(struct seq_file *, struct pid_namespace *, extern const struct dentry_operations pid_dentry_operations; extern int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *, struct kstat *); extern int proc_setattr(struct dentry *, struct iattr *); -extern struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block *, struct task_struct *); +extern struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block *, struct task_struct *, umode_t); extern int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *, unsigned int); extern int pid_delete_dentry(const struct dentry *); extern int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *, struct dir_context *); diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c index 51b8b0a8ad91..766f0c637ad1 100644 --- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c +++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c @@ -92,12 +92,11 @@ static int proc_ns_instantiate(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode; struct proc_inode *ei; - inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task); + inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO); if (!inode) goto out; ei = PROC_I(inode); - inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO; inode->i_op = &proc_ns_link_inode_operations; ei->ns_ops = ns_ops; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/vtpm_proxy.h b/include/uapi/linux/vtpm_proxy.h index 41e8e2252a30..a69e991eb080 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/vtpm_proxy.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/vtpm_proxy.h @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ /* * Definitions for the VTPM proxy driver * Copyright (c) 2015, 2016, IBM Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Corporation * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License, @@ -18,8 +19,23 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/ioctl.h> -/* ioctls */ +/** + * enum vtpm_proxy_flags - flags for the proxy TPM + * @VTPM_PROXY_FLAG_TPM2: the proxy TPM uses TPM 2.0 protocol + */ +enum vtpm_proxy_flags { + VTPM_PROXY_FLAG_TPM2 = 1, +}; +/** + * struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev - parameter structure for the + * %VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV ioctl + * @flags: flags for the proxy TPM + * @tpm_num: index of the TPM device + * @fd: the file descriptor used by the proxy TPM + * @major: the major number of the TPM device + * @minor: the minor number of the TPM device + */ struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev { __u32 flags; /* input */ __u32 tpm_num; /* output */ @@ -28,9 +44,6 @@ struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev { __u32 minor; /* output */ }; -/* above flags */ -#define VTPM_PROXY_FLAG_TPM2 1 /* emulator is TPM 2 */ - -#define VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV _IOWR(0xa1, 0x00, struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev) +#define VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV _IOWR(0xa1, 0x00, struct vtpm_proxy_new_dev) #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_VTPM_PROXY_H */ diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index bff9c774987a..f7ce79a46050 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -41,8 +41,7 @@ * outside of a lifetime-guarded section. In general, this * is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks. * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter - * @len: the number of instructions in the program - * @insnsi: the BPF program instructions to evaluate + * @prog: the BPF program to evaluate * * seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev * pointer. For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting @@ -168,8 +167,8 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen) } /** - * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @syscall - * @syscall: number of the current system call + * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd + * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters * * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes. */ diff --git a/samples/seccomp/Makefile b/samples/seccomp/Makefile index ae7ff6f24f36..bf7cc6b0dc19 100644 --- a/samples/seccomp/Makefile +++ b/samples/seccomp/Makefile @@ -36,13 +36,13 @@ HOSTLOADLIBES_bpf-direct += $(MFLAG) HOSTLOADLIBES_bpf-fancy += $(MFLAG) HOSTLOADLIBES_dropper += $(MFLAG) endif -always := $(hostprogs-y) +always := $(hostprogs-m) else # MIPS system calls are defined based on the -mabi that is passed # to the toolchain which may or may not be a valid option # for the host toolchain. So disable tests if target architecture # is MIPS but the host isn't. ifndef CONFIG_MIPS -always := $(hostprogs-y) +always := $(hostprogs-m) endif endif diff --git a/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c index 05cb4d5ff9f5..1ef0f4d72898 100644 --- a/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c +++ b/samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.c @@ -18,41 +18,41 @@ int bpf_resolve_jumps(struct bpf_labels *labels, struct sock_filter *filter, size_t count) { - struct sock_filter *begin = filter; - __u8 insn = count - 1; + size_t i; - if (count < 1) + if (count < 1 || count > BPF_MAXINSNS) return -1; /* * Walk it once, backwards, to build the label table and do fixups. * Since backward jumps are disallowed by BPF, this is easy. */ - filter += insn; - for (; filter >= begin; --insn, --filter) { - if (filter->code != (BPF_JMP+BPF_JA)) + for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { + size_t offset = count - i - 1; + struct sock_filter *instr = &filter[offset]; + if (instr->code != (BPF_JMP+BPF_JA)) continue; - switch ((filter->jt<<8)|filter->jf) { + switch ((instr->jt<<8)|instr->jf) { case (JUMP_JT<<8)|JUMP_JF: - if (labels->labels[filter->k].location == 0xffffffff) { + if (labels->labels[instr->k].location == 0xffffffff) { fprintf(stderr, "Unresolved label: '%s'\n", - labels->labels[filter->k].label); + labels->labels[instr->k].label); return 1; } - filter->k = labels->labels[filter->k].location - - (insn + 1); - filter->jt = 0; - filter->jf = 0; + instr->k = labels->labels[instr->k].location - + (offset + 1); + instr->jt = 0; + instr->jf = 0; continue; case (LABEL_JT<<8)|LABEL_JF: - if (labels->labels[filter->k].location != 0xffffffff) { + if (labels->labels[instr->k].location != 0xffffffff) { fprintf(stderr, "Duplicate label use: '%s'\n", - labels->labels[filter->k].label); + labels->labels[instr->k].label); return 1; } - labels->labels[filter->k].location = insn; - filter->k = 0; /* fall through */ - filter->jt = 0; - filter->jf = 0; + labels->labels[instr->k].location = offset; + instr->k = 0; /* fall through */ + instr->jt = 0; + instr->jf = 0; continue; } } diff --git a/samples/seccomp/dropper.c b/samples/seccomp/dropper.c index c69c347c7011..68325ca5e71c 100644 --- a/samples/seccomp/dropper.c +++ b/samples/seccomp/dropper.c @@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ * When run, returns the specified errno for the specified * system call number against the given architecture. * - * Run this one as root as PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is not called. */ #include <errno.h> @@ -42,8 +41,12 @@ static int install_filter(int nr, int arch, int error) .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])), .filter = filter, }; + if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) { + perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)"); + return 1; + } if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, &prog)) { - perror("prctl"); + perror("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)"); return 1; } return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 4304372b323f..106e855e2d9d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static bool init_keyring __initdata; int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *digest, int digestlen) { - if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX) + if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX || siglen < 2) return -EINVAL; if (!keyring[id]) { diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index ba8615576d4d..e2ed498c0f5f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, /* check value type */ switch (xattr_data->type) { case EVM_XATTR_HMAC: + if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) { + evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + goto out; + } rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, calc.digest); if (rc) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 389325ac6067..1fd9539a969d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) { struct signature_v2_hdr *sig; + enum hash_algo ret; if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2) /* return default hash algo */ @@ -143,7 +144,9 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, return sig->hash_algo; break; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: - return xattr_value->digest[0]; + ret = xattr_value->digest[0]; + if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST) + return ret; break; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: /* this is for backward compatibility */ @@ -384,14 +387,10 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); if (result == 1) { - bool digsig; - if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) return -EINVAL; - digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); - if (!digsig && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) - return -EPERM; - ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), + (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0); result = 0; } return result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index c07a3844ea0a..3df46906492d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed"; if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) - return 0; + return seq_release(inode, file); if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) { cause = "failed"; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 32912bd54ead..2ac1f41db5c0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ int __init ima_init(void) ima_used_chip = 1; if (!ima_used_chip) - pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); + pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=%d)\n", + rc); rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); if (rc) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 38b79d797aaf..c7c6619431d5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -231,12 +231,13 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) if (!isec) return -ENOMEM; - mutex_init(&isec->lock); + spin_lock_init(&isec->lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); isec->inode = inode; isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE; isec->task_sid = sid; + isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; inode->i_security = isec; return 0; @@ -247,7 +248,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent /* * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is - * allowed; when set to false, returns ERR_PTR(-ECHILD) when the label is + * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is * invalid. The @opt_dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode; * when no dentry is available, set it to NULL instead. */ @@ -1100,11 +1101,12 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options, } rc = -ENOMEM; - opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); + opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->mnt_opts) goto out_err; - opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC); + opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), + GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) { kfree(opts->mnt_opts); goto out_err; @@ -1380,7 +1382,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL; struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; - u32 sid; + u32 task_sid, sid = 0; + u16 sclass; struct dentry *dentry; #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 char *context = NULL; @@ -1388,12 +1391,15 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent int rc = 0; if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) - goto out; + return 0; - mutex_lock(&isec->lock); + spin_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) goto out_unlock; + if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) + isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); + sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) { /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, @@ -1406,12 +1412,18 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent goto out_unlock; } + sclass = isec->sclass; + task_sid = isec->task_sid; + sid = isec->sid; + isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING; + spin_unlock(&isec->lock); + switch (sbsec->behavior) { case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE: break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { - isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid; + sid = sbsec->def_sid; break; } /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one. @@ -1433,7 +1445,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could * be used again by userspace. */ - goto out_unlock; + goto out; } len = INITCONTEXTLEN; @@ -1441,7 +1453,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent if (!context) { rc = -ENOMEM; dput(dentry); - goto out_unlock; + goto out; } context[len] = '\0'; rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); @@ -1452,14 +1464,14 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc < 0) { dput(dentry); - goto out_unlock; + goto out; } len = rc; context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); if (!context) { rc = -ENOMEM; dput(dentry); - goto out_unlock; + goto out; } context[len] = '\0'; rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); @@ -1471,7 +1483,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); kfree(context); - goto out_unlock; + goto out; } /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ sid = sbsec->def_sid; @@ -1501,29 +1513,25 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent } } kfree(context); - isec->sid = sid; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: - isec->sid = isec->task_sid; + sid = task_sid; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: /* Default to the fs SID. */ - isec->sid = sbsec->sid; + sid = sbsec->sid; /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ - isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); - rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid, - isec->sclass, NULL, &sid); + rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid, sclass, NULL, &sid); if (rc) - goto out_unlock; - isec->sid = sid; + goto out; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: - isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; + sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; break; default: /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ - isec->sid = sbsec->sid; + sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on @@ -1546,25 +1554,30 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent * could be used again by userspace. */ if (!dentry) - goto out_unlock; - isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); - rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, + goto out; + rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass, sbsec->flags, &sid); dput(dentry); if (rc) - goto out_unlock; - isec->sid = sid; + goto out; } break; } - isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; +out: + spin_lock(&isec->lock); + if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) { + if (!sid || rc) { + isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; + goto out_unlock; + } + + isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; + isec->sid = sid; + } out_unlock: - mutex_unlock(&isec->lock); -out: - if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) - isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); + spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return rc; } @@ -3198,9 +3211,11 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, } isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); + spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; + spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return; } @@ -3293,9 +3308,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, if (rc) return rc; + spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; + spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return 0; } @@ -3956,8 +3973,11 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; u32 sid = task_sid(p); + spin_lock(&isec->lock); + isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; + spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ @@ -4276,24 +4296,24 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec; + u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); + u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; int err = 0; - isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); - - if (kern) - isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; - else { - err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid)); + if (!kern) { + err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid); if (err) return err; } + isec->sclass = sclass; + isec->sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; if (sock->sk) { sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; - sksec->sid = isec->sid; - sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; + sksec->sclass = sclass; + sksec->sid = sid; err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family); } @@ -4469,16 +4489,22 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) int err; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct inode_security_struct *newisec; + u16 sclass; + u32 sid; err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT); if (err) return err; - newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock)); - isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); - newisec->sclass = isec->sclass; - newisec->sid = isec->sid; + spin_lock(&isec->lock); + sclass = isec->sclass; + sid = isec->sid; + spin_unlock(&isec->lock); + + newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock)); + newisec->sclass = sclass; + newisec->sid = sid; newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; return 0; @@ -5981,9 +6007,9 @@ static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; - mutex_lock(&isec->lock); + spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; - mutex_unlock(&isec->lock); + spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } /* diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 1f1f4b2f6018..e2d4ad3a4b4c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read" +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ +#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS. +#endif + /* * Note: The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket", * and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket". diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index c21e135460a5..e8dab0f02c72 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ struct task_security_struct { enum label_initialized { LABEL_INVALID, /* invalid or not initialized */ - LABEL_INITIALIZED /* initialized */ + LABEL_INITIALIZED, /* initialized */ + LABEL_PENDING }; struct inode_security_struct { @@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ struct inode_security_struct { u32 sid; /* SID of this object */ u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */ unsigned char initialized; /* initialization flag */ - struct mutex lock; + spinlock_t lock; }; struct file_security_struct { diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 72c145dd799f..cf9293e01fc1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out; + new_value = !!new_value; + if (new_value != selinux_enforcing) { length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE); if (length) @@ -1301,7 +1303,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void) goto out; isec->sid = sid; - isec->initialized = 1; + isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; inode->i_fop = &sel_bool_ops; inode->i_ino = i|SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET; d_add(dentry, inode); @@ -1834,7 +1836,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security; isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL; isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; - isec->initialized = 1; + isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3)); d_add(dentry, inode); diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 51fd30192c08..77abe2efacae 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -336,7 +336,6 @@ extern int smack_ptrace_rule; extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor; extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat; extern struct smack_known smack_known_huh; -extern struct smack_known smack_known_invalid; extern struct smack_known smack_known_star; extern struct smack_known smack_known_web; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 23e5808a0970..356e3764cad9 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -36,11 +36,6 @@ struct smack_known smack_known_floor = { .smk_secid = 5, }; -struct smack_known smack_known_invalid = { - .smk_known = "", - .smk_secid = 6, -}; - struct smack_known smack_known_web = { .smk_known = "@", .smk_secid = 7, @@ -615,7 +610,7 @@ struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid) * of a secid that is not on the list. */ rcu_read_unlock(); - return &smack_known_invalid; + return &smack_known_huh; } /* diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 1cb060293505..4d90257d03ad 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -692,12 +692,12 @@ static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options, } } - opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); + opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->mnt_opts) goto out_err; opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), - GFP_ATOMIC); + GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) { kfree(opts->mnt_opts); goto out_err; @@ -769,6 +769,31 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED) return 0; + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + /* + * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values. + */ + if (num_opts) + return -EPERM; + /* + * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller. + */ + skp = smk_of_current(); + sp->smk_root = skp; + sp->smk_default = skp; + /* + * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled + * backing store it's okay to trust security labels + * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted. + */ + if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns && + sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC && + sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) { + transmute = 1; + sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED; + } + } + sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED; for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) { @@ -809,31 +834,6 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, } } - if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { - /* - * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values. - */ - if (num_opts) - return -EPERM; - /* - * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller. - */ - skp = smk_of_current(); - sp->smk_root = skp; - sp->smk_default = skp; - /* - * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled - * backing store it's okay to trust security labels - * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted. - */ - if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns && - sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC && - sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) { - transmute = 1; - sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED; - } - } - /* * Initialize the root inode. */ @@ -1384,20 +1384,14 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); if (!IS_ERR(skp)) isp->smk_inode = skp; - else - isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_invalid; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) { skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); if (!IS_ERR(skp)) isp->smk_task = skp; - else - isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); if (!IS_ERR(skp)) isp->smk_mmap = skp; - else - isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid; } return; @@ -2023,6 +2017,8 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, if (new_tsp == NULL) return -ENOMEM; + new->security = new_tsp; + rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp); if (rc != 0) return rc; @@ -2032,7 +2028,6 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, if (rc != 0) return rc; - new->security = new_tsp; return 0; } @@ -2067,12 +2062,8 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security; - struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid); - - if (skp == NULL) - return -EINVAL; - new_tsp->smk_task = skp; + new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid); return 0; } @@ -2337,8 +2328,16 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags) if (ssp == NULL) return -ENOMEM; - ssp->smk_in = skp; - ssp->smk_out = skp; + /* + * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label. + */ + if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) { + ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web; + ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web; + } else { + ssp->smk_in = skp; + ssp->smk_out = skp; + } ssp->smk_packet = NULL; sk->sk_security = ssp; @@ -2435,17 +2434,17 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip) list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) { /* + * If the label is NULL the entry has + * been renounced. Ignore it. + */ + if (snp->smk_label == NULL) + continue; + /* * we break after finding the first match because * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask * so we have found the most specific match */ for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - /* - * If the label is NULL the entry has - * been renounced. Ignore it. - */ - if (snp->smk_label == NULL) - continue; if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) != snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) { found = 0; @@ -3661,10 +3660,11 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, return PTR_ERR(skp); /* - * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label. + * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label + * and the star ("*") label. */ - if (skp == &smack_known_web) - return -EPERM; + if (skp == &smack_known_web || skp == &smack_known_star) + return -EINVAL; if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { rc = -EPERM; @@ -3884,21 +3884,11 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, return &smack_known_web; return &smack_known_star; } - if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) { + if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) /* * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid. */ - skp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid); - /* - * This has got to be a bug because it is - * impossible to specify a fallback without - * specifying the label, which will ensure - * it has a secid, and the only way to get a - * secid is from a fallback. - */ - BUG_ON(skp == NULL); - return skp; - } + return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid); /* * Without guidance regarding the smack value * for the packet fall back on the network @@ -4761,7 +4751,6 @@ static __init void init_smack_known_list(void) mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock); mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock); mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock); - mutex_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules_lock); mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock); /* * Initialize rule lists @@ -4770,7 +4759,6 @@ static __init void init_smack_known_list(void) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules); /* * Create the known labels list @@ -4779,7 +4767,6 @@ static __init void init_smack_known_list(void) smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat); smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star); smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor); - smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_invalid); smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web); } diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 6492fe96cae4..13743a01b35b 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -2998,9 +2998,6 @@ static int __init init_smk_fs(void) rc = smk_preset_netlabel(&smack_known_huh); if (err == 0 && rc < 0) err = rc; - rc = smk_preset_netlabel(&smack_known_invalid); - if (err == 0 && rc < 0) - err = rc; rc = smk_preset_netlabel(&smack_known_star); if (err == 0 && rc < 0) err = rc; diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c index 0309f2111c70..968e5e0a3f81 100644 --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ static int task_is_descendant(struct task_struct *parent, * @tracer: the task_struct of the process attempting ptrace * @tracee: the task_struct of the process to be ptraced * - * Returns 1 if tracer has is ptracer exception ancestor for tracee. + * Returns 1 if tracer has a ptracer exception ancestor for tracee. */ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee) @@ -320,6 +320,18 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer, bool found = false; rcu_read_lock(); + + /* + * If there's already an active tracing relationship, then make an + * exception for the sake of other accesses, like process_vm_rw(). + */ + parent = ptrace_parent(tracee); + if (parent != NULL && same_thread_group(parent, tracer)) { + rc = 1; + goto unlock; + } + + /* Look for a PR_SET_PTRACER relationship. */ if (!thread_group_leader(tracee)) tracee = rcu_dereference(tracee->group_leader); list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) { @@ -334,6 +346,8 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer, if (found && (parent == NULL || task_is_descendant(parent, tracer))) rc = 1; + +unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; |