diff options
| author | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2012-11-16 04:03:12 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2012-11-19 02:33:37 +0100 |
| commit | 3594698a1fb8e5ae60a92c72ce9ca280256939a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 54360b8a85136ebfeb10f76cfa207a23fb6035e9 | |
| parent | net: Enable a userns root rtnl calls that are safe for unprivilged users (diff) | |
| download | linux-3594698a1fb8e5ae60a92c72ce9ca280256939a7.tar.xz linux-3594698a1fb8e5ae60a92c72ce9ca280256939a7.zip | |
net: Make CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE per user namespace
Allow privileged users in any user namespace to bind to
privileged sockets in network namespaces they control.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/socket.c | 8 |
3 files changed, 10 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c index 4f5f22061e1c..24b384b7903e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c @@ -474,6 +474,7 @@ int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)uaddr; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); + struct net *net = sock_net(sk); unsigned short snum; int chk_addr_ret; int err; @@ -497,7 +498,7 @@ int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) goto out; } - chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(sock_net(sk), addr->sin_addr.s_addr); + chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(net, addr->sin_addr.s_addr); /* Not specified by any standard per-se, however it breaks too * many applications when removed. It is unfortunate since @@ -517,7 +518,8 @@ int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) snum = ntohs(addr->sin_port); err = -EACCES; - if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) + if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && + !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) goto out; /* We keep a pair of addresses. rcv_saddr is the one diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c index 4b29f6b52c11..b043c60429bd 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) return -EINVAL; snum = ntohs(addr->sin6_port); - if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) + if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) return -EACCES; lock_sock(sk); diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 15379acd9c08..2e897069310a 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -335,6 +335,7 @@ static struct sctp_af *sctp_sockaddr_af(struct sctp_sock *opt, /* Bind a local address either to an endpoint or to an association. */ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_do_bind(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr, int len) { + struct net *net = sock_net(sk); struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk); struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sp->ep; struct sctp_bind_addr *bp = &ep->base.bind_addr; @@ -378,7 +379,8 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_do_bind(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr, int len) } } - if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) + if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && + !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) return -EACCES; /* See if the address matches any of the addresses we may have @@ -1161,7 +1163,7 @@ static int __sctp_connect(struct sock* sk, * be permitted to open new associations. */ if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < PROT_SOCK && - !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) { + !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) { err = -EACCES; goto out_free; } @@ -1790,7 +1792,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, * associations. */ if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < PROT_SOCK && - !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) { + !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) { err = -EACCES; goto out_unlock; } |