Merge tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/linux

Pull fscrypt updates from Eric Biggers:
 "Adjust the timing of the fscrypt keyring destruction, to prepare for
  btrfs's fscrypt support.

  Also document that CephFS supports fscrypt now"

* tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/linux:
  fs: move fscrypt keyring destruction to after ->put_super
  f2fs: move release of block devices to after kill_block_super()
  fscrypt: document that CephFS supports fscrypt now
  fscrypt: update comment for do_remove_key()
  fscrypt.rst: update definition of struct fscrypt_context_v2

5 files changed, 29 insertions, 25 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
index 1b84f818e574..e86b886b64d0 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
@@ -31,15 +31,15 @@ However, except for filenames, fscrypt does not encrypt filesystem
 metadata.
 
 Unlike eCryptfs, which is a stacked filesystem, fscrypt is integrated
-directly into supported filesystems --- currently ext4, F2FS, and
-UBIFS.  This allows encrypted files to be read and written without
-caching both the decrypted and encrypted pages in the pagecache,
-thereby nearly halving the memory used and bringing it in line with
-unencrypted files.  Similarly, half as many dentries and inodes are
-needed.  eCryptfs also limits encrypted filenames to 143 bytes,
-causing application compatibility issues; fscrypt allows the full 255
-bytes (NAME_MAX).  Finally, unlike eCryptfs, the fscrypt API can be
-used by unprivileged users, with no need to mount anything.
+directly into supported filesystems --- currently ext4, F2FS, UBIFS,
+and CephFS.  This allows encrypted files to be read and written
+without caching both the decrypted and encrypted pages in the
+pagecache, thereby nearly halving the memory used and bringing it in
+line with unencrypted files.  Similarly, half as many dentries and
+inodes are needed.  eCryptfs also limits encrypted filenames to 143
+bytes, causing application compatibility issues; fscrypt allows the
+full 255 bytes (NAME_MAX).  Finally, unlike eCryptfs, the fscrypt API
+can be used by unprivileged users, with no need to mount anything.
 
 fscrypt does not support encrypting files in-place.  Instead, it
 supports marking an empty directory as encrypted.  Then, after
@@ -1382,7 +1382,8 @@ directory.)  These structs are defined as follows::
             u8 contents_encryption_mode;
             u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
             u8 flags;
-            u8 __reserved[4];
+            u8 log2_data_unit_size;
+            u8 __reserved[3];
             u8 master_key_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE];
             u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE];
     };
diff --git a/fs/crypto/Kconfig b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
index 2d0c8922f635..5aff5934baa1 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ config FS_ENCRYPTION
 	  feature is similar to ecryptfs, but it is more memory
 	  efficient since it avoids caching the encrypted and
 	  decrypted pages in the page cache.  Currently Ext4,
-	  F2FS and UBIFS make use of this feature.
+	  F2FS, UBIFS, and CephFS make use of this feature.
 
 # Filesystems supporting encryption must select this if FS_ENCRYPTION.  This
 # allows the algorithms to be built as modules when all the filesystems are,
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
index f34a9b0b9e92..0edf0b58daa7 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
@@ -1002,9 +1002,9 @@ static int try_to_lock_encrypted_files(struct super_block *sb,
  * FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS (all_users=true) always removes the
  * key itself.
  *
- * To "remove the key itself", first we wipe the actual master key secret, so
- * that no more inodes can be unlocked with it.  Then we try to evict all cached
- * inodes that had been unlocked with the key.
+ * To "remove the key itself", first we transition the key to the "incompletely
+ * removed" state, so that no more inodes can be unlocked with it.  Then we try
+ * to evict all cached inodes that had been unlocked with the key.
  *
  * If all inodes were evicted, then we unlink the fscrypt_master_key from the
  * keyring.  Otherwise it remains in the keyring in the "incompletely removed"
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c
index 033af907c3b1..d66e0692ac02 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1717,12 +1717,10 @@ static void f2fs_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
 
 	kvfree(sbi->ckpt);
 
-	sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
 	if (sbi->s_chksum_driver)
 		crypto_free_shash(sbi->s_chksum_driver);
 	kfree(sbi->raw_super);
 
-	destroy_device_list(sbi);
 	f2fs_destroy_page_array_cache(sbi);
 	f2fs_destroy_xattr_caches(sbi);
 	mempool_destroy(sbi->write_io_dummy);
@@ -1738,7 +1736,6 @@ static void f2fs_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNICODE)
 	utf8_unload(sb->s_encoding);
 #endif
-	kfree(sbi);
 }
 
 int f2fs_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int sync)
@@ -4902,9 +4899,9 @@ static struct dentry *f2fs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
 
 static void kill_f2fs_super(struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	if (sb->s_root) {
-		struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(sb);
+	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(sb);
 
+	if (sb->s_root) {
 		set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_IS_CLOSE);
 		f2fs_stop_gc_thread(sbi);
 		f2fs_stop_discard_thread(sbi);
@@ -4931,6 +4928,12 @@ static void kill_f2fs_super(struct super_block *sb)
 			sb->s_flags &= ~SB_RDONLY;
 	}
 	kill_block_super(sb);
+	/* Release block devices last, after fscrypt_destroy_keyring(). */
+	if (sbi) {
+		destroy_device_list(sbi);
+		kfree(sbi);
+		sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
+	}
 }
 
 static struct file_system_type f2fs_fs_type = {
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index e35936000408..d35e85295489 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -637,12 +637,6 @@ void generic_shutdown_super(struct super_block *sb)
 		fsnotify_sb_delete(sb);
 		security_sb_delete(sb);
 
-		/*
-		 * Now that all potentially-encrypted inodes have been evicted,
-		 * the fscrypt keyring can be destroyed.
-		 */
-		fscrypt_destroy_keyring(sb);
-
 		if (sb->s_dio_done_wq) {
 			destroy_workqueue(sb->s_dio_done_wq);
 			sb->s_dio_done_wq = NULL;
@@ -651,6 +645,12 @@ void generic_shutdown_super(struct super_block *sb)
 		if (sop->put_super)
 			sop->put_super(sb);
 
+		/*
+		 * Now that all potentially-encrypted inodes have been evicted,
+		 * the fscrypt keyring can be destroyed.
+		 */
+		fscrypt_destroy_keyring(sb);
+
 		if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(!list_empty(&sb->s_inodes),
 				"VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of %s (%s)",
 				sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name)) {