diff options
author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2019-12-07 06:05:14 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2019-12-07 06:05:14 +0100 |
commit | 5532946e339576097d7a0f5facc828e4d53d901b (patch) | |
tree | 725d07517fb3ffada269bee3a5c69861c6a831c8 | |
parent | Merge tag 'mlx5-fixes-2019-12-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kerne... (diff) | |
parent | tcp: Protect accesses to .ts_recent_stamp with {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() (diff) | |
download | linux-5532946e339576097d7a0f5facc828e4d53d901b.tar.xz linux-5532946e339576097d7a0f5facc828e4d53d901b.zip |
Merge branch 'tcp-fix-handling-of-stale-syncookies-timestamps'
Guillaume Nault says:
====================
tcp: fix handling of stale syncookies timestamps
The synflood timestamps (->ts_recent_stamp and ->synq_overflow_ts) are
only refreshed when the syncookie protection triggers. Therefore, their
value can become very far apart from jiffies if no synflood happens for
a long time.
If jiffies grows too much and wraps while the synflood timestamp isn't
refreshed, then time_after32() might consider the later to be in the
future. This can trick tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() into returning
erroneous values and rejecting valid ACKs.
Patch 1 handles the case of ACKs using legitimate syncookies.
Patch 2 handles the case of stray ACKs.
Patch 3 annotates lockless timestamp operations with READ_ONCE() and
WRITE_ONCE().
Changes from v3:
- Fix description of time_between32() (found by Eric Dumazet).
- Use more accurate Fixes tag in patch 3 (suggested by Eric Dumazet).
Changes from v2:
- Define and use time_between32() instead of a pair of
time_before32/time_after32 (suggested by Eric Dumazet).
- Use 'last_overflow - HZ' as lower bound in
tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(), to accommodate for concurrent
timestamp updates (found by Eric Dumazet).
- Add a third patch to annotate lockless accesses to .ts_recent_stamp.
Changes from v1:
- Initialising timestamps at socket creation time is not enough
because jiffies wraps in 24 days with HZ=1000 (Eric Dumazet).
Handle stale timestamps in tcp_synq_overflow() and
tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() instead.
- Rework commit description.
- Add a second patch to handle the case of stray ACKs.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/time.h | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/net/tcp.h | 27 |
2 files changed, 32 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/time.h b/include/linux/time.h index 0760a4f5a15c..8e10b9dbd8c2 100644 --- a/include/linux/time.h +++ b/include/linux/time.h @@ -97,4 +97,17 @@ static inline bool itimerspec64_valid(const struct itimerspec64 *its) */ #define time_after32(a, b) ((s32)((u32)(b) - (u32)(a)) < 0) #define time_before32(b, a) time_after32(a, b) + +/** + * time_between32 - check if a 32-bit timestamp is within a given time range + * @t: the time which may be within [l,h] + * @l: the lower bound of the range + * @h: the higher bound of the range + * + * time_before32(t, l, h) returns true if @l <= @t <= @h. All operands are + * treated as 32-bit integers. + * + * Equivalent to !(time_before32(@t, @l) || time_after32(@t, @h)). + */ +#define time_between32(t, l, h) ((u32)(h) - (u32)(l) >= (u32)(t) - (u32)(l)) #endif diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index 36f195fb576a..86b9a8766648 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -494,15 +494,16 @@ static inline void tcp_synq_overflow(const struct sock *sk) reuse = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_reuseport_cb); if (likely(reuse)) { last_overflow = READ_ONCE(reuse->synq_overflow_ts); - if (time_after32(now, last_overflow + HZ)) + if (!time_between32(now, last_overflow, + last_overflow + HZ)) WRITE_ONCE(reuse->synq_overflow_ts, now); return; } } - last_overflow = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp; - if (time_after32(now, last_overflow + HZ)) - tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = now; + last_overflow = READ_ONCE(tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp); + if (!time_between32(now, last_overflow, last_overflow + HZ)) + WRITE_ONCE(tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp, now); } /* syncookies: no recent synqueue overflow on this listening socket? */ @@ -517,13 +518,23 @@ static inline bool tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(const struct sock *sk) reuse = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_reuseport_cb); if (likely(reuse)) { last_overflow = READ_ONCE(reuse->synq_overflow_ts); - return time_after32(now, last_overflow + - TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID); + return !time_between32(now, last_overflow - HZ, + last_overflow + + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID); } } - last_overflow = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp; - return time_after32(now, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID); + last_overflow = READ_ONCE(tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp); + + /* If last_overflow <= jiffies <= last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID, + * then we're under synflood. However, we have to use + * 'last_overflow - HZ' as lower bound. That's because a concurrent + * tcp_synq_overflow() could update .ts_recent_stamp after we read + * jiffies but before we store .ts_recent_stamp into last_overflow, + * which could lead to rejecting a valid syncookie. + */ + return !time_between32(now, last_overflow - HZ, + last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID); } static inline u32 tcp_cookie_time(void) |