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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-02-20 20:47:11 +0100 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-02-20 20:47:11 +0100 |
commit | 32e2d7c8afb35d59fbf7d96619538427568ecb68 (patch) | |
tree | 966713f2a72ca241d4285210cd8bd8034bbaebac | |
parent | Merge branch 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kerne... (diff) | |
parent | efi/libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific (diff) | |
download | linux-32e2d7c8afb35d59fbf7d96619538427568ecb68.tar.xz linux-32e2d7c8afb35d59fbf7d96619538427568ecb68.zip |
Merge branch 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- Changes to the EFI init code to establish whether secure boot
authentication was performed at boot time. (Josh Boyer, David
Howells)
- Wire up the UEFI memory attributes table for x86. This eliminates
any runtime memory regions that are both writable and executable,
on recent firmware versions. (Sai Praneeth)
- Move the BGRT init code to an earlier stage so that we can still
use efi_mem_reserve(). (Dave Young)
- Preserve debug symbols in the ARM/arm64 UEFI stub (Ard Biesheuvel)
- Code deduplication work and various other cleanups (Lukas Wunner)
- ... plus various other fixes and cleanups"
* 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efi/libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific
efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch()
efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
efi: Get and store the secure boot status
efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
efi/libstub: Preserve .debug sections after absolute relocation check
efi/x86: Add debug code to print cooked memmap
efi/x86: Move the EFI BGRT init code to early init code
efi: Use typed function pointers for the runtime services table
efi/esrt: Fix typo in pr_err() message
x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE
efi: Introduce the EFI_MEM_ATTR bit and set it from the memory attributes table
efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures
x86/efi: Deduplicate efi_char16_printk()
efi: Deduplicate efi_file_size() / _read() / _close()
27 files changed, 383 insertions, 413 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt index 95a4d34af3fd..b8527c6b7646 100644 --- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt +++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning 1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below) 1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer (below) +1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled +1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware 1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders 290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures 2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h index 0b06f5341b45..e4e6a9d6a825 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ void efi_virtmap_unload(void); #define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__) #define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__) +#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__) #define efi_is_64bit() (false) #define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h index 0b6b1633017f..e7445281e534 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ int efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md); #define efi_call_early(f, ...) sys_table_arg->boottime->f(__VA_ARGS__) #define __efi_call_early(f, ...) f(__VA_ARGS__) +#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) sys_table_arg->runtime->f(__VA_ARGS__) #define efi_is_64bit() (true) #define efi_call_proto(protocol, f, instance, ...) \ diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c index ff01c8fc76f7..801c7a158e55 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c @@ -32,160 +32,13 @@ static void setup_boot_services##bits(struct efi_config *c) \ \ table = (typeof(table))sys_table; \ \ + c->runtime_services = table->runtime; \ c->boot_services = table->boottime; \ c->text_output = table->con_out; \ } BOOT_SERVICES(32); BOOT_SERVICES(64); -void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *, efi_char16_t *); - -static efi_status_t -__file_size32(void *__fh, efi_char16_t *filename_16, - void **handle, u64 *file_sz) -{ - efi_file_handle_32_t *h, *fh = __fh; - efi_file_info_t *info; - efi_status_t status; - efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID; - u32 info_sz; - - status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)fh->open, fh, &h, filename_16, - EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0); - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { - efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to open file: "); - efi_char16_printk(sys_table, filename_16); - efi_printk(sys_table, "\n"); - return status; - } - - *handle = h; - - info_sz = 0; - status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)h->get_info, h, &info_guid, - &info_sz, NULL); - if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { - efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get file info size\n"); - return status; - } - -grow: - status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA, - info_sz, (void **)&info); - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { - efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n"); - return status; - } - - status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)h->get_info, h, &info_guid, - &info_sz, info); - if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { - efi_call_early(free_pool, info); - goto grow; - } - - *file_sz = info->file_size; - efi_call_early(free_pool, info); - - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) - efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get initrd info\n"); - - return status; -} - -static efi_status_t -__file_size64(void *__fh, efi_char16_t *filename_16, - void **handle, u64 *file_sz) -{ - efi_file_handle_64_t *h, *fh = __fh; - efi_file_info_t *info; - efi_status_t status; - efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID; - u64 info_sz; - - status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)fh->open, fh, &h, filename_16, - EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0); - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { - efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to open file: "); - efi_char16_printk(sys_table, filename_16); - efi_printk(sys_table, "\n"); - return status; - } - - *handle = h; - - info_sz = 0; - status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)h->get_info, h, &info_guid, - &info_sz, NULL); - if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { - efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get file info size\n"); - return status; - } - -grow: - status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA, - info_sz, (void **)&info); - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { - efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n"); - return status; - } - - status = efi_early->call((unsigned long)h->get_info, h, &info_guid, - &info_sz, info); - if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { - efi_call_early(free_pool, info); - goto grow; - } - - *file_sz = info->file_size; - efi_call_early(free_pool, info); - - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) - efi_printk(sys_table, "Failed to get initrd info\n"); - - return status; -} -efi_status_t -efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, void *__fh, - efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle, u64 *file_sz) -{ - if (efi_early->is64) - return __file_size64(__fh, filename_16, handle, file_sz); - - return __file_size32(__fh, filename_16, handle, file_sz); -} - -efi_status_t -efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr) -{ - unsigned long func; - - if (efi_early->is64) { - efi_file_handle_64_t *fh = handle; - - func = (unsigned long)fh->read; - return efi_early->call(func, handle, size, addr); - } else { - efi_file_handle_32_t *fh = handle; - - func = (unsigned long)fh->read; - return efi_early->call(func, handle, size, addr); - } -} - -efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle) -{ - if (efi_early->is64) { - efi_file_handle_64_t *fh = handle; - - return efi_early->call((unsigned long)fh->close, handle); - } else { - efi_file_handle_32_t *fh = handle; - - return efi_early->call((unsigned long)fh->close, handle); - } -} - static inline efi_status_t __open_volume32(void *__image, void **__fh) { efi_file_io_interface_t *io; @@ -249,30 +102,8 @@ efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, void *__image, void **__fh) void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *table, efi_char16_t *str) { - unsigned long output_string; - size_t offset; - - if (efi_early->is64) { - struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol_64 *out; - u64 *func; - - offset = offsetof(typeof(*out), output_string); - output_string = efi_early->text_output + offset; - out = (typeof(out))(unsigned long)efi_early->text_output; - func = (u64 *)output_string; - - efi_early->call(*func, out, str); - } else { - struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol_32 *out; - u32 *func; - - offset = offsetof(typeof(*out), output_string); - output_string = efi_early->text_output + offset; - out = (typeof(out))(unsigned long)efi_early->text_output; - func = (u32 *)output_string; - - efi_early->call(*func, out, str); - } + efi_call_proto(efi_simple_text_output_protocol, output_string, + efi_early->text_output, str); } static efi_status_t @@ -1157,6 +988,13 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c, else setup_boot_services32(efi_early); + /* + * If the boot loader gave us a value for secure_boot then we use that, + * otherwise we ask the BIOS. + */ + if (boot_params->secure_boot == efi_secureboot_mode_unset) + boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table); + setup_graphics(boot_params); setup_efi_pci(boot_params); diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S index fd0b6a272dd5..d85b9625e836 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry) /* Relocate efi_config->call() */ leal efi32_config(%esi), %eax - add %esi, 32(%eax) + add %esi, 40(%eax) pushl %eax call make_boot_params @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ ENTRY(efi32_stub_entry) /* Relocate efi_config->call() */ leal efi32_config(%esi), %eax - add %esi, 32(%eax) + add %esi, 40(%eax) pushl %eax 2: call efi_main @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ relocated: #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB .data efi32_config: - .fill 4,8,0 + .fill 5,8,0 .long efi_call_phys .long 0 .byte 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S index 4d85e600db78..d2ae1f821e0c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_pe_entry) /* * Relocate efi_config->call(). */ - addq %rbp, efi64_config+32(%rip) + addq %rbp, efi64_config+40(%rip) movq %rax, %rdi call make_boot_params @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ handover_entry: * Relocate efi_config->call(). */ movq efi_config(%rip), %rax - addq %rbp, 32(%rax) + addq %rbp, 40(%rax) 2: movq efi_config(%rip), %rdi call efi_main @@ -456,14 +456,14 @@ efi_config: #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MIXED .global efi32_config efi32_config: - .fill 4,8,0 + .fill 5,8,0 .quad efi64_thunk .byte 0 #endif .global efi64_config efi64_config: - .fill 4,8,0 + .fill 5,8,0 .quad efi_call .byte 1 #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_STUB */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h index e99675b9c861..2f77bcefe6b4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h @@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ static inline efi_status_t efi_thunk_set_virtual_address_map( struct efi_config { u64 image_handle; u64 table; + u64 runtime_services; u64 boot_services; u64 text_output; efi_status_t (*call)(unsigned long, ...); @@ -226,6 +227,10 @@ static inline bool efi_is_64bit(void) #define __efi_call_early(f, ...) \ __efi_early()->call((unsigned long)f, __VA_ARGS__); +#define efi_call_runtime(f, ...) \ + __efi_early()->call(efi_table_attr(efi_runtime_services, f, \ + __efi_early()->runtime_services), __VA_ARGS__) + extern bool efi_reboot_required(void); #else diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h index b10bf319ed20..5138dacf8bb8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h @@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ struct boot_params { __u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */ __u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */ __u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */ - __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */ + __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */ + __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */ /* * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S. * diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c index 64422f850e95..7ff007ed899d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include <linux/bootmem.h> #include <linux/ioport.h> #include <linux/pci.h> +#include <linux/efi-bgrt.h> #include <asm/irqdomain.h> #include <asm/pci_x86.h> @@ -1557,6 +1558,12 @@ int __init early_acpi_boot_init(void) return 0; } +static int __init acpi_parse_bgrt(struct acpi_table_header *table) +{ + efi_bgrt_init(table); + return 0; +} + int __init acpi_boot_init(void) { /* those are executed after early-quirks are executed */ @@ -1581,6 +1588,8 @@ int __init acpi_boot_init(void) acpi_process_madt(); acpi_table_parse(ACPI_SIG_HPET, acpi_parse_hpet); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT)) + acpi_table_parse(ACPI_SIG_BGRT, acpi_parse_bgrt); if (!acpi_noirq) x86_init.pci.init = pci_acpi_init; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c index c62e015b126c..de827d6ac8c2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ void common(void) { BLANK(); OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch); + OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot); OFFSET(BP_loadflags, boot_params, hdr.loadflags); OFFSET(BP_hardware_subarch, boot_params, hdr.hardware_subarch); OFFSET(BP_version, boot_params, hdr.version); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index 4cfba947d774..69780edf0dde 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -1176,6 +1176,20 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) /* Allocate bigger log buffer */ setup_log_buf(1); + if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) { + switch (boot_params.secure_boot) { + case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled: + pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n"); + break; + case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled: + pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); + break; + default: + pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n"); + break; + } + } + reserve_initrd(); acpi_table_upgrade(); diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c index 6aad870e8962..04ca8764f0c0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi-bgrt.c @@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ #include <linux/efi.h> #include <linux/efi-bgrt.h> -struct acpi_table_bgrt *bgrt_tab; -void *__initdata bgrt_image; +struct acpi_table_bgrt bgrt_tab; size_t __initdata bgrt_image_size; struct bmp_header { @@ -28,66 +27,58 @@ struct bmp_header { u32 size; } __packed; -void __init efi_bgrt_init(void) +void __init efi_bgrt_init(struct acpi_table_header *table) { - acpi_status status; void *image; struct bmp_header bmp_header; + struct acpi_table_bgrt *bgrt = &bgrt_tab; if (acpi_disabled) return; - status = acpi_get_table("BGRT", 0, - (struct acpi_table_header **)&bgrt_tab); - if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) - return; - - if (bgrt_tab->header.length < sizeof(*bgrt_tab)) { + if (table->length < sizeof(bgrt_tab)) { pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: invalid length %u (expected %zu)\n", - bgrt_tab->header.length, sizeof(*bgrt_tab)); + table->length, sizeof(bgrt_tab)); return; } - if (bgrt_tab->version != 1) { + *bgrt = *(struct acpi_table_bgrt *)table; + if (bgrt->version != 1) { pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: invalid version %u (expected 1)\n", - bgrt_tab->version); - return; + bgrt->version); + goto out; } - if (bgrt_tab->status & 0xfe) { + if (bgrt->status & 0xfe) { pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: reserved status bits are non-zero %u\n", - bgrt_tab->status); - return; + bgrt->status); + goto out; } - if (bgrt_tab->image_type != 0) { + if (bgrt->image_type != 0) { pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: invalid image type %u (expected 0)\n", - bgrt_tab->image_type); - return; + bgrt->image_type); + goto out; } - if (!bgrt_tab->image_address) { + if (!bgrt->image_address) { pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: null image address\n"); - return; + goto out; } - image = memremap(bgrt_tab->image_address, sizeof(bmp_header), MEMREMAP_WB); + image = early_memremap(bgrt->image_address, sizeof(bmp_header)); if (!image) { pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: failed to map image header memory\n"); - return; + goto out; } memcpy(&bmp_header, image, sizeof(bmp_header)); - memunmap(image); + early_memunmap(image, sizeof(bmp_header)); if (bmp_header.id != 0x4d42) { pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: Incorrect BMP magic number 0x%x (expected 0x4d42)\n", bmp_header.id); - return; + goto out; } bgrt_image_size = bmp_header.size; + efi_mem_reserve(bgrt->image_address, bgrt_image_size); - bgrt_image = memremap(bgrt_tab->image_address, bmp_header.size, MEMREMAP_WB); - if (!bgrt_image) { - pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: failed to map image memory\n"); - bgrt_image = NULL; - return; - } - - efi_mem_reserve(bgrt_tab->image_address, bgrt_image_size); + return; +out: + memset(bgrt, 0, sizeof(bgrt_tab)); } diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c index 274dfc481849..565dff3c9a12 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c @@ -542,11 +542,6 @@ void __init efi_init(void) efi_print_memmap(); } -void __init efi_late_init(void) -{ - efi_bgrt_init(); -} - void __init efi_set_executable(efi_memory_desc_t *md, bool executable) { u64 addr, npages; @@ -960,6 +955,11 @@ static void __init __efi_enter_virtual_mode(void) return; } + if (efi_enabled(EFI_DBG)) { + pr_info("EFI runtime memory map:\n"); + efi_print_memmap(); + } + BUG_ON(!efi.systab); if (efi_setup_page_tables(pa, 1 << pg_shift)) { diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c index 2f25a363068c..a4695da42d77 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c @@ -414,10 +414,44 @@ void __init parse_efi_setup(u64 phys_addr, u32 data_len) efi_setup = phys_addr + sizeof(struct setup_data); } -void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void) +static int __init efi_update_mappings(efi_memory_desc_t *md, unsigned long pf) { unsigned long pfn; pgd_t *pgd = efi_pgd; + int err1, err2; + + /* Update the 1:1 mapping */ + pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; + err1 = kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->phys_addr, md->num_pages, pf); + if (err1) { + pr_err("Error while updating 1:1 mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n", + md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr); + } + + err2 = kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->virt_addr, md->num_pages, pf); + if (err2) { + pr_err("Error while updating VA mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n", + md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr); + } + + return err1 || err2; +} + +static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md) +{ + unsigned long pf = 0; + + if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP) + pf |= _PAGE_NX; + + if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO)) + pf |= _PAGE_RW; + + return efi_update_mappings(md, pf); +} + +void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void) +{ efi_memory_desc_t *md; if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) { @@ -426,6 +460,24 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void) return; } + /* + * Use the EFI Memory Attribute Table for mapping permissions if it + * exists, since it is intended to supersede EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE. + */ + if (efi_enabled(EFI_MEM_ATTR)) { + efi_memattr_apply_permissions(NULL, efi_update_mem_attr); + return; + } + + /* + * EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is intended to replace + * EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE. So, use EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE to update + * permissions only if EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is not + * published by the firmware. Even if we find a buggy implementation of + * EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE, don't fall back to + * EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE, because of the same reason. + */ + if (!efi_enabled(EFI_NX_PE_DATA)) return; @@ -446,15 +498,7 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void) (md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)) pf |= _PAGE_RW; - /* Update the 1:1 mapping */ - pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; - if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->phys_addr, md->num_pages, pf)) - pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n", - md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr); - - if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->virt_addr, md->num_pages, pf)) - pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n", - md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr); + efi_update_mappings(md, pf); } } diff --git a/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c b/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c index 75f128e766a9..ca28aa572aa9 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/bgrt.c @@ -15,40 +15,41 @@ #include <linux/sysfs.h> #include <linux/efi-bgrt.h> +static void *bgrt_image; static struct kobject *bgrt_kobj; static ssize_t show_version(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->version); + return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.version); } static DEVICE_ATTR(version, S_IRUGO, show_version, NULL); static ssize_t show_status(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->status); + return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.status); } static DEVICE_ATTR(status, S_IRUGO, show_status, NULL); static ssize_t show_type(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->image_type); + return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.image_type); } static DEVICE_ATTR(type, S_IRUGO, show_type, NULL); static ssize_t show_xoffset(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->image_offset_x); + return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.image_offset_x); } static DEVICE_ATTR(xoffset, S_IRUGO, show_xoffset, NULL); static ssize_t show_yoffset(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab->image_offset_y); + return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", bgrt_tab.image_offset_y); } static DEVICE_ATTR(yoffset, S_IRUGO, show_yoffset, NULL); @@ -84,15 +85,24 @@ static int __init bgrt_init(void) { int ret; - if (!bgrt_image) + if (!bgrt_tab.image_address) return -ENODEV; + bgrt_image = memremap(bgrt_tab.image_address, bgrt_image_size, + MEMREMAP_WB); + if (!bgrt_image) { + pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: failed to map image memory\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + bin_attr_image.private = bgrt_image; bin_attr_image.size = bgrt_image_size; bgrt_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("bgrt", acpi_kobj); - if (!bgrt_kobj) - return -EINVAL; + if (!bgrt_kobj) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_memmap; + } ret = sysfs_create_group(bgrt_kobj, &bgrt_attribute_group); if (ret) @@ -102,6 +112,8 @@ static int __init bgrt_init(void) out_kobject: kobject_put(bgrt_kobj); +out_memmap: + memunmap(bgrt_image); return ret; } device_initcall(bgrt_init); diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c index f853ad2c4ca0..1027d7b44358 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c @@ -250,7 +250,6 @@ void __init efi_init(void) } reserve_regions(); - efi_memattr_init(); efi_esrt_init(); efi_memmap_unmap(); diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c index 92914801e388..e7d404059b73 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c @@ -529,6 +529,8 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz, } } + efi_memattr_init(); + /* Parse the EFI Properties table if it exists */ if (efi.properties_table != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { efi_properties_table_t *tbl; diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c index 14914074f716..08b026864d4e 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ void __init efi_esrt_init(void) max -= efi.esrt; if (max < size) { - pr_err("ESRT header doen't fit on single memory map entry. (size: %zu max: %zu)\n", + pr_err("ESRT header doesn't fit on single memory map entry. (size: %zu max: %zu)\n", size, max); return; } diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile index d564d25df8ab..f7425960f6a5 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_X86) += -m$(BITS) -D__KERNEL__ -O2 \ -mno-mmx -mno-sse cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM64) := $(subst -pg,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) -cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM) := $(subst -pg,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) -g0 \ +cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM) := $(subst -pg,,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) \ -fno-builtin -fpic -mno-single-pic-base cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in. KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n -lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o +lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64 arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ CFLAGS_arm64-stub.o := -DTEXT_OFFSET=$(TEXT_OFFSET) extra-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) := $(lib-y) lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) := $(patsubst %.o,%.stub.o,$(lib-y)) -STUBCOPY_FLAGS-y := -R .debug* -R *ksymtab* -R *kcrctab* +STUBCOPY_RM-y := -R *ksymtab* -R *kcrctab* STUBCOPY_FLAGS-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += --prefix-alloc-sections=.init \ --prefix-symbols=__efistub_ STUBCOPY_RELOC-$(CONFIG_ARM64) := R_AARCH64_ABS @@ -68,17 +68,25 @@ STUBCOPY_RELOC-$(CONFIG_ARM64) := R_AARCH64_ABS $(obj)/%.stub.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE $(call if_changed,stubcopy) +# +# Strip debug sections and some other sections that may legally contain +# absolute relocations, so that we can inspect the remaining sections for +# such relocations. If none are found, regenerate the output object, but +# this time, use objcopy and leave all sections in place. +# quiet_cmd_stubcopy = STUBCPY $@ - cmd_stubcopy = if $(OBJCOPY) $(STUBCOPY_FLAGS-y) $< $@; then \ - $(OBJDUMP) -r $@ | grep $(STUBCOPY_RELOC-y) \ - && (echo >&2 "$@: absolute symbol references not allowed in the EFI stub"; \ - rm -f $@; /bin/false); else /bin/false; fi + cmd_stubcopy = if $(STRIP) --strip-debug $(STUBCOPY_RM-y) -o $@ $<; \ + then if $(OBJDUMP) -r $@ | grep $(STUBCOPY_RELOC-y); \ + then (echo >&2 "$@: absolute symbol references not allowed in the EFI stub"; \ + rm -f $@; /bin/false); \ + else $(OBJCOPY) $(STUBCOPY_FLAGS-y) $< $@; fi \ + else /bin/false; fi # # ARM discards the .data section because it disallows r/w data in the # decompressor. So move our .data to .data.efistub, which is preserved # explicitly by the decompressor linker script. # -STUBCOPY_FLAGS-$(CONFIG_ARM) += --rename-section .data=.data.efistub \ - -R ___ksymtab+sort -R ___kcrctab+sort +STUBCOPY_FLAGS-$(CONFIG_ARM) += --rename-section .data=.data.efistub +STUBCOPY_RM-$(CONFIG_ARM) += -R ___ksymtab+sort -R ___kcrctab+sort STUBCOPY_RELOC-$(CONFIG_ARM) := R_ARM_ABS diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c index b4f7d78f9e8b..d4056c6be1ec 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c @@ -20,52 +20,6 @@ bool __nokaslr; -static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) -{ - static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = { - 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 }; - static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = { - 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 }; - - efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; - efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable; - u8 val; - unsigned long size = sizeof(val); - efi_status_t status; - - status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid, - NULL, &size, &val); - - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) - goto out_efi_err; - - if (val == 0) - return 0; - - status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid, - NULL, &size, &val); - - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) - goto out_efi_err; - - if (val == 1) - return 0; - - return 1; - -out_efi_err: - switch (status) { - case EFI_NOT_FOUND: - return 0; - case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR: - return -EIO; - case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION: - return -EACCES; - default: - return -EINVAL; - } -} - efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__image, void **__fh) { @@ -91,75 +45,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, return status; } -efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle) -{ - efi_file_handle_t *fh = handle; - - return fh->close(handle); -} - -efi_status_t -efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr) -{ - efi_file_handle_t *fh = handle; - - return fh->read(handle, size, addr); -} - - -efi_status_t -efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__fh, - efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle, u64 *file_sz) -{ - efi_file_handle_t *h, *fh = __fh; - efi_file_info_t *info; - efi_status_t status; - efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID; - unsigned long info_sz; - - status = fh->open(fh, &h, filename_16, EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0); - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { - efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to open file: "); - efi_char16_printk(sys_table_arg, filename_16); - efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "\n"); - return status; - } - - *handle = h; - - info_sz = 0; - status = h->get_info(h, &info_guid, &info_sz, NULL); - if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { - efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get file info size\n"); - return status; - } - -grow: - status = sys_table_arg->boottime->allocate_pool(EFI_LOADER_DATA, - info_sz, (void **)&info); - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { - efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n"); - return status; - } - - status = h->get_info(h, &info_guid, &info_sz, - info); - if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { - sys_table_arg->boottime->free_pool(info); - goto grow; - } - - *file_sz = info->file_size; - sys_table_arg->boottime->free_pool(info); - - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) - efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get initrd info\n"); - - return status; -} - - - void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, efi_char16_t *str) { @@ -226,7 +111,7 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table, efi_guid_t loaded_image_proto = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID; unsigned long reserve_addr = 0; unsigned long reserve_size = 0; - int secure_boot = 0; + enum efi_secureboot_mode secure_boot; struct screen_info *si; /* Check if we were booted by the EFI firmware */ @@ -296,19 +181,14 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table, pr_efi_err(sys_table, "Failed to parse EFI cmdline options\n"); secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table); - if (secure_boot > 0) - pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n"); - - if (secure_boot < 0) { - pr_efi_err(sys_table, - "could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n"); - } /* - * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so - * ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. + * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so ignore + * 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. We assume that secure + * boot is enabled if we can't determine its state. */ - if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) { + if (secure_boot != efi_secureboot_mode_disabled && + strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) { pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n"); } else { status = handle_cmdline_files(sys_table, image, cmdline_ptr, diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c index 757badc1debb..919822b7773d 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c @@ -338,6 +338,69 @@ void efi_free(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, unsigned long size, efi_call_early(free_pages, addr, nr_pages); } +static efi_status_t efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__fh, + efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle, + u64 *file_sz) +{ + efi_file_handle_t *h, *fh = __fh; + efi_file_info_t *info; + efi_status_t status; + efi_guid_t info_guid = EFI_FILE_INFO_ID; + unsigned long info_sz; + + status = efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, open, fh, &h, filename_16, + EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, (u64)0); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to open file: "); + efi_char16_printk(sys_table_arg, filename_16); + efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "\n"); + return status; + } + + *handle = h; + + info_sz = 0; + status = efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, get_info, h, &info_guid, + &info_sz, NULL); + if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get file info size\n"); + return status; + } + +grow: + status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA, + info_sz, (void **)&info); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to alloc mem for file info\n"); + return status; + } + + status = efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, get_info, h, &info_guid, + &info_sz, info); + if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + efi_call_early(free_pool, info); + goto grow; + } + + *file_sz = info->file_size; + efi_call_early(free_pool, info); + + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + efi_printk(sys_table_arg, "Failed to get initrd info\n"); + + return status; +} + +static efi_status_t efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr) +{ + return efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, read, handle, size, addr); +} + +static efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle) +{ + return efi_call_proto(efi_file_handle, close, handle); +} + /* * Parse the ASCII string 'cmdline' for EFI options, denoted by the efi= * option, e.g. efi=nochunk. @@ -351,6 +414,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_parse_options(char *cmdline) char *str; /* + * Currently, the only efi= option we look for is 'nochunk', which + * is intended to work around known issues on certain x86 UEFI + * versions. So ignore for now on other architectures. + */ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86)) + return EFI_SUCCESS; + + /* * If no EFI parameters were specified on the cmdline we've got * nothing to do. */ @@ -523,7 +594,8 @@ efi_status_t handle_cmdline_files(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, size = files[j].size; while (size) { unsigned long chunksize; - if (size > __chunk_size) + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86) && size > __chunk_size) chunksize = __chunk_size; else chunksize = size; diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h index 0e2a96b12cb3..71c4d0e3c4ed 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h @@ -29,14 +29,6 @@ void efi_char16_printk(efi_system_table_t *, efi_char16_t *); efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__image, void **__fh); -efi_status_t efi_file_size(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, void *__fh, - efi_char16_t *filename_16, void **handle, - u64 *file_sz); - -efi_status_t efi_file_read(void *handle, unsigned long *size, void *addr); - -efi_status_t efi_file_close(void *handle); - unsigned long get_dram_base(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg); efi_status_t allocate_new_fdt_and_exit_boot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6def402bf569 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* + * Secure boot handling. + * + * Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited + * Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org + * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. + * Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> + * + * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the + * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2. + */ +#include <linux/efi.h> +#include <asm/efi.h> + +/* BIOS variables */ +static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; +static const efi_char16_t const efi_SecureBoot_name[] = { + 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 +}; +static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = { + 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 +}; + +/* SHIM variables */ +static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; +static efi_char16_t const shim_MokSBState_name[] = { + 'M', 'o', 'k', 'S', 'B', 'S', 't', 'a', 't', 'e', 0 +}; + +#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \ + efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \ + (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \ + __VA_ARGS__); + +/* + * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode. + */ +enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) +{ + u32 attr; + u8 secboot, setupmode, moksbstate; + unsigned long size; + efi_status_t status; + + size = sizeof(secboot); + status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid, + NULL, &size, &secboot); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + goto out_efi_err; + + size = sizeof(setupmode); + status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid, + NULL, &size, &setupmode); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + goto out_efi_err; + + if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1) + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + + /* + * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the + * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well + * honor that. + */ + size = sizeof(moksbstate); + status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid, + &attr, &size, &moksbstate); + + /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + goto secure_boot_enabled; + if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate == 1) + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + +secure_boot_enabled: + pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n"); + return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled; + +out_efi_err: + pr_efi_err(sys_table_arg, "Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n"); + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; + return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown; +} diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c index 236004b9a50d..8986757eafaf 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ int __init efi_memattr_init(void) tbl_size = sizeof(*tbl) + tbl->num_entries * tbl->desc_size; memblock_reserve(efi.mem_attr_table, tbl_size); + set_bit(EFI_MEM_ATTR, &efi.flags); unmap: early_memunmap(tbl, sizeof(*tbl)); @@ -174,8 +175,11 @@ int __init efi_memattr_apply_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm, md.phys_addr + size - 1, efi_md_typeattr_format(buf, sizeof(buf), &md)); - if (valid) + if (valid) { ret = fn(mm, &md); + if (ret) + pr_err("Error updating mappings, skipping subsequent md's\n"); + } } memunmap(tbl); return ret; diff --git a/include/linux/efi-bgrt.h b/include/linux/efi-bgrt.h index 051b21fedf68..2fd3993c370b 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi-bgrt.h +++ b/include/linux/efi-bgrt.h @@ -1,20 +1,19 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_EFI_BGRT_H #define _LINUX_EFI_BGRT_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT - #include <linux/acpi.h> -void efi_bgrt_init(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT + +void efi_bgrt_init(struct acpi_table_header *table); /* The BGRT data itself; only valid if bgrt_image != NULL. */ -extern void *bgrt_image; extern size_t bgrt_image_size; -extern struct acpi_table_bgrt *bgrt_tab; +extern struct acpi_table_bgrt bgrt_tab; #else /* !CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT */ -static inline void efi_bgrt_init(void) {} +static inline void efi_bgrt_init(struct acpi_table_header *table) {} #endif /* !CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT */ diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index 5b1af30ece55..94d34e0be24f 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -509,24 +509,6 @@ typedef struct { u64 query_variable_info; } efi_runtime_services_64_t; -typedef struct { - efi_table_hdr_t hdr; - void *get_time; - void *set_time; - void *get_wakeup_time; - void *set_wakeup_time; - void *set_virtual_address_map; - void *convert_pointer; - void *get_variable; - void *get_next_variable; - void *set_variable; - void *get_next_high_mono_count; - void *reset_system; - void *update_capsule; - void *query_capsule_caps; - void *query_variable_info; -} efi_runtime_services_t; - typedef efi_status_t efi_get_time_t (efi_time_t *tm, efi_time_cap_t *tc); typedef efi_status_t efi_set_time_t (efi_time_t *tm); typedef efi_status_t efi_get_wakeup_time_t (efi_bool_t *enabled, efi_bool_t *pending, @@ -561,6 +543,24 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_variable_store_t(u32 attributes, unsigned long size, bool nonblocking); +typedef struct { + efi_table_hdr_t hdr; + efi_get_time_t *get_time; + efi_set_time_t *set_time; + efi_get_wakeup_time_t *get_wakeup_time; + efi_set_wakeup_time_t *set_wakeup_time; + efi_set_virtual_address_map_t *set_virtual_address_map; + void *convert_pointer; + efi_get_variable_t *get_variable; + efi_get_next_variable_t *get_next_variable; + efi_set_variable_t *set_variable; + efi_get_next_high_mono_count_t *get_next_high_mono_count; + efi_reset_system_t *reset_system; + efi_update_capsule_t *update_capsule; + efi_query_capsule_caps_t *query_capsule_caps; + efi_query_variable_info_t *query_variable_info; +} efi_runtime_services_t; + void efi_native_runtime_setup(void); /* @@ -611,6 +611,9 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void); #define EFI_CONSOLE_OUT_DEVICE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd3b36f2c, 0xd551, 0x11d4, 0x9a, 0x46, 0x00, 0x90, 0x27, 0x3f, 0xc1, 0x4d) #define APPLE_PROPERTIES_PROTOCOL_GUID EFI_GUID(0x91bd12fe, 0xf6c3, 0x44fb, 0xa5, 0xb7, 0x51, 0x22, 0xab, 0x30, 0x3a, 0xe0) +#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f) +#define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID EFI_GUID(0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23) + /* * This GUID is used to pass to the kernel proper the struct screen_info * structure that was populated by the stub based on the GOP protocol instance @@ -1065,6 +1068,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *); #define EFI_ARCH_1 7 /* First arch-specific bit */ #define EFI_DBG 8 /* Print additional debug info at runtime */ #define EFI_NX_PE_DATA 9 /* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */ +#define EFI_MEM_ATTR 10 /* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */ #ifdef CONFIG_EFI /* @@ -1240,17 +1244,17 @@ struct efivar_entry { bool deleting; }; -struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol_32 { +typedef struct { u32 reset; u32 output_string; u32 test_string; -}; +} efi_simple_text_output_protocol_32_t; -struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol_64 { +typedef struct { u64 reset; u64 output_string; u64 test_string; -}; +} efi_simple_text_output_protocol_64_t; struct efi_simple_text_output_protocol { void *reset; @@ -1476,6 +1480,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg, bool efi_runtime_disabled(void); extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call); +enum efi_secureboot_mode { + efi_secureboot_mode_unset, + efi_secureboot_mode_unknown, + efi_secureboot_mode_disabled, + efi_secureboot_mode_enabled, +}; +enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table); + /* * Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding * reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt(): diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c index b0c9d6facef9..9648d707eea5 100644 --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c @@ -663,7 +663,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void) sfi_init_late(); if (efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES)) { - efi_late_init(); efi_free_boot_services(); } |