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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-10-29 19:47:42 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-10-29 19:47:42 +0100 |
| commit | 8c782932138e477fa352c5c7cfa1e3d2361e1351 (patch) | |
| tree | b66efea31c0e55d41e7ac28d90ac1cb3c4c0d0c7 | |
| parent | Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mpe... (diff) | |
| parent | Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zoh... (diff) | |
| download | linux-8c782932138e477fa352c5c7cfa1e3d2361e1351.tar.xz linux-8c782932138e477fa352c5c7cfa1e3d2361e1351.zip | |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Integrity subsystem fix from James Morris:
"These changes fix a bug in xattr handling, where the evm and ima
inode_setxattr() functions do not check for empty xattrs being passed
from userspace (leading to user-triggerable null pointer
dereferences)"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
evm: check xattr value length and type in evm_inode_setxattr()
ima: check xattr value length and type in the ima_inode_setxattr()
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 |
3 files changed, 9 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 9685af330de5..c5ee1a7c5e8a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -319,9 +319,12 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; - if ((strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) - && (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC)) - return -EPERM; + if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { + if (!xattr_value_len) + return -EINVAL; + if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) + return -EPERM; + } return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 922685483bd3..7c8f41e618b6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -378,6 +378,8 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); if (result == 1) { + if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) + return -EINVAL; ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode, (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0); result = 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index c0379d13dbe1..9d1c2ebfe12a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { EVM_XATTR_HMAC, EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG, + IMA_XATTR_LAST }; struct evm_ima_xattr_data { |