diff options
author | Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> | 2023-01-15 18:22:36 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> | 2023-02-20 15:20:42 +0100 |
commit | dfb632432a9b2548b5a4429598bb19edf58122f0 (patch) | |
tree | 7c80dbc30dd4dee483ff87980701623a6904f3c5 | |
parent | SUNRPC: Add new subkey length fields (diff) | |
download | linux-dfb632432a9b2548b5a4429598bb19edf58122f0.tar.xz linux-dfb632432a9b2548b5a4429598bb19edf58122f0.zip |
SUNRPC: Refactor CBC with CTS into helpers
Cryptosystem profile enctypes all use cipher block chaining
with ciphertext steal (CBC-with-CTS). However enctypes that are
currently supported in the Linux kernel SunRPC implementation
use only the encrypt-&-MAC approach. The RFC 8009 enctypes use
encrypt-then-MAC, which performs encryption and checksumming in
a different order.
Refactor to make it possible to share the CBC with CTS encryption
and decryption mechanisms between e&M and etM enctypes.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
-rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 187 |
1 files changed, 105 insertions, 82 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c index c5845fdda527..65c8b6982729 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c @@ -641,6 +641,100 @@ out: return ret; } +/* + * To provide confidentiality, encrypt using cipher block chaining + * with ciphertext stealing. Message integrity is handled separately. + */ +static int +krb5_cbc_cts_encrypt(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cts_tfm, + struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cbc_tfm, + u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) +{ + u32 blocksize, nbytes, nblocks, cbcbytes; + struct encryptor_desc desc; + int err; + + blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cts_tfm); + nbytes = buf->len - offset; + nblocks = (nbytes + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; + cbcbytes = 0; + if (nblocks > 2) + cbcbytes = (nblocks - 2) * blocksize; + + memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv)); + + /* Handle block-sized chunks of plaintext with CBC. */ + if (cbcbytes) { + SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, cbc_tfm); + + desc.pos = offset; + desc.fragno = 0; + desc.fraglen = 0; + desc.pages = pages; + desc.outbuf = buf; + desc.req = req; + + skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, cbc_tfm); + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); + + sg_init_table(desc.infrags, 4); + sg_init_table(desc.outfrags, 4); + + err = xdr_process_buf(buf, offset, cbcbytes, encryptor, &desc); + skcipher_request_zero(req); + if (err) + return err; + } + + /* Remaining plaintext is handled with CBC-CTS. */ + err = gss_krb5_cts_crypt(cts_tfm, buf, offset + cbcbytes, + desc.iv, pages, 1); + if (err) + return err; + + return 0; +} + +static int +krb5_cbc_cts_decrypt(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cts_tfm, + struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cbc_tfm, + u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) +{ + u32 blocksize, nblocks, cbcbytes; + struct decryptor_desc desc; + int err; + + blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cts_tfm); + nblocks = (buf->len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; + cbcbytes = 0; + if (nblocks > 2) + cbcbytes = (nblocks - 2) * blocksize; + + memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv)); + + /* Handle block-sized chunks of plaintext with CBC. */ + if (cbcbytes) { + SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, cbc_tfm); + + desc.fragno = 0; + desc.fraglen = 0; + desc.req = req; + + skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, cbc_tfm); + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); + + sg_init_table(desc.frags, 4); + + err = xdr_process_buf(buf, 0, cbcbytes, decryptor, &desc); + skcipher_request_zero(req); + if (err) + return err; + } + + /* Remaining plaintext is handled with CBC-CTS. */ + return gss_krb5_cts_crypt(cts_tfm, buf, cbcbytes, desc.iv, NULL, 0); +} + u32 gss_krb5_aes_encrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) @@ -650,11 +744,7 @@ gss_krb5_aes_encrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u8 *ecptr; struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, *aux_cipher; struct crypto_ahash *ahash; - int blocksize; struct page **save_pages; - int nblocks, nbytes; - struct encryptor_desc desc; - u32 cbcbytes; unsigned int conflen; if (kctx->initiate) { @@ -666,7 +756,6 @@ gss_krb5_aes_encrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, aux_cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc_aux; ahash = kctx->acceptor_integ; } - blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cipher); conflen = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cipher); /* hide the gss token header and insert the confounder */ @@ -710,69 +799,30 @@ gss_krb5_aes_encrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, if (err) return GSS_S_FAILURE; - nbytes = buf->len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN; - nblocks = (nbytes + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; - cbcbytes = 0; - if (nblocks > 2) - cbcbytes = (nblocks - 2) * blocksize; - - memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv)); - - if (cbcbytes) { - SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, aux_cipher); - - desc.pos = offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN; - desc.fragno = 0; - desc.fraglen = 0; - desc.pages = pages; - desc.outbuf = buf; - desc.req = req; - - skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, aux_cipher); - skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); - - sg_init_table(desc.infrags, 4); - sg_init_table(desc.outfrags, 4); - - err = xdr_process_buf(buf, offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, - cbcbytes, encryptor, &desc); - skcipher_request_zero(req); - if (err) - goto out_err; - } - - /* Make sure IV carries forward from any CBC results. */ - err = gss_krb5_cts_crypt(cipher, buf, - offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + cbcbytes, - desc.iv, pages, 1); - if (err) { - err = GSS_S_FAILURE; - goto out_err; - } + err = krb5_cbc_cts_encrypt(cipher, aux_cipher, + offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, + buf, pages); + if (err) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; /* Now update buf to account for HMAC */ buf->tail[0].iov_len += kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; buf->len += kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; -out_err: - if (err) - err = GSS_S_FAILURE; - return err; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } u32 gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *headskip, u32 *tailskip) { - struct xdr_buf subbuf; - u32 ret = 0; struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, *aux_cipher; struct crypto_ahash *ahash; struct xdr_netobj our_hmac_obj; u8 our_hmac[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; u8 pkt_hmac[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; - int nblocks, blocksize, cbcbytes; - struct decryptor_desc desc; + struct xdr_buf subbuf; + u32 ret = 0; if (kctx->initiate) { cipher = kctx->acceptor_enc; @@ -783,44 +833,17 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len, aux_cipher = kctx->initiator_enc_aux; ahash = kctx->initiator_integ; } - blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cipher); /* create a segment skipping the header and leaving out the checksum */ xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, (len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - kctx->gk5e->cksumlength)); - nblocks = (subbuf.len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize; - - cbcbytes = 0; - if (nblocks > 2) - cbcbytes = (nblocks - 2) * blocksize; - - memset(desc.iv, 0, sizeof(desc.iv)); - - if (cbcbytes) { - SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, aux_cipher); - - desc.fragno = 0; - desc.fraglen = 0; - desc.req = req; - - skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, aux_cipher); - skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); - - sg_init_table(desc.frags, 4); - - ret = xdr_process_buf(&subbuf, 0, cbcbytes, decryptor, &desc); - skcipher_request_zero(req); - if (ret) - goto out_err; - } - - /* Make sure IV carries forward from any CBC results. */ - ret = gss_krb5_cts_crypt(cipher, &subbuf, cbcbytes, desc.iv, NULL, 0); + ret = krb5_cbc_cts_decrypt(cipher, aux_cipher, 0, &subbuf); if (ret) goto out_err; + /* Calculate our hmac over the plaintext data */ our_hmac_obj.len = sizeof(our_hmac); our_hmac_obj.data = our_hmac; ret = gss_krb5_checksum(ahash, NULL, 0, &subbuf, 0, &our_hmac_obj); @@ -837,7 +860,7 @@ gss_krb5_aes_decrypt(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, u32 len, ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; goto out_err; } - *headskip = blocksize; + *headskip = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(cipher); *tailskip = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; out_err: if (ret && ret != GSS_S_BAD_SIG) |