diff options
author | Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> | 2017-06-06 14:25:16 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2017-06-09 11:42:43 +0200 |
commit | f67cf491175a315ca86c9b349708bfed7b1f40c1 (patch) | |
tree | 7b9b16deadbf5941b14cc16086eababa2dc70523 /Documentation/ABI/testing | |
parent | thunderbolt: Do not touch the hardware if the NHI is gone on resume (diff) | |
download | linux-f67cf491175a315ca86c9b349708bfed7b1f40c1.tar.xz linux-f67cf491175a315ca86c9b349708bfed7b1f40c1.zip |
thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM)
Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running
on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security
levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow
connecting devices the user trusts.
The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting
Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on
Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0
(control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add
support for the ICM messages to the control channel.
The security levels are as follows:
none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically
user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created
secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created.
The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able
to verify it is actually the approved device.
dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those
are created automatically.
The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and
by default it is set to "user" on many systems.
In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new
sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices
that support secure connect.
In order to identify the device the user can read identication
information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based
on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is
authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This
is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure
connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the
"authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been
stored to the NVM of the device.
Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing
functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with
Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM.
This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet.
Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/ABI/testing')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt | 48 |
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt index 29a516f53d2c..05b7f9a6431f 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt @@ -1,3 +1,51 @@ +What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../domainX/security +Date: Sep 2017 +KernelVersion: 4.13 +Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org +Description: This attribute holds current Thunderbolt security level + set by the system BIOS. Possible values are: + + none: All devices are automatically authorized + user: Devices are only authorized based on writing + appropriate value to the authorized attribute + secure: Require devices that support secure connect at + minimum. User needs to authorize each device. + dponly: Automatically tunnel Display port (and USB). No + PCIe tunnels are created. + +What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../authorized +Date: Sep 2017 +KernelVersion: 4.13 +Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org +Description: This attribute is used to authorize Thunderbolt devices + after they have been connected. If the device is not + authorized, no devices such as PCIe and Display port are + available to the system. + + Contents of this attribute will be 0 when the device is not + yet authorized. + + Possible values are supported: + 1: The device will be authorized and connected + + When key attribute contains 32 byte hex string the possible + values are: + 1: The 32 byte hex string is added to the device NVM and + the device is authorized. + 2: Send a challenge based on the 32 byte hex string. If the + challenge response from device is valid, the device is + authorized. In case of failure errno will be ENOKEY if + the device did not contain a key at all, and + EKEYREJECTED if the challenge response did not match. + +What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../key +Date: Sep 2017 +KernelVersion: 4.13 +Contact: thunderbolt-software@lists.01.org +Description: When a devices supports Thunderbolt secure connect it will + have this attribute. Writing 32 byte hex string changes + authorization to use the secure connection method instead. + What: /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/.../device Date: Sep 2017 KernelVersion: 4.13 |