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| author | Fabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com> | 2021-07-21 21:02:50 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> | 2021-07-25 22:39:17 +0200 |
| commit | ce48ee81a1930b2218bea23490adb6673c88bf70 (patch) | |
| tree | 062671c8503c1ca3f997710a0a9375a8c1039b4a /Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln | |
| parent | docs: virt: kvm: api.rst: replace some characters (diff) | |
| download | linux-ce48ee81a1930b2218bea23490adb6673c88bf70.tar.xz linux-ce48ee81a1930b2218bea23490adb6673c88bf70.zip | |
admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst
Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of
making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered
untrusted".
Suggested-by: Vineeth Pillai <Vineeth.Pillai@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joelaf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210721190250.26095-1-fmdefrancesco@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 10 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst index 7b410aef9c5c..0febe458597c 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst @@ -181,10 +181,12 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve -------------------------------------------------------- 1. For MDS ~~~~~~~~~~ -Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in -user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks -which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such -attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode). +Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings +running in user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all +siblings run tasks which trust each other, when the kernel is executing +code on behalf of a task, it cannot trust the code running in the +sibling. Such attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes +(host or guest mode). 2. For L1TF ~~~~~~~~~~~ |