Documentation/security-bugs: move from admin-guide/ to process/

Jiri Kosina, Jonathan Corbet, and Willy Tarreau all expressed a desire
to move this document under process/.

Create a new section for security issues in the index and group it with
embargoed-hardware-issues.

I'm doing this at the start of the series to make all the subsequent
changes show up in 'git blame'.

Existing references were updated using:

  git grep -l security-bugs ':!Documentation/translations/' | xargs sed -i 's|admin-guide/security-bugs|process/security-bugs|g'
  git grep -l security-bugs Documentation/translations/ | xargs sed -i 's|Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs|Documentation/process/security-bugs|g'
  git grep -l security-bugs Documentation/translations/ | xargs sed -i '/Original:/s|\.\./admin-guide/security-bugs|\.\./process/security-bugs|g'

Notably, the page is not moved in the translations (due to my lack of
knowledge of these languages), but the translations have been updated
to point to the new location of the original document where these
references exist.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/nycvar.YFH.7.76.2206062326230.10851@cbobk.fhfr.pm/
Suggested-by: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Hu Haowen <src.res@email.cn>
Cc: Federico Vaga <federico.vaga@vaga.pv.it>
Cc: Tsugikazu Shibata <tshibata@ab.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Jeimi Lee <jamee.lee@samsung.com>
Cc: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
Cc: Akira Yokosawa <akiyks@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Akira Yokosawa <akiyks@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Federico Vaga <federico.vaga@vaga.pv.it>
Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230305220010.20895-2-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 96 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
deleted file mode 100644
index 82e29837d589..000000000000
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-.. _securitybugs:
-
-Security bugs
-=============
-
-Linux kernel developers take security very seriously.  As such, we'd
-like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and
-disclosed as quickly as possible.  Please report security bugs to the
-Linux kernel security team.
-
-Contact
--------
-
-The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
-<security@kernel.org>.  This is a private list of security officers
-who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix.
-If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as
-that can speed up the process considerably.  It is possible that the
-security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to
-understand and fix the security vulnerability.
-
-As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it
-will be to diagnose and fix.  Please review the procedure outlined in
-'Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst' if you are unclear about what
-information is helpful.  Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
-be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
-made public.
-
-Please send plain text emails without attachments where possible.
-It is much harder to have a context-quoted discussion about a complex
-issue if all the details are hidden away in attachments.  Think of it like a
-:doc:`regular patch submission <../process/submitting-patches>`
-(even if you don't have a patch yet): describe the problem and impact, list
-reproduction steps, and follow it with a proposed fix, all in plain text.
-
-Disclosure and embargoed information
-------------------------------------
-
-The security list is not a disclosure channel.  For that, see Coordination
-below.
-
-Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts.  Fixes
-for publicly known bugs are released immediately.
-
-Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs
-as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of
-the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start
-of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days
-if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time.  The
-only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate
-the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release
-coordination.
-
-While embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
-order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
-the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
-reporter.  This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
-and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
-identity of the reporter.
-
-In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed.  All other
-information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
-of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
-lifted, in perpetuity.
-
-Coordination
-------------
-
-Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege
-escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private
-<linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors
-are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the
-upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and
-will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update
-publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate,
-the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can
-include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
-the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
-<http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
-
-CVE assignment
---------------
-
-The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them
-for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and
-may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
-assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private
-linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known
-before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit
-message if the reporter agrees.
-
-Non-disclosure agreements
--------------------------
-
-The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable
-to enter any non-disclosure agreements.