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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-12-15 02:13:53 +0100 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-12-15 02:13:53 +0100 |
commit | 1ac0884d5474fea8dc6ceabbd0e870d1bf4b7b42 (patch) | |
tree | 5158d582c0f5040a9c8a28fe9051881c5ec7b5eb /Documentation/admin-guide | |
parent | Merge tag 'docs-5.11' of git://git.lwn.net/linux (diff) | |
parent | entry: Add syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work() (diff) | |
download | linux-1ac0884d5474fea8dc6ceabbd0e870d1bf4b7b42.tar.xz linux-1ac0884d5474fea8dc6ceabbd0e870d1bf4b7b42.zip |
Merge tag 'core-entry-2020-12-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull core entry/exit updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"A set of updates for entry/exit handling:
- More generalization of entry/exit functionality
- The consolidation work to reclaim TIF flags on x86 and also for
non-x86 specific TIF flags which are solely relevant for syscall
related work and have been moved into their own storage space. The
x86 specific part had to be merged in to avoid a major conflict.
- The TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL work which replaces the inefficient signal
delivery mode of task work and results in an impressive performance
improvement for io_uring. The non-x86 consolidation of this is
going to come seperate via Jens.
- The selective syscall redirection facility which provides a clean
and efficient way to support the non-Linux syscalls of WINE by
catching them at syscall entry and redirecting them to the user
space emulation. This can be utilized for other purposes as well
and has been designed carefully to avoid overhead for the regular
fastpath. This includes the core changes and the x86 support code.
- Simplification of the context tracking entry/exit handling for the
users of the generic entry code which guarantee the proper ordering
and protection.
- Preparatory changes to make the generic entry code accomodate S390
specific requirements which are mostly related to their syscall
restart mechanism"
* tag 'core-entry-2020-12-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits)
entry: Add syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work()
entry: Add exit_to_user_mode() wrapper
entry_Add_enter_from_user_mode_wrapper
entry: Rename exit_to_user_mode()
entry: Rename enter_from_user_mode()
docs: Document Syscall User Dispatch
selftests: Add benchmark for syscall user dispatch
selftests: Add kselftest for syscall user dispatch
entry: Support Syscall User Dispatch on common syscall entry
kernel: Implement selective syscall userspace redirection
signal: Expose SYS_USER_DISPATCH si_code type
x86: vdso: Expose sigreturn address on vdso to the kernel
MAINTAINERS: Add entry for common entry code
entry: Fix boot for !CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY
x86: Support HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_OFFSTACK
context_tracking: Only define schedule_user() on !HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_OFFSTACK archs
sched: Detect call to schedule from critical entry code
context_tracking: Don't implement exception_enter/exit() on CONFIG_HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_OFFSTACK
context_tracking: Introduce HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_OFFSTACK
x86: Reclaim unused x86 TI flags
...
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/syscall-user-dispatch.rst | 90 |
2 files changed, 91 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst index 621d1c583738..041636de29ab 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ configure specific aspects of kernel behavior to your liking. rtc serial-console svga + syscall-user-dispatch sysrq thunderbolt ufs diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/syscall-user-dispatch.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/syscall-user-dispatch.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a380d6515774 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/syscall-user-dispatch.rst @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +===================== +Syscall User Dispatch +===================== + +Background +---------- + +Compatibility layers like Wine need a way to efficiently emulate system +calls of only a part of their process - the part that has the +incompatible code - while being able to execute native syscalls without +a high performance penalty on the native part of the process. Seccomp +falls short on this task, since it has limited support to efficiently +filter syscalls based on memory regions, and it doesn't support removing +filters. Therefore a new mechanism is necessary. + +Syscall User Dispatch brings the filtering of the syscall dispatcher +address back to userspace. The application is in control of a flip +switch, indicating the current personality of the process. A +multiple-personality application can then flip the switch without +invoking the kernel, when crossing the compatibility layer API +boundaries, to enable/disable the syscall redirection and execute +syscalls directly (disabled) or send them to be emulated in userspace +through a SIGSYS. + +The goal of this design is to provide very quick compatibility layer +boundary crosses, which is achieved by not executing a syscall to change +personality every time the compatibility layer executes. Instead, a +userspace memory region exposed to the kernel indicates the current +personality, and the application simply modifies that variable to +configure the mechanism. + +There is a relatively high cost associated with handling signals on most +architectures, like x86, but at least for Wine, syscalls issued by +native Windows code are currently not known to be a performance problem, +since they are quite rare, at least for modern gaming applications. + +Since this mechanism is designed to capture syscalls issued by +non-native applications, it must function on syscalls whose invocation +ABI is completely unexpected to Linux. Syscall User Dispatch, therefore +doesn't rely on any of the syscall ABI to make the filtering. It uses +only the syscall dispatcher address and the userspace key. + +As the ABI of these intercepted syscalls is unknown to Linux, these +syscalls are not instrumentable via ptrace or the syscall tracepoints. + +Interface +--------- + +A thread can setup this mechanism on supported kernels by executing the +following prctl: + + prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH, <op>, <offset>, <length>, [selector]) + +<op> is either PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON or PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF, to enable and +disable the mechanism globally for that thread. When +PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF is used, the other fields must be zero. + +[<offset>, <offset>+<length>) delimit a memory region interval +from which syscalls are always executed directly, regardless of the +userspace selector. This provides a fast path for the C library, which +includes the most common syscall dispatchers in the native code +applications, and also provides a way for the signal handler to return +without triggering a nested SIGSYS on (rt\_)sigreturn. Users of this +interface should make sure that at least the signal trampoline code is +included in this region. In addition, for syscalls that implement the +trampoline code on the vDSO, that trampoline is never intercepted. + +[selector] is a pointer to a char-sized region in the process memory +region, that provides a quick way to enable disable syscall redirection +thread-wide, without the need to invoke the kernel directly. selector +can be set to PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON or PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF. Any other +value should terminate the program with a SIGSYS. + +Security Notes +-------------- + +Syscall User Dispatch provides functionality for compatibility layers to +quickly capture system calls issued by a non-native part of the +application, while not impacting the Linux native regions of the +process. It is not a mechanism for sandboxing system calls, and it +should not be seen as a security mechanism, since it is trivial for a +malicious application to subvert the mechanism by jumping to an allowed +dispatcher region prior to executing the syscall, or to discover the +address and modify the selector value. If the use case requires any +kind of security sandboxing, Seccomp should be used instead. + +Any fork or exec of the existing process resets the mechanism to +PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF. |