Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
  upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall.
  Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the
  kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent
  loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall,
  independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure
  boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.

  In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
  ".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
  the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
  kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.

  (David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
  preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
  use case scenario, are included here)"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  integrity: Remove references to module keyring
  ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write
  ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal
  efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
  efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
  efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
  efi: Add EFI signature data types
  integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring
  integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring
  selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test
  ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs
  x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode
  docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0
  x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86
  ima: add support for arch specific policies
  ima: refactor ima_init_policy()
  ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag
  x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot
  integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field

1 files changed, 30 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index e8a1c35cd277..7b35fcb58933 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -18,10 +18,33 @@ integrity verifications match.  A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new
 when the kernel and initramfs are updated.  The same key can have many saved
 blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are easily supported.
 
+TPM 1.2
+-------
+
 By default, trusted keys are sealed under the SRK, which has the default
 authorization value (20 zeros).  This can be set at takeownership time with the
 trouser's utility: "tpm_takeownership -u -z".
 
+TPM 2.0
+-------
+
+The user must first create a storage key and make it persistent, so the key is
+available after reboot. This can be done using the following commands.
+
+With the IBM TSS 2 stack::
+
+  #> tsscreateprimary -hi o -st
+  Handle 80000000
+  #> tssevictcontrol -hi o -ho 80000000 -hp 81000001
+
+Or with the Intel TSS 2 stack::
+
+  #> tpm2_createprimary --hierarchy o -G rsa2048 -o key.ctxt
+  [...]
+  handle: 0x800000FF
+  #> tpm2_evictcontrol -c key.ctxt -p 0x81000001
+  persistentHandle: 0x81000001
+
 Usage::
 
     keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring
@@ -30,7 +53,9 @@ Usage::
     keyctl print keyid
 
     options:
-       keyhandle=    ascii hex value of sealing key default 0x40000000 (SRK)
+       keyhandle=    ascii hex value of sealing key
+                       TPM 1.2: default 0x40000000 (SRK)
+                       TPM 2.0: no default; must be passed every time
        keyauth=	     ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i
                      (40 ascii zeros)
        blobauth=     ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
@@ -84,6 +109,10 @@ Examples of trusted and encrypted key usage:
 
 Create and save a trusted key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes::
 
+Note: When using a TPM 2.0 with a persistent key with handle 0x81000001,
+append 'keyhandle=0x81000001' to statements between quotes, such as
+"new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001".
+
     $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32" @u
     440502848