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| author | Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> | 2019-04-10 11:56:27 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> | 2019-04-11 20:37:03 +0200 |
| commit | 5d2a2c59108a00ee550fd9a51f26de72e209a703 (patch) | |
| tree | 4b29803fef1e4da71fdb1f716b1547b9dd1ac66d /Documentation/speculation.txt | |
| parent | docs: ntb.txt: add blank lines to clean up some Sphinx warnings (diff) | |
| download | linux-5d2a2c59108a00ee550fd9a51f26de72e209a703.tar.xz linux-5d2a2c59108a00ee550fd9a51f26de72e209a703.zip | |
docs: speculation.txt: mark example blocks as such
Identify the example blocks there, in order to avoid Sphinx
warnings.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/speculation.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/speculation.txt | 8 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/speculation.txt b/Documentation/speculation.txt index e9e6cbae2841..50d7ea857cff 100644 --- a/Documentation/speculation.txt +++ b/Documentation/speculation.txt @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ observed to extract secret information. For example, in the presence of branch prediction, it is possible for bounds checks to be ignored by code which is speculatively executed. Consider the -following code: +following code:: int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index) { @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ following code: return array[index]; } -Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as: +Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as:: CMP <index>, #MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS B.LT less @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ microarchitectural state which can be subsequently measured. More complex sequences involving multiple dependent memory accesses may result in sensitive information being leaked. Consider the following -code, building on the prior example: +code, building on the prior example:: int load_dependent_arrays(int *arr1, int *arr2, int index) { @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ A call to array_index_nospec(index, size) returns a sanitized index value that is bounded to [0, size) even under cpu speculation conditions. -This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example: +This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example:: int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index) { |