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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-08 02:29:47 +0100 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-08 02:29:47 +0100 |
commit | 4a01e748a51cdc0527fdc913546dd46e822aa00d (patch) | |
tree | 8dbdba3aa96fb2323ba8194e8838dddf917752e5 /arch/arm/kernel/traps.c | |
parent | Merge tag 'mtd/fixes-for-5.17-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kern... (diff) | |
parent | x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT (diff) | |
download | linux-4a01e748a51cdc0527fdc913546dd46e822aa00d.tar.xz linux-4a01e748a51cdc0527fdc913546dd46e822aa00d.zip |
Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 spectre fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Mitigate Spectre v2-type Branch History Buffer attacks on machines
which support eIBRS, i.e., the hardware-assisted speculation
restriction after it has been shown that such machines are vulnerable
even with the hardware mitigation.
- Do not use the default LFENCE-based Spectre v2 mitigation on AMD as
it is insufficient to mitigate such attacks. Instead, switch to
retpolines on all AMD by default.
- Update the docs and add some warnings for the obviously vulnerable
cmdline configurations.
* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT
x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation
x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper
x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD
x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting
Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc
x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options
x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/kernel/traps.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions