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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-03-08 02:29:47 +0100
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-03-08 02:29:47 +0100
commit4a01e748a51cdc0527fdc913546dd46e822aa00d (patch)
tree8dbdba3aa96fb2323ba8194e8838dddf917752e5 /arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
parentMerge tag 'mtd/fixes-for-5.17-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kern... (diff)
parentx86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT (diff)
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Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 spectre fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Mitigate Spectre v2-type Branch History Buffer attacks on machines which support eIBRS, i.e., the hardware-assisted speculation restriction after it has been shown that such machines are vulnerable even with the hardware mitigation. - Do not use the default LFENCE-based Spectre v2 mitigation on AMD as it is insufficient to mitigate such attacks. Instead, switch to retpolines on all AMD by default. - Update the docs and add some warnings for the obviously vulnerable cmdline configurations. * tag 'x86_bugs_for_v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE
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