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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-08-08 23:48:14 +0200
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-08-08 23:48:14 +0200
commit1eccfa090eaea22558570054bbdc147817e1df5e (patch)
treea0adfdb87319abef88f575ee34314649193b7e92 /arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
parentunsafe_[get|put]_user: change interface to use a error target label (diff)
parentmm: SLUB hardened usercopy support (diff)
downloadlinux-1eccfa090eaea22558570054bbdc147817e1df5e.tar.xz
linux-1eccfa090eaea22558570054bbdc147817e1df5e.zip
Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull usercopy protection from Kees Cook: "Tbhis implements HARDENED_USERCOPY verification of copy_to_user and copy_from_user bounds checking for most architectures on SLAB and SLUB" * tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support s390/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy mm: Hardened usercopy mm: Implement stack frame object validation mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h15
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 5e834d10b291..c47257c91b77 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -265,22 +265,25 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long
static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
kasan_check_write(to, n);
- return __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+ check_object_size(to, n, false);
+ return __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
}
static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
{
kasan_check_read(from, n);
- return __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
+ check_object_size(from, n, true);
+ return __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
}
static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
kasan_check_write(to, n);
- if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))
+ if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n)) {
+ check_object_size(to, n, false);
n = __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
- else /* security hole - plug it */
+ } else /* security hole - plug it */
memset(to, 0, n);
return n;
}
@@ -289,8 +292,10 @@ static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_to_user(void __user *to, const voi
{
kasan_check_read(from, n);
- if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
+ if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)) {
+ check_object_size(from, n, true);
n = __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
+ }
return n;
}