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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-11-27 20:25:04 +0100 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-11-27 20:25:04 +0100 |
commit | 80eb5fea3c14fb171facb5242a1555b3aafea4d0 (patch) | |
tree | 08c6840f7d25876ff515dab190a38bfcfecaea88 /arch/arm64 | |
parent | Merge tag 'driver-core-5.5-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/... (diff) | |
parent | KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Flush link stack on guest exit to host kernel (diff) | |
download | linux-80eb5fea3c14fb171facb5242a1555b3aafea4d0.tar.xz linux-80eb5fea3c14fb171facb5242a1555b3aafea4d0.zip |
Merge tag 'powerpc-spectre-rsb' of powerpc-CVE-2019-18660.bundle
Pull powerpc Spectre-RSB fixes from Michael Ellerman:
"We failed to activate the mitigation for Spectre-RSB (Return Stack
Buffer, aka. ret2spec) on context switch, on CPUs prior to Power9
DD2.3.
That allows a process to poison the RSB (called Link Stack on Power
CPUs) and possibly misdirect speculative execution of another process.
If the victim process can be induced to execute a leak gadget then it
may be possible to extract information from the victim via a side
channel.
The fix is to correctly activate the link stack flush mitigation on
all CPUs that have any mitigation of Spectre v2 in userspace enabled.
There's a second commit which adds a link stack flush in the KVM guest
exit path. A leak via that path has not been demonstrated, but we
believe it's at least theoretically possible.
This is the fix for CVE-2019-18660"
* tag 'powerpc-spectre-rsb' of /home/torvalds/Downloads/powerpc-CVE-2019-18660.bundle:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Flush link stack on guest exit to host kernel
powerpc/book3s64: Fix link stack flush on context switch
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions