diff options
author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2019-04-10 08:46:32 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2019-04-18 16:14:58 +0200 |
commit | 4a8108b70508df0b6c4ffa4a3974dab93dcbe851 (patch) | |
tree | 541d1c7daad8179310c43e7faf0b59cf08446379 /arch/arm64 | |
parent | crypto: arm/aes-neonbs - don't access already-freed walk.iv (diff) | |
download | linux-4a8108b70508df0b6c4ffa4a3974dab93dcbe851.tar.xz linux-4a8108b70508df0b6c4ffa4a3974dab93dcbe851.zip |
crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - don't access already-freed walk.iv
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
xts-aes-neonbs doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However this is more
subtle than desired, and unconditionally accessing walk.iv has caused a
real problem in other algorithms. Thus, update xts-aes-neonbs to start
checking the return value of skcipher_walk_virt().
Fixes: 1abee99eafab ("crypto: arm64/aes - reimplement bit-sliced ARM/NEON implementation for arm64")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c index 4737b6c6c5cf..514455117733 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c @@ -304,6 +304,8 @@ static int __xts_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, int err; err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + if (err) + return err; kernel_neon_begin(); neon_aes_ecb_encrypt(walk.iv, walk.iv, ctx->twkey, ctx->key.rounds, 1); |