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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-12-14 23:09:48 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-12-14 23:09:48 +0100 |
| commit | 412ac77a9d3ec015524dacea905471d66480b7ac (patch) | |
| tree | 28ae7e4f3aaeab5411a11818d03b3722a31ecf36 /arch/ia64/kernel | |
| parent | Merge branch 'stable-4.10' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit (diff) | |
| parent | Revert "evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC" (diff) | |
| download | linux-412ac77a9d3ec015524dacea905471d66480b7ac.tar.xz linux-412ac77a9d3ec015524dacea905471d66480b7ac.zip | |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"After a lot of discussion and work we have finally reachanged a basic
understanding of what is necessary to make unprivileged mounts safe in
the presence of EVM and IMA xattrs which the last commit in this
series reflects. While technically it is a revert the comments it adds
are important for people not getting confused in the future. Clearing
up that confusion allows us to seriously work on unprivileged mounts
of fuse in the next development cycle.
The rest of the fixes in this set are in the intersection of user
namespaces, ptrace, and exec. I started with the first fix which
started a feedback cycle of finding additional issues during review
and fixing them. Culiminating in a fix for a bug that has been present
since at least Linux v1.0.
Potentially these fixes were candidates for being merged during the rc
cycle, and are certainly backport candidates but enough little things
turned up during review and testing that I decided they should be
handled as part of the normal development process just to be certain
there were not any great surprises when it came time to backport some
of these fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
Revert "evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC"
exec: Ensure mm->user_ns contains the execed files
ptrace: Don't allow accessing an undumpable mm
ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP
mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/ia64/kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c index 31aa8c0f68e1..36f660da8124 100644 --- a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@ arch_ptrace (struct task_struct *child, long request, case PTRACE_PEEKTEXT: case PTRACE_PEEKDATA: /* read word at location addr */ - if (access_process_vm(child, addr, &data, sizeof(data), + if (ptrace_access_vm(child, addr, &data, sizeof(data), FOLL_FORCE) != sizeof(data)) return -EIO; |