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author | Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> | 2024-08-03 08:08:30 +0200 |
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committer | Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> | 2024-08-20 20:03:35 +0200 |
commit | 31f8c8682f30720be25e9b1021caa43c64e8d9ce (patch) | |
tree | 5c210c974594b30fc81a0857beae388e6b9cf6b8 /arch/microblaze | |
parent | fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs (diff) | |
download | linux-31f8c8682f30720be25e9b1021caa43c64e8d9ce.tar.xz linux-31f8c8682f30720be25e9b1021caa43c64e8d9ce.zip |
ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider
Enable IPE policy authors to indicate trust for a singular fsverity
file, identified by the digest information, through "fsverity_digest"
and all files using valid fsverity builtin signatures via
"fsverity_signature".
This enables file-level integrity claims to be expressed in IPE,
allowing individual files to be authorized, giving some flexibility
for policy authors. Such file-level claims are important to be expressed
for enforcing the integrity of packages, as well as address some of the
scalability issues in a sole dm-verity based solution (# of loop back
devices, etc).
This solution cannot be done in userspace as the minimum threat that
IPE should mitigate is an attacker downloads malicious payload with
all required dependencies. These dependencies can lack the userspace
check, bypassing the protection entirely. A similar attack succeeds if
the userspace component is replaced with a version that does not
perform the check. As a result, this can only be done in the common
entry point - the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/microblaze')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions