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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-01-04 03:57:57 +0100 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-01-04 03:57:57 +0100 |
commit | 96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693 (patch) | |
tree | df03d142d405652392707b1b80c284d68d6ea6ab /arch/openrisc/include | |
parent | Merge tag 'locks-v4.21-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jl... (diff) | |
download | linux-96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693.tar.xz linux-96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693.zip |
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/openrisc/include')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/openrisc/include/asm/futex.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 8 |
2 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/futex.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/futex.h index 618da4a1bffb..fe894e6331ae 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/futex.h +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/futex.h @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 *uval, u32 __user *uaddr, int ret = 0; u32 prev; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uaddr, sizeof(u32))) + if (!access_ok(uaddr, sizeof(u32))) return -EFAULT; __asm__ __volatile__ ( \ diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h index bbf5c79cce7a..bc8191a34db7 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ /* Ensure that addr is below task's addr_limit */ #define __addr_ok(addr) ((unsigned long) addr < get_fs()) -#define access_ok(type, addr, size) \ +#define access_ok(addr, size) \ __range_ok((unsigned long)addr, (unsigned long)size) /* @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ extern long __put_user_bad(void); ({ \ long __pu_err = -EFAULT; \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) *__pu_addr = (ptr); \ - if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, __pu_addr, size)) \ + if (access_ok(__pu_addr, size)) \ __put_user_size((x), __pu_addr, (size), __pu_err); \ __pu_err; \ }) @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ struct __large_struct { ({ \ long __gu_err = -EFAULT, __gu_val = 0; \ const __typeof__(*(ptr)) * __gu_addr = (ptr); \ - if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, __gu_addr, size)) \ + if (access_ok(__gu_addr, size)) \ __get_user_size(__gu_val, __gu_addr, (size), __gu_err); \ (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \ __gu_err; \ @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ extern unsigned long __clear_user(void *addr, unsigned long size); static inline __must_check unsigned long clear_user(void *addr, unsigned long size) { - if (likely(access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, size))) + if (likely(access_ok(addr, size))) size = __clear_user(addr, size); return size; } |