diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-10-23 19:43:04 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-10-23 19:43:04 +0200 |
| commit | d82924c3b8d0607094b94fab290a33c5ad7d586c (patch) | |
| tree | 2afbc9066262b5987c8568a09f80db5198025689 /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | |
| parent | Merge branch 'x86-platform-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/k... (diff) | |
| parent | x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs (diff) | |
| download | linux-d82924c3b8d0607094b94fab290a33c5ad7d586c.tar.xz linux-d82924c3b8d0607094b94fab290a33c5ad7d586c.zip | |
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 pti updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes:
- Make the IBPB barrier more strict and add STIBP support (Jiri
Kosina)
- Micro-optimize and clean up the entry code (Andy Lutomirski)
- ... plus misc other fixes"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs
x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation
x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
x86/speculation: Add RETPOLINE_AMD support to the inline asm CALL_NOSPEC variant
x86/CPU: Fix unused variable warning when !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
x86/pti/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 entry trampoline
x86/entry/64: Use the TSS sp2 slot for SYSCALL/SYSRET scratch space
x86/entry/64: Document idtentry
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 16 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 9315a1660668..660d0b22e962 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1534,19 +1534,8 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__preempt_count); /* May not be marked __init: used by software suspend */ void syscall_init(void) { - extern char _entry_trampoline[]; - extern char entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline[]; - - int cpu = smp_processor_id(); - unsigned long SYSCALL64_entry_trampoline = - (unsigned long)get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->entry_trampoline + - (entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline - _entry_trampoline); - wrmsr(MSR_STAR, 0, (__USER32_CS << 16) | __KERNEL_CS); - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) - wrmsrl(MSR_LSTAR, SYSCALL64_entry_trampoline); - else - wrmsrl(MSR_LSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64); + wrmsrl(MSR_LSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64); #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION wrmsrl(MSR_CSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_compat); @@ -1557,7 +1546,8 @@ void syscall_init(void) * AMD doesn't allow SYSENTER in long mode (either 32- or 64-bit). */ wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, (u64)__KERNEL_CS); - wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1)); + wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, + (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(smp_processor_id()) + 1)); wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, (u64)entry_SYSENTER_compat); #else wrmsrl(MSR_CSTAR, (unsigned long)ignore_sysret); |