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authorThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2021-06-23 14:01:36 +0200
committerBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>2021-06-23 17:49:46 +0200
commit43be46e89698a41dbf4fff81a322f4c2ae21b5e2 (patch)
treef5db3fd5782445fb0a61d4bf78634789e10fa393 /arch/x86/kernel/fpu
parentx86/fpu: Limit xstate copy size in xstateregs_set() (diff)
downloadlinux-43be46e89698a41dbf4fff81a322f4c2ae21b5e2.tar.xz
linux-43be46e89698a41dbf4fff81a322f4c2ae21b5e2.zip
x86/fpu: Sanitize xstateregs_set()
xstateregs_set() operates on a stopped task and tries to copy the provided buffer into the task's fpu.state.xsave buffer. Any error while copying or invalid state detected after copying results in wiping the target task's FPU state completely including supervisor states. That's just wrong. The caller supplied invalid data or has a problem with unmapped memory, so there is absolutely no justification to corrupt the target state. Fix this with the following modifications: 1) If data has to be copied from userspace, allocate a buffer and copy from user first. 2) Use copy_kernel_to_xstate() unconditionally so that header checking works correctly. 3) Return on error without corrupting the target state. This prevents corrupting states and lets the caller deal with the problem it caused in the first place. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210623121452.214903673@linutronix.de
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/fpu')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c42
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c14
2 files changed, 25 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
index 6bb874441de8..a50c0a935499 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
@@ -2,11 +2,13 @@
/*
* FPU register's regset abstraction, for ptrace, core dumps, etc.
*/
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
#include <asm/fpu/signal.h>
#include <asm/fpu/regset.h>
#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
-#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
/*
* The xstateregs_active() routine is the same as the regset_fpregs_active() routine,
@@ -108,10 +110,10 @@ int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
- struct xregs_state *xsave;
+ struct xregs_state *tmpbuf = NULL;
int ret;
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
return -ENODEV;
/*
@@ -120,32 +122,22 @@ int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
if (pos != 0 || count != fpu_user_xstate_size)
return -EFAULT;
- xsave = &fpu->state.xsave;
-
- fpu__prepare_write(fpu);
+ if (!kbuf) {
+ tmpbuf = vmalloc(count);
+ if (!tmpbuf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- if (using_compacted_format()) {
- if (kbuf)
- ret = copy_kernel_to_xstate(xsave, kbuf);
- else
- ret = copy_user_to_xstate(xsave, ubuf);
- } else {
- ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, xsave, 0, -1);
- if (!ret)
- ret = validate_user_xstate_header(&xsave->header);
+ if (copy_from_user(tmpbuf, ubuf, count)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
}
- /*
- * mxcsr reserved bits must be masked to zero for security reasons.
- */
- xsave->i387.mxcsr &= mxcsr_feature_mask;
-
- /*
- * In case of failure, mark all states as init:
- */
- if (ret)
- fpstate_init(&fpu->state);
+ fpu__prepare_write(fpu);
+ ret = copy_kernel_to_xstate(&fpu->state.xsave, kbuf ?: tmpbuf);
+out:
+ vfree(tmpbuf);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index b82879cd9151..2b7b579f06b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ int using_compacted_format(void)
}
/* Validate an xstate header supplied by userspace (ptrace or sigreturn) */
-int validate_user_xstate_header(const struct xstate_header *hdr)
+static int validate_user_xstate_header(const struct xstate_header *hdr)
{
/* No unknown or supervisor features may be set */
if (hdr->xfeatures & ~xfeatures_mask_user())
@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ void copy_xstate_to_kernel(struct membuf to, struct xregs_state *xsave)
}
/*
- * Convert from a ptrace standard-format kernel buffer to kernel XSAVES format
+ * Convert from a ptrace standard-format kernel buffer to kernel XSAVE[S] format
* and copy to the target thread. This is called from xstateregs_set().
*/
int copy_kernel_to_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave, const void *kbuf)
@@ -1202,14 +1202,16 @@ int copy_kernel_to_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave, const void *kbuf)
*/
xsave->header.xfeatures |= hdr.xfeatures;
+ /* mxcsr reserved bits must be masked to zero for historical reasons. */
+ xsave->i387.mxcsr &= mxcsr_feature_mask;
+
return 0;
}
/*
- * Convert from a ptrace or sigreturn standard-format user-space buffer to
- * kernel XSAVES format and copy to the target thread. This is called from
- * xstateregs_set(), as well as potentially from the sigreturn() and
- * rt_sigreturn() system calls.
+ * Convert from a sigreturn standard-format user-space buffer to kernel
+ * XSAVE[S] format and copy to the target thread. This is called from the
+ * sigreturn() and rt_sigreturn() system calls.
*/
int copy_user_to_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave, const void __user *ubuf)
{