diff options
author | Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> | 2020-02-24 13:24:58 +0100 |
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committer | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2020-06-11 15:14:33 +0200 |
commit | 24ae0c91cbc57c2deb0401bd653453a508acdcee (patch) | |
tree | 757bf36dcca535e0e58bee390fa9b9d0423d6cfc /arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | |
parent | x86/idt: Keep spurious entries unset in system_vectors (diff) | |
download | linux-24ae0c91cbc57c2deb0401bd653453a508acdcee.tar.xz linux-24ae0c91cbc57c2deb0401bd653453a508acdcee.zip |
x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on cpu_entry_area
A data breakpoint near the top of an IST stack will cause unrecoverable
recursion. A data breakpoint on the GDT, IDT, or TSS is terrifying.
Prevent either of these from happening.
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200505134058.272448010@linutronix.de
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 25 |
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c index 4d8d53ed02c9..d42fc0eaf193 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c @@ -227,10 +227,35 @@ int arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace(struct arch_hw_breakpoint *hw) return (va >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) || ((va + len - 1) >= TASK_SIZE_MAX); } +/* + * Checks whether the range from addr to end, inclusive, overlaps the CPU + * entry area range. + */ +static inline bool within_cpu_entry_area(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end) +{ + return end >= CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE && + addr < (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE + CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE); +} + static int arch_build_bp_info(struct perf_event *bp, const struct perf_event_attr *attr, struct arch_hw_breakpoint *hw) { + unsigned long bp_end; + + bp_end = attr->bp_addr + attr->bp_len - 1; + if (bp_end < attr->bp_addr) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Prevent any breakpoint of any type that overlaps the + * cpu_entry_area. This protects the IST stacks and also + * reduces the chance that we ever find out what happens if + * there's a data breakpoint on the GDT, IDT, or TSS. + */ + if (within_cpu_entry_area(attr->bp_addr, bp_end)) + return -EINVAL; + hw->address = attr->bp_addr; hw->mask = 0; |