x86/ldt: Make the LDT mapping RO

Now that the LDT mapping is in a known area when PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is
enabled its a primary target for attacks, if a user space interface fails
to validate a write address correctly. That can never happen, right?

The SDM states:

    If the segment descriptors in the GDT or an LDT are placed in ROM, the
    processor can enter an indefinite loop if software or the processor
    attempts to update (write to) the ROM-based segment descriptors. To
    prevent this problem, set the accessed bits for all segment descriptors
    placed in a ROM. Also, remove operating-system or executive code that
    attempts to modify segment descriptors located in ROM.

So its a valid approach to set the ACCESS bit when setting up the LDT entry
and to map the table RO. Fixup the selftest so it can handle that new mode.

Remove the manual ACCESS bit setter in set_tls_desc() as this is now
pointless. Folded the patch from Peter Ziljstra.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
index 9a9c9b076955..a5b802a12212 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
@@ -93,17 +93,10 @@ static void set_tls_desc(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
 	cpu = get_cpu();
 
 	while (n-- > 0) {
-		if (LDT_empty(info) || LDT_zero(info)) {
+		if (LDT_empty(info) || LDT_zero(info))
 			memset(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc));
-		} else {
+		else
 			fill_ldt(desc, info);
-
-			/*
-			 * Always set the accessed bit so that the CPU
-			 * doesn't try to write to the (read-only) GDT.
-			 */
-			desc->type |= 1;
-		}
 		++info;
 		++desc;
 	}