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authorBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>2018-02-19 17:14:44 +0100
committerPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2018-02-24 02:24:12 +0100
commit7607b7174405aec7441ff6c970833c463114040a (patch)
treeb507a9bd87b758a01a532ac98814f614bffd3b38 /arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
parentKVM: SVM: no need to call access_ok() in LAUNCH_MEASURE command (diff)
downloadlinux-7607b7174405aec7441ff6c970833c463114040a.tar.xz
linux-7607b7174405aec7441ff6c970833c463114040a.zip
KVM: SVM: install RSM intercept
RSM instruction is used by the SMM handler to return from SMM mode. Currently, rsm causes a #UD - which results in instruction fetch, decode, and emulate. By installing the RSM intercept we can avoid the instruction fetch since we know that #VMEXIT was due to rsm. The patch is required for the SEV guest, because in case of SEV guest memory is encrypted with guest-specific key and hypervisor will not able to fetch the instruction bytes from the guest memory. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/svm.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm.c11
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index ca69d53d7e6d..4aeb665ffbb0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
static int sev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
module_param(sev, int, 0444);
+static u8 rsm_ins_bytes[] = "\x0f\xaa";
+
static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool invalidate_gpa);
static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
@@ -1383,6 +1385,7 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SKINIT);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_WBINVD);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
+ set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RSM);
if (!kvm_mwait_in_guest()) {
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MONITOR);
@@ -3699,6 +3702,12 @@ static int emulate_on_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
return emulate_instruction(&svm->vcpu, 0) == EMULATE_DONE;
}
+static int rsm_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ return x86_emulate_instruction(&svm->vcpu, 0, 0,
+ rsm_ins_bytes, 2) == EMULATE_DONE;
+}
+
static int rdpmc_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
int err;
@@ -4541,7 +4550,7 @@ static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct vcpu_svm *svm) = {
[SVM_EXIT_MWAIT] = mwait_interception,
[SVM_EXIT_XSETBV] = xsetbv_interception,
[SVM_EXIT_NPF] = npf_interception,
- [SVM_EXIT_RSM] = emulate_on_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_RSM] = rsm_interception,
[SVM_EXIT_AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI] = avic_incomplete_ipi_interception,
[SVM_EXIT_AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS] = avic_unaccelerated_access_interception,
};