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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-09-07 22:52:20 +0200
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-09-07 22:52:20 +0200
commit0c02183427b4d2002992f26d4917c1263c5d4a7f (patch)
tree426a0b282af3f309934cf0ff813b02c385e7ea04 /arch/x86/kvm
parentMerge tag 's390-6.6-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/... (diff)
parentMerge branch 'kvm-x86-mmu-6.6' into HEAD (diff)
downloadlinux-0c02183427b4d2002992f26d4917c1263c5d4a7f.tar.xz
linux-0c02183427b4d2002992f26d4917c1263c5d4a7f.zip
Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini: "ARM: - Clean up vCPU targets, always returning generic v8 as the preferred target - Trap forwarding infrastructure for nested virtualization (used for traps that are taken from an L2 guest and are needed by the L1 hypervisor) - FEAT_TLBIRANGE support to only invalidate specific ranges of addresses when collapsing a table PTE to a block PTE. This avoids that the guest refills the TLBs again for addresses that aren't covered by the table PTE. - Fix vPMU issues related to handling of PMUver. - Don't unnecessary align non-stack allocations in the EL2 VA space - Drop HCR_VIRT_EXCP_MASK, which was never used... - Don't use smp_processor_id() in kvm_arch_vcpu_load(), but the cpu parameter instead - Drop redundant call to kvm_set_pfn_accessed() in user_mem_abort() - Remove prototypes without implementations RISC-V: - Zba, Zbs, Zicntr, Zicsr, Zifencei, and Zihpm support for guest - Added ONE_REG interface for SATP mode - Added ONE_REG interface to enable/disable multiple ISA extensions - Improved error codes returned by ONE_REG interfaces - Added KVM_GET_REG_LIST ioctl() implementation for KVM RISC-V - Added get-reg-list selftest for KVM RISC-V s390: - PV crypto passthrough enablement (Tony, Steffen, Viktor, Janosch) Allows a PV guest to use crypto cards. Card access is governed by the firmware and once a crypto queue is "bound" to a PV VM every other entity (PV or not) looses access until it is not bound anymore. Enablement is done via flags when creating the PV VM. - Guest debug fixes (Ilya) x86: - Clean up KVM's handling of Intel architectural events - Intel bugfixes - Add support for SEV-ES DebugSwap, allowing SEV-ES guests to use debug registers and generate/handle #DBs - Clean up LBR virtualization code - Fix a bug where KVM fails to set the target pCPU during an IRTE update - Fix fatal bugs in SEV-ES intrahost migration - Fix a bug where the recent (architecturally correct) change to reinject #BP and skip INT3 broke SEV guests (can't decode INT3 to skip it) - Retry APIC map recalculation if a vCPU is added/enabled - Overhaul emergency reboot code to bring SVM up to par with VMX, tie the "emergency disabling" behavior to KVM actually being loaded, and move all of the logic within KVM - Fix user triggerable WARNs in SVM where KVM incorrectly assumes the TSC ratio MSR cannot diverge from the default when TSC scaling is disabled up related code - Add a framework to allow "caching" feature flags so that KVM can check if the guest can use a feature without needing to search guest CPUID - Rip out the ancient MMU_DEBUG crud and replace the useful bits with CONFIG_KVM_PROVE_MMU - Fix KVM's handling of !visible guest roots to avoid premature triple fault injection - Overhaul KVM's page-track APIs, and KVMGT's usage, to reduce the API surface that is needed by external users (currently only KVMGT), and fix a variety of issues in the process Generic: - Wrap kvm_{gfn,hva}_range.pte in a union to allow mmu_notifier events to pass action specific data without needing to constantly update the main handlers. - Drop unused function declarations Selftests: - Add testcases to x86's sync_regs_test for detecting KVM TOCTOU bugs - Add support for printf() in guest code and covert all guest asserts to use printf-based reporting - Clean up the PMU event filter test and add new testcases - Include x86 selftests in the KVM x86 MAINTAINERS entry" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (279 commits) KVM: x86/mmu: Include mmu.h in spte.h KVM: x86/mmu: Use dummy root, backed by zero page, for !visible guest roots KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow guest from using !visible slots for page tables KVM: x86/mmu: Harden TDP MMU iteration against root w/o shadow page KVM: x86/mmu: Harden new PGD against roots without shadow pages KVM: x86/mmu: Add helper to convert root hpa to shadow page drm/i915/gvt: Drop final dependencies on KVM internal details KVM: x86/mmu: Handle KVM bookkeeping in page-track APIs, not callers KVM: x86/mmu: Drop @slot param from exported/external page-track APIs KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if write-tracking is used but not enabled KVM: x86/mmu: Assert that correct locks are held for page write-tracking KVM: x86/mmu: Rename page-track APIs to reflect the new reality KVM: x86/mmu: Drop infrastructure for multiple page-track modes KVM: x86/mmu: Use page-track notifiers iff there are external users KVM: x86/mmu: Move KVM-only page-track declarations to internal header KVM: x86: Remove the unused page-track hook track_flush_slot() drm/i915/gvt: switch from ->track_flush_slot() to ->track_remove_region() KVM: x86: Add a new page-track hook to handle memslot deletion drm/i915/gvt: Don't bother removing write-protection on to-be-deleted slot KVM: x86: Reject memslot MOVE operations if KVMGT is attached ...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c40
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h46
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/governed_features.h21
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c29
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c371
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h27
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c252
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.h58
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h41
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h21
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c11
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c37
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c59
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c57
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c100
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c327
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h61
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/hyperv.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c81
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c228
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.c83
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.h1
34 files changed, 1196 insertions, 809 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
index 89ca7f4c1464..ed90f148140d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ config X86_SGX_KVM
config KVM_AMD
tristate "KVM for AMD processors support"
- depends on KVM
+ depends on KVM && (CPU_SUP_AMD || CPU_SUP_HYGON)
help
Provides support for KVM on AMD processors equipped with the AMD-V
(SVM) extensions.
@@ -138,6 +138,19 @@ config KVM_XEN
If in doubt, say "N".
+config KVM_PROVE_MMU
+ bool "Prove KVM MMU correctness"
+ depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
+ depends on KVM
+ depends on EXPERT
+ help
+ Enables runtime assertions in KVM's MMU that are too costly to enable
+ in anything remotely resembling a production environment, e.g. this
+ gates code that verifies a to-be-freed page table doesn't have any
+ present SPTEs.
+
+ If in doubt, say "N".
+
config KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING
bool
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index d3432687c9e6..0544e30b4946 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include "linux/lockdep.h"
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -84,6 +85,18 @@ static inline struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find(
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e;
int i;
+ /*
+ * KVM has a semi-arbitrary rule that querying the guest's CPUID model
+ * with IRQs disabled is disallowed. The CPUID model can legitimately
+ * have over one hundred entries, i.e. the lookup is slow, and IRQs are
+ * typically disabled in KVM only when KVM is in a performance critical
+ * path, e.g. the core VM-Enter/VM-Exit run loop. Nothing will break
+ * if this rule is violated, this assertion is purely to flag potential
+ * performance issues. If this fires, consider moving the lookup out
+ * of the hotpath, e.g. by caching information during CPUID updates.
+ */
+ lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
+
for (i = 0; i < nent; i++) {
e = &entries[i];
@@ -312,6 +325,27 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+ bool allow_gbpages;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_NR_GOVERNED_FEATURES > KVM_MAX_NR_GOVERNED_FEATURES);
+ bitmap_zero(vcpu->arch.governed_features.enabled,
+ KVM_MAX_NR_GOVERNED_FEATURES);
+
+ /*
+ * If TDP is enabled, let the guest use GBPAGES if they're supported in
+ * hardware. The hardware page walker doesn't let KVM disable GBPAGES,
+ * i.e. won't treat them as reserved, and KVM doesn't redo the GVA->GPA
+ * walk for performance and complexity reasons. Not to mention KVM
+ * _can't_ solve the problem because GVA->GPA walks aren't visible to
+ * KVM once a TDP translation is installed. Mimic hardware behavior so
+ * that KVM's is at least consistent, i.e. doesn't randomly inject #PF.
+ * If TDP is disabled, honor *only* guest CPUID as KVM has full control
+ * and can install smaller shadow pages if the host lacks 1GiB support.
+ */
+ allow_gbpages = tdp_enabled ? boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES) :
+ guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
+ if (allow_gbpages)
+ kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 1);
if (best && apic) {
@@ -647,7 +681,8 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
);
kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined(CPUID_7_1_EDX,
- F(AVX_VNNI_INT8) | F(AVX_NE_CONVERT) | F(PREFETCHITI)
+ F(AVX_VNNI_INT8) | F(AVX_NE_CONVERT) | F(PREFETCHITI) |
+ F(AMX_COMPLEX)
);
kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_D_1_EAX,
@@ -1154,6 +1189,9 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0001_EDX);
cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0001_ECX);
break;
+ case 0x80000005:
+ /* Pass host L1 cache and TLB info. */
+ break;
case 0x80000006:
/* Drop reserved bits, pass host L2 cache and TLB info. */
entry->edx &= ~GENMASK(17, 16);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index b1658c0de847..284fa4704553 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -232,4 +232,50 @@ static __always_inline bool guest_pv_has(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.features & (1u << kvm_feature);
}
+enum kvm_governed_features {
+#define KVM_GOVERNED_FEATURE(x) KVM_GOVERNED_##x,
+#include "governed_features.h"
+ KVM_NR_GOVERNED_FEATURES
+};
+
+static __always_inline int kvm_governed_feature_index(unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+ switch (x86_feature) {
+#define KVM_GOVERNED_FEATURE(x) case x: return KVM_GOVERNED_##x;
+#include "governed_features.h"
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool kvm_is_governed_feature(unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+ return kvm_governed_feature_index(x86_feature) >= 0;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(!kvm_is_governed_feature(x86_feature));
+
+ __set_bit(kvm_governed_feature_index(x86_feature),
+ vcpu->arch.governed_features.enabled);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+ if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(x86_feature) && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, x86_feature))
+ kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, x86_feature);
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool guest_can_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned int x86_feature)
+{
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(!kvm_is_governed_feature(x86_feature));
+
+ return test_bit(kvm_governed_feature_index(x86_feature),
+ vcpu->arch.governed_features.enabled);
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index 936a397a08cd..2673cd5c46cb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -1799,13 +1799,11 @@ static int writeback(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct operand *op)
op->addr.mem,
&op->val,
op->bytes);
- break;
case OP_MEM_STR:
return segmented_write(ctxt,
op->addr.mem,
op->data,
op->bytes * op->count);
- break;
case OP_XMM:
kvm_write_sse_reg(op->addr.xmm, &op->vec_val);
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/governed_features.h b/arch/x86/kvm/governed_features.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..423a73395c10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/governed_features.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#if !defined(KVM_GOVERNED_FEATURE) || defined(KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE)
+BUILD_BUG()
+#endif
+
+#define KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(x) KVM_GOVERNED_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_##x)
+
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(GBPAGES)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(XSAVES)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(VMX)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(NRIPS)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(TSCRATEMSR)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(LBRV)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(PAUSEFILTER)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(PFTHRESHOLD)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(VGIF)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(VNMI)
+
+#undef KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE
+#undef KVM_GOVERNED_FEATURE
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
index b28fd020066f..7c2dac6824e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -1293,7 +1293,6 @@ static bool hv_check_msr_access(struct kvm_vcpu_hv *hv_vcpu, u32 msr)
case HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE:
return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
HV_MSR_APIC_ACCESS_AVAILABLE;
- break;
case HV_X64_MSR_TSC_FREQUENCY:
case HV_X64_MSR_APIC_FREQUENCY:
return hv_vcpu->cpuid_cache.features_eax &
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
index ab65f3a47dfd..be7aeb9b8ea3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -213,7 +213,6 @@ struct x86_emulate_ops {
bool (*get_cpuid)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx,
u32 *ecx, u32 *edx, bool exact_only);
- bool (*guest_has_long_mode)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
bool (*guest_has_movbe)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
bool (*guest_has_fxsr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
bool (*guest_has_rdpid)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
index a983a16163b1..dcd60b39e794 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -376,7 +376,8 @@ void kvm_recalculate_apic_map(struct kvm *kvm)
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
unsigned long i;
u32 max_id = 255; /* enough space for any xAPIC ID */
- bool xapic_id_mismatch = false;
+ bool xapic_id_mismatch;
+ int r;
/* Read kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty before kvm->arch.apic_map. */
if (atomic_read_acquire(&kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty) == CLEAN)
@@ -386,9 +387,14 @@ void kvm_recalculate_apic_map(struct kvm *kvm)
"Dirty APIC map without an in-kernel local APIC");
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
+
+retry:
/*
- * Read kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty before kvm->arch.apic_map
- * (if clean) or the APIC registers (if dirty).
+ * Read kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty before kvm->arch.apic_map (if clean)
+ * or the APIC registers (if dirty). Note, on retry the map may have
+ * not yet been marked dirty by whatever task changed a vCPU's x2APIC
+ * ID, i.e. the map may still show up as in-progress. In that case
+ * this task still needs to retry and complete its calculation.
*/
if (atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(&kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty,
DIRTY, UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS) == CLEAN) {
@@ -397,6 +403,15 @@ void kvm_recalculate_apic_map(struct kvm *kvm)
return;
}
+ /*
+ * Reset the mismatch flag between attempts so that KVM does the right
+ * thing if a vCPU changes its xAPIC ID, but do NOT reset max_id, i.e.
+ * keep max_id strictly increasing. Disallowing max_id from shrinking
+ * ensures KVM won't get stuck in an infinite loop, e.g. if the vCPU
+ * with the highest x2APIC ID is toggling its APIC on and off.
+ */
+ xapic_id_mismatch = false;
+
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
if (kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
max_id = max(max_id, kvm_x2apic_id(vcpu->arch.apic));
@@ -415,9 +430,15 @@ void kvm_recalculate_apic_map(struct kvm *kvm)
if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
continue;
- if (kvm_recalculate_phys_map(new, vcpu, &xapic_id_mismatch)) {
+ r = kvm_recalculate_phys_map(new, vcpu, &xapic_id_mismatch);
+ if (r) {
kvfree(new);
new = NULL;
+ if (r == -E2BIG) {
+ cond_resched();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+
goto out;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index 92d5a1924fc1..253fb2093d5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ void kvm_mmu_unload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_mmu_free_obsolete_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_mmu_sync_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_mmu_sync_prev_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void kvm_mmu_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new,
+ int bytes);
static inline int kvm_mmu_reload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index ec169f5c7dce..e1d011c67cc6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
#include "smm.h"
#include "kvm_emulate.h"
+#include "page_track.h"
#include "cpuid.h"
#include "spte.h"
@@ -53,7 +54,7 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/vmx.h>
-#include <asm/kvm_page_track.h>
+
#include "trace.h"
extern bool itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation;
@@ -115,11 +116,6 @@ static int max_huge_page_level __read_mostly;
static int tdp_root_level __read_mostly;
static int max_tdp_level __read_mostly;
-#ifdef MMU_DEBUG
-bool dbg = 0;
-module_param(dbg, bool, 0644);
-#endif
-
#define PTE_PREFETCH_NUM 8
#include <trace/events/kvm.h>
@@ -278,16 +274,12 @@ static inline bool kvm_available_flush_remote_tlbs_range(void)
return kvm_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs_range;
}
-void kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn,
- gfn_t nr_pages)
+int kvm_arch_flush_remote_tlbs_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, u64 nr_pages)
{
- int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (!kvm_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs_range)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (kvm_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs_range)
- ret = static_call(kvm_x86_flush_remote_tlbs_range)(kvm, start_gfn,
- nr_pages);
- if (ret)
- kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
+ return static_call(kvm_x86_flush_remote_tlbs_range)(kvm, gfn, nr_pages);
}
static gfn_t kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int index);
@@ -490,7 +482,7 @@ retry:
*/
static void mmu_spte_set(u64 *sptep, u64 new_spte)
{
- WARN_ON(is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep));
__set_spte(sptep, new_spte);
}
@@ -502,7 +494,7 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_update_no_track(u64 *sptep, u64 new_spte)
{
u64 old_spte = *sptep;
- WARN_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(new_spte));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_shadow_present_pte(new_spte));
check_spte_writable_invariants(new_spte);
if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte)) {
@@ -515,7 +507,7 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_update_no_track(u64 *sptep, u64 new_spte)
else
old_spte = __update_clear_spte_slow(sptep, new_spte);
- WARN_ON(spte_to_pfn(old_spte) != spte_to_pfn(new_spte));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(spte_to_pfn(old_spte) != spte_to_pfn(new_spte));
return old_spte;
}
@@ -597,7 +589,7 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)
* by a refcounted page, the refcount is elevated.
*/
page = kvm_pfn_to_refcounted_page(pfn);
- WARN_ON(page && !page_count(page));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(page && !page_count(page));
if (is_accessed_spte(old_spte))
kvm_set_pfn_accessed(pfn);
@@ -812,7 +804,7 @@ static void update_gfn_disallow_lpage_count(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
for (i = PG_LEVEL_2M; i <= KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL; ++i) {
linfo = lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, i);
linfo->disallow_lpage += count;
- WARN_ON(linfo->disallow_lpage < 0);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(linfo->disallow_lpage < 0);
}
}
@@ -839,8 +831,7 @@ static void account_shadowed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
/* the non-leaf shadow pages are keeping readonly. */
if (sp->role.level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
- return kvm_slot_page_track_add_page(kvm, slot, gfn,
- KVM_PAGE_TRACK_WRITE);
+ return __kvm_write_track_add_gfn(kvm, slot, gfn);
kvm_mmu_gfn_disallow_lpage(slot, gfn);
@@ -886,8 +877,7 @@ static void unaccount_shadowed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
slots = kvm_memslots_for_spte_role(kvm, sp->role);
slot = __gfn_to_memslot(slots, gfn);
if (sp->role.level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
- return kvm_slot_page_track_remove_page(kvm, slot, gfn,
- KVM_PAGE_TRACK_WRITE);
+ return __kvm_write_track_remove_gfn(kvm, slot, gfn);
kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(slot, gfn);
}
@@ -941,10 +931,8 @@ static int pte_list_add(struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache, u64 *spte,
int count = 0;
if (!rmap_head->val) {
- rmap_printk("%p %llx 0->1\n", spte, *spte);
rmap_head->val = (unsigned long)spte;
} else if (!(rmap_head->val & 1)) {
- rmap_printk("%p %llx 1->many\n", spte, *spte);
desc = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(cache);
desc->sptes[0] = (u64 *)rmap_head->val;
desc->sptes[1] = spte;
@@ -953,7 +941,6 @@ static int pte_list_add(struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache, u64 *spte,
rmap_head->val = (unsigned long)desc | 1;
++count;
} else {
- rmap_printk("%p %llx many->many\n", spte, *spte);
desc = (struct pte_list_desc *)(rmap_head->val & ~1ul);
count = desc->tail_count + desc->spte_count;
@@ -973,7 +960,8 @@ static int pte_list_add(struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache, u64 *spte,
return count;
}
-static void pte_list_desc_remove_entry(struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+static void pte_list_desc_remove_entry(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
struct pte_list_desc *desc, int i)
{
struct pte_list_desc *head_desc = (struct pte_list_desc *)(rmap_head->val & ~1ul);
@@ -984,7 +972,7 @@ static void pte_list_desc_remove_entry(struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
* when adding an entry and the previous head is full, and heads are
* removed (this flow) when they become empty.
*/
- BUG_ON(j < 0);
+ KVM_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION(j < 0, kvm);
/*
* Replace the to-be-freed SPTE with the last valid entry from the head
@@ -1009,35 +997,34 @@ static void pte_list_desc_remove_entry(struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
mmu_free_pte_list_desc(head_desc);
}
-static void pte_list_remove(u64 *spte, struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head)
+static void pte_list_remove(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *spte,
+ struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head)
{
struct pte_list_desc *desc;
int i;
- if (!rmap_head->val) {
- pr_err("%s: %p 0->BUG\n", __func__, spte);
- BUG();
- } else if (!(rmap_head->val & 1)) {
- rmap_printk("%p 1->0\n", spte);
- if ((u64 *)rmap_head->val != spte) {
- pr_err("%s: %p 1->BUG\n", __func__, spte);
- BUG();
- }
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION(!rmap_head->val, kvm))
+ return;
+
+ if (!(rmap_head->val & 1)) {
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION((u64 *)rmap_head->val != spte, kvm))
+ return;
+
rmap_head->val = 0;
} else {
- rmap_printk("%p many->many\n", spte);
desc = (struct pte_list_desc *)(rmap_head->val & ~1ul);
while (desc) {
for (i = 0; i < desc->spte_count; ++i) {
if (desc->sptes[i] == spte) {
- pte_list_desc_remove_entry(rmap_head, desc, i);
+ pte_list_desc_remove_entry(kvm, rmap_head,
+ desc, i);
return;
}
}
desc = desc->more;
}
- pr_err("%s: %p many->many\n", __func__, spte);
- BUG();
+
+ KVM_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION(true, kvm);
}
}
@@ -1045,7 +1032,7 @@ static void kvm_zap_one_rmap_spte(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head, u64 *sptep)
{
mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(kvm, sptep);
- pte_list_remove(sptep, rmap_head);
+ pte_list_remove(kvm, sptep, rmap_head);
}
/* Return true if at least one SPTE was zapped, false otherwise */
@@ -1120,7 +1107,7 @@ static void rmap_remove(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *spte)
slot = __gfn_to_memslot(slots, gfn);
rmap_head = gfn_to_rmap(gfn, sp->role.level, slot);
- pte_list_remove(spte, rmap_head);
+ pte_list_remove(kvm, spte, rmap_head);
}
/*
@@ -1212,7 +1199,7 @@ static void drop_large_spte(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep, bool flush)
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep);
- WARN_ON(sp->role.level == PG_LEVEL_4K);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.level == PG_LEVEL_4K);
drop_spte(kvm, sptep);
@@ -1241,8 +1228,6 @@ static bool spte_write_protect(u64 *sptep, bool pt_protect)
!(pt_protect && is_mmu_writable_spte(spte)))
return false;
- rmap_printk("spte %p %llx\n", sptep, *sptep);
-
if (pt_protect)
spte &= ~shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
spte = spte & ~PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
@@ -1267,9 +1252,7 @@ static bool spte_clear_dirty(u64 *sptep)
{
u64 spte = *sptep;
- rmap_printk("spte %p %llx\n", sptep, *sptep);
-
- MMU_WARN_ON(!spte_ad_enabled(spte));
+ KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(!spte_ad_enabled(spte));
spte &= ~shadow_dirty_mask;
return mmu_spte_update(sptep, spte);
}
@@ -1475,14 +1458,11 @@ static bool kvm_set_pte_rmap(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
u64 new_spte;
kvm_pfn_t new_pfn;
- WARN_ON(pte_huge(pte));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(pte_huge(pte));
new_pfn = pte_pfn(pte);
restart:
for_each_rmap_spte(rmap_head, &iter, sptep) {
- rmap_printk("spte %p %llx gfn %llx (%d)\n",
- sptep, *sptep, gfn, level);
-
need_flush = true;
if (pte_write(pte)) {
@@ -1588,7 +1568,7 @@ static __always_inline bool kvm_handle_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm,
for_each_slot_rmap_range(range->slot, PG_LEVEL_4K, KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL,
range->start, range->end - 1, &iterator)
ret |= handler(kvm, iterator.rmap, range->slot, iterator.gfn,
- iterator.level, range->pte);
+ iterator.level, range->arg.pte);
return ret;
}
@@ -1710,21 +1690,19 @@ bool kvm_test_age_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
return young;
}
-#ifdef MMU_DEBUG
-static int is_empty_shadow_page(u64 *spt)
+static void kvm_mmu_check_sptes_at_free(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
- u64 *pos;
- u64 *end;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PROVE_MMU
+ int i;
- for (pos = spt, end = pos + SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE; pos != end; pos++)
- if (is_shadow_present_pte(*pos)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s: %p %llx\n", __func__,
- pos, *pos);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
+ for (i = 0; i < SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++) {
+ if (KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(is_shadow_present_pte(sp->spt[i])))
+ pr_err_ratelimited("SPTE %llx (@ %p) for gfn %llx shadow-present at free",
+ sp->spt[i], &sp->spt[i],
+ kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, i));
+ }
#endif
+}
/*
* This value is the sum of all of the kvm instances's
@@ -1752,7 +1730,8 @@ static void kvm_unaccount_mmu_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
static void kvm_mmu_free_shadow_page(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
- MMU_WARN_ON(!is_empty_shadow_page(sp->spt));
+ kvm_mmu_check_sptes_at_free(sp);
+
hlist_del(&sp->hash_link);
list_del(&sp->link);
free_page((unsigned long)sp->spt);
@@ -1775,16 +1754,16 @@ static void mmu_page_add_parent_pte(struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache,
pte_list_add(cache, parent_pte, &sp->parent_ptes);
}
-static void mmu_page_remove_parent_pte(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+static void mmu_page_remove_parent_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
u64 *parent_pte)
{
- pte_list_remove(parent_pte, &sp->parent_ptes);
+ pte_list_remove(kvm, parent_pte, &sp->parent_ptes);
}
-static void drop_parent_pte(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
+static void drop_parent_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
u64 *parent_pte)
{
- mmu_page_remove_parent_pte(sp, parent_pte);
+ mmu_page_remove_parent_pte(kvm, sp, parent_pte);
mmu_spte_clear_no_track(parent_pte);
}
@@ -1840,7 +1819,7 @@ static int mmu_pages_add(struct kvm_mmu_pages *pvec, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
static inline void clear_unsync_child_bit(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int idx)
{
--sp->unsync_children;
- WARN_ON((int)sp->unsync_children < 0);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE((int)sp->unsync_children < 0);
__clear_bit(idx, sp->unsync_child_bitmap);
}
@@ -1898,7 +1877,7 @@ static int mmu_unsync_walk(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
static void kvm_unlink_unsync_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
- WARN_ON(!sp->unsync);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->unsync);
trace_kvm_mmu_sync_page(sp);
sp->unsync = 0;
--kvm->stat.mmu_unsync;
@@ -2073,11 +2052,11 @@ static int mmu_pages_first(struct kvm_mmu_pages *pvec,
if (pvec->nr == 0)
return 0;
- WARN_ON(pvec->page[0].idx != INVALID_INDEX);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(pvec->page[0].idx != INVALID_INDEX);
sp = pvec->page[0].sp;
level = sp->role.level;
- WARN_ON(level == PG_LEVEL_4K);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(level == PG_LEVEL_4K);
parents->parent[level-2] = sp;
@@ -2099,7 +2078,7 @@ static void mmu_pages_clear_parents(struct mmu_page_path *parents)
if (!sp)
return;
- WARN_ON(idx == INVALID_INDEX);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(idx == INVALID_INDEX);
clear_unsync_child_bit(sp, idx);
level++;
} while (!sp->unsync_children);
@@ -2220,7 +2199,7 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *kvm_mmu_find_shadow_page(struct kvm *kvm,
if (ret < 0)
break;
- WARN_ON(!list_empty(&invalid_list));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&invalid_list));
if (ret > 0)
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
}
@@ -2499,7 +2478,7 @@ static void validate_direct_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
if (child->role.access == direct_access)
return;
- drop_parent_pte(child, sptep);
+ drop_parent_pte(vcpu->kvm, child, sptep);
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_sptep(vcpu->kvm, sptep);
}
}
@@ -2517,7 +2496,7 @@ static int mmu_page_zap_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
drop_spte(kvm, spte);
} else {
child = spte_to_child_sp(pte);
- drop_parent_pte(child, spte);
+ drop_parent_pte(kvm, child, spte);
/*
* Recursively zap nested TDP SPs, parentless SPs are
@@ -2548,13 +2527,13 @@ static int kvm_mmu_page_unlink_children(struct kvm *kvm,
return zapped;
}
-static void kvm_mmu_unlink_parents(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+static void kvm_mmu_unlink_parents(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
u64 *sptep;
struct rmap_iterator iter;
while ((sptep = rmap_get_first(&sp->parent_ptes, &iter)))
- drop_parent_pte(sp, sptep);
+ drop_parent_pte(kvm, sp, sptep);
}
static int mmu_zap_unsync_children(struct kvm *kvm,
@@ -2593,7 +2572,7 @@ static bool __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(struct kvm *kvm,
++kvm->stat.mmu_shadow_zapped;
*nr_zapped = mmu_zap_unsync_children(kvm, sp, invalid_list);
*nr_zapped += kvm_mmu_page_unlink_children(kvm, sp, invalid_list);
- kvm_mmu_unlink_parents(sp);
+ kvm_mmu_unlink_parents(kvm, sp);
/* Zapping children means active_mmu_pages has become unstable. */
list_unstable = *nr_zapped;
@@ -2675,7 +2654,7 @@ static void kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(struct kvm *kvm,
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
list_for_each_entry_safe(sp, nsp, invalid_list, link) {
- WARN_ON(!sp->role.invalid || sp->root_count);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->role.invalid || sp->root_count);
kvm_mmu_free_shadow_page(sp);
}
}
@@ -2775,12 +2754,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
int r;
- pgprintk("%s: looking for gfn %llx\n", __func__, gfn);
r = 0;
write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes(kvm, sp, gfn) {
- pgprintk("%s: gfn %llx role %x\n", __func__, gfn,
- sp->role.word);
r = 1;
kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp, &invalid_list);
}
@@ -2831,7 +2807,7 @@ int mmu_try_to_unsync_pages(struct kvm *kvm, const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
* track machinery is used to write-protect upper-level shadow pages,
* i.e. this guards the role.level == 4K assertion below!
*/
- if (kvm_slot_page_track_is_active(kvm, slot, gfn, KVM_PAGE_TRACK_WRITE))
+ if (kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(kvm, slot, gfn))
return -EPERM;
/*
@@ -2873,7 +2849,7 @@ int mmu_try_to_unsync_pages(struct kvm *kvm, const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
continue;
}
- WARN_ON(sp->role.level != PG_LEVEL_4K);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.level != PG_LEVEL_4K);
kvm_unsync_page(kvm, sp);
}
if (locked)
@@ -2938,9 +2914,6 @@ static int mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
bool prefetch = !fault || fault->prefetch;
bool write_fault = fault && fault->write;
- pgprintk("%s: spte %llx write_fault %d gfn %llx\n", __func__,
- *sptep, write_fault, gfn);
-
if (unlikely(is_noslot_pfn(pfn))) {
vcpu->stat.pf_mmio_spte_created++;
mark_mmio_spte(vcpu, sptep, gfn, pte_access);
@@ -2957,11 +2930,9 @@ static int mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
u64 pte = *sptep;
child = spte_to_child_sp(pte);
- drop_parent_pte(child, sptep);
+ drop_parent_pte(vcpu->kvm, child, sptep);
flush = true;
} else if (pfn != spte_to_pfn(*sptep)) {
- pgprintk("hfn old %llx new %llx\n",
- spte_to_pfn(*sptep), pfn);
drop_spte(vcpu->kvm, sptep);
flush = true;
} else
@@ -2986,8 +2957,6 @@ static int mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
if (flush)
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn(vcpu->kvm, gfn, level);
- pgprintk("%s: setting spte %llx\n", __func__, *sptep);
-
if (!was_rmapped) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == RET_PF_SPURIOUS);
rmap_add(vcpu, slot, sptep, gfn, pte_access);
@@ -3033,7 +3002,7 @@ static void __direct_pte_prefetch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u64 *spte, *start = NULL;
int i;
- WARN_ON(!sp->role.direct);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->role.direct);
i = spte_index(sptep) & ~(PTE_PREFETCH_NUM - 1);
spte = sp->spt + i;
@@ -3574,12 +3543,8 @@ static void mmu_free_root_page(struct kvm *kvm, hpa_t *root_hpa,
if (!VALID_PAGE(*root_hpa))
return;
- /*
- * The "root" may be a special root, e.g. a PAE entry, treat it as a
- * SPTE to ensure any non-PA bits are dropped.
- */
- sp = spte_to_child_sp(*root_hpa);
- if (WARN_ON(!sp))
+ sp = root_to_sp(*root_hpa);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp))
return;
if (is_tdp_mmu_page(sp))
@@ -3624,7 +3589,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_free_roots(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
&invalid_list);
if (free_active_root) {
- if (to_shadow_page(mmu->root.hpa)) {
+ if (kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(mmu->root.hpa)) {
+ /* Nothing to cleanup for dummy roots. */
+ } else if (root_to_sp(mmu->root.hpa)) {
mmu_free_root_page(kvm, &mmu->root.hpa, &invalid_list);
} else if (mmu->pae_root) {
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
@@ -3648,6 +3615,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_free_roots);
void kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
{
unsigned long roots_to_free = 0;
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
hpa_t root_hpa;
int i;
@@ -3662,8 +3630,8 @@ void kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
if (!VALID_PAGE(root_hpa))
continue;
- if (!to_shadow_page(root_hpa) ||
- to_shadow_page(root_hpa)->role.guest_mode)
+ sp = root_to_sp(root_hpa);
+ if (!sp || sp->role.guest_mode)
roots_to_free |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i);
}
@@ -3671,19 +3639,6 @@ void kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots);
-
-static int mmu_check_root(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t root_gfn)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (!kvm_vcpu_is_visible_gfn(vcpu, root_gfn)) {
- kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
- ret = 1;
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
static hpa_t mmu_alloc_root(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, int quadrant,
u8 level)
{
@@ -3821,8 +3776,10 @@ static int mmu_alloc_shadow_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
root_pgd = kvm_mmu_get_guest_pgd(vcpu, mmu);
root_gfn = root_pgd >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (mmu_check_root(vcpu, root_gfn))
- return 1;
+ if (!kvm_vcpu_is_visible_gfn(vcpu, root_gfn)) {
+ mmu->root.hpa = kvm_mmu_get_dummy_root();
+ return 0;
+ }
/*
* On SVM, reading PDPTRs might access guest memory, which might fault
@@ -3834,8 +3791,8 @@ static int mmu_alloc_shadow_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!(pdptrs[i] & PT_PRESENT_MASK))
continue;
- if (mmu_check_root(vcpu, pdptrs[i] >> PAGE_SHIFT))
- return 1;
+ if (!kvm_vcpu_is_visible_gfn(vcpu, pdptrs[i] >> PAGE_SHIFT))
+ pdptrs[i] = 0;
}
}
@@ -4002,7 +3959,7 @@ static bool is_unsync_root(hpa_t root)
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
- if (!VALID_PAGE(root))
+ if (!VALID_PAGE(root) || kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(root))
return false;
/*
@@ -4018,7 +3975,7 @@ static bool is_unsync_root(hpa_t root)
* requirement isn't satisfied.
*/
smp_rmb();
- sp = to_shadow_page(root);
+ sp = root_to_sp(root);
/*
* PAE roots (somewhat arbitrarily) aren't backed by shadow pages, the
@@ -4048,11 +4005,12 @@ void kvm_mmu_sync_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (vcpu->arch.mmu->cpu_role.base.level >= PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL) {
hpa_t root = vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa;
- sp = to_shadow_page(root);
if (!is_unsync_root(root))
return;
+ sp = root_to_sp(root);
+
write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
mmu_sync_children(vcpu, sp, true);
write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
@@ -4194,7 +4152,7 @@ static int handle_mmio_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct)
return RET_PF_EMULATE;
reserved = get_mmio_spte(vcpu, addr, &spte);
- if (WARN_ON(reserved))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reserved))
return -EINVAL;
if (is_mmio_spte(spte)) {
@@ -4232,7 +4190,7 @@ static bool page_fault_handle_page_track(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
* guest is writing the page which is write tracked which can
* not be fixed by page fault handler.
*/
- if (kvm_slot_page_track_is_active(vcpu->kvm, fault->slot, fault->gfn, KVM_PAGE_TRACK_WRITE))
+ if (kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(vcpu->kvm, fault->slot, fault->gfn))
return true;
return false;
@@ -4382,7 +4340,7 @@ static int kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
static bool is_page_fault_stale(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
{
- struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = to_shadow_page(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa);
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = root_to_sp(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa);
/* Special roots, e.g. pae_root, are not backed by shadow pages. */
if (sp && is_obsolete_sp(vcpu->kvm, sp))
@@ -4407,6 +4365,10 @@ static int direct_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
{
int r;
+ /* Dummy roots are used only for shadowing bad guest roots. */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa)))
+ return RET_PF_RETRY;
+
if (page_fault_handle_page_track(vcpu, fault))
return RET_PF_EMULATE;
@@ -4443,8 +4405,6 @@ out_unlock:
static int nonpaging_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
{
- pgprintk("%s: gva %lx error %x\n", __func__, fault->addr, fault->error_code);
-
/* This path builds a PAE pagetable, we can map 2mb pages at maximum. */
fault->max_level = PG_LEVEL_2M;
return direct_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
@@ -4562,9 +4522,19 @@ static void nonpaging_init_context(struct kvm_mmu *context)
static inline bool is_root_usable(struct kvm_mmu_root_info *root, gpa_t pgd,
union kvm_mmu_page_role role)
{
- return (role.direct || pgd == root->pgd) &&
- VALID_PAGE(root->hpa) &&
- role.word == to_shadow_page(root->hpa)->role.word;
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+
+ if (!VALID_PAGE(root->hpa))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!role.direct && pgd != root->pgd)
+ return false;
+
+ sp = root_to_sp(root->hpa);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp))
+ return false;
+
+ return role.word == sp->role.word;
}
/*
@@ -4634,11 +4604,10 @@ static bool fast_pgd_switch(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
gpa_t new_pgd, union kvm_mmu_page_role new_role)
{
/*
- * For now, limit the caching to 64-bit hosts+VMs in order to avoid
- * having to deal with PDPTEs. We may add support for 32-bit hosts/VMs
- * later if necessary.
+ * Limit reuse to 64-bit hosts+VMs without "special" roots in order to
+ * avoid having to deal with PDPTEs and other complexities.
*/
- if (VALID_PAGE(mmu->root.hpa) && !to_shadow_page(mmu->root.hpa))
+ if (VALID_PAGE(mmu->root.hpa) && !root_to_sp(mmu->root.hpa))
kvm_mmu_free_roots(kvm, mmu, KVM_MMU_ROOT_CURRENT);
if (VALID_PAGE(mmu->root.hpa))
@@ -4684,9 +4653,12 @@ void kvm_mmu_new_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t new_pgd)
* If this is a direct root page, it doesn't have a write flooding
* count. Otherwise, clear the write flooding count.
*/
- if (!new_role.direct)
- __clear_sp_write_flooding_count(
- to_shadow_page(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa));
+ if (!new_role.direct) {
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = root_to_sp(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa);
+
+ if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp))
+ __clear_sp_write_flooding_count(sp);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_new_pgd);
@@ -4808,28 +4780,13 @@ static void __reset_rsvds_bits_mask(struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check,
}
}
-static bool guest_can_use_gbpages(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- /*
- * If TDP is enabled, let the guest use GBPAGES if they're supported in
- * hardware. The hardware page walker doesn't let KVM disable GBPAGES,
- * i.e. won't treat them as reserved, and KVM doesn't redo the GVA->GPA
- * walk for performance and complexity reasons. Not to mention KVM
- * _can't_ solve the problem because GVA->GPA walks aren't visible to
- * KVM once a TDP translation is installed. Mimic hardware behavior so
- * that KVM's is at least consistent, i.e. doesn't randomly inject #PF.
- */
- return tdp_enabled ? boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES) :
- guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES);
-}
-
static void reset_guest_rsvds_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu *context)
{
__reset_rsvds_bits_mask(&context->guest_rsvd_check,
vcpu->arch.reserved_gpa_bits,
context->cpu_role.base.level, is_efer_nx(context),
- guest_can_use_gbpages(vcpu),
+ guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
is_cr4_pse(context),
guest_cpuid_is_amd_or_hygon(vcpu));
}
@@ -4906,7 +4863,8 @@ static void reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
__reset_rsvds_bits_mask(shadow_zero_check, reserved_hpa_bits(),
context->root_role.level,
context->root_role.efer_nx,
- guest_can_use_gbpages(vcpu), is_pse, is_amd);
+ guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
+ is_pse, is_amd);
if (!shadow_me_mask)
return;
@@ -5467,8 +5425,8 @@ void kvm_mmu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* physical address properties) in a single VM would require tracking
* all relevant CPUID information in kvm_mmu_page_role. That is very
* undesirable as it would increase the memory requirements for
- * gfn_track (see struct kvm_mmu_page_role comments). For now that
- * problem is swept under the rug; KVM's CPUID API is horrific and
+ * gfn_write_track (see struct kvm_mmu_page_role comments). For now
+ * that problem is swept under the rug; KVM's CPUID API is horrific and
* it's all but impossible to solve it without introducing a new API.
*/
vcpu->arch.root_mmu.root_role.word = 0;
@@ -5531,9 +5489,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_unload(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
kvm_mmu_free_roots(kvm, &vcpu->arch.root_mmu, KVM_MMU_ROOTS_ALL);
- WARN_ON(VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.root_mmu.root.hpa));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.root_mmu.root.hpa));
kvm_mmu_free_roots(kvm, &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu, KVM_MMU_ROOTS_ALL);
- WARN_ON(VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.guest_mmu.root.hpa));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.guest_mmu.root.hpa));
vcpu_clear_mmio_info(vcpu, MMIO_GVA_ANY);
}
@@ -5546,16 +5504,21 @@ static bool is_obsolete_root(struct kvm *kvm, hpa_t root_hpa)
/*
* When freeing obsolete roots, treat roots as obsolete if they don't
- * have an associated shadow page. This does mean KVM will get false
+ * have an associated shadow page, as it's impossible to determine if
+ * such roots are fresh or stale. This does mean KVM will get false
* positives and free roots that don't strictly need to be freed, but
* such false positives are relatively rare:
*
- * (a) only PAE paging and nested NPT has roots without shadow pages
+ * (a) only PAE paging and nested NPT have roots without shadow pages
+ * (or any shadow paging flavor with a dummy root, see note below)
* (b) remote reloads due to a memslot update obsoletes _all_ roots
* (c) KVM doesn't track previous roots for PAE paging, and the guest
* is unlikely to zap an in-use PGD.
+ *
+ * Note! Dummy roots are unique in that they are obsoleted by memslot
+ * _creation_! See also FNAME(fetch).
*/
- sp = to_shadow_page(root_hpa);
+ sp = root_to_sp(root_hpa);
return !sp || is_obsolete_sp(kvm, sp);
}
@@ -5634,9 +5597,6 @@ static bool detect_write_misaligned(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, gpa_t gpa,
{
unsigned offset, pte_size, misaligned;
- pgprintk("misaligned: gpa %llx bytes %d role %x\n",
- gpa, bytes, sp->role.word);
-
offset = offset_in_page(gpa);
pte_size = sp->role.has_4_byte_gpte ? 4 : 8;
@@ -5684,9 +5644,8 @@ static u64 *get_written_sptes(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, gpa_t gpa, int *nspte)
return spte;
}
-static void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
- const u8 *new, int bytes,
- struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *node)
+void kvm_mmu_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new,
+ int bytes)
{
gfn_t gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
@@ -5702,8 +5661,6 @@ static void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
if (!READ_ONCE(vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages))
return;
- pgprintk("%s: gpa %llx bytes %d\n", __func__, gpa, bytes);
-
write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
gentry = mmu_pte_write_fetch_gpte(vcpu, &gpa, &bytes);
@@ -5742,7 +5699,18 @@ int noinline kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 err
int r, emulation_type = EMULTYPE_PF;
bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct;
- if (WARN_ON(!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa)))
+ /*
+ * IMPLICIT_ACCESS is a KVM-defined flag used to correctly perform SMAP
+ * checks when emulating instructions that triggers implicit access.
+ * WARN if hardware generates a fault with an error code that collides
+ * with the KVM-defined value. Clear the flag and continue on, i.e.
+ * don't terminate the VM, as KVM can't possibly be relying on a flag
+ * that KVM doesn't know about.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(error_code & PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS))
+ error_code &= ~PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa)))
return RET_PF_RETRY;
r = RET_PF_INVALID;
@@ -6099,7 +6067,7 @@ restart:
* pages. Skip the bogus page, otherwise we'll get stuck in an
* infinite loop if the page gets put back on the list (again).
*/
- if (WARN_ON(sp->role.invalid))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.invalid))
continue;
/*
@@ -6199,16 +6167,8 @@ static bool kvm_has_zapped_obsolete_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
return unlikely(!list_empty_careful(&kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages));
}
-static void kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_pages_in_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
- struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *node)
-{
- kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
-}
-
int kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
{
- struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *node = &kvm->arch.mmu_sp_tracker;
int r;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages);
@@ -6222,10 +6182,6 @@ int kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
return r;
}
- node->track_write = kvm_mmu_pte_write;
- node->track_flush_slot = kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_pages_in_memslot;
- kvm_page_track_register_notifier(kvm, node);
-
kvm->arch.split_page_header_cache.kmem_cache = mmu_page_header_cache;
kvm->arch.split_page_header_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
@@ -6246,10 +6202,6 @@ static void mmu_free_vm_memory_caches(struct kvm *kvm)
void kvm_mmu_uninit_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
{
- struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *node = &kvm->arch.mmu_sp_tracker;
-
- kvm_page_track_unregister_notifier(kvm, node);
-
if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
kvm_mmu_uninit_tdp_mmu(kvm);
@@ -6670,7 +6622,7 @@ static void kvm_rmap_zap_collapsible_sptes(struct kvm *kvm,
*/
if (walk_slot_rmaps(kvm, slot, kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_spte,
PG_LEVEL_4K, KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL - 1, true))
- kvm_arch_flush_remote_tlbs_memslot(kvm, slot);
+ kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_memslot(kvm, slot);
}
void kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_sptes(struct kvm *kvm,
@@ -6689,20 +6641,6 @@ void kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_sptes(struct kvm *kvm,
}
}
-void kvm_arch_flush_remote_tlbs_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
- const struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot)
-{
- /*
- * All current use cases for flushing the TLBs for a specific memslot
- * related to dirty logging, and many do the TLB flush out of mmu_lock.
- * The interaction between the various operations on memslot must be
- * serialized by slots_locks to ensure the TLB flush from one operation
- * is observed by any other operation on the same memslot.
- */
- lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->slots_lock);
- kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_range(kvm, memslot->base_gfn, memslot->npages);
-}
-
void kvm_mmu_slot_leaf_clear_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,
const struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot)
{
@@ -6732,7 +6670,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_slot_leaf_clear_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,
*/
}
-void kvm_mmu_zap_all(struct kvm *kvm)
+static void kvm_mmu_zap_all(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, *node;
LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
@@ -6741,7 +6679,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_zap_all(struct kvm *kvm)
write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
restart:
list_for_each_entry_safe(sp, node, &kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages, link) {
- if (WARN_ON(sp->role.invalid))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.invalid))
continue;
if (__kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp, &invalid_list, &ign))
goto restart;
@@ -6757,9 +6695,20 @@ restart:
write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
}
+void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ kvm_mmu_zap_all(kvm);
+}
+
+void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+ kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
+}
+
void kvm_mmu_invalidate_mmio_sptes(struct kvm *kvm, u64 gen)
{
- WARN_ON(gen & KVM_MEMSLOT_GEN_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(gen & KVM_MEMSLOT_GEN_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS);
gen &= MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK;
@@ -6862,7 +6811,7 @@ static void mmu_destroy_caches(void)
static int get_nx_huge_pages(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (nx_hugepage_mitigation_hard_disabled)
- return sprintf(buffer, "never\n");
+ return sysfs_emit(buffer, "never\n");
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
index d39af5639ce9..b102014e2c60 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
@@ -6,18 +6,10 @@
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <asm/kvm_host.h>
-#undef MMU_DEBUG
-
-#ifdef MMU_DEBUG
-extern bool dbg;
-
-#define pgprintk(x...) do { if (dbg) printk(x); } while (0)
-#define rmap_printk(fmt, args...) do { if (dbg) printk("%s: " fmt, __func__, ## args); } while (0)
-#define MMU_WARN_ON(x) WARN_ON(x)
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PROVE_MMU
+#define KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(x) WARN_ON_ONCE(x)
#else
-#define pgprintk(x...) do { } while (0)
-#define rmap_printk(x...) do { } while (0)
-#define MMU_WARN_ON(x) do { } while (0)
+#define KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(x) BUILD_BUG_ON_INVALID(x)
#endif
/* Page table builder macros common to shadow (host) PTEs and guest PTEs. */
@@ -44,6 +36,16 @@ extern bool dbg;
#define INVALID_PAE_ROOT 0
#define IS_VALID_PAE_ROOT(x) (!!(x))
+static inline hpa_t kvm_mmu_get_dummy_root(void)
+{
+ return my_zero_pfn(0) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(hpa_t shadow_page)
+{
+ return is_zero_pfn(shadow_page >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
typedef u64 __rcu *tdp_ptep_t;
struct kvm_mmu_page {
@@ -170,9 +172,6 @@ bool kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, u64 gfn,
int min_level);
-void kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn,
- gfn_t nr_pages);
-
/* Flush the given page (huge or not) of guest memory. */
static inline void kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, int level)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
index 0a2ac438d647..c87da11f3a04 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c
@@ -12,13 +12,13 @@
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+#include <linux/lockdep.h>
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
-#include <asm/kvm_page_track.h>
-
#include "mmu.h"
#include "mmu_internal.h"
+#include "page_track.h"
bool kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
{
@@ -28,103 +28,64 @@ bool kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
void kvm_page_track_free_memslot(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < KVM_PAGE_TRACK_MAX; i++) {
- kvfree(slot->arch.gfn_track[i]);
- slot->arch.gfn_track[i] = NULL;
- }
+ kvfree(slot->arch.gfn_write_track);
+ slot->arch.gfn_write_track = NULL;
}
-int kvm_page_track_create_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
- unsigned long npages)
+static int __kvm_page_track_write_tracking_alloc(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+ unsigned long npages)
{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < KVM_PAGE_TRACK_MAX; i++) {
- if (i == KVM_PAGE_TRACK_WRITE &&
- !kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm))
- continue;
-
- slot->arch.gfn_track[i] =
- __vcalloc(npages, sizeof(*slot->arch.gfn_track[i]),
- GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!slot->arch.gfn_track[i])
- goto track_free;
- }
+ const size_t size = sizeof(*slot->arch.gfn_write_track);
- return 0;
+ if (!slot->arch.gfn_write_track)
+ slot->arch.gfn_write_track = __vcalloc(npages, size,
+ GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
-track_free:
- kvm_page_track_free_memslot(slot);
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return slot->arch.gfn_write_track ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
}
-static inline bool page_track_mode_is_valid(enum kvm_page_track_mode mode)
+int kvm_page_track_create_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+ unsigned long npages)
{
- if (mode < 0 || mode >= KVM_PAGE_TRACK_MAX)
- return false;
+ if (!kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm))
+ return 0;
- return true;
+ return __kvm_page_track_write_tracking_alloc(slot, npages);
}
int kvm_page_track_write_tracking_alloc(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
- unsigned short *gfn_track;
-
- if (slot->arch.gfn_track[KVM_PAGE_TRACK_WRITE])
- return 0;
-
- gfn_track = __vcalloc(slot->npages, sizeof(*gfn_track),
- GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (gfn_track == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- slot->arch.gfn_track[KVM_PAGE_TRACK_WRITE] = gfn_track;
- return 0;
+ return __kvm_page_track_write_tracking_alloc(slot, slot->npages);
}
-static void update_gfn_track(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
- enum kvm_page_track_mode mode, short count)
+static void update_gfn_write_track(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
+ short count)
{
int index, val;
index = gfn_to_index(gfn, slot->base_gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
- val = slot->arch.gfn_track[mode][index];
+ val = slot->arch.gfn_write_track[index];
- if (WARN_ON(val + count < 0 || val + count > USHRT_MAX))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(val + count < 0 || val + count > USHRT_MAX))
return;
- slot->arch.gfn_track[mode][index] += count;
+ slot->arch.gfn_write_track[index] += count;
}
-/*
- * add guest page to the tracking pool so that corresponding access on that
- * page will be intercepted.
- *
- * It should be called under the protection both of mmu-lock and kvm->srcu
- * or kvm->slots_lock.
- *
- * @kvm: the guest instance we are interested in.
- * @slot: the @gfn belongs to.
- * @gfn: the guest page.
- * @mode: tracking mode, currently only write track is supported.
- */
-void kvm_slot_page_track_add_page(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
- enum kvm_page_track_mode mode)
+void __kvm_write_track_add_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+ gfn_t gfn)
{
+ lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
- if (WARN_ON(!page_track_mode_is_valid(mode)))
- return;
+ lockdep_assert_once(lockdep_is_held(&kvm->slots_lock) ||
+ srcu_read_lock_held(&kvm->srcu));
- if (WARN_ON(mode == KVM_PAGE_TRACK_WRITE &&
- !kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm)))
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm), kvm))
return;
- update_gfn_track(slot, gfn, mode, 1);
+ update_gfn_write_track(slot, gfn, 1);
/*
* new track stops large page mapping for the
@@ -132,37 +93,22 @@ void kvm_slot_page_track_add_page(struct kvm *kvm,
*/
kvm_mmu_gfn_disallow_lpage(slot, gfn);
- if (mode == KVM_PAGE_TRACK_WRITE)
- if (kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(kvm, slot, gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K))
- kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
+ if (kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(kvm, slot, gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K))
+ kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_slot_page_track_add_page);
-/*
- * remove the guest page from the tracking pool which stops the interception
- * of corresponding access on that page. It is the opposed operation of
- * kvm_slot_page_track_add_page().
- *
- * It should be called under the protection both of mmu-lock and kvm->srcu
- * or kvm->slots_lock.
- *
- * @kvm: the guest instance we are interested in.
- * @slot: the @gfn belongs to.
- * @gfn: the guest page.
- * @mode: tracking mode, currently only write track is supported.
- */
-void kvm_slot_page_track_remove_page(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
- enum kvm_page_track_mode mode)
+void __kvm_write_track_remove_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
{
- if (WARN_ON(!page_track_mode_is_valid(mode)))
- return;
+ lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
- if (WARN_ON(mode == KVM_PAGE_TRACK_WRITE &&
- !kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm)))
+ lockdep_assert_once(lockdep_is_held(&kvm->slots_lock) ||
+ srcu_read_lock_held(&kvm->srcu));
+
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm), kvm))
return;
- update_gfn_track(slot, gfn, mode, -1);
+ update_gfn_write_track(slot, gfn, -1);
/*
* allow large page mapping for the tracked page
@@ -170,31 +116,26 @@ void kvm_slot_page_track_remove_page(struct kvm *kvm,
*/
kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(slot, gfn);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_slot_page_track_remove_page);
/*
* check if the corresponding access on the specified guest page is tracked.
*/
-bool kvm_slot_page_track_is_active(struct kvm *kvm,
- const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
- gfn_t gfn, enum kvm_page_track_mode mode)
+bool kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(struct kvm *kvm,
+ const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
{
int index;
- if (WARN_ON(!page_track_mode_is_valid(mode)))
- return false;
-
if (!slot)
return false;
- if (mode == KVM_PAGE_TRACK_WRITE &&
- !kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm))
+ if (!kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm))
return false;
index = gfn_to_index(gfn, slot->base_gfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
- return !!READ_ONCE(slot->arch.gfn_track[mode][index]);
+ return !!READ_ONCE(slot->arch.gfn_write_track[index]);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING
void kvm_page_track_cleanup(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head *head;
@@ -216,17 +157,22 @@ int kvm_page_track_init(struct kvm *kvm)
* register the notifier so that event interception for the tracked guest
* pages can be received.
*/
-void
-kvm_page_track_register_notifier(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *n)
+int kvm_page_track_register_notifier(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *n)
{
struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head *head;
+ if (!kvm || kvm->mm != current->mm)
+ return -ESRCH;
+
+ kvm_get_kvm(kvm);
+
head = &kvm->arch.track_notifier_head;
write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&n->node, &head->track_notifier_list);
write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_page_track_register_notifier);
@@ -234,9 +180,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_page_track_register_notifier);
* stop receiving the event interception. It is the opposed operation of
* kvm_page_track_register_notifier().
*/
-void
-kvm_page_track_unregister_notifier(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *n)
+void kvm_page_track_unregister_notifier(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *n)
{
struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head *head;
@@ -246,6 +191,8 @@ kvm_page_track_unregister_notifier(struct kvm *kvm,
hlist_del_rcu(&n->node);
write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
synchronize_srcu(&head->track_srcu);
+
+ kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_page_track_unregister_notifier);
@@ -256,34 +203,30 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_page_track_unregister_notifier);
* The node should figure out if the written page is the one that node is
* interested in by itself.
*/
-void kvm_page_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new,
- int bytes)
+void __kvm_page_track_write(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new, int bytes)
{
struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head *head;
struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *n;
int idx;
- head = &vcpu->kvm->arch.track_notifier_head;
+ head = &kvm->arch.track_notifier_head;
if (hlist_empty(&head->track_notifier_list))
return;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&head->track_srcu);
hlist_for_each_entry_srcu(n, &head->track_notifier_list, node,
- srcu_read_lock_held(&head->track_srcu))
+ srcu_read_lock_held(&head->track_srcu))
if (n->track_write)
- n->track_write(vcpu, gpa, new, bytes, n);
+ n->track_write(gpa, new, bytes, n);
srcu_read_unlock(&head->track_srcu, idx);
}
/*
- * Notify the node that memory slot is being removed or moved so that it can
- * drop write-protection for the pages in the memory slot.
- *
- * The node should figure out it has any write-protected pages in this slot
- * by itself.
+ * Notify external page track nodes that a memory region is being removed from
+ * the VM, e.g. so that users can free any associated metadata.
*/
-void kvm_page_track_flush_slot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+void kvm_page_track_delete_slot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head *head;
struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node *n;
@@ -296,8 +239,69 @@ void kvm_page_track_flush_slot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
idx = srcu_read_lock(&head->track_srcu);
hlist_for_each_entry_srcu(n, &head->track_notifier_list, node,
- srcu_read_lock_held(&head->track_srcu))
- if (n->track_flush_slot)
- n->track_flush_slot(kvm, slot, n);
+ srcu_read_lock_held(&head->track_srcu))
+ if (n->track_remove_region)
+ n->track_remove_region(slot->base_gfn, slot->npages, n);
srcu_read_unlock(&head->track_srcu, idx);
}
+
+/*
+ * add guest page to the tracking pool so that corresponding access on that
+ * page will be intercepted.
+ *
+ * @kvm: the guest instance we are interested in.
+ * @gfn: the guest page.
+ */
+int kvm_write_track_add_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+ int idx;
+
+ idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+
+ slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
+ if (!slot) {
+ srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+ __kvm_write_track_add_gfn(kvm, slot, gfn);
+ write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_write_track_add_gfn);
+
+/*
+ * remove the guest page from the tracking pool which stops the interception
+ * of corresponding access on that page.
+ *
+ * @kvm: the guest instance we are interested in.
+ * @gfn: the guest page.
+ */
+int kvm_write_track_remove_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+ int idx;
+
+ idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+
+ slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
+ if (!slot) {
+ srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+ __kvm_write_track_remove_gfn(kvm, slot, gfn);
+ write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_write_track_remove_gfn);
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d4d72ed999b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.h
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_PAGE_TRACK_H
+#define __KVM_X86_PAGE_TRACK_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#include <asm/kvm_page_track.h>
+
+
+bool kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(struct kvm *kvm);
+int kvm_page_track_write_tracking_alloc(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot);
+
+void kvm_page_track_free_memslot(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot);
+int kvm_page_track_create_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+ unsigned long npages);
+
+void __kvm_write_track_add_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+ gfn_t gfn);
+void __kvm_write_track_remove_gfn(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
+
+bool kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked(struct kvm *kvm,
+ const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING
+int kvm_page_track_init(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_page_track_cleanup(struct kvm *kvm);
+
+void __kvm_page_track_write(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new, int bytes);
+void kvm_page_track_delete_slot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot);
+
+static inline bool kvm_page_track_has_external_user(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return !hlist_empty(&kvm->arch.track_notifier_head.track_notifier_list);
+}
+#else
+static inline int kvm_page_track_init(struct kvm *kvm) { return 0; }
+static inline void kvm_page_track_cleanup(struct kvm *kvm) { }
+
+static inline void __kvm_page_track_write(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa,
+ const u8 *new, int bytes) { }
+static inline void kvm_page_track_delete_slot(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) { }
+
+static inline bool kvm_page_track_has_external_user(struct kvm *kvm) { return false; }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING */
+
+static inline void kvm_page_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
+ const u8 *new, int bytes)
+{
+ __kvm_page_track_write(vcpu->kvm, gpa, new, bytes);
+
+ kvm_mmu_track_write(vcpu, gpa, new, bytes);
+}
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_PAGE_TRACK_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index 0662e0278e70..c85255073f67 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -338,7 +338,6 @@ retry_walk:
}
#endif
walker->max_level = walker->level;
- ASSERT(!(is_long_mode(vcpu) && !is_pae(vcpu)));
/*
* FIXME: on Intel processors, loads of the PDPTE registers for PAE paging
@@ -348,9 +347,21 @@ retry_walk:
nested_access = (have_ad ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0) | PFERR_USER_MASK;
pte_access = ~0;
+
+ /*
+ * Queue a page fault for injection if this assertion fails, as callers
+ * assume that walker.fault contains sane info on a walk failure. I.e.
+ * avoid making the situation worse by inducing even worse badness
+ * between when the assertion fails and when KVM kicks the vCPU out to
+ * userspace (because the VM is bugged).
+ */
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(is_long_mode(vcpu) && !is_pae(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+ goto error;
+
++walker->level;
do {
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
unsigned long host_addr;
pt_access = pte_access;
@@ -381,7 +392,11 @@ retry_walk:
if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA))
return 0;
- host_addr = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa),
+ slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa));
+ if (!kvm_is_visible_memslot(slot))
+ goto error;
+
+ host_addr = gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot(slot, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa),
&walker->pte_writable[walker->level - 1]);
if (unlikely(kvm_is_error_hva(host_addr)))
goto error;
@@ -456,9 +471,6 @@ retry_walk:
goto retry_walk;
}
- pgprintk("%s: pte %llx pte_access %x pt_access %x\n",
- __func__, (u64)pte, walker->pte_access,
- walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1]);
return 1;
error:
@@ -529,8 +541,6 @@ FNAME(prefetch_gpte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
if (FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(vcpu, sp, spte, gpte))
return false;
- pgprintk("%s: gpte %llx spte %p\n", __func__, (u64)gpte, spte);
-
gfn = gpte_to_gfn(gpte);
pte_access = sp->role.access & FNAME(gpte_access)(gpte);
FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(vcpu->arch.mmu, &pte_access, gpte);
@@ -638,8 +648,19 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
if (FNAME(gpte_changed)(vcpu, gw, top_level))
goto out_gpte_changed;
- if (WARN_ON(!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa)))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa)))
+ goto out_gpte_changed;
+
+ /*
+ * Load a new root and retry the faulting instruction in the extremely
+ * unlikely scenario that the guest root gfn became visible between
+ * loading a dummy root and handling the resulting page fault, e.g. if
+ * userspace create a memslot in the interim.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa))) {
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_FREE_OBSOLETE_ROOTS, vcpu);
goto out_gpte_changed;
+ }
for_each_shadow_entry(vcpu, fault->addr, it) {
gfn_t table_gfn;
@@ -758,7 +779,6 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
struct guest_walker walker;
int r;
- pgprintk("%s: addr %lx err %x\n", __func__, fault->addr, fault->error_code);
WARN_ON_ONCE(fault->is_tdp);
/*
@@ -773,7 +793,6 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
* The page is not mapped by the guest. Let the guest handle it.
*/
if (!r) {
- pgprintk("%s: guest page fault\n", __func__);
if (!fault->prefetch)
kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, &walker.fault);
@@ -837,7 +856,7 @@ static gpa_t FNAME(get_level1_sp_gpa)(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
int offset = 0;
- WARN_ON(sp->role.level != PG_LEVEL_4K);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.level != PG_LEVEL_4K);
if (PTTYPE == 32)
offset = sp->role.quadrant << SPTE_LEVEL_BITS;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
index cf2c6426a6fc..4a599130e9c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static u64 generation_mmio_spte_mask(u64 gen)
{
u64 mask;
- WARN_ON(gen & ~MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(gen & ~MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK);
mask = (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_MASK;
mask |= (gen << MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_SHIFT) & MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_MASK;
@@ -221,8 +221,6 @@ bool make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
* shadow pages and unsync'ing pages is not allowed.
*/
if (mmu_try_to_unsync_pages(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn, can_unsync, prefetch)) {
- pgprintk("%s: found shadow page for %llx, marking ro\n",
- __func__, gfn);
wrprot = true;
pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
spte &= ~(PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_mmu_writable_mask);
@@ -242,7 +240,7 @@ out:
if ((spte & PT_WRITABLE_MASK) && kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(slot)) {
/* Enforced by kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust. */
- WARN_ON(level > PG_LEVEL_4K);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(level > PG_LEVEL_4K);
mark_page_dirty_in_slot(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index 1279db2eab44..a129951c9a88 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#ifndef KVM_X86_MMU_SPTE_H
#define KVM_X86_MMU_SPTE_H
+#include "mmu.h"
#include "mmu_internal.h"
/*
@@ -236,6 +237,18 @@ static inline struct kvm_mmu_page *sptep_to_sp(u64 *sptep)
return to_shadow_page(__pa(sptep));
}
+static inline struct kvm_mmu_page *root_to_sp(hpa_t root)
+{
+ if (kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(root))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * The "root" may be a special root, e.g. a PAE entry, treat it as a
+ * SPTE to ensure any non-PA bits are dropped.
+ */
+ return spte_to_child_sp(root);
+}
+
static inline bool is_mmio_spte(u64 spte)
{
return (spte & shadow_mmio_mask) == shadow_mmio_value &&
@@ -265,13 +278,13 @@ static inline bool sp_ad_disabled(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
static inline bool spte_ad_enabled(u64 spte)
{
- MMU_WARN_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(spte));
+ KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(spte));
return (spte & SPTE_TDP_AD_MASK) != SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED;
}
static inline bool spte_ad_need_write_protect(u64 spte)
{
- MMU_WARN_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(spte));
+ KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(spte));
/*
* This is benign for non-TDP SPTEs as SPTE_TDP_AD_ENABLED is '0',
* and non-TDP SPTEs will never set these bits. Optimize for 64-bit
@@ -282,13 +295,13 @@ static inline bool spte_ad_need_write_protect(u64 spte)
static inline u64 spte_shadow_accessed_mask(u64 spte)
{
- MMU_WARN_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(spte));
+ KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(spte));
return spte_ad_enabled(spte) ? shadow_accessed_mask : 0;
}
static inline u64 spte_shadow_dirty_mask(u64 spte)
{
- MMU_WARN_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(spte));
+ KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(!is_shadow_present_pte(spte));
return spte_ad_enabled(spte) ? shadow_dirty_mask : 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c
index d2eb0d4f8710..bd30ebfb2f2c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.c
@@ -39,13 +39,14 @@ void tdp_iter_restart(struct tdp_iter *iter)
void tdp_iter_start(struct tdp_iter *iter, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
int min_level, gfn_t next_last_level_gfn)
{
- int root_level = root->role.level;
-
- WARN_ON(root_level < 1);
- WARN_ON(root_level > PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!root || (root->role.level < 1) ||
+ (root->role.level > PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL))) {
+ iter->valid = false;
+ return;
+ }
iter->next_last_level_gfn = next_last_level_gfn;
- iter->root_level = root_level;
+ iter->root_level = root->role.level;
iter->min_level = min_level;
iter->pt_path[iter->root_level - 1] = (tdp_ptep_t)root->spt;
iter->as_id = kvm_mmu_page_as_id(root);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index 512163d52194..6c63f2d1675f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -475,9 +475,9 @@ static void handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
bool is_leaf = is_present && is_last_spte(new_spte, level);
bool pfn_changed = spte_to_pfn(old_spte) != spte_to_pfn(new_spte);
- WARN_ON(level > PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
- WARN_ON(level < PG_LEVEL_4K);
- WARN_ON(gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(level > PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(level < PG_LEVEL_4K);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1));
/*
* If this warning were to trigger it would indicate that there was a
@@ -522,9 +522,9 @@ static void handle_changed_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, gfn_t gfn,
* impact the guest since both the former and current SPTEs
* are nonpresent.
*/
- if (WARN_ON(!is_mmio_spte(old_spte) &&
- !is_mmio_spte(new_spte) &&
- !is_removed_spte(new_spte)))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_mmio_spte(old_spte) &&
+ !is_mmio_spte(new_spte) &&
+ !is_removed_spte(new_spte)))
pr_err("Unexpected SPTE change! Nonpresent SPTEs\n"
"should not be replaced with another,\n"
"different nonpresent SPTE, unless one or both\n"
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static u64 tdp_mmu_set_spte(struct kvm *kvm, int as_id, tdp_ptep_t sptep,
* should be used. If operating under the MMU lock in write mode, the
* use of the removed SPTE should not be necessary.
*/
- WARN_ON(is_removed_spte(old_spte) || is_removed_spte(new_spte));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(is_removed_spte(old_spte) || is_removed_spte(new_spte));
old_spte = kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(sptep, old_spte, new_spte, level);
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ static inline void tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
else
#define tdp_mmu_for_each_pte(_iter, _mmu, _start, _end) \
- for_each_tdp_pte(_iter, to_shadow_page(_mmu->root.hpa), _start, _end)
+ for_each_tdp_pte(_iter, root_to_sp(_mmu->root.hpa), _start, _end)
/*
* Yield if the MMU lock is contended or this thread needs to return control
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched(struct kvm *kvm,
struct tdp_iter *iter,
bool flush, bool shared)
{
- WARN_ON(iter->yielded);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(iter->yielded);
/* Ensure forward progress has been made before yielding. */
if (iter->next_last_level_gfn == iter->yielded_gfn)
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check tdp_mmu_iter_cond_resched(struct kvm *kvm,
rcu_read_lock();
- WARN_ON(iter->gfn > iter->next_last_level_gfn);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(iter->gfn > iter->next_last_level_gfn);
iter->yielded = true;
}
@@ -1241,7 +1241,7 @@ static bool set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
u64 new_spte;
/* Huge pages aren't expected to be modified without first being zapped. */
- WARN_ON(pte_huge(range->pte) || range->start + 1 != range->end);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(pte_huge(range->arg.pte) || range->start + 1 != range->end);
if (iter->level != PG_LEVEL_4K ||
!is_shadow_present_pte(iter->old_spte))
@@ -1255,9 +1255,9 @@ static bool set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
*/
tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, iter, 0);
- if (!pte_write(range->pte)) {
+ if (!pte_write(range->arg.pte)) {
new_spte = kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(iter->old_spte,
- pte_pfn(range->pte));
+ pte_pfn(range->arg.pte));
tdp_mmu_iter_set_spte(kvm, iter, new_spte);
}
@@ -1548,8 +1548,8 @@ retry:
if (!is_shadow_present_pte(iter.old_spte))
continue;
- MMU_WARN_ON(kvm_ad_enabled() &&
- spte_ad_need_write_protect(iter.old_spte));
+ KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(kvm_ad_enabled() &&
+ spte_ad_need_write_protect(iter.old_spte));
if (!(iter.old_spte & dbit))
continue;
@@ -1600,6 +1600,8 @@ static void clear_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
shadow_dirty_mask;
struct tdp_iter iter;
+ lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
rcu_read_lock();
tdp_root_for_each_leaf_pte(iter, root, gfn + __ffs(mask),
@@ -1607,8 +1609,8 @@ static void clear_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
if (!mask)
break;
- MMU_WARN_ON(kvm_ad_enabled() &&
- spte_ad_need_write_protect(iter.old_spte));
+ KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(kvm_ad_enabled() &&
+ spte_ad_need_write_protect(iter.old_spte));
if (iter.level > PG_LEVEL_4K ||
!(mask & (1UL << (iter.gfn - gfn))))
@@ -1646,7 +1648,6 @@ void kvm_tdp_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
- lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
for_each_tdp_mmu_root(kvm, root, slot->as_id)
clear_dirty_pt_masked(kvm, root, gfn, mask, wrprot);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
index bf653df86112..edb89b51b383 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
@@ -382,9 +382,6 @@ static bool check_pmu_event_filter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
struct kvm_x86_pmu_event_filter *filter;
struct kvm *kvm = pmc->vcpu->kvm;
- if (!static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_hw_event_available)(pmc))
- return false;
-
filter = srcu_dereference(kvm->arch.pmu_event_filter, &kvm->srcu);
if (!filter)
return true;
@@ -398,6 +395,7 @@ static bool check_pmu_event_filter(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
static bool pmc_event_is_allowed(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
{
return pmc_is_globally_enabled(pmc) && pmc_speculative_in_use(pmc) &&
+ static_call(kvm_x86_pmu_hw_event_available)(pmc) &&
check_pmu_event_filter(pmc);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h
index 56cbdb24400a..b81650678375 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs {
/* Intel-defined sub-features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EDX) */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI_INT8 KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_1_EDX, 4)
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_NE_CONVERT KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_1_EDX, 5)
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMX_COMPLEX KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_1_EDX, 8)
#define X86_FEATURE_PREFETCHITI KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_7_1_EDX, 14)
/* CPUID level 0x80000007 (EDX). */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
index cfc8ab773025..2092db892d7d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
@@ -791,6 +791,7 @@ static int svm_ir_list_add(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct amd_iommu_pi_data *pi)
int ret = 0;
unsigned long flags;
struct amd_svm_iommu_ir *ir;
+ u64 entry;
/**
* In some cases, the existing irte is updated and re-set,
@@ -824,6 +825,18 @@ static int svm_ir_list_add(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct amd_iommu_pi_data *pi)
ir->data = pi->ir_data;
spin_lock_irqsave(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+
+ /*
+ * Update the target pCPU for IOMMU doorbells if the vCPU is running.
+ * If the vCPU is NOT running, i.e. is blocking or scheduled out, KVM
+ * will update the pCPU info when the vCPU awkened and/or scheduled in.
+ * See also avic_vcpu_load().
+ */
+ entry = READ_ONCE(*(svm->avic_physical_id_cache));
+ if (entry & AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_IS_RUNNING_MASK)
+ amd_iommu_update_ga(entry & AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_HOST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK,
+ true, pi->ir_data);
+
list_add(&ir->node, &svm->ir_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
out:
@@ -986,10 +999,11 @@ static inline int
avic_update_iommu_vcpu_affinity(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu, bool r)
{
int ret = 0;
- unsigned long flags;
struct amd_svm_iommu_ir *ir;
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ lockdep_assert_held(&svm->ir_list_lock);
+
if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
return 0;
@@ -997,19 +1011,15 @@ avic_update_iommu_vcpu_affinity(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu, bool r)
* Here, we go through the per-vcpu ir_list to update all existing
* interrupt remapping table entry targeting this vcpu.
*/
- spin_lock_irqsave(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
-
if (list_empty(&svm->ir_list))
- goto out;
+ return 0;
list_for_each_entry(ir, &svm->ir_list, node) {
ret = amd_iommu_update_ga(cpu, r, ir->data);
if (ret)
- break;
+ return ret;
}
-out:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
void avic_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
@@ -1017,6 +1027,7 @@ void avic_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
u64 entry;
int h_physical_id = kvm_cpu_get_apicid(cpu);
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ unsigned long flags;
lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled();
@@ -1033,6 +1044,15 @@ void avic_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
if (kvm_vcpu_is_blocking(vcpu))
return;
+ /*
+ * Grab the per-vCPU interrupt remapping lock even if the VM doesn't
+ * _currently_ have assigned devices, as that can change. Holding
+ * ir_list_lock ensures that either svm_ir_list_add() will consume
+ * up-to-date entry information, or that this task will wait until
+ * svm_ir_list_add() completes to set the new target pCPU.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+
entry = READ_ONCE(*(svm->avic_physical_id_cache));
WARN_ON_ONCE(entry & AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_IS_RUNNING_MASK);
@@ -1042,25 +1062,48 @@ void avic_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
WRITE_ONCE(*(svm->avic_physical_id_cache), entry);
avic_update_iommu_vcpu_affinity(vcpu, h_physical_id, true);
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
}
void avic_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 entry;
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ unsigned long flags;
lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled();
+ /*
+ * Note, reading the Physical ID entry outside of ir_list_lock is safe
+ * as only the pCPU that has loaded (or is loading) the vCPU is allowed
+ * to modify the entry, and preemption is disabled. I.e. the vCPU
+ * can't be scheduled out and thus avic_vcpu_{put,load}() can't run
+ * recursively.
+ */
entry = READ_ONCE(*(svm->avic_physical_id_cache));
/* Nothing to do if IsRunning == '0' due to vCPU blocking. */
if (!(entry & AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_IS_RUNNING_MASK))
return;
+ /*
+ * Take and hold the per-vCPU interrupt remapping lock while updating
+ * the Physical ID entry even though the lock doesn't protect against
+ * multiple writers (see above). Holding ir_list_lock ensures that
+ * either svm_ir_list_add() will consume up-to-date entry information,
+ * or that this task will wait until svm_ir_list_add() completes to
+ * mark the vCPU as not running.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+
avic_update_iommu_vcpu_affinity(vcpu, -1, 0);
entry &= ~AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_IS_RUNNING_MASK;
WRITE_ONCE(*(svm->avic_physical_id_cache), entry);
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+
}
void avic_refresh_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index 96936ddf1b3c..dd496c9e5f91 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static void nested_svm_uninit_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static bool nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
- if (!svm->v_vmload_vmsave_enabled)
+ if (!guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD))
return true;
if (!nested_npt_enabled(svm))
@@ -552,6 +552,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb12
bool new_vmcb12 = false;
struct vmcb *vmcb01 = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
struct vmcb *vmcb02 = svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr;
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
nested_vmcb02_compute_g_pat(svm);
@@ -577,18 +578,18 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb12
vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb02, VMCB_DT);
}
- kvm_set_rflags(&svm->vcpu, vmcb12->save.rflags | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED);
+ kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, vmcb12->save.rflags | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED);
- svm_set_efer(&svm->vcpu, svm->nested.save.efer);
+ svm_set_efer(vcpu, svm->nested.save.efer);
- svm_set_cr0(&svm->vcpu, svm->nested.save.cr0);
- svm_set_cr4(&svm->vcpu, svm->nested.save.cr4);
+ svm_set_cr0(vcpu, svm->nested.save.cr0);
+ svm_set_cr4(vcpu, svm->nested.save.cr4);
svm->vcpu.arch.cr2 = vmcb12->save.cr2;
- kvm_rax_write(&svm->vcpu, vmcb12->save.rax);
- kvm_rsp_write(&svm->vcpu, vmcb12->save.rsp);
- kvm_rip_write(&svm->vcpu, vmcb12->save.rip);
+ kvm_rax_write(vcpu, vmcb12->save.rax);
+ kvm_rsp_write(vcpu, vmcb12->save.rsp);
+ kvm_rip_write(vcpu, vmcb12->save.rip);
/* In case we don't even reach vcpu_run, the fields are not updated */
vmcb02->save.rax = vmcb12->save.rax;
@@ -602,7 +603,8 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb12
vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb02, VMCB_DR);
}
- if (unlikely(svm->lbrv_enabled && (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) {
+ if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
+ (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) {
/*
* Reserved bits of DEBUGCTL are ignored. Be consistent with
* svm_set_msr's definition of reserved bits.
@@ -658,7 +660,8 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
* exit_int_info, exit_int_info_err, next_rip, insn_len, insn_bytes.
*/
- if (svm->vgif_enabled && (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK))
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
+ (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK))
int_ctl_vmcb12_bits |= (V_GIF_MASK | V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
else
int_ctl_vmcb01_bits |= (V_GIF_MASK | V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
@@ -695,10 +698,9 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
vmcb02->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
- if (svm->tsc_ratio_msr != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio) {
- WARN_ON(!svm->tsc_scaling_enabled);
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
+ svm->tsc_ratio_msr != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio)
nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu);
- }
vmcb02->control.int_ctl =
(svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & int_ctl_vmcb12_bits) |
@@ -717,7 +719,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
* what a nrips=0 CPU would do (L1 is responsible for advancing RIP
* prior to injecting the event).
*/
- if (svm->nrips_enabled)
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
vmcb02->control.next_rip = svm->nested.ctl.next_rip;
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
vmcb02->control.next_rip = vmcb12_rip;
@@ -727,7 +729,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
svm->soft_int_injected = true;
svm->soft_int_csbase = vmcb12_csbase;
svm->soft_int_old_rip = vmcb12_rip;
- if (svm->nrips_enabled)
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
svm->soft_int_next_rip = svm->nested.ctl.next_rip;
else
svm->soft_int_next_rip = vmcb12_rip;
@@ -735,15 +737,21 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
vmcb02->control.virt_ext = vmcb01->control.virt_ext &
LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
- if (svm->lbrv_enabled)
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
vmcb02->control.virt_ext |=
(svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK);
if (!nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm))
vmcb02->control.virt_ext |= VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK;
- pause_count12 = svm->pause_filter_enabled ? svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_count : 0;
- pause_thresh12 = svm->pause_threshold_enabled ? svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_thresh : 0;
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER))
+ pause_count12 = svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_count;
+ else
+ pause_count12 = 0;
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD))
+ pause_thresh12 = svm->nested.ctl.pause_filter_thresh;
+ else
+ pause_thresh12 = 0;
if (kvm_pause_in_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
/* use guest values since host doesn't intercept PAUSE */
vmcb02->control.pause_filter_count = pause_count12;
@@ -1027,7 +1035,7 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (vmcb12->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_ERR)
nested_save_pending_event_to_vmcb12(svm, vmcb12);
- if (svm->nrips_enabled)
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
vmcb12->control.next_rip = vmcb02->control.next_rip;
vmcb12->control.int_ctl = svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl;
@@ -1066,7 +1074,8 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (!nested_exit_on_intr(svm))
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu);
- if (unlikely(svm->lbrv_enabled && (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) {
+ if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
+ (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) {
svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb12, vmcb02);
svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
} else if (unlikely(vmcb01->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)) {
@@ -1101,10 +1110,10 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb01, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
}
- if (svm->tsc_ratio_msr != kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio) {
- WARN_ON(!svm->tsc_scaling_enabled);
+ if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control &&
+ vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio != vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio) {
vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio = vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio;
- __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
+ svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu);
}
svm->nested.ctl.nested_cr3 = 0;
@@ -1537,7 +1546,7 @@ void nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio =
kvm_calc_nested_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio,
svm->tsc_ratio_msr);
- __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
+ svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu);
}
/* Inverse operation of nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(). asid is copied too. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index d3aec1f2cad2..b9a0a939d59f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <asm/pkru.h>
#include <asm/trapnr.h>
#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include "mmu.h"
#include "x86.h"
@@ -54,9 +55,14 @@ module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
/* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
+static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
+module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
#else
#define sev_enabled false
#define sev_es_enabled false
+#define sev_es_debug_swap_enabled false
#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
static u8 sev_enc_bit;
@@ -606,6 +612,9 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
save->xss = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss;
save->dr6 = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6;
+ if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled)
+ save->sev_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
+
pr_debug("Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA):\n");
print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, save, sizeof(*save), false);
@@ -619,6 +628,11 @@ static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
int ret;
+ if (vcpu->guest_debug) {
+ pr_warn_once("KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG for SEV-ES guest is not supported");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
/* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */
ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
if (ret)
@@ -1725,7 +1739,7 @@ static void sev_migrate_from(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
* Note, the source is not required to have the same number of
* vCPUs as the destination when migrating a vanilla SEV VM.
*/
- src_vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(dst_kvm, i);
+ src_vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(src_kvm, i);
src_svm = to_svm(src_vcpu);
/*
@@ -2171,7 +2185,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
bool sev_es_supported = false;
bool sev_supported = false;
- if (!sev_enabled || !npt_enabled)
+ if (!sev_enabled || !npt_enabled || !nrips)
goto out;
/*
@@ -2256,6 +2270,9 @@ out:
sev_enabled = sev_supported;
sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
+ if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) ||
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
+ sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
#endif
}
@@ -2881,7 +2898,10 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
break;
case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
- ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_IRET);
+ ++vcpu->stat.nmi_window_exits;
+ svm->nmi_masked = false;
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+ ret = 1;
break;
case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
ret = kvm_emulate_ap_reset_hold(vcpu);
@@ -2944,6 +2964,7 @@ int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in)
static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE;
@@ -2952,9 +2973,12 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
/*
* An SEV-ES guest requires a VMSA area that is a separate from the
* VMCB page. Do not include the encryption mask on the VMSA physical
- * address since hardware will access it using the guest key.
+ * address since hardware will access it using the guest key. Note,
+ * the VMSA will be NULL if this vCPU is the destination for intrahost
+ * migration, and will be copied later.
*/
- svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
+ if (svm->sev_es.vmsa)
+ svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
/* Can't intercept CR register access, HV can't modify CR registers */
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
@@ -2972,8 +2996,23 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR4_WRITE);
svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
- /* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */
- clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+ vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
+ if (!sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) {
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
+ recalc_intercepts(svm);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Disable #DB intercept iff DebugSwap is enabled. KVM doesn't
+ * allow debugging SEV-ES guests, and enables DebugSwap iff
+ * NO_NESTED_DATA_BP is supported, so there's no reason to
+ * intercept #DB when DebugSwap is enabled. For simplicity
+ * with respect to guest debug, intercept #DB for other VMs
+ * even if NO_NESTED_DATA_BP is supported, i.e. even if the
+ * guest can't DoS the CPU with infinite #DB vectoring.
+ */
+ clr_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
+ }
/* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
@@ -3000,6 +3039,12 @@ void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
clr_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
+ /*
+ * Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests, e.g. for the VMware backdoor, as
+ * KVM can't decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
+ */
+ clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+
if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
sev_es_init_vmcb(svm);
}
@@ -3018,20 +3063,41 @@ void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
{
/*
- * As an SEV-ES guest, hardware will restore the host state on VMEXIT,
- * of which one step is to perform a VMLOAD. KVM performs the
- * corresponding VMSAVE in svm_prepare_guest_switch for both
- * traditional and SEV-ES guests.
+ * All host state for SEV-ES guests is categorized into three swap types
+ * based on how it is handled by hardware during a world switch:
+ *
+ * A: VMRUN: Host state saved in host save area
+ * VMEXIT: Host state loaded from host save area
+ *
+ * B: VMRUN: Host state _NOT_ saved in host save area
+ * VMEXIT: Host state loaded from host save area
+ *
+ * C: VMRUN: Host state _NOT_ saved in host save area
+ * VMEXIT: Host state initialized to default(reset) values
+ *
+ * Manually save type-B state, i.e. state that is loaded by VMEXIT but
+ * isn't saved by VMRUN, that isn't already saved by VMSAVE (performed
+ * by common SVM code).
*/
-
- /* XCR0 is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
hostsa->xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
-
- /* PKRU is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
hostsa->pkru = read_pkru();
-
- /* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the currnet host value */
hostsa->xss = host_xss;
+
+ /*
+ * If DebugSwap is enabled, debug registers are loaded but NOT saved by
+ * the CPU (Type-B). If DebugSwap is disabled/unsupported, the CPU both
+ * saves and loads debug registers (Type-A).
+ */
+ if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) {
+ hostsa->dr0 = native_get_debugreg(0);
+ hostsa->dr1 = native_get_debugreg(1);
+ hostsa->dr2 = native_get_debugreg(2);
+ hostsa->dr3 = native_get_debugreg(3);
+ hostsa->dr0_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(0);
+ hostsa->dr1_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(1);
+ hostsa->dr2_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(2);
+ hostsa->dr3_addr_mask = amd_get_dr_addr_mask(3);
+ }
}
void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index d4bfdc607fe7..f283eb47f6ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -39,10 +39,9 @@
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/reboot.h>
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
-#include <asm/virtext.h>
-
#include <trace/events/ipi.h>
#include "trace.h"
@@ -203,7 +202,7 @@ static int nested = true;
module_param(nested, int, S_IRUGO);
/* enable/disable Next RIP Save */
-static int nrips = true;
+int nrips = true;
module_param(nrips, int, 0444);
/* enable/disable Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE */
@@ -365,6 +364,8 @@ static void svm_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
svm->vmcb->control.int_state |= SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
}
+static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+ void *insn, int insn_len);
static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
bool commit_side_effects)
@@ -385,6 +386,14 @@ static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}
if (!svm->next_rip) {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Drop this when kvm_emulate_instruction() does the
+ * right thing and treats "can't emulate" as outright failure
+ * for EMULTYPE_SKIP.
+ */
+ if (!svm_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP, NULL, 0))
+ return 0;
+
if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects))
old_rflags = svm->vmcb->save.rflags;
@@ -517,14 +526,21 @@ static void svm_init_osvw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.osvw.status |= 1;
}
-static bool kvm_is_svm_supported(void)
+static bool __kvm_is_svm_supported(void)
{
- int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
- const char *msg;
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+
u64 vm_cr;
- if (!cpu_has_svm(&msg)) {
- pr_err("SVM not supported by CPU %d, %s\n", cpu, msg);
+ if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
+ c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
+ pr_err("CPU %d isn't AMD or Hygon\n", cpu);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SVM)) {
+ pr_err("SVM not supported by CPU %d\n", cpu);
return false;
}
@@ -542,25 +558,55 @@ static bool kvm_is_svm_supported(void)
return true;
}
+static bool kvm_is_svm_supported(void)
+{
+ bool supported;
+
+ migrate_disable();
+ supported = __kvm_is_svm_supported();
+ migrate_enable();
+
+ return supported;
+}
+
static int svm_check_processor_compat(void)
{
- if (!kvm_is_svm_supported())
+ if (!__kvm_is_svm_supported())
return -EIO;
return 0;
}
-void __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(u64 multiplier)
+static void __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(u64 multiplier)
{
- preempt_disable();
-
if (multiplier == __this_cpu_read(current_tsc_ratio))
- goto out;
+ return;
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO, multiplier);
__this_cpu_write(current_tsc_ratio, multiplier);
-out:
- preempt_enable();
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_cpu_svm_disable(void)
+{
+ uint64_t efer;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, 0);
+ rdmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer);
+ if (efer & EFER_SVME) {
+ /*
+ * Force GIF=1 prior to disabling SVM, e.g. to ensure INIT and
+ * NMI aren't blocked.
+ */
+ stgi();
+ wrmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer & ~EFER_SVME);
+ }
+}
+
+static void svm_emergency_disable(void)
+{
+ kvm_rebooting = true;
+
+ kvm_cpu_svm_disable();
}
static void svm_hardware_disable(void)
@@ -569,7 +615,7 @@ static void svm_hardware_disable(void)
if (tsc_scaling)
__svm_write_tsc_multiplier(SVM_TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);
- cpu_svm_disable();
+ kvm_cpu_svm_disable();
amd_pmu_disable_virt();
}
@@ -677,6 +723,39 @@ free_save_area:
}
+static void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
+ vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
+
+ recalc_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
+static void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+
+ vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
+
+ recalc_intercepts(svm);
+}
+
static int direct_access_msr_slot(u32 msr)
{
u32 i;
@@ -947,50 +1026,24 @@ static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb01.ptr, svm->vmcb);
}
-static int svm_get_lbr_msr(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u32 index)
+static struct vmcb *svm_get_lbr_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
/*
- * If the LBR virtualization is disabled, the LBR msrs are always
- * kept in the vmcb01 to avoid copying them on nested guest entries.
- *
- * If nested, and the LBR virtualization is enabled/disabled, the msrs
- * are moved between the vmcb01 and vmcb02 as needed.
+ * If LBR virtualization is disabled, the LBR MSRs are always kept in
+ * vmcb01. If LBR virtualization is enabled and L1 is running VMs of
+ * its own, the MSRs are moved between vmcb01 and vmcb02 as needed.
*/
- struct vmcb *vmcb =
- (svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK) ?
- svm->vmcb : svm->vmcb01.ptr;
-
- switch (index) {
- case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
- return vmcb->save.dbgctl;
- case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP:
- return vmcb->save.br_from;
- case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP:
- return vmcb->save.br_to;
- case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP:
- return vmcb->save.last_excp_from;
- case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP:
- return vmcb->save.last_excp_to;
- default:
- KVM_BUG(false, svm->vcpu.kvm,
- "%s: Unknown MSR 0x%x", __func__, index);
- return 0;
- }
+ return svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK ? svm->vmcb :
+ svm->vmcb01.ptr;
}
void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
-
- bool enable_lbrv = svm_get_lbr_msr(svm, MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR) &
- DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR;
-
- bool current_enable_lbrv = !!(svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &
- LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK);
-
- if (unlikely(is_guest_mode(vcpu) && svm->lbrv_enabled))
- if (unlikely(svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))
- enable_lbrv = true;
+ bool current_enable_lbrv = svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
+ bool enable_lbrv = (svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) ||
+ (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
+ (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK));
if (enable_lbrv == current_enable_lbrv)
return;
@@ -1101,21 +1154,23 @@ static u64 svm_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return svm->tsc_ratio_msr;
}
-static void svm_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset)
+static void svm_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
svm->vmcb01.ptr->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset;
- svm->vmcb->control.tsc_offset = offset;
+ svm->vmcb->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
}
-static void svm_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 multiplier)
+void svm_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(multiplier);
+ preempt_disable();
+ if (to_svm(vcpu)->guest_state_loaded)
+ __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
+ preempt_enable();
}
-
/* Evaluate instruction intercepts that depend on guest CPUID features. */
static void svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vcpu_svm *svm)
@@ -1156,8 +1211,6 @@ static inline void init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 0, 0);
set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0, 0);
-
- svm->v_vmload_vmsave_enabled = false;
} else {
/*
* If hardware supports Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE then enable it
@@ -1201,10 +1254,9 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
* trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
* We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
- * as VMware does. Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests as KVM can't
- * decrypt guest memory to decode the faulting instruction.
+ * as VMware does.
*/
- if (enable_vmware_backdoor && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
@@ -1949,7 +2001,7 @@ static void svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)))
return;
get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
@@ -2510,12 +2562,13 @@ static int iret_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm));
+
++vcpu->stat.nmi_window_exits;
svm->awaiting_iret_completion = true;
svm_clr_iret_intercept(svm);
- if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
- svm->nmi_iret_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+ svm->nmi_iret_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
return 1;
@@ -2680,6 +2733,13 @@ static int dr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
unsigned long val;
int err = 0;
+ /*
+ * SEV-ES intercepts DR7 only to disable guest debugging and the guest issues a VMGEXIT
+ * for DR7 write only. KVM cannot change DR7 (always swapped as type 'A') so return early.
+ */
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return 1;
+
if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) {
/*
* No more DR vmexits; force a reload of the debug registers
@@ -2764,7 +2824,8 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
switch (msr_info->index) {
case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !svm->tsc_scaling_enabled)
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR))
return 1;
msr_info->data = svm->tsc_ratio_msr;
break;
@@ -2802,11 +2863,19 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux;
break;
case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
+ msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP:
+ msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_from;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP:
+ msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_to;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP:
+ msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_from;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP:
- msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_msr(svm, msr_info->index);
+ msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_to;
break;
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
msr_info->data = svm->nested.hsave_msr;
@@ -2906,7 +2975,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
switch (ecx) {
case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
- if (!svm->tsc_scaling_enabled) {
+ if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
if (!msr->host_initiated)
return 1;
@@ -2928,7 +2997,8 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
svm->tsc_ratio_msr = data;
- if (svm->tsc_scaling_enabled && is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
+ is_guest_mode(vcpu))
nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu);
break;
@@ -3037,13 +3107,8 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
if (data & DEBUGCTL_RESERVED_BITS)
return 1;
- if (svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)
- svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl = data;
- else
- svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.dbgctl = data;
-
+ svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl = data;
svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
-
break;
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
/*
@@ -3769,6 +3834,19 @@ static void svm_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (svm_get_nmi_mask(vcpu) && !svm->awaiting_iret_completion)
return; /* IRET will cause a vm exit */
+ /*
+ * SEV-ES guests are responsible for signaling when a vCPU is ready to
+ * receive a new NMI, as SEV-ES guests can't be single-stepped, i.e.
+ * KVM can't intercept and single-step IRET to detect when NMIs are
+ * unblocked (architecturally speaking). See SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE.
+ *
+ * Note, GIF is guaranteed to be '1' for SEV-ES guests as hardware
+ * ignores SEV-ES guest writes to EFER.SVME *and* CLGI/STGI are not
+ * supported NAEs in the GHCB protocol.
+ */
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
if (!gif_set(svm)) {
if (vgif)
svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
@@ -3918,12 +3996,11 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
svm->soft_int_injected = false;
/*
- * If we've made progress since setting HF_IRET_MASK, we've
+ * If we've made progress since setting awaiting_iret_completion, we've
* executed an IRET and can allow NMI injection.
*/
if (svm->awaiting_iret_completion &&
- (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) ||
- kvm_rip_read(vcpu) != svm->nmi_iret_rip)) {
+ kvm_rip_read(vcpu) != svm->nmi_iret_rip) {
svm->awaiting_iret_completion = false;
svm->nmi_masked = false;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
@@ -4209,28 +4286,37 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
- vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
-
- /* Update nrips enabled cache */
- svm->nrips_enabled = kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS) &&
- guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
-
- svm->tsc_scaling_enabled = tsc_scaling && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
- svm->lbrv_enabled = lbrv && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV);
-
- svm->v_vmload_vmsave_enabled = vls && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
-
- svm->pause_filter_enabled = kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER) &&
- guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);
+ /*
+ * SVM doesn't provide a way to disable just XSAVES in the guest, KVM
+ * can only disable all variants of by disallowing CR4.OSXSAVE from
+ * being set. As a result, if the host has XSAVE and XSAVES, and the
+ * guest has XSAVE enabled, the guest can execute XSAVES without
+ * faulting. Treat XSAVES as enabled in this case regardless of
+ * whether it's advertised to the guest so that KVM context switches
+ * XSS on VM-Enter/VM-Exit. Failure to do so would effectively give
+ * the guest read/write access to the host's XSS.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+ guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
+ kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
- svm->pause_threshold_enabled = kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD) &&
- guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV);
- svm->vgif_enabled = vgif && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF);
+ /*
+ * Intercept VMLOAD if the vCPU mode is Intel in order to emulate that
+ * VMLOAD drops bits 63:32 of SYSENTER (ignoring the fact that exposing
+ * SVM on Intel is bonkers and extremely unlikely to work).
+ */
+ if (!guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
- svm->vnmi_enabled = vnmi && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF);
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm);
@@ -4651,16 +4737,25 @@ static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
* and cannot be decrypted by KVM, i.e. KVM would read cyphertext and
* decode garbage.
*
- * Inject #UD if KVM reached this point without an instruction buffer.
- * In practice, this path should never be hit by a well-behaved guest,
- * e.g. KVM doesn't intercept #UD or #GP for SEV guests, but this path
- * is still theoretically reachable, e.g. via unaccelerated fault-like
- * AVIC access, and needs to be handled by KVM to avoid putting the
- * guest into an infinite loop. Injecting #UD is somewhat arbitrary,
- * but its the least awful option given lack of insight into the guest.
+ * If KVM is NOT trying to simply skip an instruction, inject #UD if
+ * KVM reached this point without an instruction buffer. In practice,
+ * this path should never be hit by a well-behaved guest, e.g. KVM
+ * doesn't intercept #UD or #GP for SEV guests, but this path is still
+ * theoretically reachable, e.g. via unaccelerated fault-like AVIC
+ * access, and needs to be handled by KVM to avoid putting the guest
+ * into an infinite loop. Injecting #UD is somewhat arbitrary, but
+ * its the least awful option given lack of insight into the guest.
+ *
+ * If KVM is trying to skip an instruction, simply resume the guest.
+ * If a #NPF occurs while the guest is vectoring an INT3/INTO, then KVM
+ * will attempt to re-inject the INT3/INTO and skip the instruction.
+ * In that scenario, retrying the INT3/INTO and hoping the guest will
+ * make forward progress is the only option that has a chance of
+ * success (and in practice it will work the vast majority of the time).
*/
if (unlikely(!insn)) {
- kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+ if (!(emul_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP))
+ kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return false;
}
@@ -5112,9 +5207,11 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
svm_adjust_mmio_mask();
+ nrips = nrips && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
+
/*
* Note, SEV setup consumes npt_enabled and enable_mmio_caching (which
- * may be modified by svm_adjust_mmio_mask()).
+ * may be modified by svm_adjust_mmio_mask()), as well as nrips.
*/
sev_hardware_setup();
@@ -5126,11 +5223,6 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
goto err;
}
- if (nrips) {
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
- nrips = false;
- }
-
enable_apicv = avic = avic && avic_hardware_setup();
if (!enable_apicv) {
@@ -5213,6 +5305,13 @@ static struct kvm_x86_init_ops svm_init_ops __initdata = {
.pmu_ops = &amd_pmu_ops,
};
+static void __svm_exit(void)
+{
+ kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
+
+ cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback(svm_emergency_disable);
+}
+
static int __init svm_init(void)
{
int r;
@@ -5226,6 +5325,8 @@ static int __init svm_init(void)
if (r)
return r;
+ cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback(svm_emergency_disable);
+
/*
* Common KVM initialization _must_ come last, after this, /dev/kvm is
* exposed to userspace!
@@ -5238,14 +5339,14 @@ static int __init svm_init(void)
return 0;
err_kvm_init:
- kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
+ __svm_exit();
return r;
}
static void __exit svm_exit(void)
{
kvm_exit();
- kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
+ __svm_exit();
}
module_init(svm_init)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 8239c8de45ac..f41253958357 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <asm/svm.h>
#include <asm/sev-common.h>
+#include "cpuid.h"
#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
#define __sme_page_pa(x) __sme_set(page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT)
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
#define MSRPM_OFFSETS 32
extern u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;
extern bool npt_enabled;
+extern int nrips;
extern int vgif;
extern bool intercept_smi;
extern bool x2avic_enabled;
@@ -260,16 +262,6 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
unsigned long soft_int_next_rip;
bool soft_int_injected;
- /* optional nested SVM features that are enabled for this guest */
- bool nrips_enabled : 1;
- bool tsc_scaling_enabled : 1;
- bool v_vmload_vmsave_enabled : 1;
- bool lbrv_enabled : 1;
- bool pause_filter_enabled : 1;
- bool pause_threshold_enabled : 1;
- bool vgif_enabled : 1;
- bool vnmi_enabled : 1;
-
u32 ldr_reg;
u32 dfr_reg;
struct page *avic_backing_page;
@@ -406,48 +398,6 @@ static inline bool vmcb12_is_intercept(struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *control, u3
return test_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&control->intercepts);
}
-static inline void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
-{
- struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
-
- if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
- }
-
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
-
- recalc_intercepts(svm);
-}
-
-static inline void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
-{
- struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
-
- vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
-
- /* DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest */
- if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
- vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
- }
-
- recalc_intercepts(svm);
-}
-
static inline void set_exception_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u32 bit)
{
struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
@@ -493,7 +443,8 @@ static inline bool svm_is_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int bit)
static inline bool nested_vgif_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
- return svm->vgif_enabled && (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
+ return guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF) &&
+ (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK);
}
static inline struct vmcb *get_vgif_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
@@ -544,7 +495,7 @@ static inline bool nested_npt_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
static inline bool nested_vnmi_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
- return svm->vnmi_enabled &&
+ return guest_can_use(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK);
}
@@ -660,7 +611,7 @@ int nested_svm_check_exception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned nr,
bool has_error_code, u32 error_code);
int nested_svm_exit_special(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
void nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
-void __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(u64 multiplier);
+void svm_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
struct vmcb_control_area *control);
void nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
index d0abee35d7ba..41a4533f9989 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_pml(void)
static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_xsaves(void)
{
return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
- SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES;
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES;
}
static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_waitpkg(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/hyperv.c
index 79450e1ed7cf..313b8bb5b8a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/hyperv.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID | \
- SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES | \
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING | \
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 516391cc0d64..c5ec0ef51ff7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -2307,7 +2307,7 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_early(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs0
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID |
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES |
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES |
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |
SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
@@ -6331,7 +6331,7 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
* If if it were, XSS would have to be checked against
* the XSS exit bitmap in vmcs12.
*/
- return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES);
+ return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES);
case EXIT_REASON_UMWAIT:
case EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
@@ -6426,7 +6426,7 @@ static int vmx_get_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
- if (nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu) &&
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
(vmx->nested.vmxon || vmx->nested.smm.vmxon)) {
kvm_state.hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa = vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr;
kvm_state.hdr.vmx.vmcs12_pa = vmx->nested.current_vmptr;
@@ -6567,7 +6567,7 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (kvm_state->flags & ~KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
- if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
+ if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
return -EINVAL;
if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa))
@@ -6601,7 +6601,8 @@ static int vmx_set_nested_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return -EINVAL;
if ((kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS) &&
- (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu) || !vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled))
+ (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX) ||
+ !vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled))
return -EINVAL;
vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
@@ -6874,7 +6875,7 @@ static void nested_vmx_setup_secondary_ctls(u32 ept_caps,
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID |
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC |
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES |
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES |
SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING |
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h
index 96952263b029..b4b9d51438c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static inline int nested_cpu_has_ept(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
static inline bool nested_cpu_has_xsaves(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
- return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES);
+ return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES);
}
static inline bool nested_cpu_has_pml(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
index 80c769c58a87..f2efa0bf7ae8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c
@@ -22,23 +22,51 @@
#define MSR_PMC_FULL_WIDTH_BIT (MSR_IA32_PMC0 - MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0)
+enum intel_pmu_architectural_events {
+ /*
+ * The order of the architectural events matters as support for each
+ * event is enumerated via CPUID using the index of the event.
+ */
+ INTEL_ARCH_CPU_CYCLES,
+ INTEL_ARCH_INSTRUCTIONS_RETIRED,
+ INTEL_ARCH_REFERENCE_CYCLES,
+ INTEL_ARCH_LLC_REFERENCES,
+ INTEL_ARCH_LLC_MISSES,
+ INTEL_ARCH_BRANCHES_RETIRED,
+ INTEL_ARCH_BRANCHES_MISPREDICTED,
+
+ NR_REAL_INTEL_ARCH_EVENTS,
+
+ /*
+ * Pseudo-architectural event used to implement IA32_FIXED_CTR2, a.k.a.
+ * TSC reference cycles. The architectural reference cycles event may
+ * or may not actually use the TSC as the reference, e.g. might use the
+ * core crystal clock or the bus clock (yeah, "architectural").
+ */
+ PSEUDO_ARCH_REFERENCE_CYCLES = NR_REAL_INTEL_ARCH_EVENTS,
+ NR_INTEL_ARCH_EVENTS,
+};
+
static struct {
u8 eventsel;
u8 unit_mask;
} const intel_arch_events[] = {
- [0] = { 0x3c, 0x00 },
- [1] = { 0xc0, 0x00 },
- [2] = { 0x3c, 0x01 },
- [3] = { 0x2e, 0x4f },
- [4] = { 0x2e, 0x41 },
- [5] = { 0xc4, 0x00 },
- [6] = { 0xc5, 0x00 },
- /* The above index must match CPUID 0x0A.EBX bit vector */
- [7] = { 0x00, 0x03 },
+ [INTEL_ARCH_CPU_CYCLES] = { 0x3c, 0x00 },
+ [INTEL_ARCH_INSTRUCTIONS_RETIRED] = { 0xc0, 0x00 },
+ [INTEL_ARCH_REFERENCE_CYCLES] = { 0x3c, 0x01 },
+ [INTEL_ARCH_LLC_REFERENCES] = { 0x2e, 0x4f },
+ [INTEL_ARCH_LLC_MISSES] = { 0x2e, 0x41 },
+ [INTEL_ARCH_BRANCHES_RETIRED] = { 0xc4, 0x00 },
+ [INTEL_ARCH_BRANCHES_MISPREDICTED] = { 0xc5, 0x00 },
+ [PSEUDO_ARCH_REFERENCE_CYCLES] = { 0x00, 0x03 },
};
/* mapping between fixed pmc index and intel_arch_events array */
-static int fixed_pmc_events[] = {1, 0, 7};
+static int fixed_pmc_events[] = {
+ [0] = INTEL_ARCH_INSTRUCTIONS_RETIRED,
+ [1] = INTEL_ARCH_CPU_CYCLES,
+ [2] = PSEUDO_ARCH_REFERENCE_CYCLES,
+};
static void reprogram_fixed_counters(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u64 data)
{
@@ -80,16 +108,18 @@ static bool intel_hw_event_available(struct kvm_pmc *pmc)
u8 unit_mask = (pmc->eventsel & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK) >> 8;
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(intel_arch_events); i++) {
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(intel_arch_events) != NR_INTEL_ARCH_EVENTS);
+
+ /*
+ * Disallow events reported as unavailable in guest CPUID. Note, this
+ * doesn't apply to pseudo-architectural events.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < NR_REAL_INTEL_ARCH_EVENTS; i++) {
if (intel_arch_events[i].eventsel != event_select ||
intel_arch_events[i].unit_mask != unit_mask)
continue;
- /* disable event that reported as not present by cpuid */
- if ((i < 7) && !(pmu->available_event_types & (1 << i)))
- return false;
-
- break;
+ return pmu->available_event_types & BIT(i);
}
return true;
@@ -438,16 +468,17 @@ static int intel_pmu_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
static void setup_fixed_pmc_eventsel(struct kvm_pmu *pmu)
{
- size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(fixed_pmc_events);
- struct kvm_pmc *pmc;
- u32 event;
int i;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(fixed_pmc_events) != KVM_PMC_MAX_FIXED);
+
for (i = 0; i < pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters; i++) {
- pmc = &pmu->fixed_counters[i];
- event = fixed_pmc_events[array_index_nospec(i, size)];
+ int index = array_index_nospec(i, KVM_PMC_MAX_FIXED);
+ struct kvm_pmc *pmc = &pmu->fixed_counters[index];
+ u32 event = fixed_pmc_events[index];
+
pmc->eventsel = (intel_arch_events[event].unit_mask << 8) |
- intel_arch_events[event].eventsel;
+ intel_arch_events[event].eventsel;
}
}
@@ -508,10 +539,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_refresh(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (pmu->version == 1) {
pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters = 0;
} else {
- pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters =
- min3(ARRAY_SIZE(fixed_pmc_events),
- (size_t) edx.split.num_counters_fixed,
- (size_t)kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_fixed);
+ pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters = min_t(int, edx.split.num_counters_fixed,
+ kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_fixed);
edx.split.bit_width_fixed = min_t(int, edx.split.bit_width_fixed,
kvm_pmu_cap.bit_width_fixed);
pmu->counter_bitmask[KVM_PMC_FIXED] =
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index b483a8baaacf..72e3943f3693 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -41,13 +41,12 @@
#include <asm/idtentry.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
-#include <asm/kexec.h>
+#include <asm/reboot.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
#include <asm/mwait.h>
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
-#include <asm/virtext.h>
#include <asm/vmx.h>
#include "capabilities.h"
@@ -237,9 +236,6 @@ static const struct {
#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
-/* Control for disabling CPU Fill buffer clear */
-static bool __read_mostly vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available;
-
static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
{
struct page *page;
@@ -255,14 +251,9 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
return 0;
}
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) {
- u64 msr;
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr);
- if (msr & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
- l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
+ l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
+ return 0;
}
/* If set to auto use the default l1tf mitigation method */
@@ -366,22 +357,9 @@ static int vmentry_l1d_flush_set(const char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
static int vmentry_l1d_flush_get(char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(l1tf_vmx_mitigation >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmentry_l1d_param)))
- return sprintf(s, "???\n");
+ return sysfs_emit(s, "???\n");
- return sprintf(s, "%s\n", vmentry_l1d_param[l1tf_vmx_mitigation].option);
-}
-
-static void vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl(void)
-{
- u64 msr;
-
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) &&
- !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
- !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr);
- if (msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL)
- vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available = true;
- }
+ return sysfs_emit(s, "%s\n", vmentry_l1d_param[l1tf_vmx_mitigation].option);
}
static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
@@ -409,7 +387,9 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
- vmx->disable_fb_clear = vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available;
+ vmx->disable_fb_clear = (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
/*
* If guest will not execute VERW, there is no need to set FB_CLEAR_DIS
@@ -754,17 +734,51 @@ static int vmx_set_guest_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
return ret;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
-static void crash_vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void)
+/*
+ * Disable VMX and clear CR4.VMXE (even if VMXOFF faults)
+ *
+ * Note, VMXOFF causes a #UD if the CPU is !post-VMXON, but it's impossible to
+ * atomically track post-VMXON state, e.g. this may be called in NMI context.
+ * Eat all faults as all other faults on VMXOFF faults are mode related, i.e.
+ * faults are guaranteed to be due to the !post-VMXON check unless the CPU is
+ * magically in RM, VM86, compat mode, or at CPL>0.
+ */
+static int kvm_cpu_vmxoff(void)
+{
+ asm_volatile_goto("1: vmxoff\n\t"
+ _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])
+ ::: "cc", "memory" : fault);
+
+ cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
+ return 0;
+
+fault:
+ cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
+ return -EIO;
+}
+
+static void vmx_emergency_disable(void)
{
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
struct loaded_vmcs *v;
+ kvm_rebooting = true;
+
+ /*
+ * Note, CR4.VMXE can be _cleared_ in NMI context, but it can only be
+ * set in task context. If this races with VMX is disabled by an NMI,
+ * VMCLEAR and VMXOFF may #UD, but KVM will eat those faults due to
+ * kvm_rebooting set.
+ */
+ if (!(__read_cr4() & X86_CR4_VMXE))
+ return;
+
list_for_each_entry(v, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu),
loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link)
vmcs_clear(v->vmcs);
+
+ kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE */
static void __loaded_vmcs_clear(void *arg)
{
@@ -1899,25 +1913,14 @@ u64 vmx_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio;
}
-static void vmx_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset)
+static void vmx_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, offset);
+ vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset);
}
-static void vmx_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 multiplier)
+static void vmx_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- vmcs_write64(TSC_MULTIPLIER, multiplier);
-}
-
-/*
- * nested_vmx_allowed() checks whether a guest should be allowed to use VMX
- * instructions and MSRs (i.e., nested VMX). Nested VMX is disabled for
- * all guests if the "nested" module option is off, and can also be disabled
- * for a single guest by disabling its VMX cpuid bit.
- */
-bool nested_vmx_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return nested && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+ vmcs_write64(TSC_MULTIPLIER, vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
}
/*
@@ -2047,7 +2050,7 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
[msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0];
break;
case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
- if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
+ if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
return 1;
if (vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_info->index,
&msr_info->data))
@@ -2355,7 +2358,7 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
return 1; /* they are read-only */
- if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
+ if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
return 1;
return vmx_set_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
@@ -2729,11 +2732,11 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
return 0;
}
-static bool kvm_is_vmx_supported(void)
+static bool __kvm_is_vmx_supported(void)
{
- int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
- if (!cpu_has_vmx()) {
+ if (!(cpuid_ecx(1) & feature_bit(VMX))) {
pr_err("VMX not supported by CPU %d\n", cpu);
return false;
}
@@ -2747,13 +2750,24 @@ static bool kvm_is_vmx_supported(void)
return true;
}
+static bool kvm_is_vmx_supported(void)
+{
+ bool supported;
+
+ migrate_disable();
+ supported = __kvm_is_vmx_supported();
+ migrate_enable();
+
+ return supported;
+}
+
static int vmx_check_processor_compat(void)
{
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
struct vmcs_config vmcs_conf;
struct vmx_capability vmx_cap;
- if (!kvm_is_vmx_supported())
+ if (!__kvm_is_vmx_supported())
return -EIO;
if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_conf, &vmx_cap) < 0) {
@@ -2833,7 +2847,7 @@ static void vmx_hardware_disable(void)
{
vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss();
- if (cpu_vmxoff())
+ if (kvm_cpu_vmxoff())
kvm_spurious_fault();
hv_reset_evmcs();
@@ -3071,13 +3085,6 @@ static void enter_rmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 1;
- /*
- * Very old userspace does not call KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR before entering
- * vcpu. Warn the user that an update is overdue.
- */
- if (!kvm_vmx->tss_addr)
- pr_warn_once("KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR needs to be called before running vCPU\n");
-
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, kvm_vmx->tss_addr);
@@ -3350,7 +3357,7 @@ void vmx_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
vmx->emulation_required = vmx_emulation_required(vcpu);
}
-static int vmx_get_max_tdp_level(void)
+static int vmx_get_max_ept_level(void)
{
if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels())
return 5;
@@ -4553,16 +4560,19 @@ vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 *exec_control,
* based on a single guest CPUID bit, with a dedicated feature bit. This also
* verifies that the control is actually supported by KVM and hardware.
*/
-#define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, name, feat_name, ctrl_name, exiting) \
-({ \
- bool __enabled; \
- \
- if (cpu_has_vmx_##name()) { \
- __enabled = guest_cpuid_has(&(vmx)->vcpu, \
- X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \
- vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, \
- SECONDARY_EXEC_##ctrl_name, __enabled, exiting); \
- } \
+#define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, name, feat_name, ctrl_name, exiting) \
+({ \
+ struct kvm_vcpu *__vcpu = &(vmx)->vcpu; \
+ bool __enabled; \
+ \
+ if (cpu_has_vmx_##name()) { \
+ if (kvm_is_governed_feature(X86_FEATURE_##feat_name)) \
+ __enabled = guest_can_use(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \
+ else \
+ __enabled = guest_cpuid_has(__vcpu, X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \
+ vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, SECONDARY_EXEC_##ctrl_name,\
+ __enabled, exiting); \
+ } \
})
/* More macro magic for ENABLE_/opt-in versus _EXITING/opt-out controls. */
@@ -4622,19 +4632,7 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
if (!enable_pml || !atomic_read(&vcpu->kvm->nr_memslots_dirty_logging))
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
- if (cpu_has_vmx_xsaves()) {
- /* Exposing XSAVES only when XSAVE is exposed */
- bool xsaves_enabled =
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
- guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
- guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
-
- vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled = xsaves_enabled;
-
- vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, &exec_control,
- SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES,
- xsaves_enabled, false);
- }
+ vmx_adjust_sec_exec_feature(vmx, &exec_control, xsaves, XSAVES);
/*
* RDPID is also gated by ENABLE_RDTSCP, turn on the control if either
@@ -4653,6 +4651,7 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP,
rdpid_or_rdtscp_enabled, false);
}
+
vmx_adjust_sec_exec_feature(vmx, &exec_control, invpcid, INVPCID);
vmx_adjust_sec_exec_exiting(vmx, &exec_control, rdrand, RDRAND);
@@ -6796,8 +6795,10 @@ static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, pfn_to_hpa(pfn));
read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
- vmx_flush_tlb_current(vcpu);
-
+ /*
+ * No need for a manual TLB flush at this point, KVM has already done a
+ * flush if there were SPTEs pointing at the previous page.
+ */
out:
/*
* Do not pin apic access page in memory, the MMU notifier
@@ -7243,13 +7244,20 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
flags);
vcpu->arch.cr2 = native_read_cr2();
+ vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
+
+ vmx->idt_vectoring_info = 0;
vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx);
- if (unlikely(vmx->fail))
+ if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
vmx->exit_reason.full = 0xdead;
- else
- vmx->exit_reason.full = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ vmx->exit_reason.full = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
+ if (likely(!vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry))
+ vmx->idt_vectoring_info = vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD);
if ((u16)vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
is_nmi(vmx_get_intr_info(vcpu))) {
@@ -7258,6 +7266,7 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
}
+out:
guest_state_exit_irqoff();
}
@@ -7379,8 +7388,6 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
loadsegment(es, __USER_DS);
#endif
- vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~VMX_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;
-
pt_guest_exit(vmx);
kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
@@ -7397,17 +7404,12 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
}
- vmx->idt_vectoring_info = 0;
-
if (unlikely(vmx->fail))
return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
if (unlikely((u16)vmx->exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY))
kvm_machine_check();
- if (likely(!vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry))
- vmx->idt_vectoring_info = vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD);
-
trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
if (unlikely(vmx->exit_reason.failed_vmentry))
@@ -7751,8 +7753,16 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- /* xsaves_enabled is recomputed in vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(). */
- vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled = false;
+ /*
+ * XSAVES is effectively enabled if and only if XSAVE is also exposed
+ * to the guest. XSAVES depends on CR4.OSXSAVE, and CR4.OSXSAVE can be
+ * set if and only if XSAVE is supported.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+ guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
@@ -7760,7 +7770,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(vmx,
vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx));
- if (nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
@@ -7769,7 +7779,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
~(FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX);
- if (nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(vcpu);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) &&
@@ -8526,7 +8536,7 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
*/
vmx_setup_me_spte_mask();
- kvm_configure_mmu(enable_ept, 0, vmx_get_max_tdp_level(),
+ kvm_configure_mmu(enable_ept, 0, vmx_get_max_ept_level(),
ept_caps_to_lpage_level(vmx_capability.ept));
/*
@@ -8622,10 +8632,8 @@ static void __vmx_exit(void)
{
allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = false;
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
- RCU_INIT_POINTER(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss, NULL);
- synchronize_rcu();
-#endif
+ cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback(vmx_emergency_disable);
+
vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush();
}
@@ -8666,18 +8674,14 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
if (r)
goto err_l1d_flush;
- vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl();
-
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
pi_init_cpu(cpu);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
- rcu_assign_pointer(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss,
- crash_vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss);
-#endif
+ cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback(vmx_emergency_disable);
+
vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets();
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index 32384ba38499..c2130d2c8e24 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -374,7 +374,6 @@ struct kvm_vmx {
u64 *pid_table;
};
-bool nested_vmx_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
struct loaded_vmcs *buddy);
int allocate_vpid(void);
@@ -562,7 +561,7 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS | \
- SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES | \
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_XSAVES | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING | \
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML | \
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index c381770bcbf1..6c9c81e82e65 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "tss.h"
#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
#include "kvm_emulate.h"
+#include "mmu/page_track.h"
#include "x86.h"
#include "cpuid.h"
#include "pmu.h"
@@ -237,6 +238,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(enable_apicv);
u64 __read_mostly host_xss;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_xss);
+u64 __read_mostly host_arch_capabilities;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_arch_capabilities);
+
const struct _kvm_stats_desc kvm_vm_stats_desc[] = {
KVM_GENERIC_VM_STATS(),
STATS_DESC_COUNTER(VM, mmu_shadow_zapped),
@@ -1021,7 +1025,7 @@ void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != host_xcr0)
xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, vcpu->arch.xcr0);
- if (vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled &&
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != host_xss)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, vcpu->arch.ia32_xss);
}
@@ -1052,7 +1056,7 @@ void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != host_xcr0)
xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, host_xcr0);
- if (vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled &&
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != host_xss)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, host_xss);
}
@@ -1620,12 +1624,7 @@ static bool kvm_is_immutable_feature_msr(u32 msr)
static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
{
- u64 data = 0;
-
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) {
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, data);
- data &= KVM_SUPPORTED_ARCH_CAP;
- }
+ u64 data = host_arch_capabilities & KVM_SUPPORTED_ARCH_CAP;
/*
* If nx_huge_pages is enabled, KVM's shadow paging will ensure that
@@ -2631,7 +2630,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 l1_offset)
else
vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = l1_offset;
- static_call(kvm_x86_write_tsc_offset)(vcpu, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset);
+ static_call(kvm_x86_write_tsc_offset)(vcpu);
}
static void kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 l1_multiplier)
@@ -2647,8 +2646,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 l1_multipli
vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio = l1_multiplier;
if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control)
- static_call(kvm_x86_write_tsc_multiplier)(
- vcpu, vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
+ static_call(kvm_x86_write_tsc_multiplier)(vcpu);
}
static inline bool kvm_check_tsc_unstable(void)
@@ -4665,7 +4663,6 @@ static int kvm_x86_dev_get_attr(struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
return 0;
default:
return -ENXIO;
- break;
}
}
@@ -6532,7 +6529,7 @@ static void kvm_free_msr_filter(struct kvm_x86_msr_filter *msr_filter)
static int kvm_add_msr_filter(struct kvm_x86_msr_filter *msr_filter,
struct kvm_msr_filter_range *user_range)
{
- unsigned long *bitmap = NULL;
+ unsigned long *bitmap;
size_t bitmap_size;
if (!user_range->nmsrs)
@@ -8245,11 +8242,6 @@ static bool emulator_get_cpuid(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
return kvm_cpuid(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), eax, ebx, ecx, edx, exact_only);
}
-static bool emulator_guest_has_long_mode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
-{
- return guest_cpuid_has(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), X86_FEATURE_LM);
-}
-
static bool emulator_guest_has_movbe(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
return guest_cpuid_has(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), X86_FEATURE_MOVBE);
@@ -8351,7 +8343,6 @@ static const struct x86_emulate_ops emulate_ops = {
.fix_hypercall = emulator_fix_hypercall,
.intercept = emulator_intercept,
.get_cpuid = emulator_get_cpuid,
- .guest_has_long_mode = emulator_guest_has_long_mode,
.guest_has_movbe = emulator_guest_has_movbe,
.guest_has_fxsr = emulator_guest_has_fxsr,
.guest_has_rdpid = emulator_guest_has_rdpid,
@@ -9172,7 +9163,7 @@ static int kvmclock_cpu_down_prep(unsigned int cpu)
static void tsc_khz_changed(void *data)
{
struct cpufreq_freqs *freq = data;
- unsigned long khz = 0;
+ unsigned long khz;
WARN_ON_ONCE(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC));
@@ -9512,6 +9503,9 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
kvm_init_pmu_capability(ops->pmu_ops);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, host_arch_capabilities);
+
r = ops->hardware_setup();
if (r != 0)
goto out_mmu_exit;
@@ -11111,12 +11105,17 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
r = -EINTR;
goto out;
}
+
/*
- * It should be impossible for the hypervisor timer to be in
- * use before KVM has ever run the vCPU.
+ * Don't bother switching APIC timer emulation from the
+ * hypervisor timer to the software timer, the only way for the
+ * APIC timer to be active is if userspace stuffed vCPU state,
+ * i.e. put the vCPU into a nonsensical state. Only an INIT
+ * will transition the vCPU out of UNINITIALIZED (without more
+ * state stuffing from userspace), which will reset the local
+ * APIC and thus cancel the timer or drop the IRQ (if the timer
+ * already expired).
*/
- WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_lapic_hv_timer_in_use(vcpu));
-
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
@@ -11798,15 +11797,22 @@ static int sync_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
__set_regs(vcpu, &vcpu->run->s.regs.regs);
vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs &= ~KVM_SYNC_X86_REGS;
}
+
if (vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs & KVM_SYNC_X86_SREGS) {
- if (__set_sregs(vcpu, &vcpu->run->s.regs.sregs))
+ struct kvm_sregs sregs = vcpu->run->s.regs.sregs;
+
+ if (__set_sregs(vcpu, &sregs))
return -EINVAL;
+
vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs &= ~KVM_SYNC_X86_SREGS;
}
+
if (vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs & KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS) {
- if (kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(
- vcpu, &vcpu->run->s.regs.events))
+ struct kvm_vcpu_events events = vcpu->run->s.regs.events;
+
+ if (kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(vcpu, &events))
return -EINVAL;
+
vcpu->run->kvm_dirty_regs &= ~KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS;
}
@@ -12627,6 +12633,13 @@ int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *new,
enum kvm_mr_change change)
{
+ /*
+ * KVM doesn't support moving memslots when there are external page
+ * trackers attached to the VM, i.e. if KVMGT is in use.
+ */
+ if (change == KVM_MR_MOVE && kvm_page_track_has_external_user(kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (change == KVM_MR_CREATE || change == KVM_MR_MOVE) {
if ((new->base_gfn + new->npages - 1) > kvm_mmu_max_gfn())
return -EINVAL;
@@ -12772,7 +12785,7 @@ static void kvm_mmu_slot_apply_flags(struct kvm *kvm,
* See is_writable_pte() for more details (the case involving
* access-tracked SPTEs is particularly relevant).
*/
- kvm_arch_flush_remote_tlbs_memslot(kvm, new);
+ kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_memslot(kvm, new);
}
}
@@ -12781,6 +12794,9 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
const struct kvm_memory_slot *new,
enum kvm_mr_change change)
{
+ if (change == KVM_MR_DELETE)
+ kvm_page_track_delete_slot(kvm, old);
+
if (!kvm->arch.n_requested_mmu_pages &&
(change == KVM_MR_CREATE || change == KVM_MR_DELETE)) {
unsigned long nr_mmu_pages;
@@ -12797,17 +12813,6 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
kvm_arch_free_memslot(kvm, old);
}
-void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- kvm_mmu_zap_all(kvm);
-}
-
-void kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
-{
- kvm_page_track_flush_slot(kvm, slot);
-}
-
static inline bool kvm_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 82e3dafc5453..1e7be1f6ab29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ fastpath_t handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
extern u64 host_xcr0;
extern u64 host_xss;
+extern u64 host_arch_capabilities;
extern struct kvm_caps kvm_caps;