Merge tag 'kernel-hardening-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull kernel hardening updates from Kees Cook:

 - usercopy hardening expanded to check other allocation types (Matthew
   Wilcox, Yuanzheng Song)

 - arm64 stackleak behavioral improvements (Mark Rutland)

 - arm64 CFI code gen improvement (Sami Tolvanen)

 - LoadPin LSM block dev API adjustment (Christoph Hellwig)

 - Clang randstruct support (Bill Wendling, Kees Cook)

* tag 'kernel-hardening-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (34 commits)
  loadpin: stop using bdevname
  mm: usercopy: move the virt_addr_valid() below the is_vmalloc_addr()
  gcc-plugins: randstruct: Remove cast exception handling
  af_unix: Silence randstruct GCC plugin warning
  niu: Silence randstruct warnings
  big_keys: Use struct for internal payload
  gcc-plugins: Change all version strings match kernel
  randomize_kstack: Improve docs on requirements/rationale
  lkdtm/stackleak: fix CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n
  arm64: entry: use stackleak_erase_on_task_stack()
  stackleak: add on/off stack variants
  lkdtm/stackleak: check stack boundaries
  lkdtm/stackleak: prevent unexpected stack usage
  lkdtm/stackleak: rework boundary management
  lkdtm/stackleak: avoid spurious failure
  stackleak: rework poison scanning
  stackleak: rework stack high bound handling
  stackleak: clarify variable names
  stackleak: rework stack low bound handling
  stackleak: remove redundant check
  ...

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 5d5c7bb50ce9..ffe3b3a087fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static inline bool pti_kernel_image_global_ok(void)
 	 * cases where RANDSTRUCT is in use to help keep the layout a
 	 * secret.
 	 */
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT))
 		return false;
 
 	return true;