xen: Revert commits da72ff5bfcb0 and 72a9b186292d

Recent discussion (http://marc.info/?l=xen-devel&m=149192184523741)
established that commit 72a9b186292d ("xen: Remove event channel
notification through Xen PCI platform device") (and thus commit
da72ff5bfcb0 ("partially revert "xen: Remove event channel
notification through Xen PCI platform device"")) are unnecessary and,
in fact, prevent HVM guests from booting on Xen releases prior to 4.0

Therefore we revert both of those commits.

The summary of that discussion is below:

  Here is the brief summary of the current situation:

  Before the offending commit (72a9b186292):

  1) INTx does not work because of the reset_watches path.
  2) The reset_watches path is only taken if you have Xen > 4.0
  3) The Linux Kernel by default will use vector inject if the hypervisor
     support. So even INTx does not work no body running the kernel with
     Xen > 4.0 would notice. Unless he explicitly disabled this feature
     either in the kernel or in Xen (and this can only be disabled by
     modifying the code, not user-supported way to do it).

  After the offending commit (+ partial revert):

  1) INTx is no longer support for HVM (only for PV guests).
  2) Any HVM guest The kernel will not boot on Xen < 4.0 which does
     not have vector injection support. Since the only other mode
     supported is INTx which.

  So based on this summary, I think before commit (72a9b186292) we were
  in much better position from a user point of view.

Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

1 files changed, 8 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
index 72df54a481d6..078c512b8720 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
 #include "mmu.h"
 #include "smp.h"
 
+__read_mostly int xen_have_vector_callback;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_have_vector_callback);
+
 void __ref xen_hvm_init_shared_info(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
@@ -123,7 +126,7 @@ static int xen_cpu_up_prepare_hvm(unsigned int cpu)
 		per_cpu(xen_vcpu_id, cpu) = cpu;
 	xen_vcpu_setup(cpu);
 
-	if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock))
+	if (xen_have_vector_callback && xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock))
 		xen_setup_timer(cpu);
 
 	rc = xen_smp_intr_init(cpu);
@@ -139,7 +142,7 @@ static int xen_cpu_dead_hvm(unsigned int cpu)
 {
 	xen_smp_intr_free(cpu);
 
-	if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock))
+	if (xen_have_vector_callback && xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock))
 		xen_teardown_timer(cpu);
 
        return 0;
@@ -156,7 +159,8 @@ static void __init xen_hvm_guest_init(void)
 
 	xen_panic_handler_init();
 
-	BUG_ON(!xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector));
+	if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector))
+		xen_have_vector_callback = 1;
 
 	xen_hvm_smp_init();
 	WARN_ON(xen_cpuhp_setup(xen_cpu_up_prepare_hvm, xen_cpu_dead_hvm));
@@ -189,7 +193,7 @@ bool xen_hvm_need_lapic(void)
 		return false;
 	if (!xen_hvm_domain())
 		return false;
-	if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs))
+	if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs) && xen_have_vector_callback)
 		return false;
 	return true;
 }