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authorHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>2015-06-01 09:53:06 +0200
committerHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>2015-06-03 04:51:24 +0200
commitb7c89d9e2fef1c9f4c9d8bacf0c1459e30561289 (patch)
tree494e3cf601a2fbfd3c880d28d30dab51d5888e50 /arch/x86
parentcrypto: nx - prevent nx 842 load if no hw driver (diff)
downloadlinux-b7c89d9e2fef1c9f4c9d8bacf0c1459e30561289.tar.xz
linux-b7c89d9e2fef1c9f4c9d8bacf0c1459e30561289.zip
crypto: aesni - Convert rfc4106 to new AEAD interface
This patch converts the low-level __gcm-aes-aesni algorithm to the new AEAD interface. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c250
1 files changed, 83 insertions, 167 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
index 5660a183420c..ebcb981d241c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
@@ -44,13 +44,18 @@
#endif
+#define AESNI_ALIGN 16
+#define AES_BLOCK_MASK (~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1))
+#define RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE 16
+
/* This data is stored at the end of the crypto_tfm struct.
* It's a type of per "session" data storage location.
* This needs to be 16 byte aligned.
*/
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx {
- u8 hash_subkey[16];
- struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key_expanded;
+ u8 hash_subkey[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
+ struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key_expanded
+ __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
u8 nonce[4];
};
@@ -65,10 +70,6 @@ struct aesni_hash_subkey_req_data {
struct scatterlist sg;
};
-#define AESNI_ALIGN (16)
-#define AES_BLOCK_MASK (~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1))
-#define RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE 16
-
struct aesni_lrw_ctx {
struct lrw_table_ctx lrw_table;
u8 raw_aes_ctx[sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx) + AESNI_ALIGN - 1];
@@ -282,10 +283,11 @@ static void (*aesni_gcm_dec_tfm)(void *ctx, u8 *out,
static inline struct
aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
{
- return
- (struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *)
- PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)
- crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)), AESNI_ALIGN);
+ unsigned long align = AESNI_ALIGN;
+
+ if (align <= crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment())
+ align = 1;
+ return PTR_ALIGN(crypto_aead_ctx(tfm), align);
}
#endif
@@ -838,8 +840,6 @@ rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *key, unsigned int key_len)
if (IS_ERR(ctr_tfm))
return PTR_ERR(ctr_tfm);
- crypto_ablkcipher_clear_flags(ctr_tfm, ~0);
-
ret = crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(ctr_tfm, key, key_len);
if (ret)
goto out_free_ablkcipher;
@@ -888,56 +888,20 @@ out_free_ablkcipher:
static int common_rfc4106_set_key(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
- int ret = 0;
- struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(aead);
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(aead);
- u8 *new_key_align, *new_key_mem = NULL;
if (key_len < 4) {
- crypto_tfm_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+ crypto_aead_set_flags(aead, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
return -EINVAL;
}
/*Account for 4 byte nonce at the end.*/
key_len -= 4;
- if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
- key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256) {
- crypto_tfm_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
memcpy(ctx->nonce, key + key_len, sizeof(ctx->nonce));
- /*This must be on a 16 byte boundary!*/
- if ((unsigned long)(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_enc[0])) % AESNI_ALIGN)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if ((unsigned long)key % AESNI_ALIGN) {
- /*key is not aligned: use an auxuliar aligned pointer*/
- new_key_mem = kmalloc(key_len+AESNI_ALIGN, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!new_key_mem)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- new_key_align = PTR_ALIGN(new_key_mem, AESNI_ALIGN);
- memcpy(new_key_align, key, key_len);
- key = new_key_align;
- }
- if (!irq_fpu_usable())
- ret = crypto_aes_expand_key(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded),
- key, key_len);
- else {
- kernel_fpu_begin();
- ret = aesni_set_key(&(ctx->aes_key_expanded), key, key_len);
- kernel_fpu_end();
- }
- /*This must be on a 16 byte boundary!*/
- if ((unsigned long)(&(ctx->hash_subkey[0])) % AESNI_ALIGN) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto exit;
- }
- ret = rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(ctx->hash_subkey, key, key_len);
-exit:
- kfree(new_key_mem);
- return ret;
+ return aes_set_key_common(crypto_aead_tfm(aead),
+ &ctx->aes_key_expanded, key, key_len) ?:
+ rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(ctx->hash_subkey, key, key_len);
}
static int rfc4106_set_key(struct crypto_aead *parent, const u8 *key,
@@ -960,7 +924,7 @@ static int common_rfc4106_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *aead,
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
- crypto_aead_crt(aead)->authsize = authsize;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -975,20 +939,17 @@ static int rfc4106_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *parent,
return crypto_aead_setauthsize(&cryptd_tfm->base, authsize);
}
-static int __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
- u32 key_len = ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_length;
void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
- u8 iv_tab[16+AESNI_ALIGN];
- u8* iv = (u8 *) PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)iv_tab, AESNI_ALIGN);
+ u8 iv[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
- struct scatter_walk assoc_sg_walk;
struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk;
unsigned int i;
@@ -997,12 +958,6 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
/* to 8 or 12 bytes */
if (unlikely(req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12))
return -EINVAL;
- if (unlikely(auth_tag_len != 8 && auth_tag_len != 12 && auth_tag_len != 16))
- return -EINVAL;
- if (unlikely(key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
- key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
- key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256))
- return -EINVAL;
/* IV below built */
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
@@ -1011,55 +966,57 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
*(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i];
*((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter;
- if ((sg_is_last(req->src)) && (sg_is_last(req->assoc))) {
+ if (sg_is_last(req->src) &&
+ req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE &&
+ sg_is_last(req->dst) &&
+ req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE) {
one_entry_in_sg = 1;
scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
- scatterwalk_start(&assoc_sg_walk, req->assoc);
- src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
- assoc = scatterwalk_map(&assoc_sg_walk);
+ assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
+ src = assoc + req->assoclen;
dst = src;
if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
- dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk);
+ dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen;
}
-
} else {
/* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
- src = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen,
+ assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen,
GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (unlikely(!src))
+ if (unlikely(!assoc))
return -ENOMEM;
- assoc = (src + req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len);
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(src, req->src, 0, req->cryptlen, 0);
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->assoc, 0,
- req->assoclen, 0);
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0,
+ req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
+ src = assoc + req->assoclen;
dst = src;
}
+ kernel_fpu_begin();
aesni_gcm_enc_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, (unsigned long)req->cryptlen, iv,
ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, (unsigned long)req->assoclen, dst
+ ((unsigned long)req->cryptlen), auth_tag_len);
+ kernel_fpu_end();
/* The authTag (aka the Integrity Check Value) needs to be written
* back to the packet. */
if (one_entry_in_sg) {
if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
- scatterwalk_unmap(dst);
- scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 0, 0);
+ scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen);
+ scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst->length);
+ scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0);
}
- scatterwalk_unmap(src);
scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
- scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, 0);
- scatterwalk_done(&assoc_sg_walk, 0, 0);
+ scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, req->src->length);
+ scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0);
} else {
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, 0,
- req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len, 1);
- kfree(src);
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen,
+ req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len, 1);
+ kfree(assoc);
}
return 0;
}
-static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
@@ -1068,26 +1025,16 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
int retval = 0;
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
- u32 key_len = ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_length;
void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
- u8 iv_and_authTag[32+AESNI_ALIGN];
- u8 *iv = (u8 *) PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)iv_and_authTag, AESNI_ALIGN);
- u8 *authTag = iv + 16;
+ u8 iv[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN)));
+ u8 authTag[16];
struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
- struct scatter_walk assoc_sg_walk;
struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk;
unsigned int i;
- if (unlikely((req->cryptlen < auth_tag_len) ||
- (req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12)))
+ if (unlikely(req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12))
return -EINVAL;
- if (unlikely(auth_tag_len != 8 && auth_tag_len != 12 && auth_tag_len != 16))
- return -EINVAL;
- if (unlikely(key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
- key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
- key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256))
- return -EINVAL;
/* Assuming we are supporting rfc4106 64-bit extended */
/* sequence numbers We need to have the AAD length */
@@ -1101,33 +1048,36 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
*(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i];
*((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter;
- if ((sg_is_last(req->src)) && (sg_is_last(req->assoc))) {
+ if (sg_is_last(req->src) &&
+ req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE &&
+ sg_is_last(req->dst) &&
+ req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE) {
one_entry_in_sg = 1;
scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
- scatterwalk_start(&assoc_sg_walk, req->assoc);
- src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
- assoc = scatterwalk_map(&assoc_sg_walk);
+ assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
+ src = assoc + req->assoclen;
dst = src;
if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
- dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk);
+ dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen;
}
} else {
/* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
- src = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!src)
+ assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!assoc)
return -ENOMEM;
- assoc = (src + req->cryptlen);
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(src, req->src, 0, req->cryptlen, 0);
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->assoc, 0,
- req->assoclen, 0);
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0,
+ req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
+ src = assoc + req->assoclen;
dst = src;
}
+ kernel_fpu_begin();
aesni_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, tempCipherLen, iv,
ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, (unsigned long)req->assoclen,
authTag, auth_tag_len);
+ kernel_fpu_end();
/* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */
retval = crypto_memneq(src + tempCipherLen, authTag, auth_tag_len) ?
@@ -1135,16 +1085,17 @@ static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
if (one_entry_in_sg) {
if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
- scatterwalk_unmap(dst);
- scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 0, 0);
+ scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen);
+ scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst->length);
+ scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0);
}
- scatterwalk_unmap(src);
scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
- scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, 0);
- scatterwalk_done(&assoc_sg_walk, 0, 0);
+ scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, req->src->length);
+ scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0);
} else {
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, 0, tempCipherLen, 1);
- kfree(src);
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen,
+ tempCipherLen, 1);
+ kfree(assoc);
}
return retval;
}
@@ -1188,36 +1139,6 @@ static int rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
return crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
}
-
-static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
-{
- int ret;
-
- if (unlikely(!irq_fpu_usable())) {
- WARN_ONCE(1, "__gcm-aes-aesni alg used in invalid context");
- ret = -EINVAL;
- } else {
- kernel_fpu_begin();
- ret = __driver_rfc4106_encrypt(req);
- kernel_fpu_end();
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
-{
- int ret;
-
- if (unlikely(!irq_fpu_usable())) {
- WARN_ONCE(1, "__gcm-aes-aesni alg used in invalid context");
- ret = -EINVAL;
- } else {
- kernel_fpu_begin();
- ret = __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(req);
- kernel_fpu_end();
- }
- return ret;
-}
#endif
static struct crypto_alg aesni_algs[] = { {
@@ -1389,27 +1310,6 @@ static struct crypto_alg aesni_algs[] = { {
.geniv = "chainiv",
},
},
-}, {
- .cra_name = "__gcm-aes-aesni",
- .cra_driver_name = "__driver-gcm-aes-aesni",
- .cra_priority = 0,
- .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
- .cra_blocksize = 1,
- .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx) +
- AESNI_ALIGN,
- .cra_alignmask = 0,
- .cra_type = &crypto_aead_type,
- .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
- .cra_u = {
- .aead = {
- .setkey = common_rfc4106_set_key,
- .setauthsize = common_rfc4106_set_authsize,
- .encrypt = helper_rfc4106_encrypt,
- .decrypt = helper_rfc4106_decrypt,
- .ivsize = 8,
- .maxauthsize = 16,
- },
- },
#endif
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC)
}, {
@@ -1526,6 +1426,22 @@ static struct crypto_alg aesni_algs[] = { {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static struct aead_alg aesni_aead_algs[] = { {
+ .setkey = common_rfc4106_set_key,
+ .setauthsize = common_rfc4106_set_authsize,
+ .encrypt = helper_rfc4106_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = helper_rfc4106_decrypt,
+ .ivsize = 8,
+ .maxauthsize = 16,
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "__gcm-aes-aesni",
+ .cra_driver_name = "__driver-gcm-aes-aesni",
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
+ .cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx),
+ .cra_alignmask = AESNI_ALIGN - 1,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ },
+}, {
.init = rfc4106_init,
.exit = rfc4106_exit,
.setkey = rfc4106_set_key,