diff options
author | Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> | 2017-07-24 12:28:16 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2017-08-04 03:27:23 +0200 |
commit | 537c1445ab0b1e33ca338b669e347652c45f4e8c (patch) | |
tree | 0d84da1538a5ef83cf48199ddd97bdb9e3871d8d /arch | |
parent | crypto: arm64/aes-bs - implement non-SIMD fallback for AES-CTR (diff) | |
download | linux-537c1445ab0b1e33ca338b669e347652c45f4e8c.tar.xz linux-537c1445ab0b1e33ca338b669e347652c45f4e8c.zip |
crypto: arm64/gcm - implement native driver using v8 Crypto Extensions
Currently, the AES-GCM implementation for arm64 systems that support the
ARMv8 Crypto Extensions is based on the generic GCM module, which combines
the AES-CTR implementation using AES instructions with the PMULL based
GHASH driver. This is suboptimal, given the fact that the input data needs
to be loaded twice, once for the encryption and again for the MAC
calculation.
On Cortex-A57 (r1p2) and other recent cores that implement micro-op fusing
for the AES instructions, AES executes at less than 1 cycle per byte, which
means that any cycles wasted on loading the data twice hurt even more.
So implement a new GCM driver that combines the AES and PMULL instructions
at the block level. This improves performance on Cortex-A57 by ~37% (from
3.5 cpb to 2.6 cpb)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S | 175 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c | 438 |
3 files changed, 591 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig index f9e264b83366..7ca54a76f6b9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig @@ -29,10 +29,12 @@ config CRYPTO_SHA2_ARM64_CE select CRYPTO_SHA256_ARM64 config CRYPTO_GHASH_ARM64_CE - tristate "GHASH (for GCM chaining mode) using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions" + tristate "GHASH/AES-GCM using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions" depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON select CRYPTO_HASH select CRYPTO_GF128MUL + select CRYPTO_AES + select CRYPTO_AES_ARM64 config CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_ARM64_CE tristate "CRCT10DIF digest algorithm using PMULL instructions" diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S index f0bb9f0b524f..cb22459eba85 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S @@ -77,3 +77,178 @@ CPU_LE( rev64 T1.16b, T1.16b ) st1 {XL.2d}, [x1] ret ENDPROC(pmull_ghash_update) + + KS .req v8 + CTR .req v9 + INP .req v10 + + .macro load_round_keys, rounds, rk + cmp \rounds, #12 + blo 2222f /* 128 bits */ + beq 1111f /* 192 bits */ + ld1 {v17.4s-v18.4s}, [\rk], #32 +1111: ld1 {v19.4s-v20.4s}, [\rk], #32 +2222: ld1 {v21.4s-v24.4s}, [\rk], #64 + ld1 {v25.4s-v28.4s}, [\rk], #64 + ld1 {v29.4s-v31.4s}, [\rk] + .endm + + .macro enc_round, state, key + aese \state\().16b, \key\().16b + aesmc \state\().16b, \state\().16b + .endm + + .macro enc_block, state, rounds + cmp \rounds, #12 + b.lo 2222f /* 128 bits */ + b.eq 1111f /* 192 bits */ + enc_round \state, v17 + enc_round \state, v18 +1111: enc_round \state, v19 + enc_round \state, v20 +2222: .irp key, v21, v22, v23, v24, v25, v26, v27, v28, v29 + enc_round \state, \key + .endr + aese \state\().16b, v30.16b + eor \state\().16b, \state\().16b, v31.16b + .endm + + .macro pmull_gcm_do_crypt, enc + ld1 {SHASH.2d}, [x4] + ld1 {XL.2d}, [x1] + ldr x8, [x5, #8] // load lower counter + + movi MASK.16b, #0xe1 + ext SHASH2.16b, SHASH.16b, SHASH.16b, #8 +CPU_LE( rev x8, x8 ) + shl MASK.2d, MASK.2d, #57 + eor SHASH2.16b, SHASH2.16b, SHASH.16b + + .if \enc == 1 + ld1 {KS.16b}, [x7] + .endif + +0: ld1 {CTR.8b}, [x5] // load upper counter + ld1 {INP.16b}, [x3], #16 + rev x9, x8 + add x8, x8, #1 + sub w0, w0, #1 + ins CTR.d[1], x9 // set lower counter + + .if \enc == 1 + eor INP.16b, INP.16b, KS.16b // encrypt input + st1 {INP.16b}, [x2], #16 + .endif + + rev64 T1.16b, INP.16b + + cmp w6, #12 + b.ge 2f // AES-192/256? + +1: enc_round CTR, v21 + + ext T2.16b, XL.16b, XL.16b, #8 + ext IN1.16b, T1.16b, T1.16b, #8 + + enc_round CTR, v22 + + eor T1.16b, T1.16b, T2.16b + eor XL.16b, XL.16b, IN1.16b + + enc_round CTR, v23 + + pmull2 XH.1q, SHASH.2d, XL.2d // a1 * b1 + eor T1.16b, T1.16b, XL.16b + + enc_round CTR, v24 + + pmull XL.1q, SHASH.1d, XL.1d // a0 * b0 + pmull XM.1q, SHASH2.1d, T1.1d // (a1 + a0)(b1 + b0) + + enc_round CTR, v25 + + ext T1.16b, XL.16b, XH.16b, #8 + eor T2.16b, XL.16b, XH.16b + eor XM.16b, XM.16b, T1.16b + + enc_round CTR, v26 + + eor XM.16b, XM.16b, T2.16b + pmull T2.1q, XL.1d, MASK.1d + + enc_round CTR, v27 + + mov XH.d[0], XM.d[1] + mov XM.d[1], XL.d[0] + + enc_round CTR, v28 + + eor XL.16b, XM.16b, T2.16b + + enc_round CTR, v29 + + ext T2.16b, XL.16b, XL.16b, #8 + + aese CTR.16b, v30.16b + + pmull XL.1q, XL.1d, MASK.1d + eor T2.16b, T2.16b, XH.16b + + eor KS.16b, CTR.16b, v31.16b + + eor XL.16b, XL.16b, T2.16b + + .if \enc == 0 + eor INP.16b, INP.16b, KS.16b + st1 {INP.16b}, [x2], #16 + .endif + + cbnz w0, 0b + +CPU_LE( rev x8, x8 ) + st1 {XL.2d}, [x1] + str x8, [x5, #8] // store lower counter + + .if \enc == 1 + st1 {KS.16b}, [x7] + .endif + + ret + +2: b.eq 3f // AES-192? + enc_round CTR, v17 + enc_round CTR, v18 +3: enc_round CTR, v19 + enc_round CTR, v20 + b 1b + .endm + + /* + * void pmull_gcm_encrypt(int blocks, u64 dg[], u8 dst[], const u8 src[], + * struct ghash_key const *k, u8 ctr[], + * int rounds, u8 ks[]) + */ +ENTRY(pmull_gcm_encrypt) + pmull_gcm_do_crypt 1 +ENDPROC(pmull_gcm_encrypt) + + /* + * void pmull_gcm_decrypt(int blocks, u64 dg[], u8 dst[], const u8 src[], + * struct ghash_key const *k, u8 ctr[], + * int rounds) + */ +ENTRY(pmull_gcm_decrypt) + pmull_gcm_do_crypt 0 +ENDPROC(pmull_gcm_decrypt) + + /* + * void pmull_gcm_encrypt_block(u8 dst[], u8 src[], u8 rk[], int rounds) + */ +ENTRY(pmull_gcm_encrypt_block) + cbz x2, 0f + load_round_keys w3, x2 +0: ld1 {v0.16b}, [x1] + enc_block v0, w3 + st1 {v0.16b}, [x0] + ret +ENDPROC(pmull_gcm_encrypt_block) diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c index 30221ef56e70..ee6aaac05905 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c @@ -11,18 +11,25 @@ #include <asm/neon.h> #include <asm/simd.h> #include <asm/unaligned.h> +#include <crypto/aes.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> +#include <crypto/b128ops.h> #include <crypto/gf128mul.h> +#include <crypto/internal/aead.h> #include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> +#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h> #include <linux/cpufeature.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> #include <linux/module.h> -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("GHASH secure hash using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("GHASH and AES-GCM using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); #define GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE 16 #define GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE 16 +#define GCM_IV_SIZE 12 struct ghash_key { u64 a; @@ -36,9 +43,27 @@ struct ghash_desc_ctx { u32 count; }; +struct gcm_aes_ctx { + struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_key; + struct ghash_key ghash_key; +}; + asmlinkage void pmull_ghash_update(int blocks, u64 dg[], const char *src, struct ghash_key const *k, const char *head); +asmlinkage void pmull_gcm_encrypt(int blocks, u64 dg[], u8 dst[], + const u8 src[], struct ghash_key const *k, + u8 ctr[], int rounds, u8 ks[]); + +asmlinkage void pmull_gcm_decrypt(int blocks, u64 dg[], u8 dst[], + const u8 src[], struct ghash_key const *k, + u8 ctr[], int rounds); + +asmlinkage void pmull_gcm_encrypt_block(u8 dst[], u8 const src[], + u32 const rk[], int rounds); + +asmlinkage void __aes_arm64_encrypt(u32 *rk, u8 *out, const u8 *in, int rounds); + static int ghash_init(struct shash_desc *desc) { struct ghash_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); @@ -130,17 +155,11 @@ static int ghash_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst) return 0; } -static int ghash_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, - const u8 *inkey, unsigned int keylen) +static int __ghash_setkey(struct ghash_key *key, + const u8 *inkey, unsigned int keylen) { - struct ghash_key *key = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm); u64 a, b; - if (keylen != GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE) { - crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN); - return -EINVAL; - } - /* needed for the fallback */ memcpy(&key->k, inkey, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE); @@ -157,32 +176,401 @@ static int ghash_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, return 0; } +static int ghash_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, + const u8 *inkey, unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct ghash_key *key = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm); + + if (keylen != GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE) { + crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return __ghash_setkey(key, inkey, keylen); +} + static struct shash_alg ghash_alg = { - .digestsize = GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE, - .init = ghash_init, - .update = ghash_update, - .final = ghash_final, - .setkey = ghash_setkey, - .descsize = sizeof(struct ghash_desc_ctx), - .base = { - .cra_name = "ghash", - .cra_driver_name = "ghash-ce", - .cra_priority = 200, - .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH, - .cra_blocksize = GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE, - .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct ghash_key), - .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - }, + .base.cra_name = "ghash", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ghash-ce", + .base.cra_priority = 200, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH, + .base.cra_blocksize = GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct ghash_key), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .digestsize = GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = ghash_init, + .update = ghash_update, + .final = ghash_final, + .setkey = ghash_setkey, + .descsize = sizeof(struct ghash_desc_ctx), +}; + +static int num_rounds(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx) +{ + /* + * # of rounds specified by AES: + * 128 bit key 10 rounds + * 192 bit key 12 rounds + * 256 bit key 14 rounds + * => n byte key => 6 + (n/4) rounds + */ + return 6 + ctx->key_length / 4; +} + +static int gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *inkey, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct gcm_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); + u8 key[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + int ret; + + ret = crypto_aes_expand_key(&ctx->aes_key, inkey, keylen); + if (ret) { + tfm->base.crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN; + return -EINVAL; + } + + __aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->aes_key.key_enc, key, (u8[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]){}, + num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key)); + + return __ghash_setkey(&ctx->ghash_key, key, sizeof(key)); +} + +static int gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize) +{ + switch (authsize) { + case 4: + case 8: + case 12 ... 16: + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + return 0; +} + +static void gcm_update_mac(u64 dg[], const u8 *src, int count, u8 buf[], + int *buf_count, struct gcm_aes_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (*buf_count > 0) { + int buf_added = min(count, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - *buf_count); + + memcpy(&buf[*buf_count], src, buf_added); + + *buf_count += buf_added; + src += buf_added; + count -= buf_added; + } + + if (count >= GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE || *buf_count == GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE) { + int blocks = count / GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE; + + ghash_do_update(blocks, dg, src, &ctx->ghash_key, + *buf_count ? buf : NULL); + + src += blocks * GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE; + count %= GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE; + *buf_count = 0; + } + + if (count > 0) { + memcpy(buf, src, count); + *buf_count = count; + } +} + +static void gcm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u64 dg[]) +{ + struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); + struct gcm_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead); + u8 buf[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + struct scatter_walk walk; + u32 len = req->assoclen; + int buf_count = 0; + + scatterwalk_start(&walk, req->src); + + do { + u32 n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len); + u8 *p; + + if (!n) { + scatterwalk_start(&walk, sg_next(walk.sg)); + n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len); + } + p = scatterwalk_map(&walk); + + gcm_update_mac(dg, p, n, buf, &buf_count, ctx); + len -= n; + + scatterwalk_unmap(p); + scatterwalk_advance(&walk, n); + scatterwalk_done(&walk, 0, len); + } while (len); + + if (buf_count) { + memset(&buf[buf_count], 0, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - buf_count); + ghash_do_update(1, dg, buf, &ctx->ghash_key, NULL); + } +} + +static void gcm_final(struct aead_request *req, struct gcm_aes_ctx *ctx, + u64 dg[], u8 tag[], int cryptlen) +{ + u8 mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u128 lengths; + + lengths.a = cpu_to_be64(req->assoclen * 8); + lengths.b = cpu_to_be64(cryptlen * 8); + + ghash_do_update(1, dg, (void *)&lengths, &ctx->ghash_key, NULL); + + put_unaligned_be64(dg[1], mac); + put_unaligned_be64(dg[0], mac + 8); + + crypto_xor(tag, mac, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); +} + +static int gcm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); + struct gcm_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 ks[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 tag[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u64 dg[2] = {}; + int err; + + if (req->assoclen) + gcm_calculate_auth_mac(req, dg); + + memcpy(iv, req->iv, GCM_IV_SIZE); + put_unaligned_be32(1, iv + GCM_IV_SIZE); + + if (likely(may_use_simd())) { + kernel_neon_begin(); + + pmull_gcm_encrypt_block(tag, iv, ctx->aes_key.key_enc, + num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key)); + put_unaligned_be32(2, iv + GCM_IV_SIZE); + pmull_gcm_encrypt_block(ks, iv, NULL, + num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key)); + put_unaligned_be32(3, iv + GCM_IV_SIZE); + + err = skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(&walk, req, true); + + while (walk.nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + int blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + + pmull_gcm_encrypt(blocks, dg, walk.dst.virt.addr, + walk.src.virt.addr, &ctx->ghash_key, + iv, num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key), ks); + + err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, + walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + kernel_neon_end(); + } else { + __aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->aes_key.key_enc, tag, iv, + num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key)); + put_unaligned_be32(2, iv + GCM_IV_SIZE); + + err = skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(&walk, req, true); + + while (walk.nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + int blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr; + u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr; + + do { + __aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->aes_key.key_enc, + ks, iv, + num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key)); + crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, ks, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + crypto_inc(iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + dst += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + src += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } while (--blocks > 0); + + ghash_do_update(walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE, dg, + walk.dst.virt.addr, &ctx->ghash_key, + NULL); + + err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, + walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + if (walk.nbytes) + __aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->aes_key.key_enc, ks, iv, + num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key)); + } + + /* handle the tail */ + if (walk.nbytes) { + u8 buf[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + crypto_xor_cpy(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, ks, + walk.nbytes); + + memcpy(buf, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.nbytes); + memset(buf + walk.nbytes, 0, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - walk.nbytes); + ghash_do_update(1, dg, buf, &ctx->ghash_key, NULL); + + err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0); + } + + if (err) + return err; + + gcm_final(req, ctx, dg, tag, req->cryptlen); + + /* copy authtag to end of dst */ + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(tag, req->dst, req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, + crypto_aead_authsize(aead), 1); + + return 0; +} + +static int gcm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); + struct gcm_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead); + unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(aead); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 tag[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 buf[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u64 dg[2] = {}; + int err; + + if (req->assoclen) + gcm_calculate_auth_mac(req, dg); + + memcpy(iv, req->iv, GCM_IV_SIZE); + put_unaligned_be32(1, iv + GCM_IV_SIZE); + + if (likely(may_use_simd())) { + kernel_neon_begin(); + + pmull_gcm_encrypt_block(tag, iv, ctx->aes_key.key_enc, + num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key)); + put_unaligned_be32(2, iv + GCM_IV_SIZE); + + err = skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, true); + + while (walk.nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + int blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + + pmull_gcm_decrypt(blocks, dg, walk.dst.virt.addr, + walk.src.virt.addr, &ctx->ghash_key, + iv, num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key)); + + err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, + walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + if (walk.nbytes) + pmull_gcm_encrypt_block(iv, iv, NULL, + num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key)); + + kernel_neon_end(); + } else { + __aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->aes_key.key_enc, tag, iv, + num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key)); + put_unaligned_be32(2, iv + GCM_IV_SIZE); + + err = skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, true); + + while (walk.nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + int blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr; + u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr; + + ghash_do_update(blocks, dg, walk.src.virt.addr, + &ctx->ghash_key, NULL); + + do { + __aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->aes_key.key_enc, + buf, iv, + num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key)); + crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + crypto_inc(iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + dst += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + src += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } while (--blocks > 0); + + err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, + walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + if (walk.nbytes) + __aes_arm64_encrypt(ctx->aes_key.key_enc, iv, iv, + num_rounds(&ctx->aes_key)); + } + + /* handle the tail */ + if (walk.nbytes) { + memcpy(buf, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.nbytes); + memset(buf + walk.nbytes, 0, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - walk.nbytes); + ghash_do_update(1, dg, buf, &ctx->ghash_key, NULL); + + crypto_xor_cpy(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, iv, + walk.nbytes); + + err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0); + } + + if (err) + return err; + + gcm_final(req, ctx, dg, tag, req->cryptlen - authsize); + + /* compare calculated auth tag with the stored one */ + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(buf, req->src, + req->assoclen + req->cryptlen - authsize, + authsize, 0); + + if (crypto_memneq(tag, buf, authsize)) + return -EBADMSG; + return 0; +} + +static struct aead_alg gcm_aes_alg = { + .ivsize = GCM_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = gcm_setkey, + .setauthsize = gcm_setauthsize, + .encrypt = gcm_encrypt, + .decrypt = gcm_decrypt, + + .base.cra_name = "gcm(aes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "gcm-aes-ce", + .base.cra_priority = 300, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct gcm_aes_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, }; static int __init ghash_ce_mod_init(void) { - return crypto_register_shash(&ghash_alg); + int ret; + + ret = crypto_register_aead(&gcm_aes_alg); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = crypto_register_shash(&ghash_alg); + if (ret) + crypto_unregister_aead(&gcm_aes_alg); + return ret; } static void __exit ghash_ce_mod_exit(void) { crypto_unregister_shash(&ghash_alg); + crypto_unregister_aead(&gcm_aes_alg); } module_cpu_feature_match(PMULL, ghash_ce_mod_init); |